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PREFACE 
This study is concerned with the formulation phase of state 
budgeting, a stage of the budget system about which there is very 
little published material* It deals with the organizations, 
procedures, and personnel associated with the framing of the budgets 
te be submitted to the legislature for authorization. The approach to 
the subject is primarily from the standpoint of governmental 
administration and political-administrative relationships, although 
it has been necessary also to draw upon some material relating to 
historical, economic, and accounting aspects of budgeting. 
Three countries, comprising sixty-six separate state and 
provincial governments, are covered* It would have been possible, 
and in some respects simpler, to have concentrated upon only one 
country er even one state and te have made a very detailed examination 
of its budgetary arrangements* Given the present state of the 
literature about budget preparation, however, a broad comparative 
survey was felt to be of more immediate value, even though it was 
recognized that this would inevitably necessitate omission of some 
of the minutiae of various states' budgetary practices* Only a few 
states have been dealt with in a detailed way, but supplementary 
examples have been taken from as wide a range of systems as possible 
in order to bring out comparisons and contrasts and to indicate the 
variety that exists in the treatment of particular facets ®f fiscal 
arrangements• 
(iv) 
Chapters 1-3 are concerned with the nature of the budget and 
the budgetary process and with the ways in which budgetary machinery 
has evolved in the parliamentary and congressional systems of 
government* The influence of British practice is examined, as is 
the role of executive budgeting in the American administrative 
re-organization movement* In chapter 4 attention is paid to the 
form and content of state budget documents since these are matters 
that markedly affect not only the use which may be made of the budget 
papers by various groups but also the effective eperatiea of subsequent 
phases of the budget system, particularly these of legislative 
authorization and execution* 
Chapter 5 looks in detail at the procedures followed in a number 
of states in formulating their budgets, including capital works 
requirements and the estimating of likely revenues* This latter is 
a feature of budgeting which exhibits serious weaknesses in all three 
countries, budget documents often being at best simply expenditure 
plans* In the course of this discussiek examples are given of the 
methods used in some states that exercise more care than is usual 
in estimating revenue* 
When examining the question of budget agency location within the 
overall administrative framework (chapter 6), the concentration is on 
America, partly because it is there that the greatest organizational 
variety is to be found, and partly because location is relevant to 
executive strength and co-ordination of governmental activities, both 
of which are matters of major significance in the American state 
governmental context* Discussion of the roles of budget agencies and 
(v) 
analysts is linked with location in this chapter, but also extends 
to cover the concepts held about the nature of budgeting, which are 
examined in terms of "control" versus "management" orientation* 
Legislative influence is examined in chapter 7 only insofar as it 
touches directly or indirectly oA budget preparation. 
Central to budget formulation is the work of the individual 
budget analyst* Organizational and procedural questions are 
important, but the effectiveness of the process of preparation 
depends largely on factors associated with the personnel involved. 
A close analysis has therefore been made in chapter 8 of such things 
as the ways in which budget officials are recruited, their qualifications 
and experience, the training and staff development methods commonly 
used in budget offices, promotion prospects both within the field of 
budgeting and for general administrative posts, the relationship of 
agency organization to movement of staff, and the problems arising 
from high turnover rates amongst budget personnel* Discussion of 
factors such as these is supplemented by appendices containing a good 
deal of detailed information* 
The breadth of coverage of this study has made it difficult to 
keep within the space limitations imposed by thesis regulations. 
Each chapter has accordingly been designed to incorporate conclusions 
that would otherwise have formed the basis of a final chapter 
recapitulating and summarising arguments appearing in the main body 
of the text* Such a chapter has been replaced by a brief sitrvey of 
the literature of state budgeting with a commentary upon the 
lacunae that exist in such areas as state administrative history. 
(vi) 
factual description of budget preparation methods, and budgetary 
theory* We seem now to be at the crossroads and it is likely that 
much of the future writing about budgeting will concern itself with 
constructing theoretical models of the types already developed in 
other areas of political science* 
Except where indicated in the text or by footnote references 
this study represents the original work and investigations of the 
author. 
(vii) 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
"...I to Sir G. Carteret, to his lodging, and 
here discoursed much of the want of money and 
our being designed for destruction* How the 
King hath lost his power, by submitting himself 
to this way of examining his accounts, and is 
become but as a private man." 
Pepys. (4th October, 1666) 
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SCOPE OF STUDY 
Public finance represents a field of study common to several 
disciplines* It well illustrates the way in which social sciences 
meet and overlap, and how work on one aspect of a topic may be 
strengthened by research in related areas* Even a cursory examnation 
of the literature of public finance reveals numerous variations in 
treatment: accounting; administrative; economic; historical; legal; 
and political. GenereuLly speaking, however, there are two major 
standpoints from which the study of public finance is commonly 
approached. 
In the first of these attention is directed main3iy to factors of a 
political/administrative nature. Public authorities of all nations and 
at each level of government have created political and administrative 
machinery to cope with the management of their financial affcdLrs. In 
this process, four separate phases may be distinguished: 
(i) formulation of the budget to be submitted to the legislative 
body; 
(ii) authorization by that body in original or amended form of 
the proposals contained in the budget; 
(iii) execution of the financial policy so determined, involving 
such things as control of funds, collection of revenue, 
raising of leans, and expenditure ot authorized amounts; and 
(iv) appraisal of results after the close of the fiscal period, 
including review of audited accounts of revenue anA 
expenditure* 
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Together these phases make up what may be called the "budget system" 
of the particular country or level of government* 
The second major approach stems from the obvious fact that a 
state's financial operations also have significant economic implications* 
That is to say, they involve a transfer from the community to the state 
of control over part of the community's productive resources - resources 
which might otherwise have been used to produce goods and services for 
the satisfaction of individual wants* The purchases of goods and services 
by state governments, plus private purchases aiising from their 
activities, create a substantial part of total employment* State taxes 
take a portion of all private income. The borrowing and debt retirement 
of the states affects the fineuacial market. 
The basic economic problem of any community is to allocate Ii mi ted 
resources to the best advantage among competing uses. Like those of 
individuals, the wants of public authorities are virtualll^ unlimited, 
and rarely does an agency's own assessment of its needs coincide witk 
what can be made available to it. It is true that a government is able 
to increase its resources more readily than can an individual. Tax 
scales may be adjusted, or new forms of ta;sation imposed; various charges 
may be increased; or it may be decided to budj^ et for a deficit. But, in 
practice, there are limits to such adjustments. The structure of 
government is made up of closely interwoven organizations, and the 
inter-relationships between programmes of activity are highly complex. 
The results of change are not immediate in their impact. Nor can revenues 
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and expenditures simply be altered at will, so as to achieve any 
desired pattern. There is, moreover, a major difficulty arising from 
the inflexibility and uncontrollable nature of a large part of the 
activities which the budget attempts to influence. Numerous fixed 
commitments exist, so that budgetary policy change is feasible only 
within a relatively narrow area, and even within that area change can 
normally only be effected slowly* For various reasons limitations of 
this sort are more significant at the state government level than they 
are for central governments. 
AB^ though it is possible to distinguish various approaches to the 
subject, we must never lose sight of the fact that, inevitably, 
budget management is vitally affected by the interplay of political 
pressures, impinging on both the legislative and the executive 
departments. It is often the case, for instance, that whatever the 
economic justification, politi^l er social factors make it impracticable 
for a government to budget for a deficit. This is particularly so in the 
United States where the ideal, of a balanced budget is deeply rooted. 
Even though informed opinion may accept the proposition that deficit 
financing is actually desirable in some circumstances, the incurring 
of deficits is nevertheless widely regarded as something to be avoided 
whenever possible and certainly to be adopted only as a purely temporary 
1* Cf. Frederick C* Mosher, Recent Trends in Governmental Finance in 
the United States. Berkeley, Calif., Bureau of Public Administration, 
University of California, 1961, pp.63-64. 
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measure. The balanced budget, for the household, the business, or 
the government connotes social respectability, while deficits are 
associated with waste and corruption, fiscal irresponsibility, and 
moves to introduce "socialism". There are, indeed, widespread constit-
utional and other legal prohibitions or limitations against deficit 
financing by state and local governments, and these restrictions are 
partly at least a reflection of a particular social morality. A 
rounded study would have to take account of a wide variety of factors^ 
not only those arising from the economic impact of budgetary decisions, 
but also those of a general political and administrative nature, 
including the implications of adopting particular forms of budgetary 
organization. This would be a task of great magnitude and complexity, 
for, as Wildavsky points out, if one looks upon politics as a process by 
which a government mobilizes resources to meet pressing problems, then 
the budget is a focus of these efforts and in the most integral sense is 
2 
at the heart of the political process. 
This thesis does not aim at anything like complete coverage of even 
one of the two broad divisions of public finance mentioned earlier. It 
treats only the state level of government and is concerned primarily 
with political and administrative aspects of budgeting. Within this 
2* Aaron Wildavsky, The Politics of the Budgetary Process* Boston, 
Little, Brown and Company, 19^4, pp.4-5. 
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area attention is concentrated on the first of the four phases of 
the budget system; the ways in which the budgets of various state 
governments are prepared for submission to their respective legislatures. 
More specifically, the study deals with the machinery and procedures 
which have been formulated to assist budget agencies to evaluate the 
competing demands of departments and authorities seeking finance te 
maintain er expand their functions* This involves, of course, a 
detailed examination ef the personnel of budget agencies, since the 
likely effectiveness of any budget in meeting its professed objects 
will depend largely en the ability, qualifications and experience ef 
those who framed it. 
In Carrying out such an investigation it is necessary te canvass 
numerous budgetary issues as yet unsettled and to seek answers to a 
wide range of questions. What are the roles of central budget eigencies 
at the state level, in terms primarily of administratively accepted 
functions rather than formal statutory previsions? HVhat organizational 
and staffing patterns can be discerned? This is an aspect which requires 
consideration not only of internal division of labour, but also of 
management arrangements and relationships* What form of organization is 
likely to lead to the most efficient budget operation? Where should a 
budget agency be located? How much independence sheuld it have? On 
what basis sheuld work be assigned to the budget analysts? Sheuld it be 
la terms of functions te be performed, of agencies to be serviced, or 
according to some other criteriea? What does, or should, the work of a 
budget analyst entail? Is he te be restricted to the examination ef 
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financial matters, or are his functions tote wider than this and 
to embrace what may be deseribed as management analysis? Is the 
analyst's task to be essentially that of reviewing individual 
departmental actions and requests, or is it to be that of helping 
departments te obtain maximum results from the available allocations? 
In the light of the budget agency's conception of its role, what type 
of individual, in terms of age, qualifications, experience, and 
personality, is appropriate for appointment as an analyst? How may 
the abilities of newly appointed analysts be developed? These are only 
a few of the questions that occur* Others arise fron^uch issues as the 
relationship between the budget analyst and the departments assigned te 
him; the relations between the budget agency and the executive; andB^  
between agency and legislature* Also a source of many unresolved 
questions is the speciallst/generalist controversy* In some states 
analysts generally trained in economics or government predominate. 
In others budget officials, specially trained in accountancy, education, 
agriculture, engineering or architecture are employed. What are the 
advantages and disadvantages of each approach? Is it desirable to seek, 
or possible to achieve, a meaningful balance between generallst and 
specialist budgetary personnel? 
Of course, in each state the answers to meoiy of these questions 
will be a l^ eflectlen of the concept of the budget functiom. held by 
the executive, the legislature, or the budget agency itself* As we 
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shall see, in some states the central budget agency is thought of as 
being primarily part of the the treasury's machinery for controlling 
departmental expenditures* Elsewhere, a different view prevails and 
the budget agency's main role is regarded as that of providing a 
specialized service designed to help the operating departments to make 
the best use of their resources* Similarly, the budget organization 
and the tasks which analysts are required to perform will vary according 
to conceptions of the scope of budgeting* In practice the budget in 
some states will be simply the plan of expenditure from a general fund, 
whereas in ethers it will cover all state expenditures, or will be a 
complete financial plan encompassing revenue and current expenditures 
as well as loan raisings and capital expenditures* And quite apart from 
differences of this sort, there is the more fundsunental distinction 
between the conception of budgeting as a purely financial operation and 
that which sees the budget as a work plan which has simply been translated 
into financial terms* In this latter case the objective of budgeting 
will be accepted as the achieving of efficient overall administration 
rather than the ensuring of fiscal control* In short, then, the 
notions that are held concerning what budgeting is all about will 
materially affect the type of personnel needed, the organizational 
pattern, and the interdepartmental relationships Involved in budget 
admlaistratlea• 
la Itself the foregoing provides a wide enough field for any one 
study; but having thus delineated the scope of our Inquiry, we must 
Immediately enter a caveat* The four budgetary phases cannot be seen as 
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watertight compartments. Each forms part of a unified system, and 
the arrangements for carrying out a single activity may be influenced 
by, or may dictate, the procedures, administrative maehinexy or 
personnel required elsewhere in the system. Accordingly, it is necessary 
that from time to time we go beyond the formulation stage to consider 
others of the processes which go to make up the budget system as a whole. 
Insofar as bud^ et^  formulation is concerned, published material is 
scarce and limited in scope. The bulk of the study is therefore based 
on primary sources and personal examination of the budgetary metl^ds of 
various governments* Where the stages of authorization, execution and 
appraisal are dealt with there has been greater reliance on secondary 
sources, although here again a good deal of personal investigation has 
been necessary. 
The study is a comparative one, designed to bring out sifflilarities 
and differences in the methods of budget preparation at the state level 
of government in Australia, Canada, and the United States of America. 
Within each of these countries there are, of course, variations in 
practice and organizational structure from one state or province to 
another, andiit has not been possible to illustrate all such differences. 
To have attempted this would have Involved a detailed examination of 
some sixty-six separate budget systems. Despite the internal 
differences that do exist, however, one can, to a surprising extent, 
arrive at general conclusions about each country's budgetary methods, amd 
so can obtain a basis for comparison* 
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Here we may note that the similarities between budget systems 
are more apparent when we are considering the Australian states and the 
Canadian provinces, than is the case within the United States of America. 
Indeed, for Australia and Canada the similarities exist between the two 
countries themselves. That is to say, as parliamentary systems, 
having a high degree of organizational and procedural uniformity 
from one unit of government to another, they may be much more readily 
compared with each other than with the United States* Among the 
governmental budget systems in the United States the range of variation 
is much more marked, so that one cannot speak of a system at the state 
level in the same way as can be done - with some qualifications - for 
Australia and Canada* When examining particular facets of budgetary 
organization and procedures, however, one can discern patterns and 
groupings of states, so that comparisons and contrasts can be brought 
out, while at the same time keeping the study to a manageable length* 
The budget systems of two Australian states, New South Wales and 
Queensland, are examined in detail. This is sufficient to give a picture 
of the budgetary methods commonly found in this country. For Canada 
attention is directed mainly to Ontario, but British Columbia, Manitoba, 
and Saskatchewan are also discussed. Because of the range of systems 
found in the United States, coverage of that country has necessarily 
had to be wider than this, and the budgetary organization and 
procedures of a number of states have been described. For each of 
3. Most attention has been paid to Maryland and New York, but 
procedural variations in other states have also been examined and 
the states discussed differ according to the aspect of budgeting 
being considered, so as to give broad coverage. 
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these countries, moreover, the textual coverage has been supplemented 
by tabular presentation of particular aspects of budgetary practice 
in systems not dealt with fully. In this way it has been possible 
to obtain a picture of the varying budgetary processes which is 
as complete as is needed for a comparative survey of this nature. 
It would have been easier in some respects simply to have treated 
each country in turn. This would not, however, so readily have 
brought out comparisons and contrasts as a study oriented towards a 
coverage of systems and specific aspects of budgeting* Although it 
has been necessary to devote a good deal of attention to the varying 
approaches to budgeting throughout the United States, this stress is 
weO'ranted in view of the number of states involved and also because 
in some ways the Australian and Canadian approaches and actual methods 
are sufficiently alike to be dealt with together and compared or 
contrasted with various United States practices* 
It must now be further noted that just as we cannot meaningfully 
restrict our examination to only one phase of budgeting, that of 
formulation, so we cannot confine our attention to the three countries 
already mentioned* To a greater or lesser extent each of the budget 
systems in operation in Australia, Canada and the United States owes 
something to that of the United Kingdom. In some instances the 
influence may be only of an indirect kind, but it is nonetheless real. 
This has had to be recognised, both in coverage and organization of 
material. 
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Finally, it sheuld be borne in mind that in the literature of 
public finance the term "budget" is commonly used to nrefer either to 
particular financial documents prepared! by a government or authority, 
or to the plans for raising and spending money which are embodied in 
those documents* Essentially this study is concerned with the budget 
in the latter sense* At the same time, however, it must be recognised 
that the actual form in which the financial plan is drawn up and 
presented to the legislature is of great significance* The budget 
papers of state governments often fall to reflect adequately the 
present complexities ef governmental activities* A great deal may be 
concealed or revealed by particular ways of setting out financial 
operations, and it is not too much to say that the effectiveness of 
legislative authorization and appraisal depends largely on the nature 
and form of the budget documents. Some discussion of this aspect of 
budgeting has therefore been included. 
4. An interesting analysis of Australian budget documents is given by 
L, J. Hume in an article, "Parliamentary Scrutiny and the Financial 
Documents", Public Adminletration (Sydney)* Vol* XXII, Ne* 2, June, 
1963, pp.165-177. This article was based on statements submitted in 
1962 te the Joint Ceomittee of Public Accounts. Although Dr. 
Hume's criticisms are aimed at the federal budget papers, many of 
them are applicable to the financial documents prepared by state: 
governments. Later changes in the federal budget documents are 
discussed in his "Reforms in the Budget Documents Since 1963," 
Public Administration (Sydney), Vol. XXV, No. 4, December, 1966, 
pp. 309-322. 
CHAPTER 2 
BUDGETS AND BUDGETING 
"...After dinner to my papers and Tangier accounts 
again till supper, and after supper again to them, 
but by my mixing them, I know not how, my private and 
publique accounts, it makes me mad to see how hard it 
is to bring them to be understood, and my head is 
confounded, that though I did sweare to sit up till 
one o'clock upon them, yet, I fear, it will be to no 
purpose, for I cannot understand what I do or have 
been doing ef them to-day." 
Pepys* (25th March, 1666) 
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THE BUDGET 
In discussions about public finance the word "budget" seems 
to have been in common use in England by the early eighteenth 
century, the term being first applied to the leather bag in which 
the treasurer carried financial documents, and later to the documents 
themselves* As far as is known, the first written reference occurs in 
an anonymous pamphlet. The Budget Opened, published in 1733» which 
attacked Walpole's policy as chancellor of the exchequer and likened 
2 him to a conjuror openxng his box of tricks and deceptions. 
Subsequently the phrase "opening the budget" became normal 
parliamentary usage* 
Over the years the meaning of "budget" has, of course, been 
extended, so that the word may now be used to describe any forecast 
3 
of income and outlay, or any planned expenditure programme.'^ The 
financial statements of public authority business undertakings are not, 
however, usually referred to as budgets; although the accounts of some 
such undertakings may be included in the government's budget, sometimes 
for the information of parliament, sometimes because the expenditures of 
the particular undertakings require parliamentary authorization. Nor 
1. The probable derivation of the word is from the Anglo-Saxon 
"bougette" - a bag or wallet. (See The Encyclopaedia of the 
Social Sciences, edited Edwin R. A* Seligman, London, Macmlllan, 
1930, Vol. Ill, p*38.) 
2* A* E, Buck, The Budget in Governments ccf Today. New York, 
Macmlllan, 1934, p.5* 
3« "Family budget"; "Industrial budget"; and so on* 
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is it common in Australia to find the word applied to the financial 
statements of lecal authorities, though these clearly fall within 
4 
generally accepted definitions ef the term* 
The varied ways in which the word "budget" is used make it 
5 
difficult to define the term precisely* As Wildavsky points out, 
in the most literal sense a budget is a document proposing expenditures 
for certain items and purposes, and some definitions refer to the 
documents alone* Fitzpatrick, for Instance, describes the bud^t as 
"the administrative experience of the last or current fiscal period 
systematized and organized for presentation to the legislature, 
together with recommendatiens as to expenditures and revenue for the 
forthcoming fiscal period". Sometimes, toe, the budget is simply 
regarded as being synonymous with a revenue or appropriation act* 
Other writers, however, view the budget as a plan for raising and 
spending money. A. E. Buck, for example, considers that the budget "as 
a plan, sets forth the monetary requirements of the Government for a 
definite future period - usually a year - and in so doing presents a 
balanced relatienshlp between estimated expenditures and anticipated 
7 
income." 
4* There are some exceptions, particularly in the case of large 
multi-purpose authorities such as the Brisbane City Council. 
5« Aaron Wildavsky, The Politics of the Budgetary Process* Boston, 
Little, Brown and Company, 1964, p.1* 
6. E. A. Fitzpatrlok, Budget Making in a Democracy. New York, 
Macmlllan, 19l8, p.H. 
7* A. E. Buck, op.cit., p*47* In Australia a similar view is taken 
by Bland: "The Budget itself may be regarded as a plan which sets 
out the requirements ef the GovernLment for a fixed period, and in 
so doing relates its income to its expenditure." F. A* Bland, 
"Budgets and Budgetary Methods," Public Administration (Sydney), 
Vel* IV, Ne* 2, June, 1942, p.92* 
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We may sum up the first of these approaches by agreeing that in 
one sense "budget" does refer to the document or set of documents in 
which a government's financial plans, its estimates of receipts and 
expenditures for the current or forthcoming fiscal period, are outlined 
and presented te the legislature for approval; and in which the actual 
receipts and expenditures of the fiscal period just ended are brought 
together so that the result may be appraised. In other words, the 
budget document contains elements which make it at once a report, an 
estimate, and a proposal* It reports on the receipts and expenditures of 
the current or past period, estimates the expenditures to be incurred 
on the various works and services in the coming or current period, and 
makes proposals for raising the money to finance those expenditures* 
As far as the second use of the word is concerned, it may be said 
that the estimates of expenditure and the proposals for financing that 
expenditure de represent much more than a simple outline of the 
government's past euad proposed financial dealings* They constitute the 
public authority's plan in the widest sense, presenting proposals for 
carrying into effect its political, social and economic policy. 
Budgeting, then, has sis its object the translating of financial resources 
into human purposes and the budget puts forward a series of goals with 
Q 
price tags at tached to them. That i s t e say, the est imates of 
expenditure are net simply a s e t ©f figures* They serve to ind ica te the 
8* Cf* Aaron Wildavsky, op*c i t . , pp .1-2 . 
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relative importance which the public authority attaches to its 
various functions and provide the mechanism for choosing between 
alternative courses of action. Similarly, the proposals for financing 
the expenditures are a reflection of the public authority's policy on 
the way the "burden" is to be shared by the different groups in the 
community. On this view, the essence of the budget is te be seen in 
its role as a plan; as a work programme which happens to have been 
translated irte terms of dollars and cents. It embraces both the 
planning of future public activities and the carrying out of those 
9 plans. 
Most people regard the proposals for the future as the most 
interesting or spectacular aspects of the financial documents. The 
executive's explanation to the legislature of its intentions for the 
next fiscal period is, so to speak, the climax of the whole preparatory 
stage of the budgetary process. Because of this and the wide-reaching 
economic implications ef the proposals, it is not surprising that 
popular discussions and press coverage of governmental budgets are most 
likely to be concerned with the budget as an overall plan* In Chapter 4 
we shall discuss budget speeches or messages and examine their form and 
content in several states to assess how far they add to public 
understanding of the likely overall effects of the budget. 
9* Interesting discussions of the nature and variety of budgets are to 
be found in Frederick C. Mosher, Program Budgeting: Theory and 
Praetiee, with Particular Reference to the U*S* Department of the 
Army, Chicago* Public Administration Service, 1954, Chapter 1; 
Jesse Burkhead, Qevemment Budgeting, New York, Wiley, 1956; and 
Aaucon Wildavsky, op.cit.* Chapter 1. Wildavsky mentions several 
other purposes ef the budget, which have not been dealt with here* 
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Quite apart from the budget speech, the details of the plan 
and the actual ferm in which it is presented are also of vital 
importance - however mundane this aspect of budgeting may appear to the 
layman* The drawing up of a budget document sheuld not be leeked upon 
as a separate and routine operation which has to be performed as a minor 
part of the administering ef a government's financial affairs. It is an 
integral part ef the budgetary function, for the document provides a 
means by which the activities of government may be brought together and 
examined, so that their interrelationship may be made apparent* The 
form in which proposals are presented is, moreover, of great significance 
from the point of view ef control - from within the executive arm of 
government, as well as control e£ the executive* Inevitably, therefore, 
discussions of the machinery of public finance must pay a good deal of 
attention to this aspect of budgeting. Different ways of presenting 
budget information in variotis states are illustrated in Chapter 4. 
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE BUDGET 
It is all too easy for students and practitioners of budgeting 
te over-stress the importance of the budget and to see budget 
preparation as the central process of government. This is, perhaps, 
more particularly so when one's attention is directed towards government 
at the state level. 
Several factors contribute to this state of mind* In the first 
plaee, there is a comforting sense of quantitative solidity about the 
items which go te make up the budget. A budget document has about it an 
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authoritative air* It deals explicitly with concrete things; 
with money, equipment, positions, beds, patients, desks, students -
Indeed, with all the objects and objectives to whiiah state expenditures 
relate* Simply because it is quantitatively explicit, the budget can 
readily give the impression of establishing a precise formulation of 
10 public policy for a definite time period. 
Again, the sigsoificance of the budget and the budgetary process is 
enhanced by the concentrated attention they are given by many of the 
most powerful members of the executive and legislature* There are few 
aspects of governmental activity that receive closer scrutiny than 
does the budget during its preparation and authorization* Hand in hand 
with this, moreover, goes a high degree ef concern about the budget on 
the part of officials of operating departments and agencies, their 
clientele, and a wide range of interested groups - a cohcern that is 
reflected in the intensity ef their efforts to Influence budgetary 
11 deexsions. The general situation is aptly summed up by Wildavsky: 
"The size and shape of the budget is a matter of serious 
contention in our political life* Presidents, political parties, 
administrators. Congressmen, Interest groups, and interested 
citizens vie with one another to have their preferences recorded 
in the budget* The victories and defeats, the compromises and 
the bargains, the realms of agreement and the spheres ef 
conflict in regard to the role of national government in our 
society all appear in the budget." 12 
1©* Cf. Freeman Helmer, "The Place of Budgeting in State Management," 
in (Eds*) Jehn L. Fulmer, Utha Conrad, and Charles A* Byerly, 
The Budget Analyst la State Management, Kentucky, 1965, p*8. 
11. ibid* 
12* Aaron Wildavsky, op.cit** pp.4-5* 
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Te-day the budget tends to be the fecal point in the 
presentation and implementation of a government's economic policy* 
This is, however, largely a matter of convenience, rather than of 
necessity* It is difficult to diseern any basis of principle in the 
present procedure* Presentation of the budget accounts could be 
treated quite perfunctorily, as a matter concerned entirely with 
questions ef financial accountability in the technical sense* In 
practice, however, presentation of the budget has proved te be a 
convenient occasion for a wide-ranging review of government policy 
and the general economic situation. At this stage, too, thf 
opportunity may be taken, openly or through calculated leakage of 
information, to obtain publicity for the government's wishes concerning 
the behaviour of individuals, organizations, or particular sections of 
the economy. Expressions of governmental epinlen of this kind may, of 
course, be designed either te improve the chances of success for 
13 proposed measures, or te serve as a substitute for specific measures* "^  
Whatever the reasons, however, the important aspect from our point of 
view is the influence that the atmosphere in which budget proposals are 
considered has in enhancing the apparent significance of the budget in 
the eyes of both its framers and the public generally. 
In part, toe, the significance of the budget is linked with the 
13* That is to say, persuasion, exhortation, intimidation, and so 
forth, may themselves sometimes constitute budgetary measures* 
Cf. Alan Williams, Public Finance and Budgetary Policy, London, 
Allen and Unwln, 1963, p.272* 
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organizational situation of branches or agencies concerned with 
financial administration. A bureau created to handle budgeting and 
financial administration encompasses all the affairs of its parent 
organizatloa* Its functions are, in a sense. Interwoven into all 
of the operations and into every part of the administrative processes 
ef the whole enterprise. It cannot be set up in isolation* Nor can it 
go about its work in a vacuum* Its activities are inextricably part 
of those of every level of management and, indeed, of every level of 
operations. Chapter 6 examines and discusses, among other things, the 
organizational locations of state budget agencies in each of the 
countries we are reviewing* 
There is no doubt that budgets are important* Adoption of a 
system of budgeting is basic to the efficient and economical conduct of 
public affairs* No modern government can adequately perform its 
functions without a well-developed financial system, £Uid no such system 
can prove satisfactory if it is not based on a budget. The budget does, 
moreover, serve as a valuable tool for a wide variety of managerial 
purposes. Nevertheless, it must not be allowed to loom so large in our 
14 thinking that it comes to be regarded as a substitute for management* 
Budgeting is a significant element in planning, but planning is only one 
of a number of management activities. Even though budgets are a 
reflection of, or an influence upon, almost all other administrative 
acts, it is clear that most administrators devote the bulk of their 
l4* Cf* Freeman Holmer, op*cit., p.8. "Management" is here used to mean 
the total direction of the executive function. 
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time and energy to aspects of their work that are not directly of a 
budgetary nature. 
Although, toe, many governmental decisions are expressed in 
financial terms, it is the case that major decisions with important 
fiscal implications are often made without prior detailed budgetary 
analysis being carried out. Indeed, in each of the countries under 
review a substantial proportion of state expenditure is committed on 
the basis of decisions that have had little regard to budgetary 
considerations, except in some vague, overall sense. The need to win 
er maintain political support may be a dominant factor in some 
decisions. In others the enhancement ef the personal prestige of 
government leaders may be significant. A state premier, for instance, 
may authorize a costly project, such as an opera house, mainly te 
"immortalize" himself in concrete. Again, the commencement ef a 
service or a project by one state may be sufficient reason for others 
to fellow suit* That is to say, state prestige may be regarded as an 
important, if not overriding, factor in reaching a particular decision. 
If one state sets up a second or a third university, another may feel 
that it must do likewise or lose face* State governments are just as 
likely as individuals to be influenced by the desire to "keep up with 
the Jones's"* And quite apart from factors of this sort it must be noted 
that for various reasons state revenues are frequently committed in 
advance; while state budgetary decisions may also be "distorted" by 
the availability of federal grants, often of a conditional nature, and 
the existence of a wide range of co-operative intergovernmental ventures* 
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This does not mean, of course, that the budget occupies only a 
minor place in the management ef the affairs of a state* Far from it* 
There are several ways in which the existence of budgets and systems of 
budgeting makes substantial contributions to the process of government* 
In the first place, there is the relationship of the budget te 
the organizing and co-ordinating of governmental operations. The 
processes involved in the putting together of a budget in themselves 
lead to the acquiring of a detailed understanding of the structure, 
procedures, and purposes of the particular system of government. The 
budget process can, and frequently does, bring to light instances of 
overlapping, dupHeation, and maladministration* Of course, the mere 
existence of a budget system does not mean that administrative defects 
will be cured; but it may at least be said that the first step in 
achieving greater efficiency in organization and procedures is the 
identification of existing inefficiencies, and in this respect the 
budget can be of real benefit* 
Better managerial performance may also result from the budget* 
Depending upon its formr the budget can be the means for determining 
unit costs, thus providing a tool for identifying performance levels 
or demonstrating whether or net improvements have been achieved. 
Simplification of methods or procedures can, no doubt, occur 
independently of fiscal considerations, but it is often the financial 
implications that stimulate management to institute measures designed to 
improve the working of the organization. 
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In recent years budgeting has come to play a much more positive 
part in the process of management. It has, too, taken on a new 
dimension because of the increased concern for "scientific 
management". In many states budget agencies have been made responsible 
for general oversight of administrative efficiency throughout the 
machinery of government and for the conducting of intensive surveys 
and continuing studies aimed at effecting improvements. Various 
"housekeeping" functions have also been vested in budget bureaux. 
As we shall see in our examination of the role of budget agencies 
(chapter 6), this is more common in the United States than in 
Australia and Canada* 
Perhaps the area in which budgeting can make its major 
contribution is that of planning. In choosing between alternatives 
one tries to look at the overall picture, for this will provide the 
basis for the important budgetary decisions. It is the budgetary 
process that presents us with the overall picture, and brings out 
the inter-relationship of the various parts of the governmental system. 
It shows how programmes of activity, revenues, costs, and organizational 
units are related one to another. How clearly the relationships are 
perceived will, it is true, depend partly on the acumen of the observer, 
as well as upon the talents of those who framed the budget; but it is, 
nevertheless, the existence of the budget that makes possible this sort 
of analysis* 
The budget, moreover, permits a dynamic rather than a static 
analysis to be made. That is to say, the presentation through the 
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budgetary process of the whole picture makes it possible to trace 
out the likely consequences of any particular decision or course of 
actien. Major dependent and Independent variables can be identified 
and we may then examine what happens when one is altered, the impact 
being measured in terms of programmes, overall finance, or organization. 
In effect, the budget process represents the only comprehensive 
mechanism for periodical review and reconsideration of state programmes 
and prospects. It is the budget that ensures that specific answers 
must be given to questions about expectations and future developments. 
Many such decisions would be deferred indefinitely were it not for the 
need to comply with a budgetary timetable, and planning would take place 
in a piecemeal fashion, instead of taking account of the 
inter-relatienshlps existing throughout the particular governmental 
system. It is true that planning is possible and would go on whether 
or not there were a budget process; but it is that process which 
gives planning shape, substance, and continuity. 
In the final resort governmental decision-making is a product 
ef political forces* Budgeting sheuld not be looked upon as being 
the only, or even the most potent, factor in that decision-making 
process* We may agree, nevertheless, that it is the single most 
slgnlfieauit tool which has yet been created to enable rational 
management deeisions to be reached. 
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THE PROCESS OF BUDGETING 
The budget first csune into existence as an instrument which 
assisted the legislature to control the purse strings and, indirectly, 
the actions of the executive. Throughout the greater part of the 
nineteenth century, when budget principles were being formulated, 
minimum governmental interference in the affairs of the community 
was generally held te be desirable* The precept was accepted that 
"that government is best which governs least", and the budget was viewed 
largely as the means by which government expenditure might be restricted 
to bare essentials. Not only did the budget system have a narrow range 
of items to cover, but the process of budgeting inevitably came to 
connote economy and control* Indeed, "budgeting" and "economizing" 
became virtually synonymous terms, and manifestations of this attitude 
are still common to-day* 
As the budgetary process was suhjected to detailed analysis, 
however, there was a gradual shifting away from the notion that 
budgeting involved merely the restriction of spending, or parsimony -
away, that is, from Gladstenian preoccupation with the "saving of 
15 
candle-ends"* Ideas have changed about the appropriate range of 
15* This phrase, which is, somewhat unfairly, often regarded as 
epitomising Gladstone's main impact on treasury thinking, comes from 
a letter written by Gladstone in l877t concerning the appointment 
of the Hon. F. A. Stanley, M.P., as financial Secretary to the 
treasury* "Stanley is clever, but can an heir to the earldom of 
Derby descend to the saving of candle-ends, which is very much the 
measure of a good Secretary to the Treasury?" (Sir Algernon West, 
Recollections: 1832 te 1866, London, Smith, Elder and Co., l899» 
Vol. II, p.82.) 
- 27 -
governmental activities, and, as indicated, the process of budgeting 
has come to be seen as one of choosing between alternatives and 
allecatlng available resources among the various wants that compete 
for satisfaction. 
It is not an easy task te determine appropriate levels of receipts 
and expenditures, and te distribute funds to cover a large number of 
existing or projected activities* There is no eompletely satisfying 
method, theoretical or practical, of evaluating the relative merits of 
a variety of proposals for increased spending put forward by departments 
and authorities* In apportioning resources the aims of the budget 
system are to give maximum effect to the government's policy as a whole, 
te appropriate only for needs that are clearly demonstrated to exist, 
and to make no funds available before expressed needs l^ve been 
thoroughly examined. This involves the making of judgements about 
desirable increments of expenditure over a broad front. The process 
is complicated by the fact that the budget formulator does not start 
with a clean sheet at the beginning of the financial period. Throughout 
each year policy deeisions are made which commit the government te 
immediate or future expenditures, often of a continuing nature. Once a 
service is provided, moreover, it tends to become an accepted 
governmental function, and any attempt at curtailment is likely to 
encounter strong resistance, from both within departments and outside 
them. One may even argue that underlying the budget-making process is 
the premise that services will continue te be provided at their 
existing level at least, and that only exceptional circumstances will 
require or permit reduction of this standard. For current activities. 
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that is to say, the budget is to a large extent pre-determined; the 
general pattern of state expenditures being fairly rigid, with most 
items representiag expenditure for the continuation of services which 
were provided in the preceding period, or which the government in policy 
announcements has promised to inaugu:ate. It must, then, be recognised 
that substantial reductions in expenditure are unlikely to be achieved 
through the normal process of budgeting. Broadly speaking, when 
reviewing total outlay it is practicable to consider only those current 
expenditures that are on the "fringe" - proposed new items which are not 
essential to the furtherance of the government's policy, or existing 
items which may be reduced in scale without inciting undue opposition* 
The process is largely one of edging forward - and occasionally 
backward - in respect of various types of governmental services* Effective 
decision-making in this field must, of course, be based on an extensive 
knowledge and appreciation of competing demands, as well as upon 
detailed examination of the likely effects on each department's 
activities of changes in its spending allocation* In providing the 
necessary background information and in carrying out specific 
investigations budget agencies fill vital needs* 
On the revenue side a similar sii^ uation obtains, and it is 
common for most taxes to remain unchanged from one fiscal period to 
the next* Usually only a limited number is selected to be varied so as 
to produce the increased (er decreased) revenue decided upon. In 
Australia the central government is most likely to think ii^erms of 
adjusting income taxation rates or customs and excise duties* The 
problem fer the state governments is greater, most of their major 
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independent sources of revenue being of a relatively inflexible 
natureo As we shall see, this is not the case in others of the state 
systems that we are examining* Borrowing, on the other hand, is an 
item which at the state level in all three countries normally exhibits 
a good deal of flexibility* 
Te recapitulate, it is important that we remember that budget 
formulation each year starts from what already exists. Thie situation 
is hardly likely te be one in which there is an "ideal" distribution 
of resources and effort appropriate to the current circumstances* 
Instead, the budget maker will be faced with an existing pattern ef 
widely vasying elements. Seme ef these elements will have come into 
the financial picture only a short time before and may well be la 
accord with prevailing needs. Others, however, will have become part 
of the pattern at an earlier stage, when the overall situation may 
have been much different* Some of these earlier elements may, of course, 
still suit the present circumstances, but in most cases radical changes 
would be desirable* Such changes do not occur frequently, however. 
Experience suggests that for long periods there will be toleration ef 
programmes of activity or items of expenditure which have ceased te 
serve their original purposes. Existing appropriatiens will tend not 
te be stringently reviewed until a financial "crisis situation" 
develops. The Implications ef this will be discussed later. 
It is now more than twenty-five years since V* 0. Key argued that 
there was a need for studies aimed at developing a budgetary theory ea 
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l6 
which could be based decisions about allocation of resources. 
A satisfactory theory of this kind has net yet emerged, although 
17 
steps in that direction were taken by Buchanan in 1949, and by 
18 Lewis in 1952, whilst McKean subsequently made a significant 
contribution in showing hew systematic quantitative analysis, 
particularly "cost-benefit analysis", might be used as an aid by 
administrators required to choose between alternative courses of 
action.^ More recently Wildavsky's study. The Politics of the 
Budgetary Process, has added considerably to our knowledge of the 
roles ef the various participants in the budgetary process and of the 
basis on which budgetary deeisions are actually made. With Davis and 
Dempster he has also demonstrated that it is possible to find simple 
linear equations for major facets of the budgetary process, so that 
20 propositions about outcomes can be stated and tested. It is beyond the 
scope of this study to attempt to fit the budgetary decision-making 
process at the state level into a general theoretical model or models, 
16. V. 0* Key Jr/, "The Lack of a Budgetary Theory," American Political 
Science Review, Vol* XXXIV, No* 4, December, 1940, pp*1137-44. 
17* James M. Buchanan, "The Pare Theory of Government Fxance: A 
Suggested Approach", Journal of Political Economy, Vol. LVII, No. 6, 
December, 1949, pp*496-505. 
18. Verne B. Lewis, "Toward a Theory of Budgeting", Public 
Administration Review, Vel* XII, Winter, 1952, pp*42-54. 
19* Roland N. McKean, Efficiency in Government Through Systems 
Analysis. New Yerk, Wiley, 1958« 
20* Otto 0* Davis, M*A*H. Dempster, and Aaron Wildavsky, "A Theory 
ef the Budgetary Process," The American Political Science Review, 
Vol, LX, No. 3, September, 1966, pp*529-547« 
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although in subsequent chapters the way budget agencies and individual 
budget analysts go about their work will be examined* At this stage, 
however, a few general comments are appropriate. 
It has been suggested that budgeting is the most significant 
single factor leading to rational management decisions. A budget compels 
the Gonsdlous making of cheices - the evaluating of the marginal results 
ef spending la one way as opposed to another. In preparing a budget 
it is necessary te weigh up the marginal benefits of inaugurating a 
new service or activity against the marginal disadvantages of a tax or 
fee increase to meet the cost of the programme. Similarly, choices 
must be made for such issues as the marginal disadvantages of raising 
©ne type of tax as against another, or the marginal disadvantage over a 
period of time resulting from the incurring of interest and debt 
charges, compared with the marginal disadvantages of raising taxation 
immediately* The basis on which these and numerous other such choices 
are made may or may not be a rational one. Much depends upon hew 
carefully the various criteria are selected and assessed, and on 
21 
whether the full Implications of each alternative are perceived. 
Be this as it may, however, it is clear that the process of choice 
iinvolved in the budgetary system is inherently more rational than 
would be undisciplined ad ho<g decisioa-making. 
Nevertheless, this is net to suggest that the case for, say, a new 
or increased tax can be made solely, or even primarily, through the 
21* It must also be noted that Jesse Burkhead (op.cit*, pp.4l-44) 
expresses doubts about the practical application of "marginalism" 
except as an ex post facto description of the process of 
allecatiea* 
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budget procedures. In examining budgetary methods and machinery we 
must never lose sight of the fact that for both revenue and 
expenditure the major decisions will inevitably be based on 
non-budgetary factors. The significant decisions affecting the size, 
shape and direction of the budget will have their source in the 
political process, and the official who does not appreciate this will 
quickly find his efforts frustrated* This is the case, whatever 
system we are examining. 
It sheuld be noted, too, that in some countries the executive 
has not only to ensure the co-operation of various economic units if 
measures are to be carried into effect, but must also persuade the 
legislature to adopt those measures in the first place* In other 
countries, legislative approval is virtually assured in advance, 
since a government could net have been formed without such a guarantee. 
This points, of course, te many of the most significant budgetary 
©rganizational and procedural differences between the United States on 
the one hand and Australia and Canada on the other* No matter what the 
actual pattern of the process, however, there will always be numerous 
budgetary measures adopted outside the formal framework of the budget 
itself. It would plaee undue strain on economic policy-making if 
governments were restricted to annual adjustments at the time the 
budget is prepared. Continuous scrutiny and frequent small adjustments 
are necessary throughout each financial period* 
Demands for new services and spending ultimately reach and must 
be judged by the political executive. At the same time, however, there 
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are both direct and indirect forces which operate to restrain the 
executive's demands fer revenue from the public* A major problem 
associated with this situation is that the conflicting pressures 
are unlikely to reach the executive with an equal amount of organized 
and explicit support. In devising a system which could effectively 
reconcile the various interacting forces, one might well wish to set up 
machinery that enables the varying demands relating to any given period 
te be all considered at the same time and place* Such machinery could 
prevent items or programmes ef lower priority becoming established 
simply because they have arisen earlier. But, of course, this 
objective cannot be fully achieved, since problems and proposals have 
a way of coming up seriatim. Nor would it necessarily be desirable to 
attempt a wholesale examination of governmental activities in one 
operation* In a sense, the seeds of basic conflict lie dormant within 
the budgeting structure Itself* The great increase in governmental 
activities and expenditure, coupled with the growing competition for 
funds, undoubtedly creates pressure for the development of formal 
controls which, if strictly observed, lead te rigidity and 
inflexibility* Yet many of today's governmental functions are aimed 
at meeting particular sei^ lal needs which increase and contract without 
any relationship to the fiscal period for which the budget is compiled. 
Modern 13^ aMlgeting cannot proceed through a number of separate 
assessments, each designed to cover a situation remaining static for 
the following twelve months or two years. Budgeting must be looked 
upon as being almost a day to day operation, the techniques of which 
will give both regularity and flexibility in a way that is markedly 
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different from the results of mechanistic procedures and methods* 
That is to say, if the direction of governmental expenditures is 
new a major factor in the community's economic and social life, then 
budgeting can only appropriately be conducted on a basis of continuous 
planning, control, and review of those expenditures and of their 
underlying purposes. 
When conducting annual or biennial reviews of expenditure 
patterns the budget formulator is involved in re-assessing trends, 
such re-assessment covering both total ex|)enditure and the elements 
which make up the total. Clearly, however, it is not practicable 
abruptly to stop and start major programmes of governmental activity 
to fit the budget to the demands of each new situation* Public works 
and services generate a dependence whic^ cannot be suddenly removed 
without there being unacceptable social or economic consequences* 
There are, too, problems caused by the fadt that so many governmental 
activities begin on a comparatively small scale smd develop gradually 
over time* Perhaps the process of thought appropriate for budgetary 
review may be to consider first how total expenditure should move in 
relation te the economic development of the state or country as a whole, 
and then, within that general movement, which activities can be 
accelerated, which retarded, at what rates, and what changes of 
character or direction are appropriate. Some such conclusions could 
be reached on the basis of known changes in the magnitude or nature 
of particular elements in the society* In other instances a building up 
or a reduction of activity would have to be designed to meet anticipated 
situations* Indeed, budgeting must always involve anticipation ef 
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likely consequences, even the separate apparently minor issues 
which arise througheat the fiscal period having to be judged in 
accordance with their probable effects on later budgets. 
It will be appreciated that this "trend" approach does call 
into questioa the validity of both the total and the distribution of 
effort in the period that is used as the base - that is, the immediately 
preceding financial period* Allocation of resources to at least some 
of the elements in this base will always represent a departure from the 
ideal since the base period itself is made up of a collection of 
programmes and administrative policies dating from different times in 
the past* As stated earlier, all priorities cannot be continually 
22 
re-assessed* This means, as Wildavsky points out, that to a 
department or authority the concept of "the base" - a term that is 
part of the regular parlance of budget officials - represents more than 
simply its expenditure allocation for a single fiscal period* There 
is included in the notion ef the base the general expectation by 
participants that programmes once began will be continued at close to 
the existing levels of expenditure* It will be accepted that some 
activities may from time to time have to be discontinued, but that for 
the most part the established allocations will net he scrutinized 
intensively. Budget agencies seldom, in fact, have the resources to 
carry out regular detailed investigations of particular programmes or 
areas of administration, so that wide fluctuations in allocations from 
budget to budget are unlikely to occur* The norm consists of 
22* Aaron Wildavsky» op.cit., P*17* 
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comparatively small additions or subtractions from the fairly 
steady base. Expansionary pressures may, of course, force departmental 
officials themselves to eliminate particular programmes, to 
re-erganize, or to improve procedures, so that limited resources may 
be spread further; but budget framers cannot and do not rely upon this. 
Clearly, then, the commonly-used notion of a base year which 
serves as a yardstick in the assessment of current proposals is not 
without its faults, but provided these are kept in mind by the budget 
analyst it can conveniently serve as a point of departure for trend 
23 
analysis* Although the practicable adjustments to both receipts and 
expenditure programmes may be limited in extent, the marginal adjustments 
which can be made are important to the operating departments and their 
impact on the overall direction and economic effect of the budget can 
be highly significant. 
As well as considerations such as those already mentioned, the 
process of budgeting raises questional relating to the form and content 
of the budget documents* Before any of the plans emb-odied in the 
budget can be implemented the approval of the legislature must be 
obtained. Whatever the extent ©f the legislature's direct influence 
ever the budget - and this, ef course, varies from one governmental 
system to another - the mere fact that legislative approval is required 
does imply that both the substance and form of the budget papers should 
23* Gordon W. Stead, "Patterns of Government Expenditure", Canadian 
Public Administration, Vol* I, Ne* 1, March, 1958, p*5« 
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be such that the legislature is readily able to appreciate the 
financial policies presented for its consideration and to debate 
adequately the whole of the budgetary proposals. 
From this point of view one of the major aspects of budgeting 
may be seen as that of determining the appropriate form and content 
ef the budget documents* Much of the writing of early students of 
budgeting relates to this facet of the subject. In such an approach 
budgetary consideratiens are likely to be linked to moves for "reform" 
of the machinery of government. The studies of A. E. Buck are a case 
in point. Much of Buck's writing about the budget stresses the need 
net only for improvements in the form in which budgetary information is 
presented, but also for the establishment of appropriate personnel 
systems, for "merit" appointments and promi}tions, better classification 
of civil servants, effective auditing eind controlit the achieving of 
econesd.es through such devices as centralized purchasing arrangements, 
24 
and for administrative re-organization. In Australia, F* A* Bland 
for many years worked with similar ends in view* 
The struggle f® achieve goals such as these is by no means over in 
any of the countries we are examining* In many states there are grave 
weaknesses in budget machinery, personnel procedures, and the forms in 
which financial papers are presented* At the same time, however, 
24* Some of the implications of the work of Buck and others, and the 
assumptions underlying their writings on administrative 
re-erganization will be discussed later* 
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aspects, ef this kind may be regarded as constituting the "old" 
problem ef the budget* T^ere is also te be resolved what has been 
25 
called the "new" problem* This arises from the fact that the budget 
of to-day is a major weapon in the government's economic armoury. 
It must now be viewed from the standpoint of its role in promoting 
a high and stable level of national income and employment, and the 
way in which it uses government receipts and expenditures to help 
prevent er minimize recurrent booms and recessions. 
Budgets, then, are instruments of fiscal and economic policy, 
consciously designed to fit anticipated economic conditions* The 
budget may seek to affect those conditions, or it may merely insert 
itself in a neutral fashion into the stream of economic events. In 
either case it must take account of thoseo events. 
The pervasiveness ef the modern budget is frequently reiaarked 
upon. This is not really a new phenomenon, however* The budget has 
always had widespread ramifications throughout the economy, or has 
at least always possessed the potential for such widespread effect. 
"The battle between free trade and protection, ending in a 
revolution ef our commercial system, had awakened men to the 
enormous tzoith - that budgets are not merely affairs ef 
arithmetic, but in a thousand ways go to the root of the prosperity 
ef individuals, the relation of classes and the strength of 
kingdoms* 26 
25« Cf. F. A* Bland, Budget Control, Sydney, Angus and Robertson, 
Fourth Edition, 1946, Chapter I. 
26* John Morley, The Life of W. E. Gladstone* London, Macmlllan, 
1905, Vol* I, p.458. 
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What is new is that to-day the budget process is used much more 
deliberately with its pervasiveness in mind. This is true whether 
we are thinking of budgeting by the central government or by 
subordinate levels of government* Quite apart from this, moreover, 
the growth in size and scope of the modern budget has greatly enhanced 
its power to affect the whole economy* One of the most impressive 
features of present-day government is, of course, its size and the 
breadth of its coverage* It is unnecessary to underline withi statistical 
data the vast proliferation of governmental activities during this 
centaury and the consequent multiplication of administrative agencies* 
The situation is well known; as are the economic and social implications 
of the government's dominance. Budgeting must take account of the fact 
that governments purchase enormous quantities of goods sind services, 
empley a vast range of skills, levy taxes on a large scale^ borrow 
substantial sums, and redistribute incomes extensively* The effects of 
any particular measure or type of activity cannot easily be identified, 
let alone "sealed off" within a sector of the economy or confined to one 
variable* Inevitably the effects will be widespread and uncertain* 
In federal systems of government there are added difficulties in 
the use of budgeting to influence the economy. Although "economic" 
controls are primarily a matter for central government, the state and 
local units also have responsibilities in this respect* Unless they 
recognise this their actions may serve to nullify the efforts of the 
central gevernment to influence the direction of the economy* 
27* Cf, Alan Williams, op*cit*. p*273* 
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Generally speaking, state and local financial measures have tended 
to fellow the movements of the business cycle, with activities and 
expenditures expanding in good times and being reduced in paor* 
This has sometimes operated to aggravate cyclical swings in the 
economy, as obviously occurred during the depression of the 1930s 
in each ef the three countries we are examining* Unfortunately, 
however, counter-cyclical policy requires the use of credit resources 
not generally available to state and local units of government - the 
more so in the United States where so many state constitutions 
prohibit or restrict borrowing, or contain provisiibns making a 
"balanced" budget mandatory. Nor is the tax base at the state level 
generally suitable for counter-cyclical purposes; while unity of action 
among s^ ate governments is difficult to achieve. 
It should not be thought that the "traditional" accountability 
controls are unimportant in relation to ©verall considerations of 
economic policy* The significance of such controls may in fact be 
enhanced when substantial stress is being placed on the need fer 
economic control and planning* Laxity in the treatment of 
appropriations, such as that which, as we shall see, occurs in New 
South Wales under the procedures relating to "Payments Unauthorized in 
Suspense", may well cause public expenditure not only to be 
to 
economically inappropriate in amount, but also/have unwanted effects 
28 
or dysfunctions. While, therefore, analysis of the budget's role in 
28. Cf* Ursula K. Hicks, "The Control of Public Expenditure", Public 
Finance. Vol* VIII, No* 1, 1953, P»8* 
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economic planning may be primarily a task for the economist, 
questions of the form and content of budgets, and of budgetary 
machinery and personnel have far-reaching implications with which 
we shall have te concern ourselves throughout this study, 
BUDGET PRINCIPLES 
Until late in the nineteenth century it was feasible for 
gevernment budgets to be set out in such a way that the executive's 
proposals could fairly readily be understood by members of the 
legislature. Governmental expenditure was comparatively small and 
was almost wholly related to current services* Receipts consisted 
for the most part of regularly recurring revenue, and all governmental 
income and expenditure could be managed through a single fund. IQiere 
were no pressing reasons for the exclusion of any head of income or 
expenditure from the budget, for differences in the method of treatment 
ef various items, or for lack of clarity in presentation. 
Because ef this and the importance of the budget document as an 
instirument of legislative control, certain "Hrinciples" were formulated 
at an early stage la the development of the budget process. The more 
Important of these were usually listed under the following headings: 
Comprehensiveness 
: Unity 
Specific Appropriation 
Clarity 
Accuracy 
Gradually these came to be regarded as fundamental conditions or 
criteria by which aay budget might be judged* 
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There are methedologieal problems associated with the |ise 
of criteria such as these, so that they must be handled cautiously. 
Quite apart from this, moreover, the nature of state government has 
changed radically since the tests were devised. Most state 
governments are now large-scale enterprises, offering an array -
sometimes a bewildering array - of services, and exercising extensive 
control over many ef the (iaily activities of citizens* The functions 
of state governments are no longer essentially negative or protective. 
Nor are they relatively stable, as was earlier the case. As it now 
operates the budget process is inevitably coloured by the increasing 
complexity of government in an era of continual change* In these 
circumstances it is no longer practicable fter the framers of budgets te 
comply with some of the "principles" mentioned - notably the conditions 
of comprehensiveness, unity and clarity. 
This does not necessarily mean, however, that the criteria are 
without value as yardsticks for assessing certain budgetary features. 
Clearly they are still accepted, implicitly or explicitly, by many 
observers and practitioners of budgeting, ^  and there is some merit in 
their adoption as a means ef approach to comparative examination of 
the ferm and substance of budgets* With reservations, therefore» use 
will be made of these criteria when discussing in Chapter 4 the form 
and content of state budgets* 
29* See, for instance, the opinions expressed by Con F. Shea, State 
Budget Director, Colorado and President, National Association of 
State Budget Officers, in his paper, "A Western View," in (Eds.) 
John L. Fulmer, Utha Conrad, and Charles A* Byerlj^, op.cit** 
pp*58-59. 
- ^ 3 -
LINE-ITEM versus PERFORMANCE BUDGETING 
The effectiveness of any budget system is largely governed by 
the fashion in which the budget document itself is established* That 
is to say, the manner in which departments and authorities present data 
and the way in which the overall budget is formulated by the budget 
30 
agency will tend to reflect the purpose of the whole process. 
The type of budget most familiar to us is that which is usually 
referred to as "line-item". This is the form of budget most commonly 
found in Australia, Canada, and the United States of America* Such 
budgets characteristically emphasize the objects (materials, equipment, 
manpower, etc.) which governments must procure in order to carry out 
their functions* Due describes the framework of the line-item budget 
in this way: 
"Traditionally the budgets have been established on the 
basis of agency, since appropriations are made on this basis, 
with breakdown, in substantial detail, in terms of objects 
purchased.* * .Summaries are fr^uently given in terms of major 
function Cnational defence) cutting across departmental 
lines ..."•^ ' 
This emphasis on itemization of objects begins with the preparation of 
the estimates and usually culminates in a detailed appropriation measure 
30* The qualifying word "tend" has been used because, although the form 
of presentation may indicate the nature of the budget system, it 
may not, alene, always accurately reflect the spirit behind the 
system and the attitudes of the various participants in the budgetary 
process. 
31* John F. Due, Government Finance; an Economic Analysis, Illinois, 
Irwin, 1959i pp.64-65* 
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which may go so far as to show separately each position in each 
department or agency. 
In the United States the practice of detailed budgetary itemization 
arose in the early part of this century mainly as a corrective to the 
unwise or corrupt use by administrators of lump-siim appropriations. 
To overcome, or at least mitigate, this situation legislative itemization 
©f appropriations by object became customary* ffihis, along with 
accounting systems geared to the appropriation structure, made it 
difficult fer officials to use appropriated funds for other than the 
purposes specified by the legislature. Detailed itemization was, of 
course, adopted much earlier in England, Australia and Canada, and it 
has remained the practice in those countries up to the present. One of 
the main justifications for its retention in budgeting is in terms of its 
use as a device for facilitating centralized control of public funds. 
In recent years a good deal of interest has developed in programme 
or performande budgeting, and the concepts associated with this form ef 
32. Cf. A* E* Buck, Public Budgeting, Mew York, Harper and Brothers, 
1929* p.128. 
33o The terms "programme" and "performance" will be used interchangeably, 
although from a technical standpoint it would be possible to prepare 
a budget in programme form which would contain little of the 
objective measure of performance* Were this study more specifically 
concea:ned with budgetary coneys, there would perhaps be merit in 
attempting to distinguish between the two words. In doing this, 
performance budgeting might be regarded as an extension of - but 
within the spirit of - the programme budget concept; adding, in 
effect, a work measurement element to the programme approach. 
Perferman<fe budgeting, that is, has the twin implications of, 
firstly, organization of the budget by programmes of activities, 
and, secondly, the expression of estimates and accomplishments in 
objective measurable terms* 
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budgeting are presently enjoyihg considerable popularity. This 
interest was greatly stimulated by the 1949 Hoover Commission report on 
Budgeting and Accounting, although, as has been pointed out by several 
observers, seme government agencies and municipal authorities had 
earlier used the programme concept in budgeting. The Hoover Commission 
strongly advocated the introduction of performance budgeting* 
"We recommend that the whole budgetary concept of the Federal 
Gevernment should be refashioned by the adoption of a budget 
based upon functions, activities, and projects: this we designate 
as a 'performance budget*." 35 
The Commission went on to say* 
"Such an approach would focus attention upon the general 
character and relative importance of the work to be done, 
or upon the service to be rendered, rather than upon the 
things to be acquired, such as personal services, supplies, 
equipment, and so on* These latter objects are after all 
only the means to an end* The all-important thing in budgeting 
is the work or service to be accomplished, and what the work or 
service will cost. 
Under performance budgeting, attention is centred on the 
function or activity - on the accomplishment of the purpose -
instead of on lists of employees or authorizations of purchases* 
In reality, this method of budgeting concentrates congressional 
actien and executive direction on the scope and magnitude of the 
different Federal activities* It places both accomplishment and 
cost in a clear light before the Congress and the public*" 36 
A performance budget, then, will be arranged on the basis of various 
prograomes and activities. Each programme must then be broken down 
34* See, fer instance, Catherine Seckler-Hudson, "Performance Budgeting 
in Gevernment," Advanced Management, March, 1953» PP*7-8; and the 
account of earlier experiments given by Jesse Burkhead, Government 
Budgeting. New York, Wiley, 1959, PP.133-139. 
35* The Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the 
Government, Budgetiag and Accounting, Washington, Government 
Printing Office, 1949, Recommendation No* 1, p*8* 
36* ibid., pp.8-9. 
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according to the performance of the agencies involved in its 
accomplishment, and in such a way that measurement of performance and 
ascertaining of costs is facilitated. Information about objects 
acquired (the central feature of the line-item approach to budgeting) 
is in this case presented in terms of the use to which those objects 
are put in the carrying out of particular programmes of activity. 
Thus the section of the budgebt dealing with, say^ roadworks, would be 
set out en the basis of miles of road to be repaired, instead of in 
terms of tons of gravel and cement to be purchased, number of men to 
be hired, and so on. 
There is a certain attractiveness about the idea of framing a 
budget so that it expresses the operations of a government according to 
its output of activities conducted, rather than in accordance with input. 
Such a budget could bring benefits that are not provided by an 
©bject-of-expenditure formulatien* By concentrating on the task te 
be done the performance budget could provide an important management 
tool* Not only could it reduce unimportant detail and so allow more 
intelligent action by the central budget agency, but it could also be 
the basis of greater departmental initiative in planning;* This form of 
presentation of information, moreover, may considerably facilitate 
legislative review* 
Each year a government is faced with the problem of meeting a 
wide range of demands from resources that are limitede Decisions must 
be made about which services may be provided and which omitted or 
deferred. It is widely claimed that the performance budget can make a 
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very substantial contribution to the reaching of informed decisions 
of this sort. The "traditional" line-item budget contains a detailed 
listing of the positions that would be filled and the things that would 
be bought with the expenditures authorized by the legislative body. 
In a situation, however, in which an enormous variety of services is 
performed it msiy be difficult to assess need^n this type of 
information* The legislature is being required to base its approval 
of expenditures upon the details of the budget, not upon the relative 
importance of the several functions and activities for which funds are 
sought. 
Decisions about the dividing up of blocks of funds needed to 
accomplish specified purposes might well be left to departmental heads 
and budget officials* To fulfil its function of authorization in a 
meaningful way the legislature perhaps needs information of a very 
different kind from that given to it in line-item budgets. 
(1) What are the objectives of each department and ageacy? 
What are the reasons given by each unit of government for 
its seeking appropriations of funds? What services does 
it provide which justify its existence? 
(11) By what programmes or activities does the department or 
agency seek to achieve its objectives? What volume of 
work does each of its activities require? 
(ill) What has been the level of service achieved as a result of 
appropriations previously made? What level of service might 
be expected if the amounts sought were now appropriated? 
The answers to some of these questions should be expressed in 
meaningful units of service and cost* It is in providing such answers 
that the performance budget may serve a real purpose and enable Informed 
decisions to be reached* Through it an assessment may be able to be made 
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of how well the various governmental activities have been performed 
and whether the level of each activity should be maintained or varied. 
The performance budget may also have advantages beyond the 
providing of a more effective means of reviewing proposed programmes of 
activity* From the standpoint of the individual department 
administration is aided by the very process of producing a performance 
budget* To provide the required data on its operations each department 
must not only collect and examine the facts about its activities, but 
must indulge, too, in some clear and critical thinking about what it 
is trying to do and how it can best do iit* Not only this, performance 
budgeting should involve greater freedom for departmental managers. 
Under the system legislative attention centres on programmes and 
overall activities, leaving departmental officials free to act on 
their own initiative within the appropriation limit approved for each 
prograiame* One of the greatest merits of performance budgeting, then, 
may be its effect in increasing the area of discretion and responsibility 
of departmental heads* 
To discuss at length the difficulties involved in implementing 
this concept of budgeting would go well beyond the scope of our study* 
We may, however, note briefly some of the problems actually encountered 
by the few states that have adopted programme budgeting in one form or 
37o Some other problems will be mentioned, however, in the discussion 
of budgetaa:'y classification in Chapter 4* 
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another, and discuss the difficulties likely to be met by any 
state wishing to change from line-item budgeting. 
The performance concept cannot be regarded as a cure-all for 
the ills of budget-making* In solving some of the old problems it 
undoubtedly creates new ones* 
In the first place, one of the major tasks involved in introducing 
performance budgeting is the developing of adequate methods of 
providing figures for accrued expenditures and programme costs. 
Whei^  dealing with some operating departments it may be relatively 
easy to establish units of cost and performance - miles of street 
resurfacing carried out, number of houses provided with water and 
sewerage, book circulation, and so on* Of course, egen in operating 
departments problems will arise when it comes to activities like 
recreation programmes or park maintenance, but units of measurement 
can and are being formulated* With other sorts of governmental 
activities, however, the task is not so straightforward. How, for 
instance, may one measure the end product of, say, police operations? 
Performance could be measured simply in terms of the extent of the 
conduct of the activity - e.g., in terms of man-hours of patrel duty 
carried out - but this is only a very ppor substitute for measurement 
of actual results* Again, let us take what at first sight seems an easy 
example: purchasing* There is no difficulty in setting up a work 
measurement unit based on the number of purchase requisitions issued* 
But this is not an appropriate way of assessing a purchasing programme* 
The aim of such a programme is not the issuing of orders; it is the 
- 50 -
securing of materials for departments at the lowest cost consistent 
with the desired quality and in the time required* This has no 
necessary relationship to the number of orders issued* Most personnel 
activities also involve problems of measurement* Indeed, numerous 
examples could be given of difficulties similar to those already 
mentioned* As things stand at the moment, performance budgeting can 
be little more than an aspiration for most state governments* T^ e 
development and application of standards and units of cost and 
performance requires a great deal of spade work and much greater effort 
by budget examining staffs than is involved in conventional budgeting* 
Not only is it costly, but few, if any, states are adequately staffed 
for programme budgeting* Maryland, as we shall see later, has perhaps 
gone furthest towards setting up the machinery required for programme 
budgeting, while several other states, notably Illinois, Kentucky, 
Michigan, and Oklahoma, have been moving in that direction^ but in no 
case has it been possible to base the budgetary process entirely on 
performance concepts. 
Quite apart from problems associated with the staffing of 
budget agencies which would arise with the introduction of perforxaance 
budgeting, it must be appreciated that the changeover from the line-item 
approach could not be effective without an accompanying thorough-going 
reorganization of the government's accounting system* It is, after all, 
the accounting system which must throw up the data needed for budget 
formulation and control. If accounts are kept on a strictly 
organizational, object basis, planning and control in terms of 
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programmes of activity is hardly practicable* This is particularly 
so when one department, as is coiamonly the case, is responsible for 
several separate programmes* In such an instance the operating costs 
of each programme would not be apparent unless the department's 
organizational structure and its accounting system were specifically 
designed to reflect its programme activity. 
It is, of course, possible, though time-consuming, to assemble 
object data into programme form to meet a particular need or occasion. 
Several states with line-item budgets do this for the purpose of budget 
"justification"* Ontario is one such instance which we shall be 
examining. This is, however, essentially a single exercise. It does 
not provide a continuing record of programme performance for management 
andi cost control such as is normally envisaged by advocates of 
performance budgeting. This can only be provided by integration of 
the accounting and budget systems. Probably the sole alternative to 
this - and perhaps this would constitute the only "true" performance 
budget system - would be to direct attention entirely to the end result 
of a budget and completely aj^ andon any attempt to control the means to 
that end. This would involve giving programme managers complete 
autonomy as to procedures stnd methods within the boundaries of total 
cost, requiring them only to comply with the provisions of some general 
code* It is unlikely that any state executive would be prepared to 
delegate auiUaorlty to that extent, or that any state legislature would 
authorize such a system* Some degree of control from the centre must 
therefore be assumed to be required and this in turn would involve 
jetary and accounting integration* 
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Many problems are involved in achieving such integration in 
a way that would permit effective performance budgeting. One set of 
problems is ©rganizational in nature. If the accounting and budgeting 
functions are the responsibility of different departments, it may be 
difficult for the budget officer to obtain needed information in 
precisely the form in which it is required* Often, for instance, 
the accounting office keeps only appropriation records, so that the 
budget office must rely on departmental reports for programme 
information* The result may be that departmental accounting and the 
budget system are integrated, but not the central accounting system. 
Maryland provides an example of this* In that State - the first to 
adopt a budget of the programme variety - departments are required to 
submit monthly expenditure reports directly to the budget agency. 
The form of these reports was decided by the budget agency, and the 
information they provide serves no purpose for the central accounting 
office, which maintains only appropriation records coftctaining nothing 
of an activity nature* In some instances, departments receive direct 
assistance from the budget agency in the keeping of detailed fineuicial 
records, rather than from the central accounting office. 
If a state wished to adopt performance budgeting bifc^ o^r 
institutional or other reasons could not abandon the "traditional" 
form of accounting, it could meet the needs of performance budgeting 
by maintaining two independent sets of accounts. One of these sets 
would be used mainly for appropriation control, the other, prepared on 
a programme basis, would figure in departmental operations and budget 
review* This zalght well represent a practical way of solving particular 
difficulties, despite the wastefulness of keeping dual accounts - at 
l^ast if it can be shown that the extra cost is outweighed by the 
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advantages gained from programme budgeting* 
The second set of problems stems from the basis on which 
governmental accounts are normally prepared. One of the essential 
purposes of performance budgeting is to measure the cost of each 
undertaking so that a comparison can be made of programmes and resources 
can then be allocated appropriately among them* This suggests that if 
accurate determinations and comparisons are to be made over a period, 
expenditures should be kept on an accrual basis. Yet most governmental 
accounting uses a cash basis^ and this is, in fact, often required by 
law* In these circumstances, th<e accounts reflet only the good^ k^nd 
services paid for during a fiscal period; unlike the accrual method, 
which shows the goods and services actually used. Maryland, it is true, 
has been able to go a long way towards performance budgeting without 
radically changing its earlier accounting procedures, but, in general, 
substantial elements of accrual accounting must be adopted if 
performance budgeting is to be effectively carried on. Washington 
State provides one example of a state which has introduced the accrual 
method as part of a sweeping overhaul of its accounting system* 
In his study. The Budgetary Process in the United States, Smithies 
brings out yet another difficulty which may arise in installing a 
prograipie-type budget* He suggests that even if it can be demonstratedi 
that the programme budget is preferable for planning and evaluation 
purposes, it must be recognized that the organizational unit responsible 
for the carrying out of a programme is not always coterminous with the 
programme itself and cannot therefore be fully held to account for 
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management* That is to say, there may be a conflict between the 
requirements of programming and those of execution* This sort of 
situation may arise, for instance, when a department has a regional 
o rgeml za tl on: 
"From the policy standpoint, the functional division of the 
department's program as a whole may be the essential breakdown. 
But from the point of view of efficient execution, it may be 
desirable to regard each regional office as the responsible unit*.. 
In short, a budget that reflects programs adequately is unlikely 
to be all that is needed from the standpoint of economy and 
efficiency***" 38 
"The departmental reviews should compensate for the failure 
of a program budget in important instances to record the 
performance of organization units. When an organization unit 
handles parts of several programs, its head escapes 
accountability if budgeting and review are done on a program 
basis exclusively. Consequently the departmental review should 
pay special attention to the performance of responsible 
Individuals within it* Otherwise, it may be impossible to go 
below the top level in fixing responsibility for departmental 
actions.***" 39 
Smithies' discussion of this problem is directed towards the 
United States federal government* The nature of government at that 
level, its size, and complexity, intensify the difficulties* At the 
state level the problem, though it exists, is by no means as acute. 
In those states which are experimenting with programme-type budgeting 
it has been possible for the most part to retain departmental 
identification in the making of appropriations, even where several 
major organizational units are associated with one programme. In 
departments having an institutional structure, moreover, the 
appropriation would normally be made to each individual institution -
38. A, Smithies, The Budgetary Process in the United States, New York, 
McGraw Hill, 1955, p.84o 
39. ibid., po210. 
sometimes to the institution as such, sometimes in accordance with 
the programmes for which it is responsible* In this way comparisons 
can be made of the performance of different institutions, while 
management responsibility remains unimpaired. Occasionally, too, 
the operations of branch offices are treated in a similar way in 
the exercising of control or the making of appropriations. 
The need to institute cost accounting procedures may also be a 
handicap to the introduction of performance budgeting. It is 
unnecessary here to examine the differences of opinion which exist 
concerning the part which cost accounting should plsiy in performance 
budgeting. We need only note that some authorities look upen cost 
accounting as an integral phase of the performance budget system, 
whereas others prefer budgetary tools that do not involve this method 
40 
of accounting. When costing procedures are considered essential 
they will undoubtedly be expensive to introduce, but it does seem clear 
that a state could move well on the way towards performance budgeting 
without adopting this form of accounting* 
There seems to be a tendency for the literature on budgeting to 
look upon the performance and line-item approaches as being mutually 
exclusive. This is not the case, however* An emphasis upon performance 
aspects of governmental operations, for instance, will not necessarily 
eliminate from the budget the listings of objects of expenditure, 
40/ cf. Jesse Burkhead, op.cit., pp.150-151* 
- 56 -
Legislatures have become accustomed to the line-item form of 
presentation and even though an administration may find it convenient 
to use the programme approach in preparing its budget, it may, as in 
Ontario, be unable to avoid subsequently breaking down proposed 
expenditures for each budgetary planning unit into items covering 
personnel, equipment, supplies, and so on* We shall see, too, that 
there are problems of this sort in Maryland. 
t One of the most interesting recent discussions of programme 
4l 
and line-item budgeting is provided by Wildavsky. As he does in a 
number of other aspects of budgeting, Wildavsky breaks new ground by 
suggesting that the traditional budgetary procedure increases agreement 
amongst the participants whereas the programme device decreases it* 
"The incremental, fragmented, non-pjcggrammatiac, and 
sequential procedures of the present budgetary process slid 
in securing agreement and reducing the burden of calculation. 
It is much easier to agree on an addition or reduction of a 
few thousand or a million than to agree on whether a program 
is good in the abstract. It is much easier to agree on a 
small addition or decrease than to compare the worth of one 
program to that of all others*" 42 
In effect, the Incremental approach to budgeting used in the 
traditional method of preparation considerably reduces the field open 
to dispute* Similarly, problems of calculation are very much 
lessened, simply because it is not necessary to evaluate all 
expenditures in a comprehensive fashion* 
4l* Aaron Wildavsky, op*cit*, pp.135-138. 
42* ibid*, p*136. 
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This is a particularly important consideration so far as United 
States' budgetary procedures are concerned. The system by which 
legislative subcommittees review sections of the budget presented 
by the executive has the potential for serious conflict. Such 
conflict would probably occur if the subcommittees and committees 
of the legislature were required to decide upon the merits or otherwis< 
of overall programmes of activity. The programme approach would 
inevitably direct attention to policy differences between the major 
political parties* As it is, budgets are considered in relatively 
independent segments and it is possible for party differences to be 
kept in the background during the committees' deliberations* "Thus, 
the usual process of taking something from a program here, adding to 
a program there, swapping this for that, can go on at the committee 
stage without having to take the kind of 'yes' or 'no' party positions 
that may be required at the voting stage on the floor." ^  
The fact that conflict is likely to be less under the traditional 
incremental approach to budget formulation should not, of course, be 
taken as a justification of that form of budgeting. More, rather than 
less conflict may be desirable. However, the reduction of conflict is 
one of the values of our society and that value, we must note, would 
44 probably be affected by a system of performance budgeting,'' 
43. ibid., p,137o 
44, ibid., p,138. 
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Finally, the line-item budget is prepared, as we have seen, by 
estimating needs according to detailed objects of expenditure* This in 
itself does not cohistitute a valid criticism of this form of budget. 
What is important for this or any other type of budget is the way in 
which the detailed estimates of expenditure have been arrived at. 
Expenditure estimates are frequently drawn up on the basis of the 
previous year's expenditures, rather than according to a department's 
assessment of what it is desirable or possible to accomplish in the 
forthcoming fiscal period* This may be so even in systems based on 
programme planning. That is to say, a system which takes previous 
expenditures as a guide for current and future needs offers no 
guarantee that activities will necessarily be appropriately related to 
the means available for carrying them out* A lack of tools of evaluation 
may lead to the continuance of programmes of declining significance. 
And on the other side of the coin, moreover, information presented in 
line-item form may well have been arrived at only after programme aims 
and work loads had been established by investigation. 
One cannot, therefore, pronounce on the desirability of one form 
of budget over another without taking into account the aims and general 
philosophies of the budget processes in the particular systems being 
examined. Nor can definite conclusions be reached about the effect of 
various forms of budgeting on the quality of legislative examination of 
proposed expenditures. Some discussion of both these aspects, however, 
is to be found later in this study. 
CHAPTER 3 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF BUDGETARY MACHINERY 
"...Being come home, I to Sir W. Batten, and there 
hear our business was tendered to the House to-day, 
and a Committee of the whole House chosen to examine 
our accounts, and a great many Hotspurs enquiring into 
it, and likely to give us much trouble and blame, and 
perhaps (which I am afeard of) will find faults enow 
to demand better officers. This I truly fear." 
Pepys. (26th September, 1666) 
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THE PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM 
The formulation of adequate machinery and procedures for 
preparing the budget and controlling public expenditures is a 
comparatively recent development. As we know it to-day in 
parliamentary forms of government, budgeting had its beginnings in 
England, where it evolved along with the systems of representative 
... •»»» 
and responsible government. Its main lines began to emerge during 
and after the seventeenth century conflict between monarch and 
parliament - a struggle in which control of public finance was one 
1 
of the most important issues. 
This section aims only at sketching in the minimum amount of 
background needed for an appreciation of the process of budget 
formulation'. The growth of parliamentary government is not 
discussed in detail* No attempt is made to summarise or assess the 
wealth of historical and polemical material relating to control of 
2 finance in England* Nor is a step by step account given of the 
1. Attempts to control the raising of revenue date, of course, from a 
much earlier period, but expenditure controls are essentially a 
post-1688 development* See W. F. Willoughby's brief account under 
the heading, "Budget", in (Ed.) Edwin R. A. Seligman, The 
Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, London, Macmlllan, 1930, 
Vol. Ill, pp*38-44. 
2. A useful account of the "rise and fall" of parliament as financial 
controller is given by Paul Einzig, The Control of the Purse, London, 
Seeker and Warburg, 1959. Financial committees of the House of 
Commons are discussed by Basil Chubb, The Control of Publle 
Expenditure, Oxford University Press, 1952, and by K. C. Wheare, 
Gevernment by Committee, Oxford University Press, 1955« More 
recently a different and interesting approach is provided by Gordon 
Reid, The Politics of Financial Control, London, Hutchinson, 1966* 
Raid's book also contains a valuable select bibliography covering 
various aspects of parliamentaiy control of finance* 
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development of budgetary procedures in Australia and Canada since 
those countries took over the British model, in its essentials at 
least, and adapted it to meet local circumstances* Some specific 
Australian and Canadian divergences from British practice are, 
3 however, brought out in later chapters. 
Our main concern is with the existing machinery for formulating 
budgets, rather than with the parliamentary procedures relating to the 
authorization stage of the budgetary process. For our purposes it is 
sufficient to note that even after the legislature had established its 
right to control both the levying of taxes and the spending of public 
funds a long period elapsed before machinery and practices were 
actually brought to the stage where the hard-won power over 
appropriations and expenditures could be exercised effectively. 
Although in the period after the revolution of 1688 the notion of 
appropriation began to be accepted as a normal feature of parliamentary 
control, it was not until late in the eighteenth century that the 
desirability of viewing financial policy as a whole was recognized, 
and there emerged the practice of presenting to parliament a financial 
plan which might be regarded as corresponding, at least in its main 
features, to a modern budget. Nearly another century was then to pass 
3* Surprisingly little work has yet been done on the administrative 
history of the Australian states and the Canadian provinces. 
Some of the relevant writings are discussed in chapter 9* 
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before effective action was taken to ensure that public moneys were 
applied exclusively to the purposes for which they had been appropriated. 
It is true that the treasury, guided by able political figures and 
officials like Lord Godolphin, Sir George Downing and Charles Bertie, 
had gained by the early eighteenth century a leading position among 
4 departments* However, its influence over departmental finances 
remained restricted until at least the middle of the nineteenth 
century. In the first place, although after I688 the expenditures 
of the armed services were required to be voted annually, their 
6 
estimates were not presented in detail to parliament. Nor were 
there any such annual votes for the civil departments* The expenses 
of the comparatively small civil organization of government were met 
from the civil list, out of which the monarch's personal expenses were 
also defrayed. In effect, consideration by the house of national 
4* It is difficult to put any precise date to the emergence of the 
treasury as a leading public department, but clearly its development 
to its modern position is continuous from the revolution of I688; 
the way for this development having been opened by the requirement 
from 1667 that departments furnish weekly accounts of their 
transactions with the exchequer, cf. Lord Bridges, The Treasury, 
London, Allen and Unwin, 1964, pp.17 ff» and Stephen B* Baxter, 
The Development of the Treasury 166O-I702, London, Longmans, Ggeen 
and Co., 1957i passim* Ursula Hicks probably overstates the 
influence of Sir William Lowndes (Public Finance, London, James 
Nisbet and Co. Ltd., 2nd edition, 1955, P*47, footnote 2) when she 
asserts that his work in the treasury was "at least equally 
important" as that of Downing. 
5* However complete it may have been in theory, treasury control was, 
in practice, much more limited than is usually admitted. It has 
been suggested that this situation applied until well into the 
present century, cf* Ann M. Burton, "Treasury Control and Colonial 
Policy in the Late Nineteenth Century," Public Administration 
(London), Vol. XLIV, Summer, 1966, pp*l69 ff. 
60 Cf. Basil Chubb, op.cit*, pp.8-9* 
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expenditure as a whole was restricted to the occasions when the 
king overspent his civil list grants and sought additional funds. 
It was only by degrees between 176O and 183O that departmental 
expenditures were taken off the civil list and annual parliamentary 
appropriations were introduced* As far as revenue was concerned it 
was customary to assign fees and the proceeds of particular taxes to 
individual departments. Each department kept the accounts of revenue 
and expenditure relating to its own activities, and was to a large 
extent financially independent. This cumbersome arrangement persisted 
until 1787, when Pitt established the consolidated fund method of 
financing departmental expenditure. Under this system the proceeds of 
all taxes were paid into a common fund and departments received 
allocations from the fund to cover expenditure authorized by 
7 
parliament* &t this time, too, there was introduced the practice of 
laying the financial year's programme before the house, so that 
thenceforward we have budgets that bear at least a superficial 
o 
resemblance to those of to-day* The changes made at this time, 
7o The fund was described by the legislation as one "into which shall 
flow every stream of the revenue, and from which shall issue the 
supply for every public service"* (27 Geo.Ill, c*13» S 47) 
8* Downing is sometimes regarded as the first to recognize the 
principle of appropriation, on the ground that in 1665 he induced 
Charles II to agree to an amount of £1-^  million being "appropriated" 
exclusively for the Dutch war. This was, however, an isolated 
instance (cf. Lord Bridges, op.cit., p.l9)» and in any case there 
had been much earlier examples of similar pppropriation clauses -
e*g. in 1353 and l426* (Cf. Basil Chubb, op.cit., pp.7-8, and 
Sir Frank Tribe, "Parliamentary Control of Public Expenditure," 
Public Administration (London), Vol. XXXII, Winter, 1954, p*365.) 
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together with those resulting from the preceding "economical reform" 
movement and Burke's civil establishment act of 1782, are of great 
importance, not only in their own right, but also because they opened 
the way fer later financial reforms. As Reid points out, the creation 
of the consolidated fund "broke the disorder caused by assigning 
particular taxes to special purposes and.**provided the means of 
infinite expenditure control through comprehensive appropriation 
9 
schedules". 
Most of the remaining parts of the present British budgetary 
machinery were creations of the nineteenth century. After the accession 
of William IV in 183O it was decided that the expenses of civil 
government should be removed from the civil list, thus separating 
them from the crown's personal expenses. The classification of supply 
votes was gradually made more detailed in a series of changes between 
1824 and 1847, until the civil estimates took on most of their present 
10 
characteristics. The process of reform of the exchequer, involving 
abolition of sinecures and obsolete systems of accounting, was 
virtually completed by the changes made after Lord Grenville's death 
in 1834. The separate posts of paymaster were consolidated into the 
office of paymaster general in 1836; while the position of comptroller 
and auditor general emerged in 1866 after several changes which 
culminated in the amalgamation of the departments of exchequer and 
9* Gordon Reid, op.cit., p.57« See also Basil Chubb, op.cit., 
pp.10-12. 
10, Cf. Basil Chubb, op.cit., p.11* 
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audit* This represented, of course, another crucial step as far 
as parliamentary control of finance is concerned, for it is clear 
that a system of appropriation, by which parliament authorizes the 
spending of money in particular ways, needs to be supported by a 
system designed to check whether the funds so provided have been 
applied only to the approved ends* A long period elapsed before this 
proposition was accepted, however* The first appropriation audit, 
aimed at ensuring that all departmental expenditures were in 
accordance with the purposes of the relevant parliamentary votes 
and that the total amounts voted were not exceeded, did not come until 
1832. The admiralty was the department then concerned, but the system 
was not further extended until 1846 when the war and ordnance offices 
were required to submit accounts showing how voted moneys had been 
spent. There was another extension in 185I to the office of woods and 
works, and ten years later to the revenue departments; while the 
obligation to present accounts and submit to audit was made universal 
12 by the exchequer and audit departments act of 1866. Other notable 
developments of the l860's were the creation of the public accounts 
committee and the emergence of the practice of introducing single finance 
and appropriation measures, respectively to levy the taxes and vote the 
expenditures sought in the budget - a practice which gave parliament a 
11. ibid., p*13« It may be noted that this last change involved a 
mingling of the executive function of the exchequer with the 
parliamentary function of the audit department, and stimulated a 
good deal of opposition at the time* 
12. 29 and 30 Vict* c*39» Cf. Sir Frank Tribe, op.cit., p.3^5 and 
Basil Chubb, op.cit., pp*11 and 21* 
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broader picture of the government's financial proposals than was 
previously available to it* 
These alterations and additions to the financial system were 
chiefly concerned with strengthening parliamentary control over 
expenditure and improving the methods of keeping public accounts, though 
they also had the effect of forcing departments to estimate their 
financial requirements much more accurately and specifically than was 
necessary under earlier arrangements* With the passing of the 
exchequer and audit departments act of 1866 the essential features of 
the budgetary process - the preparation of a more or less comprehensive 
plan, the authorization of that plan by the legislature, the carrying 
out of the plan, and the rendering of an accounting to the legislature 
at the end of the financial period - were in existence* From that time 
onward, although changes in attitudes towards control and economy in 
governmental spending have occurred, a regular financial routine, not 
13 
very different from to-day's, has been followed* 
As has already been suggested, Australia and Canada adopted or 
had imposed upon them the essential features of the British financial 
procedures existing at the time of their colonization. While they 
remained in a colonial situation subsequent British developments 
13« Gordon Reid, op.cit*, p*155» makes some perceptive comments about 
shortcomings in the present arrangements for debating the British 
budget and points to the need for a method "by which the annual 
financial plan - or even a plan for a longer period - may be 
considered as a whole and also by its component parts,..." 
The time is clearly ripe for sweeping changes in the parliamentary 
procedures relating to budget authorization as well as in the 
methods of budget preparation which are the subject of this study. 
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continued to be incorporated into their financial system©* It would be 
interesting to examine this process of transfer in detail, but to do so 
would raise matters peripheral to our present study and necessitate 
a lengthy account in its own right. The general point of transference 
of procedures should, however, be briefly illustrated. This can be done 
by reference to the formative years of New South Wales. 
Well established practices existed to cover the handling of public 
moneys by colonial officials and there were "model" regulations which 
could be used or adapted as required by local circumstances. From a 
colony's foundation steps were taken by the colonial office to ensure 
that only authorized procedures were observed in financial affairs. 
Governor Phillip, for instance, was given precise instructions in this 
regard before the first fleet sailed. 
"I have this day received your Lordship's letter of the 6th 
with a printed copy of an Act, for better examining and auditing 
the Public Accounts, and I have the honour to assure Your 
Lordship that I shall strictly conform myself to the particular 
sections pointed out, and shall take care that all Sub.-
Accountants conform to the directions contained therein." 14 
For audit and review purposes, too, the accounts of the colony's 
commissariat were regularly despatched to England; a practice that 
15 
continued until the end of l843. ^ From time to time throughout the 
14. Original correspondence, CO.201/2* Phillip to Sydney, 23rd April, 
1787. Microfilm, Mitchell Library. Quoted, Arthur McMartin, "The 
Treasury in New South Wales, 1786-1836," Public Administration 
(Sydney), Vol* XVII, No. 3, September, 1958, p.215* McMartin also 
quotes part of a despatch of 1798 which indicates the continuing 
interest of the secretary of state in orderly financial administrat-
ion, and specifically instructs Hunter that he is to observe the 
printed instructions "in common with the Governors of His Majesty's 
other colonies". 
15. Cf. V. E. Cohen, An Historical Survey of the Establishment and 
Development of the Audit and of the Public Accounts in N.S.W*, 
Sydney, Unpublished, 1938, p.1» 
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nineteenth century, moreover, the colonial office issued lengthy 
and detailed directions concerning financial management and in 183O 
set up a commission to inquire into the revenues and expenditures of 
16 
all colonies* Commissions to examine the functioning of particular 
17 
colonies or dependencies were also common. 
Quite apart from this type of direct oversight a certain amount 
of regularity and uniformity in a procedural sense undoubtedly arose 
from the fact that many key officials had served in more than one 
colony and were well experienced in the requirements of their offices. 
Among early New South Wales officials, for instance, we find that the 
first colonial treasurer, William Balcombe, had previously been at St. 
Helena, whilst William Lithgow, the first auditor-general, had been 
transferred from Mauritius. That movement of officials from one 
colony to another was regarded as normal practice is borne out by 
colonial office instructions to governors requiring them to report on 
candidates for public office, in order that: 
"...when a vacancy or an opportunity for promotion occurs, the 
Secretary of State may have before him the means of judging 
how far the particular candidate recommended by the Governor 
is on the whole the best qualified, and whether a candidate of 
proper qualifications is to be found in the Colony or in any 
adjacent Colony."I8 
16. Cf, Arthur McMartin, op.cit*, p.227* 
17* E.g. Trinidad l802. West Africa I81I, New South Wales 1819 and 1823. 
(Cf. Martin Wight, The Development of the Legislative Council, 
1606-1945, London, Faber, 1946, p*56.) 
180 Regulations Relative to Tenure of Office in the Colonies, 6th 
August, 1847, mss, Mitchell Library, Sydney* (Emphasis mine) 
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It may be noted, too, that Sir Penrose Julyan, who became crown 
agent in I858, had previously served in such varied capacities as 
special commissioner of roads and bridges in Lower Canada, on the 
financial secretariat of the board of works in Ireland, and as 
19 director of the Australian branch of the royal mint. 
,_^  , Of course, complete uniformity of practice from colony to colony 
cQuld hardly be expected or, indeed, regarded as desirable. 
Circumstances differed widely from place to place and allowances 
had to be made for this. As a penal establishment, sparsely settled 
and in a precarious economic position. New South Wales in its early 
yearel had many special problems to face - not the least of these being 
an acute shortage of trained and trustworthy officials. In 1827, for 
example, governor Darling lamented that: 
"The system here, probably arising from necessity, from 
the nature of things, has been pernicious in the extreme. 
When I arrived there was hardly a Clerk in any of the Public 
Offices, even those of the greatest trust and confidence, 
who was not a convict." 20 
Individuals, too, might sometimes exercise strong personal influence 
over matters of organization and procedures of government, as Geoffrey 
21 Eagar later did in the financial affairs of New South Wales. The 
distance of a colony from England was another factor giving rise to 
19o Cf. A. W. Abbott, A Short History of the Crown Agents and Their 
Office, London, Eyre and Spottiswoode Ltd., 1959, pp.l8-19* 
20* Quoted V. H. Cohen, op.cit., pp*68-9* 
2I0 Cfo P. N. Lamb, op.cit.. pp.19 ff.; and K. W. Knight, The 
Development of the Public Service of New South Wales from 
Responsible Government (1856) to the Establishment of the 
Public Service Board (l895)t unpublished thesis. University 
of Sydney, 1955, PP.56-57. 
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particular variations in practices, required to meet difficulties of 
communication. However, even after allowance is made for adaptations 
needed to cope with peculiar local circumstances, it would still be 
correct to say that the basic British system of financial control 
passed intact to Australia and Canada. Some deviations from British 
budgetary practice are apparent to-day - e.g* the use made in Canada 
of treasury boards - and will be examined later; but McMartin correctly 
assesses the general position when he argues that there is a continuity 
in colonial administrative history* As he puts it: 
"There are no sudden breaks or startling innovations in the 
methods by which the second British Empire came to be 
controlled as compared with the first* The procedures by 
which:: Georgia and Nova Scotia had been administered are 
gradually adapted and altered to meet the changing needs of 
the new colonies such as Ceylon and New South Wales* In 
the end we can see that a new system has arisen but it is 
often difficult to say precisely where the old one ends and 
the new one begins." 22 
22, Arthur McMartin, op.cit., p.2l4. 
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II 
THE CONGRESSIONAL SYSTEM 
At both the national and state levels the adoption of 
comprehensive governmental budgeting arrangements came much later 
in the United States than in Australia and Canada, whose budgetary 
systems, as we have noted, were derived directly from that of 
England. In fact, no other major nation of the world so long 
23 delayed the establishment of an integrated budget system. 
A brief outline of the main steps in the process of budgetary 
development in the United States is essential if we are to appreciate 
the reasons both for the divergence from the course of development in 
Australia and Canada, and for the wide variations in machinery and 
procedure which still exist amongst the American states. Many ©f; 
the present differences hag® their roots in the past. 
The American system of administration derived from the British 
and in a general way it may be argued that it has remained British in 
form and spirit* White has summed this up well: 
"...The colonists brought English government with them and 
although the Revolution broke the political tie, the 
administrative structure withstood the separation and became 
the foundation of state and local governments and of the 
administrative structure of the new general government* The 
23. It is true that Hamilton at an early stage personally presented his 
financial proposals to congress and that these exhibited a high 
degree of unity. However, this period of executive initiative in 
budgeting was brief and the practice of presenting a unified set of 
financial proposals did not continue* 
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organic administrative laws, as Jefferson observed, were 
written from English models. Ideas of self-government, of 
local responsibility, of the place of officials in the life 
of the community were English in their origin and substeaice. 
Developments since the Revolution have been in conformity 
with Anglo-Saxon ideals; the centralized, authoritative, and 
inclusive pattern of the European continent has never made 
headway in the United States,"24 
This assessment is undoubtedly correct if administration is viewed 
in broad terms. Certainly, America's governmental heritage is British 
and its system of government may be characterized as "Anglo-Saxon", 
Nevertheless, in a number of significant particular respects the 
United States has departed from British practice. One such example 
is budgeting. 
It is not surprising that budget procedures in the United States 
developed along different lines from those of Australia and Canada. 
In large part this is simply a reflection of the fact that the 
American colonies won their independence at a much earlier date, and 
at a time when, as we have already seen, the budget system of Great 
Britain was itself not fully developed. The colonial budget system 
before the American Revolution need not be examined in detail, but 
we may note that the chsiin of events by which parliamentary sovereignty 
was established in England at the expense of the royal prerogative 
25 
was paralleled by similar moves in America. In effect, control of 
24, Leonard D. White, Introduction to the Study of Public Administration, 
New York, Macmlllan, Fourth Edition, 1955, P*l4. 
25. Useful and well documented accounts of this movement are given by 
Leonard Woods Labaree, Royal Government in America, New York, 
Ungar Publishing Co., 1958, Chapter VII,and A* Berridale Keith, 
Constitutional History of the First British Empire, Oxford 
University Press, 1930, chapter VIII* 
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finance was used by colonial assemblies as one of their strongest 
weapons in limiting gubernatorial power. 
During the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries the colohial 
governors in theory had extensive financial powers* Warrants for all 
expenditures had to be issued by the governor (sometimes with the 
consent of councillors), and in essence, once supply had been 
approved by the legislative body, the disposal of the authorized 
funds was at his discretion. The only significant checks on this 
discretion were the provisions that accounts had to be submitted to 
the home authorities for auditing, or to the auditor-general's deputy 
in the colony, and that the legislative assembly should be permitted to 
examine the accounts; thus affording its members a chance to criticize 
the uses to which funds had been put. In the absence of detailed 
appropriations, however, the governor's area of discretion remained wide. 
But over a period of time the colonial legislatures gained more and 
more financial power by using, in much the same way as the house of 
commons, their initiative in the raising of local revenue and the 
technique of appropriating money for specific purposes. As a result, 
by the middle of the eighteenth century the colonial assemblies had 
won at least de facto control of expenditures* This meant, in turn, 
that there was no effective executive leadership in budgeting. 
26 
It has. been argued by Vieg that until the movement for state 
26. John A. Vieg, "The Growth of Public Administration" in (Ed.) 
Fritz Morstein Marx, Elementi^f Public Administration, 
Englewood Cliffs, Prentice-Hall, 1959, P*9» 
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administrative reorganization began the impact of the British 
example on state administration can best be described in terms of 
"reverse English"* The suggestion is that after 1776 when new 
state governments were organized the model of the powerful chief 
executive was deliberately reversed. State constitutions were 
designed specifically to ensure the dominance of the legislature 
and the subordination of the executive. There was a fear of 
centralized administrative authority and although there is now a 
tendency for the office of governor to become sai increasingly strong 
one, it was for a long period completely overshadowed by the state 
legislative bodies. This is confirmed by contemporary comments, such 
as that of James Madison during the constitutional convention debates: 
"Experience had proved a tendency in our government to throw 
all power into the legislative vortex. The executives of 
the states are in general little more than ciphers; the 
legislatures omnipotent." 27 
By 1831 De Tocqueville was contrasting the roles of the executive 
and the legislature in these terms: 
"In America the legislature of each state is supreme; nothing 
can impede its authority...its own determination..*is the only 
limit to its action* In juxtaposition with it, and under its 
immediate control, is the representative of the executive power, 
whose duty is to restrain the refractory to submit by superior 
force. 
The legislative bodies daily encroach upon the authority of 
the governor and their tendency...is to appropriate it entirely 
27. Quoted Leonard D. White, The Federalists, New York, Macmlllan, 1961, 
P0I5. The Records of the Federal Convention, 1787i edited by Max 
Farrand, Norwood, Mass., The Plimpton Press, 1911, Vol* II, p*74, 
gives a shorter version of Madison's comment. White having quoted 
from the account of the debates in the several state conventions 
edited by Jonathan Elliott. 
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..28 
to themselves." 
Half a century later Lord Bryce could go so far as to assert that 
the legislature "is so much the strongest force in the several States 
that we may almost call it the government and ignore all other 
29 
authorities"* 
In terms of American governmental theory the legislature, subject 
to some advice and checks by the executive, is supposed to frame the 
law* This is then to be carried into effect by the executive, subject 
in turn to some advice and checks by the legislature* In such a 
situation of divided but overlapping responsibility, the possibility 
of deadlocks occurring is always present; as, for example, if the 
legislature were to refuse to accept the budget prepared by the 
executive* This, of course, is to take an extreme example. 
Nevertheless, as things stand at present, the legislature in most 
states may considerably modify the recommended budget proposals and 
may enact supplementary or independent financial legislation of its 
own* Against this there is at the disposal of the chief executive 
the power of either general veto or the more effective specific veto; 
30 but these defences are of a negative kind* 
28* Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, New York, Century Co., 
1898, pp.110-112, 
29, James Bryce, The American Commonwealth, London, Macmlllan, 1889, 
Vol, II, p*511. 
30, The "specific" or "item" veto is one of the most effective means of 
helping to place responsibility for the budget in the hands of the 
chief executive. It offers some safeguard against "riders" or 
"tacking" and provides an opportunity for the executive to exercise 
selective economy* The president has only the power of general veto, 
though the right to veto particular items is commonly held by state 
governors. In such cases, however, the power extends only to the 
deletion of budget items, not to their reduction. 
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At the national as at the state level legislative supremacy 
was marked and in the field of budgeting was achieved very early in 
the histoiy of the federal government. Although the constitutional 
convention had given the chief executive a considerable measure of 
31 
strength and initiative m both policy-making and administration, 
and although Alexander Hamilton as secretary of the treasury assumed 
a strong executive leadership in financial matters, this situation was 
not to last long. In 1796 the house of representatives appointed a 
32 
committee on ways and means and this seriously reduced the continuous 
and direct treasury influence over the direction of governmental 
finances. During Jefferson's period of office there was a separation 
of cabinet officials from the daily working of congress and written 
communication replaced the previous oral communication between the two 
branches of government. Executive influence became only an indirect 
force, operating through the developing congressional committee system* 
The various governmental agencies began to submit their budget requests 
directly to the legislature and in the execution of their budgets 
operated independently and without co-ordination. Executive discretion 
was further restricted by the legislature's growing use of detailed 
appropriations* Much of this was, of course, in line with Jefferson's 
belief that Hamilton's financial procedures, based on the English 
pattern, by which an account was given to the legislature after the 
31* Cf* Leonard D* White, The Federalists, chapter 2. 
32. This became a permanent standing committee in l802* 
33. Cf. Jesse Burkhead, Government Budgeting, p.10 and Arthur 
Smithies, The Budgetary Process in the United States, pp.55-5^« 
- 77 -
money had been spent, were both undemocratic and potentially 
corrupt. Only if the representatives of the people had power to 
approve or disapprove of each detailed item, argued Jefferson, 
could there be effective control over the government and an 
adequate check upon its actions. 
It may be noted, too, that until l844 the budget appropriations 
for each fiscal period were made by one act of congress. In that 
year, however, the practice of working through a single appropriation 
bill was abandoned and it became customary to vote appropriations in 
a number of separate acts. This "fragmentation" added to the 
difficulties in the way of drawing up a co-ordinated financial 
plan. Nevertheless, it was still possible to maintain an element of 
budgetary unity, if only because all financial matters were dealt 
with by only one committee in each chamber of congress. In 1865, 
however, even this semblance of unity was further reduced by the 
creation of a committee on appropriations in the house of 
representatives, while the senate followed suit two years later. 
Expenditure proposals were henceforth to be considered separately 
from revenue matters which were left in the hands of the committee on 
ways and means. Although the states and municipal authorities mostly 
continued to treat the budget as a consolidated whole, this was not so 
at the federal level and by 1885 the piecemeal approach to federal 
finances had gone so far that not only did the chief executive lack 
the means to achieve budgetary co-ordination, but unified financial 
34 planning within congress itself no longer existed. 
3^ 0 Cf* A. E, Buck, The Budget in Governments of Today. New York, 
Macmlllan, 1934, p*39« 
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There followed what has sometimes been described as the era 
of the pork barrel,-^^ during which large amounts of public funds 
were squandered in the interests of political patronage* Congressional 
^6 
"logrolling" was common and it was accordingly difficult for the 
executive to set limits to the spending programme. Although there 
could be resort to the chief executive's veto power, this was hardly 
an effective sanction since, as we have already noted, bills could 
only be disallowed in their entirety and particular appropriation 
items could not be reduced or eliminated. It was the limitations on 
the exercise of effective executive leadership that permitted the rise 
of the political boss, with the attendant problems of spoils, 
37 patronage and corruptxon - features that were to become evident 
at all levels of government in the United States. 
In general, the picture throughout most of the nineteenth 
century is one of declining legislative prestige. The Jacksonian 
period, which saw the popular election of state governors, brought, 
also9 the plural executive. What was appropriate for the governorship 
also seemed appropriate for other executive posts. So we find the 
Jacksonian stress on direct control and participation by the people 
leading to the "long ballot", with popular election of officials like 
the attorney-general, secretary of state, treasurer, and auditor. 
35* By "pork barrel" is meant legislation designed to give some 
advantage to particular groups or localities. 
36. i.e* the exchange of support by legislators in return for a share 
of the "p®rk barrel". 
37« Cf* F. A. Cleveland and A. E, Buck, The Budget and Responsible 
Government, New York, Macmlllan, 1920, pp.54-58* 
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Widespread distrust of legislatures also gave rise to constitutional 
restrictions on legislative power; particularly restrictions 
consequent upon the setting up of various administrative agencies. 
Often when legislative abuses prompted the creation of new agencies 
or administrative reorganization there was an insistence on the new 
administrative pattern being specifically set out in the constitution. 
If the constitution itself could not be readily altered, departments 
and agencies were created by statute. 
Here we may note an imteresting instance of the unexpected 
consequences which so often flow from political and administrative 
actions. Largely as a reaction to the apparent evils of the general 
political situation and the atmosphere in which governmental 
activities were conducted, there arose considerable support for 
independent boards and commissions as a form of organization which 
could take various functions of government away from political 
influence. The net result of the creation of virtually autonomous 
governmental agencies, however, was a further reduction of executive 
power and greater fragmentation of the activities of government. 
"When this third group of civic agencies entered the 
political arena, they did so on the assumption that the 
chief cause of the high cost of government was waste and 
inefficiency which came from prostituting the public service 
to the selfish interests of the irresponsible party boss and 
his machine - "graft", "patronage", "spoils". But as the work 
of these new bodies went on they found that quite as much, 
possibly more, of the inefficiency and waste was due to the 
headless, spineless system of government; they found that the 
incoordinate acts, the conflicts and the lack of cooperation 
were due to the fact that the administrative motor bodies 
were activated from unrelated centers of control, each, of 
which was made responsible to stimuli from the outside and 
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did not record themselves at the political brain center -
a chief executive that in turn was accountable to the whole 
people for leadership."38 
This, then, was one aspect of a general situation which included a 
deterioration in governmental standards at all levels and which 
stimulated the activities of the "muckrakers" such as Steffens, 
Tarbell and Baker, and touched off a reform movement. The sprawling 
administrative machinery was an obvious target for the reformers of 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, one of whose major 
aims became that of achieving integration under a substantially 
strengthened executive. 
The attention of the "muckrakers" had been largely concentrated 
on municipal corruption and the movement for reform began at the 
municipal level, with reorganization of city government and the 
creation of centralized financial machinery. One of the most 
important elements in the reform programme was the stressing of the 
need for systematic budgeting. The budget was seen as the tool by 
which responsibility could be instilled into the governmental 
structure. It was argued that the budget system rests on popular 
control; that the budget shows what the government is doing, produces 
an informed public, and goes far towards breaking the power of the 
39 irresponsible party bosses working behind the scenes. Soon the 
movement spread to other levels of government, assisted by pressure 
38* ibid., p.70. 
39« Jesse Burkhead, op.cit., p.l4* 
- 81 -
from business interests concerned after 1900 about their growing tsix 
40 burdens* As Burkhead rightly points out, the work of reformers 
and zeal for good government, though important, would not alone have 
led to rapid adoption of systems of executive budgeting. Support 
from the business community added a crucial element. Businessmen 
looked upon the introduction of the budget system as a necessary move 
towards reduction of governmental expenditure and hence taxation. 
The slogan "more business in government", claims Burkhead, probably 
did more for the cause of budgetary reform than the agitation of 
reformers against "invisible government"; even though the underlying 
motive may have simply been the desire for retrenchment, rather than 
the strengthening of government to enable programmes of social welfare 
4l to be carried out more efficiently. 
By 1910 the various pressures for financial reform had increased 
to such an extent that corrective steps had to be taken - or, at the 
very least, an appearance of concern had to be evinced by national 
leaders. In that year president Taft appointed a commission on 
economy and efficiency to examine the administrative organization 
and financial procedures of government. The chairman of this commission 
was Frederick A, Cleveland of the New York bureau of municipal research, 
which had been set up in 1906 and which was the most notable of the 
40* ibid., p.15. 
4l* ibid* It is further argued that some support was motivated by a 
desire to rationalize relations between the business community and 
governmental agencies, thus allowing other than "insiders" to win 
government contracts. 
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various municipal bureaux so prominent in the reform campaign. 
The other members of the commission, W. F. Willoughby, F. J. Goodnow, 
H. S. Chase, W, W. Warwick, and M. 0. Chance, included some of the 
best-known figures in the field of public finance. Several reports 
were issued, one of the most important being that on "The Need for a 
National Budget", which Taft endorsed and submitted to congress on 
42 27th June, 1912. 
Although it is clear that the president himself strongly 
43 
supported the commission's main recommendations, the report 
received only a lukewarm reception in congress, going no further 
than the committee on appropriations. However, despite the fact 
44 that it was not implemented, the report is worth discussing, since 
it is clearly a significant milestone in the development of adequate 
governmental financial machinery in the United States* Not only did 
it focus attention on the need for improved budgetary machinery and 
touch off a continuing congressional debate about desirable forms of 
budgetary systems, but it also influenced developments at the state 
level, where its impact was immediate and substantial. The 
commission's recommendations, well publicized and for the most part 
widely applauded, provided considerable impetus to a nation-wide 
42. House Documents, 62nd Congress, 2nd Session, 1911-1912, Vol. 1l8, 
Document No.854. 
43. Cf, A. E. Buck, The Budget in Governments of Today, p.4o, 
44. Taft was defeated in the 1912 elections and a congress controlled by 
the Democrats was returned. Adoption of a national budget did not 
come until the budget and accounting act of 1921 was passed. The 
only immediate result of the commission's report was the formation 
in 1913 of a bureau of efficiency within the civil service 
commission* This later became an independent bureau, functioning 
until 1933 as an agency to secure public service management 
efficiency* 
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45 
movement for state budgetary reform. They also constituted the 
basis upon which most subsequent changes were actually made* The 
creation of similar groups to study state budgetary methods became 
common, and in many states these led to the introduction of legislation 
46 to provide for administrative re-organization and budgetary reform. 
Maryland, one of the states whose budget system we shall examine in 
more detail, is a good example of this process. There the constitutional 
amendment creating an executive budget system, ratified by the voters of 
the state on 7th November, 19l6, was drafted by a special "commission 
on economy and efficiency on a budget system" appointed in September, 
1915> and headed by Frank J* Goodnow, then president of Johns Hopkins 
University, who had been a member of the Taft commission* 
Perhaps the most significant of the Taft commission's 
recommendations was that "the President, as the constitutional head 
of the executive branch of the Government, shall each year submit to 
47 the Congress**.a budget". In this way the commission was attempting 
to place squarely on the chief executive the responsibility for budget 
formulation. Indeed, as their discussion of this recommendation 
indicates, they drew their inspiration from the British system of 
45. The influence of the commission is clearly evident in budgetary 
writings of the time and later - e.g, in the various studies of the 
New York Bureau of Municipal Research and Training School for 
Public Service listed in the bibliography. 
46. See F. A. Cleveland and A. E. Buck, op.cit*, pp*1l8-129, for an 
outline of state budget legislation enacted as a direct result of 
the reform movement. 
47. House Documents, 62nd Congress, 2nd Session, 1911-1912, Vol. II8, 
Document No* 854, p.7» 
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government and argued for a high degree of executive responsibility, 
not only in respect of budgeting, but also generally for the economical 
48 
and efficient conduct of the public business. It is of interest to 
note that the Maryland commission, mentioned above, had similar intent 
but expressed it more strongly and explicitly: 
"Our thought in drafting the proposed amendment has been: 
1st. To impose upon the Governor the sole responsibility, 
within the limits of the Constitution and the provisions of 
existing law, of presenting to the Legislature a complete and 
comprehensive statement of the needs and resources of the State, 
based upon: 
a. Estimates made by those applying for State moneys* 
b* Evidence brought out at public hearings on those estimates; 
and 
c. Administrative revision by the Governor of all estimates, 
except those for the Legislature and the Judiciary, and for 
purposes for which provision has been made by the Constitution 
or existing law, 
2nd, To make it impossible for the Legislature so to change 
the plans proposed by the Governor as to produce a deficit; and 
3rd. To permit the Legislature to make provision for soiy 
purpose not included in the Governor's plan, on the condition 
that it provide also for the revenue, which the accomplishment 
of its purpose necessitates*" 49 
The provisions restricting the scope of legislative action, which are 
still applicable in Maryland, were unique at the time and aroused 
widespread attention throughout the country* However, only two other 
48. ibid., pp.143-44, 
49* Quoted Hooper S, Mi l e s , The Maryland Execut ive Budget System and 
a Review of i t s A d m i n i s t r a t i o n , 1916-1941, Ba l t imore , Dai ly Record, 
1942, p p , 7 - 8 . 
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states. New Mexico and Utah, adopted the "no legislative increase" 
clause when establishing their budget systems. 
The Taft commission also made recommendations concerning the 
form in which the budget and supporting documents should be presented. 
However, although the commissioner's comments on these matters were 
valuable in clarifying their conception of "the budget" and in 
presenting concrete proposals to congress, they need not be examined 
in this section of our study. 
On the machinery side the commission's report had much of 
importance to put forward* It was suggested that the secretary of the 
treasury should be the president's "ministerial agent" responsible for 
collecting and "harmonizing" the estimates before they were presented 
to the president for review and subsequent transmittal to congress* 
Creation of a separate budget agency was not proposed, however. 
Instead, it was suggested that there be a budget unit within the 
treasury* In the discussion of the appropriate role of the treasury 
the influence of the British model on the commission's thinking is 
again apparent* It was envisaged that departments would submit 
annttal reports to the treasury and that such reports would include 
"detailed accounts of expenditures so classified as to show auaounts 
expended by appropriations, as well as by classes of work,...as well as 
such other data or operative statistics and comment...as may be 
50c Cf, Jesse Burkhead, op.cit., p.24. 
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necessary to show results obtained and the economy and efficiency 
51 
of doing Government work, as well as of contracting and purchasing". 
The treasury's authority, then, was to extend well beyond the purely 
financial aspects of departmental operations. 
The final proposal of the commission is also of relevance to 
current debate about the form which estimates should take and the 
need for a stronger executivet 
"That the President recommend for the consideration of the 
Congress such changes in the form of appropriation bills as 
will enable the Government to avail itself of the benefits 
of the exercise of discretion on the part of the Executive in 
the transaction of current business in order that the 
Government may do work and accomplish results with economy 
and efficiency as will definitely fix responsibility for 
failure so to exercise such discretion," 52 
53 This, as is made clear in later discussion in the report, constituted 
a proposal for abandoning itemized appropriation in favour of 
authorization of expenditure in broad terms which would allow the 
executive to exercise a good deal of initiative in carrying 
administrative programmes into effect. 
In almost every instance the commissions set up by state 
governments to examine and report on administrative re-organization 
accepted the Taft commission's general line of argument about the need 
51* House Documents, 62nd Congress, 2nd Session, 1911-1912, Vol. 1l8, 
Document No* 854, p.8. 
52. ibid. 
53. ibid., p.210. 
- 87 -
for political and administrative responsibility, and accordingly 
recommended changes designed to strengthen the executive and 
introduce an executive budget. Although preceded in major budgetary 
change by Maryland, Illinois in 1917 was the first state to put in 
hand a thorough-going administrative re-organization, and by 1925 
54 fifteen other states had done likewise. Up to this time, however, 
the trend in many states had been towards the weakening of the 
executive, with constitutional revision depriving state governors 
of some of the powers they had originally possessed. As we have already 
noted, many of the state fiscal offices were elective, so that 
executive authority was diffused; whilst legislation concerning 
appropriations had also tended to restrict the executive's scope for 
independent action. The states were now being asked, in effect, to 
reverse a trend, firmly grounded in a widely accepted philosophy of 
government, which held that governmental authorities and 
responsibilities should be limited and strictly controlled, lest the 
rights of citizens be curtailed by arbitrary action. In view of the 
existence of attitudes of this sort and their past incorporation into 
state constitutions, it is hardly surprising that the recommendations 
of the study groups were not always acceptable to state legislatures -
some of which were extremely reluctant to embrace the theory of the 
54. Cf. Ferrel Heady, State Constitutions: The Structure of 
Administration, New York, National Municipal League, 1961, p* 19* 
By the beginning of World War II about thirty states had 
re-organized, while the postwar period has seen another spate of 
re-organizations with "little Hoover commissions" in at least 
two-thirds of the states* 
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strong executive. One experienced administrator, E. A. Fitzpatrick, 
who had originally supported the reform programme, completely changed 
his position after examining the results of budgetary experiments in 
Wisconsin and in 1918 strongly attacked the whole idea of an 
s6 
executive budget. Fitzpatrick's opposition was based mainly on 
the arguments that the budget system would lead to an undesirable 
increase in executive power and to a concentration on the achieving 
of retrenchment rather than efficiency in governmental operations* 
On this latter point it may be noted that in some states - e,g^ 
Massachusetts - there was considerable stress on the "selling point" 
that a budget system would keep taxes and expenditures down* Because 
of the existence of doubts of this sort, attitudes, constitutional 
limitations, vested interests of legislators, and so on, differences in 
budgetary methods among the states began to grow more pronounced from 
this time onwards. For instance, although by 1920 some forty-four 
states had adopted improved methods of budgeting, only twenty-three of 
57 these had actually provided for an executive budget. Writing fourteen 
years later Buck estimated that about two-thirds of the states had been 
prepared to make the governor responsible for preparing and submitting 
the budget to the legislature. For varying periods, however, others, 
55. Ohio in 191O and Wisconsin and California in 191I had made changes 
in their financial procedures, but without adopting complete 
executive budget systems. 
56. Edward A* Fitzpatrick, Budget Making in a Democracy, New York, 
Macmlllan, 1918. 
57* Cf. F. A. Cleveland and A. E* Buck, op*cit*, p*124. 
58. A* E. Buck, The Budget in Governments of Today, p*4lo 
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l i k e C a l i f o r n i a , New York and Wisconsin, had experimented wi th 
boards or commissions to handle the budgetary f u n c t i o n . A few had 
59 t r i e d compromise s o l u t i o n s , adopt ing elements of both sys tems . 
Many of the p resen t p rocedura l d i f f e r e n c e s from s t a t e to s t a t e have 
t h e i r o r i g i n s i n t h i s p e r i o d . 
We may note h e r e , t o o , the e f f e c t s of c e r t a i n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l 
r e s t r i c t i o n s on s t a t e borrowing. Although o r i g i n a l l y conceived as 
curbs upon l e g i s l a t i v e abuse, t hese a l s o e f f e c t i v e l y r e s t r i c t t he 
room for budgetary manoeuvre possessed by the e x e c u t i v e . In a l l 
s t a t e s except f ive - Connec t icu t , M i s s i s s i p p i , New Hampshire, 
Tennessee and Vermont - t h e r e a r e l i m i t a t i o n s on the s t a t e ' s 
i n c u r r i n g of deb t . Twenty-six s t a t e c o n s t i t u t i o n s p r o h i b i t borrowing, 
60 
except for emergency purposes such as the suppress ion of i n s u r r e c t i o n s * 
The types of l i m i t a t i o n t h a t e x i s t e l sewhere , often r e q u i r i n g t h a t 
borrowing be approved by referendum, tend t o d e t e r a governor from 
presen t ing a programme t o the l e g i s l a t u r e for which he and i t can 
take j o i n t r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . The most he can do i s to p r e s e n t a 
programme which, i f approved by the l e g i s l a t u r e , must then be 
confirmed by referendum. He may, of cou r se , campaign for such 
conf i rmat ion, bu t i f t h i s i s not forthcoming the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i s not 
h i s . In e f f e c t , debt l i m i t a t i o n p r o v i s i o n s tend to m i l i t a t e a g a i n s t 
the gove rno r ' s a b i l i t y to provide c l e a r - c u t l e a d e r s h i p . They encourage 
59. Cf. F . A. Cleveland and A. E, Buck, o p . c i t * , pp*107-117 and 126-129* 
60, See L e g i s l a t i v e Reference Bureau, Manual on S t a t e C o n s t i t u t i o n a l -
P r o v i s i o n s , Honolulu, U n i v e r s i t y of Hawaii , 1950, p*237. 
- 90 -
6i both executive and legislature to evade their responsibilities. 
In a valuable study, Organization, Role and Staffing of State 
62 
Budget Offices, Shadoan points out that the administrative aoid 
budgetary reform movement initiated at the turn of the century is still 
going on* This is, in a sense, t3rue* States that implemented 
administrative re-organization and passed budget legislation early 
in the centui^ - are in some instances still perfecting both machinery 
and procedures. Others enacted the necessary legislation, but went 
no further and are only now taking steps to set up effective budgetary 
machinery. Looked at in retrospect the first move towards establishing 
a rational budget process compatible with growing state responsibilities 
was that of requiring an annual or biennial compilation of revenues, 
past expenditures and departmental requests for appropriations, thus 
enabling the overall financial picture to be seen and reviewed by a 
single committee of the legislature. This introduced some order into 
a previously haphazard process. In essence, however, the step was a 
simple clerical one, no judgment on policies or priorities being 
involved in the mere bringing together of revenues and requests for 
funds. But concern with the achieving of a "balanced" budget also 
affected the situation and this concern led to the introduction of 
budgetary controls, requiring such things as central accounting 
systems, financial reporting, and continuous oversight by budget 
6l* cf. Ferrel Heady, op.cit., p.20* 
62, Arlene T. Shadoan, Organization, Role and Staffing of State Budget 
Offices, Lexington, University of Kentucky, I96I, p.4. 
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officials. Moreover, review by a single legislative committee 
introduced a significant new element, since the committee was 
confronted with the task of consciously allocating resources among 
competing ends. It was then an obvious and short step for the 
legislature to seek from the executive the submission of a 
co-ordinated budget plan, consisting of a carefully prepared set 
of programme recommendations. More recently there has been a 
granting to the executive of greater powers to determine the way the 
budget plan is carried into effect. Overall we have seen a steady 
broadening of the concept of budgeting and an improvement in the 
factual base for management decision-making. 
The above comments, taken in conjunction with Shadoan's account, 
may tend to suggest that the process of budgetary reform has been a 
continuous one. This is hardly the case, however. In most states, 
after the initial enthusiasm for reform, there seems to have been a 
long period of relative inactivity, and for much of the time since 
1930 the incentive for change has been apparent only at the national 
level. 
Now it seems that as far as the states are concerned another 
period of reform has begun. In acaminlng state budgetary systems and 
interviewing budget officials throughout the country one cannot but 
be impressed by the changes that are proceeding or pending. By 
comparison the Australian and Canadian situations seem almost static, 
though this is not really the case in either country. It may well be 
that, like the Taft commission of 1910-1912, the commission on 
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organization of the executive branch of the federal government 
63 (the Hoover commission) has had the side effect of stimulating 
budgetary developments at the state level. Not only has there been 
an impetus to further reform, there also seems to have arisen a 
recognition that constant review of organization and procedures is 
vital if government is to fulfil the role expected of it to-day. 
This could lead to greater uniformity of budget machinery and 
procedures among the states; but the more likely result is that there 
will be even more variety than exists at present. Undoubtedly, 
most states will follow the trend towards further strengthening of 
executive powers in the field of budgeting. In the meantime, however, 
some states will adopt, as a few have already done, newer and 
fashionable budgetary techniques associated with programme or 
performance budgeting. Some of these techniques and their 
implications have already been mentioned. 
63* Some of the recommendations of the Hoover commission are dealt 
with elsewhere in this study. 
CHAPTER 4 
THE FORM AND CONTENT OF STATE BUDGETS 
"...then home and to my accounts, where very late 
at them, but, LordI what a deale of do I have to 
understand any part of them, and in short do what 
I could I could not come to any understanding of 
them, but after I had thoroughly wearied myself, 
I was forced to go to bed and leave them much 
against my will and vowe too, but I hope God will 
forgive me, for I have sat up these four nights 
till past twelve at night to master them, but cannot," 
Pepys. (31st March, 1666) 
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In recent years the company annual report has "changed from 
a formal, terse, technical, forbidding document, to an 
attractively printed illustrated pamphlet, in some cases still 
fairly dignified and stately, but ranging all the way up (or 
1 
down) to rivals of the comic strip". The same cannot be said 
of the financial documents of governments* Although some states 
and public authorities are now making use of modern printing 
techniques and various forms of graphic presentation of financial 
information, there has in general been little change in the format 
of state financial papers. Nor has there been much incentive or 
strong pressure to bring about such change. Governmental 
financial documents are usually complex and deal with a wide 
range of activities. Often they contain a mass of detailed 
information which may ©bscure rather than reveal budgetary 
implications* Because they are obscure the documents are not 
widely studied; and because readership is so restricted there 
is no pressing demand for greater clarity of presentation. 
For the most part, requests for change come only from small 
groups: economic research workers who have difficulty in 
obtaining information needed for particular types of analysis; 
legislators and political scientists concerned mainly with 
1. T, H. Sanders, Company Annual Reports, Boston, Division of 
Research, Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard 
University, 1949, p.vii. 
2. Cf. A. A* and G. E. Fitzgerald, The Form and Contents of 
Published Financial Statements, Sydney, Butterworth, 1948, p.13* 
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strengthening legislative or popular control of finance; and 
committees or officials of the legislature, like the public 
accounts committee and the auditor general. 
In considering the appropriate form for presentation of 
budgets and other financial statements of governments a major 
problem arises from the varied uses to which such documents are 
3 
put. They must serve the differing needs of many users; needs 
that did not exist when the documents were originally designed. 
The legislature, for instance, requires information enabling it to 
exercise its constitutional authority over finance. Therefore the 
financial system and records must be set up in such a way that the 
authenticity of each item and its legislative authority can be 
checked. But it is not sufficient simply to ensure that nothing is 
spent without the authority of the legislature. The present scale 
of governmental expenditure makes it essential that accounts and 
accounting practices be formulated in a manner that allows 
assessments to be made about whether services are being provided 
at the lowest cost compatible with efficiency* They must also 
throw up other information necessary to the decision-making process. 
And budget papers cannot be drafted with only the needs of 
legislators and administrators in mind* The business community 
for its decision-making requires facts about governmental finances 
3. There is a good discussion of this problem in Cmd*7969, Final 
Report of the Committee on the Form of Government Accounts, 
Londoii, H.M.S.O., 1950, pp*9 ff. 
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and the overall financial situation. Experts outside the 
government service must therefore be furnished with material 
which will enable them to analyse past events and current trends 
as a basis for predicting future economic moves. The general 
public, too, must be informed in simple terms of the implications 
of the budget - difficult though it is to achieve simplicity in 
accounts that cover a complex of operations like those handled by 
today's governments* 
Merely to outline these few considerations is sufficient to 
indicate the magnitude of the problems associated with presentation 
of governmental budgetary material* The diverse needs of the groups 
that look to governmental financial statements for information cannot 
all be satisfied equally well. There will be differences of opinion 
about how far it is desirable or possible to go in attempting to 
produce budget documents and supporting financial statements that 
will serve a wide variety of purposes; and more will be said about 
this issue later in this chapter. At this point, however, it may be 
stated that subsequent comments about the form and content of 
particular state budgets are based on acceptance of the view that 
the primary aim of a government's financial statements and procedures 
should be to satisfy the requirements of the legislature and the 
administration. If the documents can serve the needs of other users 
at the same time, so much the better; but this should be a secondary 
consideration. 
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To describe the state budgets presented in Australia, Canada 
and the United States would involve a good deal of tedious 
repetition* This difficulty is partly overcome, however, by 
Appendix A (pp* 422 ff*), which consists of sample pages from 
state budgets, chosen to illustrate the variety of approaches 
which exist in both form and content* Apart from some brief 
general remarks, the discussion will be linked to consideration 
of the budgetary "principles" outlined in chapter 2. We shall be 
concerned not only with how far state budget documents conform or 
could conform to those principles, but also with the extent to 
which they fulfil or may be made to fulfil their primary and 
secondary purposes. In discussing various aspects of budget 
presentation, illustrations will be drawnifrom as wide a range of 
state budget papers as possible, and references will be given to 
appropriate examples in several other appendices which show 
differing approaches to the presentation of particular types of 
budget information* In this way it is hoped to avoid what might 
otherwise be an arid presentation of purely descriptive material. 
Of the three countries with which we are concerned, Australian 
state budgets are the most uniform in format and contents* Although 
there are considerable differences in detail from one set of 
documents to another, all states prepare budget papers that, as we 
shall see, are similar in their basic features* For all Australian 
governments the financial documents that are issued when the budget is 
presented consist primarily of cash statements showing estimated 
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receipts and expenditures for the year from the consolidated 
revenue and loan funds* Information is given as to the actual 
receipts and expenditures for the preceding financial year; a 
comparison being made with what had been estimated as the likely 
receipts and expenditures for that year* Classification of 
receipts is in terms of sources of revenue; while expenditure is 
classified by object and arranged according to ministerial or 
4 departmental responsibility. Supplementary or supporting 
documents provide detailed information about items or groups of 
items in the main statements. This supplementary material is 
usually extensive and complex, so that painstaking examination is 
necessary if any real understanding of the main statements is to be 
gained* This is, in fact, a task that can only be performed 
satisfactorily by those with accountancy training or with a good 
knowledge of governmental accounting methods. The layman cannot 
easily interpret the documents, except in a superficial way. 
As well as the statements of estimated and actual receipts 
and expenditures for both revenue and loan accounts, the legislatures 
receive annual statements of all treasury balances, bank balances, 
public debt, monies held in trust or on deposit for special purposes, 
investments of trust funds, and loans or advances to other authorities, 
4* Expenditure classifications are discussed later in this chapter. 
5* Cf* A* A. and G» E. Fitzgerald, op.cit., p.213* 
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Similar information is given in the budgets of the Canadian 
provinces, although their format and methods of presentation vary 
much more widely than is the case in Australia. In turning to the 
American states, however, we find no semblance of uniformity of 
treatment whatsoever. Physically, budget documents in the United 
States range through every size from octavo to large atlas. Some 
are illustrated and contsdn diagrams and graphs of various kinds 
presenting in visual form the sources of state revenue and objects 
of expenditure. Others are quite primitive in appearance and in 
the printing techniques used. They vary in length from less than 
twenty pages to well over seven hundred* Indeed, the executive 
budget of New York state consists of two volumes, each of over five 
hundred pages. Sometimes the budget documents contain only 
expenditure data, with not even a brief outline of governmental, 
income. Some states make no effort at all to ensure that the public 
has adequate information about revenue and expenditure estimates, 
their budgetary plans not being published for general distribution 
in any form* 
In the light of differences from state to state in administrative 
structure, constitutional provisions, financial legislation, and 
taxation systems, it is not surprising to find wide variations in 
the manner of presenting budgetary data. At the same time, however, 
it is clear that the financial practices of some states fail to meet 
even the minimum criteria necessary to make budget documents of 
Value to legislators and citizens. 
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Differences of the same magnitude are noticeable, too, in 
the budget messages by which state governors transmit their budgets 
to the legislatures. Such messages are the counterparts of the 
budget speeches or financial statements of Australian and Canadian 
treasurers. Naturally enough, Australian financial statements vary 
in content or emphasis from year to year and from one state to 
another as circumstances change* Nevertheless, there is a basic 
similarity about them. Customarily the treasurer outlines the main 
features of the government's financial operations in the preceding 
year and of the estimates for the current year. General economic 
conditions are seldom dealt with at any length, unless some 
particular condition such as prolonged drought or natural disaster 
has especially affected production in the state. Although the federal 
treasurer's budget statement usually gives a good deal of information 
about the ways in which proposed expenditures are to be financed, 
that aspect of budgeting receives relatively little attention at the 
state level. Since the introduction of uniform taxation the emphasis 
in state budget speeches has clearly shifted to the expenditure 
proposals. Examination of the budget statements of state treasurers 
indicates that discussion of the revenue side of the budget consists 
largely of attacking, often in general terms, what state governments 
regard, or purport to regard, as adverse effects of the uniform 
6 taxation arrangements. - • -. 
6, See, for instance, the 1966-67 budget speech of The Honorable 
Sir Henry Bolte,- K.C.M.G., M.L.A., Premier and Treasurer of 
Victoria, pp.4-6. 
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In the i r coverage Canadian provincia l budget speeches are not 
dissimilar to those of Aus t ra l i a , although because of t h e i r more 
extensive independent revenue sources there i s grea ter s t r e s s on 
7 
that aspect of budgeting than is apparent in Australia* More 
detail about commercial, industrial and agricultural prospects is 
given* There is also greater vgiriation in format in Canada, with 
some provinces, such as British Columbia, producing printed versions 
of ;fche budget speech that include numerous tables and graphs and are 
lavishly illustrated in colour. The content of the budget statement 
does not differ markedly from one province to another, usually 
covering in a document of about twenty-five printed pages the 
changes that are to be made in taxation, a discussion of transactions 
during the current year, and a somewhat less detailed forecast of 
likely results in the forthcoming year. Most provinces attach 
supplementary statistical information to the budget statement, 
though few go as far in this direction as Ontario where in each of 
the last five years the financial and economic statements appended 
to the printed budget speech have totalled over one hundred pages. 
The budget message in the United States provides the governor 
with an opportunity to give life to the overall budget plan 
submitted to the legislature. He may, as is often done, break away 
7. Canadian provinces commonly impose personal and corporation 
taxes as well as expenditure taxation in fields such as liquor, 
gasoline, tobacco and amusements* Some go in for the lucrative 
direct sales tax, with rates that vary from two to five per cent. 
Most tax totalizator operations* Ontario and Quebec impose 
succession duties; the other provinces receive half the yield 
from such duties collected within their borders by the dominion 
government/ All collect automobile licence fees. 
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from technical financial terminology and present his proposals in 
terms that are understandable to the layman and newsworthy. Many 
state budget messages, however, are little more than letters of 
transmittal from the governor or from whoever is responsible for 
8 budget preparation. Sometimes such a letter of transmittal is 
supplemented by an analysis of the budget plan (usually prepared by 
Q 
the chief budget officer); but this is by no means common, so that 
the messages frequently add little or nothing to the ability of the 
legislature and the public to appreciate the implications and 
ramifications of the budget. Notes on the contents of a selection 
of American budget messages are contained in Appendix B (pp* 434 ff.)* 
These notes indicate the wide variations to be found. 
With this general background we are now in a position to look 
more closely at particular features of state budget documents and 
budgetary practice, review the budget criteria mentioned earlier 
and use them as the basis of our examination of state budgets. 
Comprehensiveness 
The first budget principle mentioned in chapter 2 was that of 
comprehensiveness. By this it is implied that a budget should 
include all income and outgoings of a government. No receipt or 
8, e.g. Colorado, Iowa, Tennessee, 
9* e,go Colorado, Illinois, Mississippi. 
- 103 -
expenditure should be omitted, while the budget should also 
indicate whether there will be a surplus or deficit and the 
10 
way in which any deficit is to be met. This does not mean that 
all fiscal activities must be treated uniformly at all times, but 
rather that the existing practice should be known and understood, 
so that it can be relied upon to give an accurate picture of the 
state's financial operations, with no item of receipt or expenditure 
lying outside the procedure for planning and controlling fiscal 
operations. 
At first sight this seems a straightforward and reasonable 
proposition. Further examination shows, however, that those who 
demand that budget documents be "comprehensive" are not always using 
the word in the same way. Nor is it always clear what a particular 
writer has in mind when he outlines the principle. Sometimes the. 
proposal seems to be that all governmental expenditure should be 
included in the budget for legislative appropriation. At other 
times the objective is more limited, comprehensiveness being taken 
to mean simply that all financial operations should appear in the 
budget, at least for the information of the legislature, if not for 
actual authorization. On this latter basis it would be possible 
for the budget documents to be comprehensive in their coverage, 
without there being comprehensiveness in the budget system and 
control of expenditures. 
10. Cfo A* E. Buck, The Budget in Governments of Today, New York, 
Macmlllan, 1934, p*125, and F. A, Bland, Budget Control, 
Sydney, Angus and Robertson, 1946, p.18* 
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Earlier, this sort of distinction would not have arisen, 
as almost all expenditures were both set out in the budget and 
voted by the legislature. That is to say, both the budget and 
the budget system were to all intents and purposes comprehensive 
in scope* For much of this century, however, there has been a 
gradual breaking down of coB|prehensiveness in budgeting* In 
many instances legislative bodies themselves have renounced 
their effective control over the use to which certain revenues 
may be put, by assigning or earmarking them for specific 
purposes* 
There are varying motives inspiring the assigning of 
revenues for particular activities* There may, for instance, 
be a desire to limit expenditures by confining them to what can be 
raised from one form of tax or other charge. Again, assignment 
may be intended to achieve some degree of independence for a 
segregated function. Or - as when receipts from state lotteries 
or other forms of gambling are set aside for hospital purposes -
the earmarking may be aimed at winning support for a particular 
revenue measure by linking it with some lofty purpose. Here we may 
note, however, that the same result may be achieved without formally 
assigning revenue. Carefully worded statements can create the 
impression that lottery revenue is specifically directed to hospital 
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maintenance, even though this may not be the case. In New South 
Wales, for instance, it is widely believed that hospitals are 
directly supported from lottery revenue. In fact, such receipts, 
apart from those arising from special "opera house lotteries", 
are paid into the consolidated revenue fund, so that hospitals 
are assisted by this method of raising revenue no more than any 
other governmental activity. In Queensland, on the other hand, 
lottery receipts are paid into a special trust account, the 
"hospital, motherhood and child welfare fund", which is in turn 
a major source of revenue for the "hospital administration trust 
fund". Since, however, allowance is made for this when money from 
other sources such as consolidated revenue is allocated, the benefit 
of lottery revenue to hospitals is probably no greater than it would 
be were the New South Wales practice followed. 
In examining the financial dealings of state governments in 
the three countries with which we are concerned, instances may be 
seen of the assignment of the proceeds of virtually every type of 
tax and charge. Perhaps the most common example, however, is the 
almost universal earmarking of revenues associated with the use of 
motor vehicles* An example of this is the assigning of motor 
registration fees and fuel taxation for spending on road construction 
and maintenance* In New South Wales the expenditure of the department 
of main roads is met from such sources and does not require to be 
voted by parliament. Indeed, in all the systenswe are examining it is 
not only usual for revenues collected from highway users to be set 
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aside for highway expenditure, but for the most part such revenues 
constitute the only financial resource available for highway work. 
A similar case, common in Canada and the United States, is the 
segregation for conservation and recreation purposes of receipts 
from hunting and fishing licence fees. 
Another common form of revenue assignment arises from the 
practice of submitting for legislative authorization only the net 
expenditure of some departments - "net expenditure" being a 
department's total outlay less amounts earned by it for goods 
supplied or services rendered. An arrangement of this sort operates 
in New South Wales in the financing of the forestry commission. 
Half the commission's gross receipts from such things as licences, 
timber royalties and sales may be spent by it on afforestation and 
other defined activities, without such expenditure having to be voted 
by parliament* An indication of the extent to which this and other 
forms of revenue assignment operate in various states and the 
impact in overall financial terms is given later. 
The creation of semi-independent governmental business 
undertakings and utilities also gives rise to many breaches of 
the ideal that budgets should be comprehensive. Such bodies 
normally earn substantial revenue and it is common for the enabling 
legislation to provide that their expenditures be not subject to 
legislative appropriation* The implications of this from an 
accountability point of view need not be discussed here. We may 
note, however, that at the state level in Australia, Canada and the 
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United States there are numerous examples of corporations whose 
expenditures do not form par t of the budget, or figure in i t only 
11 
on a net basis* 
Then there are the cases where certain expenditures have 
been permanently authorized - "permanently" in the sense that they 
are automatically approved each year until such time as the 
authorizing legislation is amended or repealed. Statutory 
appropriations of this kind are usually excluded from the budget 
or appropriation bills in which the ordinary expenditures of 
government are submitted for approval, though they are often shown 
as attachments to the budget papers for the information of the 
legislature* Such appropriations go by different names in various 
12 
countries but, generally speaking, they cover similar types of 
expenditure - those, like interest payments and sinking fund 
contributions, which are contractual in nature; and those, such 
as judges' salaries, condidered inappropriate for regular review 
by the legislature. 
Finally, we find that most governments have created trust 
accounts to handle the receipt and payment of moneys which do not 
represent governmental revenue in the strict sense, but of which 
11. It would require detailed analysis of each state's activities and 
expenditures to assess accurately the amounts excluded. Estimates 
for some states are given later, however. Examination of budgets 
suggests that complete or almost complete coverage is given in 25 
states, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Iowa, 
Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, 
Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, 
I Oklahoma, Oregon, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, West 
Virginia, Elsewhere many funds and particular types of expenditure 
are excluded or appear only in brief summary statements, 
12, e.g, "consolidated fund services"; "special appropriations"; 
"permanent appropriations". 
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the government is more or less temporarily the custodian or 
trustee. Statements showing the transactions on such funds 
are sometimes attached to the budget papers and in some instances 
may be reflected in the overall budget result. Often, however, 
trust accounts are treated as separate entities and are 
considered apart from the main financial documents. 
The assigning of revenue for specific purposes, omission of 
some operations from the budgetary process, and the maintenance of 
a multiple fund system, are all practices which are potential 
causes of fiscal maladministration and are sometimes associated 
with attempts to disguise the real impact of particular financial 
or economic policies. However, these practices cannot in 
themselves or in every instance be regarded as fiscally unsound. 
Arguments may be advanced for the waiving of regular appropriation 
for some types of expenditure from moneys held in trust, or where 
it is desired to ensure the independence of certain officials. 
Nor need the creation of a special fund for, say, the amortization 
of debt be looked upon as defeating the proper administration of the 
budget system. Criticism, then, must be qualified to some extent. 
But even when appropriate allowance is made, the fact remains that 
the methods of treating receipts and expenditures mentioned above 
do represent a breaking down of the comprehensiveness of the budget 
system; and in numerous such cases the procedures adopted are 
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unnecessary and undesirable. Indeed, many state governments have 
gone beyond what is indicated by the above discussion and have 
completely excluded from the budget documents those expenditures 
which do not require regular appropriation, not even setting them out 
for the legislature's information. To this extent there is a loss of 
comprehensiveness of the documents as well as a reduction in the 
coverage of the budget system as such. Although a case may be made 
out for the special treatment^ of some forms of revenue and expenditure, 
it is hard to find any grounds for exclusion of items from the budget 
documents. Accounts relating to assigned revenues, trust funds, or 
business undertakings can readily be annexed to the budget papers for 
the legislature's information, if not for its formal approval. The 
results, actual and estimated, of such accounts could also be 
incorporated, preferably on a net basis, into the summary statement 
of receipts and payments which usually appears at the beginning of 
the budget. This would not impair the financial independence of the 
authorities or funds concerned. The legislature would, however, be 
better able to review performance and could, if necessary, reconsider 
the degree of independence provided. As things stand at present it is 
clear that budget totals do not give an accurate measure of the 
government's role in the economy as a whole, or even of trends within 
the governmental sector. 
Despite some of the above criticisms, it may generally be said 
that while state budgets in Australia and Canada do not comply 
strictly with the notion of comprehensiveness, they are by comparison 
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with the budgets of many other countries fairly complete. We 
may take the New South Wales situation as more or less typical 
of Australian and Canadian practice. In New South Wales there are 
fifteen separate funds operating. The transactions of seven of 
these funds are reflected in the main budget document, while one 
is covered by the loan estimates. Of the seven funds which do not 
appear in these documents, two (the "special deposits account" and 
the "supreme court accounts") are in the nature of trust or special 
accounts; one (the "state transport co-ordination fund") covers the 
receipt and disbursement of assigned revenues; and one (the 
"miners' accident relief (repeal) act of 1916 account") merely 
reflects a credit balance in the form of securities held under that 
act. The remaining three funds are overdraft accounts through which 
money is advanced for the establishment of working accounts and for 
some other purposes such as the temporary investment of any surplus 
balance on the aggregate ef the treasurer's accounts. The activities 
of the department of main roads and of some smaller bodies whose 
expenditure does not require parliamentary sanction are financed 
through working accounts within the special deposits account, so 
that their financial operations are not reflected in the budget papers, 
Other autonomous undertakings are financed from funds directly 
controlled by the undertakings themselves and outside the scopee 
of the government's arrangements for banking and custody of funds. 
Since appropriation is not required these bodies' financial operations 
do not show in the budget documents. Until 1945 the income and 
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expenditure statements of the New South Wales government insurance 
office and some of the smaller trading bodies were annexed to the 
budget papers, but in that year the size of the document was reduced 
13 and these accounts were omitted. 
Expenditure on public works, which in New South Wales is financed 
by borrowing, is set out in a separate document, "the loan estimates". 
Apart from the capital expenditure of the ministerial departments and 
the major business undertakings, the loan estimates cover the 
transactions of the department of main roads and minor trading bodies 
coming under the supervision of the minister for public works* An 
important omission, however, is the expenditure of the housing 
commission on the construction of houses under the commonwealth-state 
housing agreement, finance for which comes from special commonwealth 
l4 
advances to the state. Also excluded is the loan expenditure of 
financially autonomous bodies which, to the extent that they rely on 
borrowing, negotiate their own loans, subject to the approval of the 
15 Australian loan council as to amounts, terms and conditions. Apart 
from omissions of the kind mentioned above, the loan estimates are 
defective in that they do not indicate the actual expenditure incurred 
on the listed works in the previous year. Nor do they give details of 
13* Omission from the budget papers of the government insurance office 
alone involves exclusion of an organization whose annual net premium 
income currently exceeds ^46 million and whose net surplus on 
operations is in the vicinity of ^ 2 million a year. 
l4. These advances currently amount to approximately ^40 million a year. 
15* Organizations such as the metropolitan water sewerage and drainage 
board and the electricity commission obtain only part of their 
capital needs through the state's general loan account, so the whole 
of their borrowings is not shown in the loan estimates. The water 
board's loan raisings, for instance, are of the order of ^40 million 
a year, of which no more than ^ 15 million would normally be 
reflected in the loan estimates. 
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how the estimated expenditure is to be financed. That is to say, 
balances of unexpended loan funds on hand at the beginning of the 
year, estimated repayments of previous advances, and proposed new 
borrowings should be, but are not, shown. Sample pages showing 
varying ways of presenting data about capital works are included in 
Appendix f ( pp.438 ff.). 
Examination of the main budget documents prepared by the 
Australian states and the Canadian provinces indicates that they do 
not differ substantially from each other as far as comprehensiveness 
of coverage is concerned, though there are naturally variations in 
detail and manner of presentation. All states and provinces, for 
instance, treat the capital works programme as a separate entity for 
budgetary planning purposes, but they do not all present capital works 
in a separate document, as does New South Wales. Alberta, Manitoba, 
Ontario, Quebec, and Saskatchewan follow the same practice as 
Queensland in that they include both current and capital expenditure 
inthe main budget document, but show separate totals for each. 
British Columbia and the maritime provinces show only current 
expenditures, so that there is a consequent lowering of comprehensivenesi 
in their main budget documents. In Canada the operating requirements 
of government enterprises are also commonly omitted from provincial 
budgets* The major enterprises are hydro-electricity and telephone 
systems, both of which are normally financed independently of each 
province's budget. Saskatchewan, however, does includenin its budget 
a lump-sum item for the operating expenses of its telephone network, 
and similarly shows its capital requirements. Insofar as its general 
budgetary procedures are concerned this province is one of the most 
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progressive in Canada. 
Throughout Canada statutory expenditures such as interest and 
sinking fund charges are shown in the budget document separately 
from those expenditures which must be voted annually. Debate is 
usually confined to the items to be voted, and in a few provinces 
the result is a restriction of legislative discussion to ajnounts 
totalling less than half the overall provincial expenditure. 
Unlike most Australian states, all provinces use supplementary 
estimates, voted towards the end of the financial year. Sometimes the 
supplementary requests for funds are very substantial, though such 
cases are usually the result of special circumstances, as when 
prolonged drought affects provincial finances. Generally supplementary 
estimates are kept below ten per cent of the amount voted on the 
regular budget. The use of supplementary estimates is not unknown 
in Australia, but it is by no means as common a practice as in Canada, 
We cannot generalize about the budget documents of the American 
states to the same extent as we can about those of Australia and 
Canada. The diversity of form is too great. A few states prepare 
budgets that cover virtually the whole of the state's revenues and 
expenditures. Mostly, however, the documents are far from complete. 
Indeed, the governor frequently is precluded from including in his 
budget the appropriation requests of all departments, particularly 
those that are headed by elected officials. In some states, too, 
there are in existence dozens, even hundreds, of special funds, some 
or all of which may lie beyond the coverage of the governor's general 
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fund budget. In 1957, for ins tance , i t was reported that Oklahoma 
maintained two hundred and t h i r t y separate funds, and tha t the 
1956-57 s t a te budget accounted for only about twenty-five per cent 
16 
of t o t a l s t a t e expenditures. This i s an extreme example, but when 
allowance i s made for funds only nominally under the control of 
governors, i t i s not uncommon to find tha t executive f i sca l control 
covers less than half a s t a t e ' s expendi tures . After taking in to 
account gran ts - in-a id expended under formulas and conditions la id 
down by the l e g i s l a t u r e , Mahin concluded in 1952 that the governor 
of I l l i n o i s through his department of finance had no ac tual f i s ca l 
control over about f i f ty -e igh t per cent of the s t a t e ' s t o t a l 
17 appropriat ions. Such a s i t u a t i o n makes e f f i c i en t planning of s t a t e 
f iscal operations very d i f f i c u l t , to say the l e a s t . The pic ture has 
not changed markedly since.- then, and a s imi lar posi t ion applies in 
numerous other s t a t e s . This i s perhaps not surpr i s ing , since the 
s ta tes have before them the example of the United States federal 
government i t s e l f , which excludes from i t s budget very large sums 
held in tinist accounts such as the old age annuity and r e l a t ed social-
security funds and the highway t r u s t fund. 
We have already noted some of the problems caused by the earmarking 
of subs tan t ia l amounts of s t a t e revenue for specia l funds or spec i f ic 
16, Cf. Leslie Allen, Oklahoma State Budget Procedures and P rac t i ces , 
Norman, University of Oklahoma, Bureau of Government Research, 
1957, p .25 . 
17. Cf. George E. Mahin, "The Problem of Control of Expenditures a t the 
State Level ," Proceedings of the For ty- f i f th Annual Conference of 
the National Tax Associat ion, 1952, Sacramento, 1953, P*367. 
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functions. This practice is permitted in all but two of the 
American states. In 1955 it was estimated that state tax 
collections earmarked for special purposes ranged from nil in 
Delaware (where the practice was, however, permitted) to almost 
ninety per cent in Alabama, with the average proportion for all 
18 
states being in excess of fifty per cent. More recently, Ferrel 
Heady has given examples of states in which high proportions of 
tax collections are assigned to special funds, instancing 
percentages as high as ninety for Colorado, eighty-five for Texas 
19 
and eighty for Kansas. He also notes that in twenty-six states 
there is constitutional provision to permit the earmarking of 
20 
revenue. In 1945 and 1947 clauses were included in the constitutions 
of Georgia and New Jersey respectively to provide for a single general 
21 fund and to prohibit the creation of special earmarked revenue funds. 
The constitution of Alaska has outlawed further fragmentation off 
revenues by prohibiting the setting-up of special funds beyond 
those specified in the constitution itself. 
As already pointed out, the assignment of revenue for expenditure 
in particular directions cannot simply be condemned out of hand. 
Nevertheless, it is one thing to assign revenue from fuel taxation 
18* The Tax Foundation, Earmarked State Taxes, New York, 1955, p.13. 
19. Ferrel Heady, State Constitutions: The Structure of Administration, 
New York, National Municipal League, 196I, p.20. 
20* ibid* 
21. In Georgia this arrangement was subsequently compromised by a 
1960 amendment assigning the proceeds of gasoline taxation for 
expenditure on Ba|:ghways. 
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for expenditure on hifefghway maintenance, the proceeds of hunting 
and fishing licences for conservation and recreation purposes, or 
receipts from timber royalties for re-afforestation. These are 
specific purposes directly related to the revenue sources. It is 
a very different thing to earmark "normal" income taxes for 
expenditure on education, as is done in Minnesota, or to earmark, 
as Michigan also does for educational expenditure, two-thirds of 
sales tax rdceipts, the whole of the inheritance, insurance premium 
utility property, liquor excise, and corporate organization tax 
22 
collections, plus forty per cent of cigarette taxation. This is 
assignment of revenue without rhyme or reason, and can only serve to 
prevent the making of rational budgetary decisions. 
Unity 
The second of the major budgetary principles commonly laid down 
is that of unity* Like the principle of comprehensiveness this may 
also relate either to the budget documents or to the budget system 
as a whole. As far as the document is concerned, application of the 
principle requires a singleness in the information presented and its 
consolidation. That is to say, uniformity of presentation is called 
for so that the items in the budget document may be aggregated to 
give an overall picture of the accounts. Sometimes it is suggested 
that the idea of unity further involves the inclusion in the budget 
document of a single statement which presents such an aggregation of 
22. Cf. Harvey E. Brazer, "State Budget Systems and State Expenditures," 
Proceedings of the Fifty-second Annual Conference of the National 
Tax Association, 1959« Harrisburg, 1960, p,303o 
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items and so summarises the financial operations set out in the 
23 body of the document. Buck stresses that the mile of unity 
connotes "the bringing together of the government's financial 
requirements, not in a number of separate and unrelated totals, but 
in two grand totals, one of income and the other of outgo. By such 
arrangement,,.a complete picture of governmental needs is presented 
24 to the legislature and the public in one statement or account." 
As applied to the budget system, unity would imply that there should 
be uniformity in the way accounts are treated and expenditures 
controlled. It may be argued, that is to say, that "no part of the 
material in the budget system should be considered as separate or 
apart from the ordinary finances and accorded a personality of its 
2§ 
own". Sundelson adds that the use of a single general fund for 
receipts and expenditures is "an essential prerequisite for budgetary 
26 
unity", while Bland also makes the same point when he argues that 
"all receipts should be paid into one general fund from which all 
27 
expenditures should be made". 
The rule of unity was developed when the role of government was 
seen mainly in terms of "keeping the ring"; of providing simply the 
23. A. E. Buck, op,cit., p.125* 
24. ibid. 
25. J. Ublner Sundelson, "Budgetary Principles," Political Science 
Quarterly, Vol. L, No. 2, June, 1935, p.248, 
26. ibid, 
27. F. A, Bland, op,cit., p,l8. 
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basic legislative and administrative framework within which the 
private enterprise system could function. Governmental income 
then consisted almost wholly of regularly recurring revenues 
(mainly taxation); large-scale borrowing was seldom resorted to; 
and expenditure was almost entirely devoted to the provision of a 
limited range of current services. Items of income were of a more 
or less similar nature, as were expenditure items. Hence there was 
little need or incentive to segregate particular receipts and payments 
and to give them "a personality of their own". Nor was it necessary 
to depart from a straightforward "cash book" type of budget enabling 
all income and expenditure to be aggregated. When this aggregation 
indicated an equilibrium between total expenditure and normal or 
regularly recurring income, the budget could be considered "balanced". 
An excess of normal revenues over total expenditures constituted a 
"surplus" and was taken to imply that the government could and should 
repay any debt contracted in earlier years or build up funds with 
which to make such repayments later. An excess of total expenditure 
over normal revenue, a "deficit", involved increasing the government's 
indebtedness or reducing its accumulated funds to meet the deficit. 
This brief outline of what are perhaps self-evident propositions 
is pertinent insofar as the principle of unity was developed as an 
offshoot of the notion that balanced budgets, and to a lesser extent 
surpluses, represent sound financial practice, while deficits are 
unsound. This attitude was based, of course, on certain assumptions 
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of the classical school of economics; particularly those that a 
competitive private enterprise system would automatically provide 
for maximum employment of the community's resources and that 
economic recessions could only be of a temporary nature if wages 
and prices were sufficiently flexible. Given these assumptions 
and other tenets of the classical school, it followed that a 
budget deficit, involving as it did the spending of more than the 
government was taking from the community, would add to total demand 
and create an inflationary situation. From this position it was a 
short step to the view that budget documents should be drawn up in a 
form that would enable the overall "result" (surplus, deficit, or 
balance) to be seen at a glance. 
Of course, the economic theories related to public finance have 
undergone great change since the rule of unity was laid down, and it 
is now recognized that deficit budgeting is often an appropriate method 
of promoting desirable economic expansion, A budget deficit may 
merely indicate that the government is making up a deficienjjy in the 
community's total expenditure and utilizing labour and resources 
which would otherwise remain idle. Once this is appreciated it must 
be conceded that while a budget format which permits aggregation of 
ordinary revenues and expenditures does give an immediately discernible 
"result", the real significance of that "result" is not apparent unless 
there is also taken into account the prevailing economic conditions, the 
way in which the deficit is to be financed, and other factors. In 
short, the need to apply the unity principle no longer finds its major 
support in economic theory as such. 
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Reservations of this sort should not be taken to imply, 
however, that the ideal of unity in the presentation of budgetary 
data may simply be ignored. Generally speaking, budget officers 
accept the need for a high degree of unity throughout the budget. 
Some, like Wisconsin's capital budget analyst, Roger Schrantz, 
go further and hold that the rule of unity should be applied in 
a wholehearted fashion, 
"One of the cardinal rules of a sophisticated budget is 
that the budget must be both comprehensive and unified. 
If the budget is to be an effective tool for political and 
management decision making, according to the rule, then all 
governmental resources and expenditures should be considered 
in the same budget procedure and should be evaluated 
according to the same basic criteria," 28 
This is an admirable statement of what should be the approach 
of the budget framer if he is to present a budget in a form which 
permits proper evaluation. In practice, however, various factors 
operate to make it difficult to adhere to the rule of unity, except 
to a limited extent* 
Here a relevant consideration is the change in the nature of 
governmental income and expenditure which has followed the extension 
of the functions of government. The creation of government business 
undertakings and public utilities, and their adoption of commercial 
accounting methods; the use of trust funds for recording certain 
transactions; and the acquisition of assets and construction of capital 
28, Roger Schrantz, "State Capital Budgeting and its Relation to the 
Operating Budget," in (eds,) John L. Fulmer, Utha Conrad and 
Charles N. Byerly, The Budget Analyst in State Management, 
Chicago, Council of State Governments, 1965, p*101. 
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works by both business undertakings and normal departments; have 
all introduced into the financial operations of government items of 
income and outlay which have a new significance. As soon as 
government income no longer consisted of regularly recurring 
revenues, and expenditure went beyond that for a restricted range 
of current services, it became necessary to treat new items in a 
different way and in large measures to accord them the separate 
personality which Sundelson deplored. In addition, as we have already 
noted, some financial activities can not, for various reasons, be 
fitted in as integral parts of a single government account. Instead, 
they have had to be treated in separate accounts or statements, 
sometimes prepared on a commercial accounting basis, so that 
aggregation or unification presents severe problems. For reasons 
of this kind there.has been a departure from the rule of unity in 
the budgets of virtually all governments. 
In recent years numerous attempts have been made to devise ways 
of overcoming difficulties of presentation caused by the extension 
and diversification of governmental financial operations. These 
attempts have sometimes led to a more satisfactory presentation of 
budgetary material, but at the same time they have often further 
reduced the unity of budget documents. One practice which has had this 
effect is that of showing certain items on a net rather than a gross 
basis. Thus, revenue earned by departments in the provision of 
services may be deducted from their expenditure on the services, 
interest receipts may be deducted from interest payments, or earnings 
of undertakings may be shown after deducting their working expenses. 
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It may be arguedthat this avoids the inflating of both sides of the 
budget that occurs when items are shown gross, and more readily 
allows the economic significance of the government's financial 
operations to be appreciated. There is merit in this argument. 
Certainly, it is desirable that sufficient information about such 
things as fees and revenue from sales or provision of services be 
presented in a form which can be related to expenditure so that the 
29 
net cost of any governmental activity can be determined. Nevertheless, 
if budgets were drawn up entirely on a net basis there would be a 
serious weakening of the legislature's ability to control finance. 
The ideal of legislative oversight requires approval of all (i.e, 
gross) expenditure, A compromise solution is, of course, possible. 
Income and expenditure might be treated on a gross basis in the 
detailed estimates and the amounts submitted for legislative 
appropriation, but relevant items could be offset against one 
another and net amounts shown in a summary statement attached to the 
budget papers. This would be preferable to the mixing of gross and 
net items in the main budget document, Australian and Canadian 
state budgets are still drawn up on the traditional gross basis 
and gross expenditures are submitted for parliamentary appropriation; 
though in Canada occasional items subsidized by the dominion 
government are shown net, and in both countries summary statements 
set out on a net basis are used. The inclusion of net figures in 
the budget document itself is much more common in the United States, 
29c Cf, Report of the Royal Commission on Government Administration, 
Saskatchewan, Regina, (Queen's Printer, 1965, P«549. 
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Another, and more objectionable, departure from the "cash 
book" budget is that represented by the division of fiscal 
operations into "ordinary" and "extra-ordinary" budgets* In 
most countries where this division has been made it represents 
little more than an expedient for producing balance in at least 
part of the financial operations, in a situation where balancing 
(in the traditional sense of the term) has been made difficult 
because of depressed revenue yields* Where the division is 
adopted, operating expenditure, to the extent that it can be 
covered by ordinary revenues (taxation, royalties, receipts for 
services rendered, etc.) is brought to account in the "ordinary" 
budget; whilst all other expenditure is charged to the "extra-ordinary" 
budget and is usually covered by borrowing, in the form of either 
public loans or central bank credit. In other words, the ordinary 
budget is "balanced" by the expedient of charging the excess 
3o 
expenditures to a separate statement. 
It is of interest to note that a procedure analogous to this 
was adopted in Australia by the commonwealth government during and 
after world war II* It became customary for the commonwealth 
budget, which sets out the operations on the consolidated revenue 
fund, to be always balanced - expenditures on defence and capital 
works, insofar as they could not be met from consolidated revenue, 
being charged to the loan fund and financed from loan raisings and 
30. Cf* Ursula Hicks, Public Finance, London, James Nisbet and Co. 
Ltd*, 2nd edition, 1955, p.90. 
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treasury bill issues. In the post-war period, when ordinary 
revenues were more than sufficient to cover total expenditure 
(including that on defence and capital works), the budget was 
"balanced" by making transfer payments, equal to the potential 
"surplus", to the loan and trust funds, which do not form part of 
the budget. This was not, then, a case of the disguising of 
deficits on the government's financial operations - one's first 
suspicion when finding a budget divided in this way; but rather a 
case of using potential surpluses on the "ordinary" budget for the 
financing of capital expenditure and the redemption of short-term 
debt. Although, however, the division of operations between 
"ordinary" and "extra-ordinary" budgets has normally been for the 
purpose of covering up financial difficulties, the system is not 
dissimilar to that adopted by the Australian government* 
In America, multiple budgets, including the use of the 
"extraordinary" budget arose out of the conditions of the late 
1920's. Up to that time all expenditures were classified in a 
single general budget. The depression, however, saw the growth of 
"emergency" expenditures and these were brought to account by the 
federal government and later some states in separate budget documents, 
Support for this procedure was basically in terms of drawing a 
distinction between so-called "normal" and "emergency" expenditures, 
the latter being those which arose out of governmental attempts to 
31 
combkt the depression. 
31. Cf. Vincent J, Browne, The Control of the Public Budget, 
Washington, D.C., Public Affairs Press, 1949, pp.97-98. 
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It is not necessary here to examine the programmes of public 
expenditure instituted at this period* We need simply note that the 
dividing of budgets in this way not only seriously weakens budgetary 
uniigi but also creates problems of control - particularly since the 
government itself arbitrarily determines which expenditures are to 
be designated "extra-ordinary" and treated separately* The 
opportunity which this provides for budgetary manipulation is 
obvious. Also important is the profound effect on the course of 
budgetary studies which resulted from the growth of "emergency" 
expenditures at this period. Prior to this most writings about 
budgeting were devoted to what may be described as the mechanics 
of the subject. From the 1930's onwards, however, much more 
attention is given to the refining of budgetary theories in terms 
of their relationship to the economy as a whole. As Browne has 
observed, the "exigencies of the emergency gave the budget a scope 
32 
which it had previol^ sly not reached". 
Another kind of division of the budget and summary statement 
which is commonly found, and which has advantages, is that of thfe 
"current" and "capital" budget. In the United States these are 
usually referred to as "operating" and "improvement" budgets. 
Where this division applies, all expenditure on administrative 
and current services, maintenance of assets and provision for 
depreciation, together with all ordinary revenues, are brought to 
32, ibid,, p,98* 
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account in the current budget. All expenditure on the purchase 
and construction of capital assets, together with loan raisings, 
is set out in the capital budget. Thus, the former budget shows 
the cost of operating government services, while the latter shows 
the amount spent on adding to and improving public works and assets, 
and the change in indebtedness arising out of this activity. At the 
end of each fiscal period the current budget may be formally balanced 
by transferring any surplus to the capital budget* However, unlike 
the use of "ordinary" and "extra-ordinary" budgets, which usually 
involves an arbitrary division of expenditure and may permit the 
real position on the current account to be disguised, the division 
into current and capital budgets is made on a defined basis and 
clearly indicates any deficiency on current account and the means by 
which it is to be financed. 
As we have seen, the Australian states finance the major part 
of their capital works from loan raisings and show such expenditure 
separately from their current or "revenue" budgets. However, the 
division is not always made on as strict a basis as is envisaged by 
those who support the use of separate capital budgets* Items of 
expenditure not clearly of a capital nature are sometimes charged to 
33 the loan account, and no state makes effective provision for 
33. For several years after the last war, for instance, South Australia 
charged to its loan account the whole of the expenditure on the Rum 
Jungle uranium project (including general operating costs) and paidi 
the revenue earned by the project to that account* This had the 
effect of considerably increasing the state's "formula rights" 
under the financial agreement of 1928 and so strengthening its 
bargaining position at loan council meetings* 
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depreciation of assets* It may be said, too, that the loan estimates 
prepared by Australian state governments, although forming part of the 
budget documents, cannot in themselves be regarded as "budgets", since 
they include no statement or account which sets out the relationship 
between the proposed expenditures from the loan fund and the estimated 
receipts to be paid into the fund* To take this line of criticism 
further, we may note that Australian loan estimates seldom indicate 
the amounts proposed to be raised by borrowing or the sums to be 
received in the form of repayments to the credit of previous years' 
votes. Nor are details always given of the actual loan raisings and 
expenditures of the previous year. To comply^  with what is properly 
involved in the presentation of current and capital budgets these 
details would have to be shown and a statement summarising activities 
on the loan account would have to be both includled in the loan 
estimates and reproduced im the current or operating budget, alongside 
the summary statement of activities on current account. A further 
serious defect is that estimates give no indication of the 
anticipated total cost of each project listed, although such 
information is clearly essential if any analysis is to be made of the 
34 government's longer-run capital requirements. 
The treatment of capital expenditures is one of the worst 
features of the budgetary practices of many of the American states. 
It would be inappropriate here to analyse in detail the difficulties 
34. A similar complaint is made about the estimates of Saskatchewan 
in the Report of the Royal Commission on Government Administration, 
1965, PT549I 
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caused by particular procedures commonly adopted to allow for 
annual appropriation in situations where long-term contracts are 
involved. We may note, however, that in computing the annual 
appropriation, two adjustments must normally be made - a reduction 
to make allowance for expenditures in one budget year which are met 
from unused balances of funds voted for multi-year contracts 
(usually referred to as "unliquidated obligations carried forward"); 
and an addition to provide for expenditures which will occur in the 
later years of a long-term contract entered into during the budget 
year under consideration. In these circumstances the amount of an 
appropriation may give no indication whatever of the actual extent of 
the work to be done in the fiscal year. In other words, annual 
appropriations often cover, in addition to the carryover between 
years, the total contracts to be awarded in the fiscal year concerned, 
taking no account of the long period ove^ which expenditures may be 
spread before those contracts are completed. The annual expenditures 
reported by an agency are usually unrelated to the year in which the 
contracts were let or to the obligations incurred to obtain the 
55 
necessary current deliveries.^ -'^  This makes it very difficult to 
exercise sound judgment in budget preparation or to assess budgetary 
36 proposals at the legislative level, 
35* Cf, Herman C. Loeffler, "Alice in Budget-Land," National Tax 
Journal, Vol, IV, No, 1, March, 1951, p« 55* 
36* The general implications of having separate budgets for revenue 
services and capital works will not be further discussed. 
Interesting material on this topic is to be found in Fritz 
Morstein Marx, "The Divided Budget in Scandinavian Practice," 
National Tax Journal, Vol. VIII, Noo 2, June, 1955, pp.186-200, 
and Roger Schrantz, op.cit*, pp.101-^05* 
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In discussing comprehensiveness in budgeting it was noted that in 
the United States difficulties arose from the fact that in many states 
the budget proposals of particular departments could not be integrated 
into the governor's executive budget* This situation creates a similar 
problem in the achieving of unity of treatment of budgetary material. 
Exclusion of departments from the chief executive's budget applies most 
commonly when there are departments headed by elected officials. We may 
57 take the situation that exists in Illinois as a case in point. In that 
state there are in addition to the governor, seven popularly elected 
officials occupying major governmental posts. These are the lieutenant 
governor, secretary of state, auditor of public accounts, treasurer, 
attorney general, superintendent of public instruction, and clerk of the 
supreme court. Frequently one or more of these officials are of 
different political persuasion from the governor. Each controls 
expenditures appropriated specifically to his office and separately 
from the governor's executive budget, and clashes over financial 
matters and differences in appreaeh are not uncommon. The state 
universities and teachers' college are also virtually independent 
entities, specifically exempted from the fiscal control and supervision 
of the governor's department of finance. There is, then, a high 
degree of fragmentation of the budget, with the governor's oversight 
58 
extending to only about seventy per cent of the state's expenditure. 
37. Michigan was in a similar position until 1965, when constitutional 
change reduced the number of elected officials to two - attorney 
general and secretary of state - and greatly strengthened the 
executive budget, 
38, Cf. Geaorge E. Mahin, op.cit., pp.366-367, 
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All in all, it is clear that in each of the countries we are 
examining there is little possibility of achieving unity in the budget 
documents - insofar as that ideal implies a budget in simple form, in 
which all items are treated uniformly, in which each item is an integral 
part of the one budget, and in which it is possible to aggregate all 
items to show clearly the total revenue and expenditure of the state. 
Some form of budget unity is, however, made practicable by the 
inclusion of statements in which the various separate financial 
activities are summarized and brought together. Aggregate statements 
of this sort serve to present an overall, though necessarily brief, 
outline of the government's financial operations - an outline which it 
might otherwise be difficult to extract from the detailed estimates of 
receipts and expenditures. Varying forms of presentation of such 
summary statements are shown in appendix B (pp. 442 ff,). 
The financial operations of business and trading undertakings -
whether they form part of the budget and require legislative 
authorization, or whether they are merely annexed to the budget for the 
information of the legislature - may be brought together with the other 
fiscal material by including their net surpluses or deficits in the 
aggregate statement. Nor is it difficult to include on a gross 
basis the financial dealings associated with works and services 
financed from assigned revenues - e.g, road construction and maintenance, 
The operations of the various trust funds could also be brought into 
the aggregate statement, though this does involve certain difficulties 
which need not be enlarged upon here. Finally, the aggregate statement 
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could include a summary of capital expenditures, loan raisings and 
repayments, and could be divided into two parts, a current and 
capital statement, if the budget itself were so divided. 
The effectiveness of such an aggregate statement would, of 
course, depend largely on the extent to which the budget was 
comprehensive in its coverage, since it would hardly be likely to 
include summaries of operations not dealt with in the budget itself 
or annexed to it. However, if a budget were to include a summary 
statement consolidating in broad terms the detailed estimates 
making up the body of the document and any of its annexures, the 
budget could fairly be regarded as satisfying the condition of unity 
in at least the newer and more limited sense of the term. 
Clarity 
A third major budgetary principle relates to the clarity of 
the budget documents. The extent to which budgets can or should 
exhibit clarity of presentation, however, is not an issue that can 
be resolved in simple terms. What may be regarded as an extreme view 
is expressed by Bland who argues that "it should be possible for the 
Budget to be understood by all citizens", adding that "without an 
informed electorate, parliamentary control lacks a firm foundation",-^" 
A more moderate attitude is adopted by Sundelson, who points out that 
"democratic ideals scarcely require that the technical and complex 
39* F. A. Bland, op.cit., p,19< 
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contents of the budget be made entirely comprehensible to the 
legendary man in the street, but, on the other hand, there are 
reasonable limits to the amount of specialized training one must 
40 possess in order to know what the budget contains". 
Apart from this question of emphasis, we may note that, like so 
much of the discussion about budgetary principles, the arguments 
concerning clarity are commonly used to support two distinct matters. 
The term may firstly be used with reference to financial operations 
generally. From this point of view clarity is partly a question of 
broad classification of receipts and outlays, and partly a matter of 
treatment. It is here related to the notion of unity, in that it 
implies the intelligent summarizing of the individual accounts into 
a single statement - the grouping together of the state's financial 
activities to form one general picture. Secondly, the term may be 
used to apply to the detailed estimates. In this sense it is almost 
wholly a question of classification - of whether the estimates are set 
out in such a way as to show "clearly" how money is being spent and the 
sources from which money is being obtained. For the time being let us 
concentrate on the first use of the term. 
Generally speaking, early budgets presented no serious problem 
in giving a clear statement of overall financial activities. As we 
have already indicated, both revenues and expenditures were narrow in 
scope, and could readily be aggregated in a single statement showing the 
40* J, Wilner Sundelson, op,cit., p.258* 
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overall surplus or deficit* A surplus indicated that the 
government was diminishing its net indebtedness, either by actually 
redeeming debt or by accumulating a money balance for such redemption. 
A deficit indicated that indebtedness was being increased or that 
money balances, otherwise available for debt redemption, were being 
reduced* That is to say, a definite meaning could be attached to the 
budget result* Although incorrect views may then have been held 
concerning the economic significance of the budget result and about 
what constituted "sound" finance, this does not alter the fact that 
early budgets were "clear" documents in their capacity to reflect 
overall financial transactions* 
Budget clarity in this sense can only be achieved in 
conjunction with comprehensiv.iness and unity. That is to say, 
a budget cannot be clear if certain operations are omitted and/or 
if accounts are presented separately without aggregation in some 
kind of summary statement. Clarity requires that we have before us 
a picture of the totality of the government's financial activities. 
On the other hand, comprehensiveness and unity do not automatically 
ensure that budgets will be clear* Something more is required* The 
development of business undertakings and trading services and the 
growth of capital expenditure on both commercial and non-commercial 
assets have introduced items which will not fit into the traditional 
categories. Today a budget may be comprehensive, in the "newer" sense 
that all operations are reflected either in the budget itself or in 
annexed statements, and may be unified at least insofar as operations 
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are summarised and aggregated in a single statement, without the 
budget having clarity - without it presenting a clear picture of 
the government's overall financial operations. 
In thinking about the question of clarity, attention must 
also be paid to the budget's role in attempts to direct the economy 
along particular lines. 
"The ultimate object of budgetary policy is to contribute 
to economic stabilization - that is to say, the Budget 
should provide, as far as possible, a counterpoise to the 
tendencies to excessive or deficient saving, which may be 
detectable in the private sector of the economy, and which 
(if uncorrected) would make for unemployment or for 
inflation respectively." 4l 
This suggests that the problem of prescribing a form of budgetary 
presentation which meets the condition of clarity has in reality 
two aspects: accounting and economic. From the accounting viewpoint 
the problem is largely that of maintaining order in the accounts of 
government; to treat the various components in a way that enables 
the legislature to exercise intelligent oversight. From the economic 
aspect the need is to present accounts that can be related to those 
of the whole economy, the national income accounts. This facilitates 
full employment budgeting, which involves making calculations about 
and influencing national income and outlay. In some financial systems 
radical changes in existing methods of accounting and the control of 
expenditure would be required if budgetary presentation were to be 
4l, J. R, Hicks, The Problem of Budgetary Reform, Oxford University 
Press, 1948, p.54. 
- 135 -
recast to meet both requirements, and in these cases it would be 
necessary to decide whether the accounting or the economic aspect 
were the more important. Generally, at the state government level 
the stress is likely to be placed on the accounting approach. In 
some instances, however, it would be possible to draw up financial 
statements which achieve both objectives, without unduly disturbing 
the existing system. 
If an attempt were to be made to meet both aims it would be 
necessary as a first step to ensure that government business 
undertsikings, utilities and trading authorities were classified as 
such, and to make a clear distinction between these undertakings and 
ordinary government departments. Undertakings sell their output 
or services, borrow and lend, and accumulate real assets, the stock 
of which rises and falls. Their accounts, unlike those of most 
ministerial departments, cannot appropriately be kept on a simple 
cash-book basis. Their financial operations need to be reflected 
in accounts similar in form to those used generally in commerce, 
an income and expenditure or profit and loss account, a capital 
account, and, if possible, % balance sheet being prepared for each 
enterprise. As we have already noted, financial details of the 
activities of trading services can beincluded in the main budget 
document when their expenditure is subject to legislative appropriation, 
while accounts of other independent services may be annexed to the 
budget without infringement of their autonomy or of the aim of 
treating them as business concerns. To incorporate trading services 
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into a clear overal l p ic ture of governmental f inances, therefore , 
involves simply the re f lec t ing of the i r net surpluses or de f i c i t s 
in the current account section of the aggregate budget statement, 
and for the items making up t h e i r c ap i t a l accounts to be shown in the 
budget s tatement 's capi ta l sec t ion . 
The second requirement would be for a d i s t inc t ion to be drawn 
between current and cap i ta l ou t lays . We have seen that government 
expenditure (as d i s t i nc t from tha t of t rading undertakings) i s in 
some systems divided between current and cap i t a l i tems, bas ica l ly in 
accordance with accepted accounting p r i nc ip l e s , and the grea ter par t of 
the capi ta l expenditure i s charged against a separate account or fund. 
This i s the case in the Scandinavian countries and, with minor 
reservations, in the Austral ian s t a t e s . In other systems the division 
is often made a r b i t r a r i l y to meet administrat ive convenience, and 
here i t would be necessary to choose between the accounting and 
ecohomic objectives in preparing the aggregate statement. Assuming 
that government cap i ta l expenditure, which i s usual ly l imited to that 
on formation of non-commercial assets , can be dist inguished from current 
expenditure, i t would be re f lec ted in the budget s ta tement 's cap i t a l 
account, along with advances to non-governmental bodies and repayments 
of debt applicable to non-commercial a s s e t s . The surplus on 
administrative services and sinking fund contr ibutions (which could 
be t ransferred from the budget s ta tement ' s current account), along with 
governmental borrowing, would be shown on the rece ip ts side of the 
capital account. That account would also r e f l e c t the items presented in 
the cap i t a l accounts of the t rading undertakings. 
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An aggregate budget statement, distinguishing between 
administrative and trading services and between current and capital 
expenditure, is presented hereunder. This statement has been drawn 
up with the form of the New South Wales financial documents in mind, 
but with minor modifications would be suitable for use with other 
bu dge ts. 
CURRENT ACCOUNT 
(a) Administrative Services 
—7 
Income from property 
Interest on advances 
Tax revenue 
Transfers from other 
public au thor i t i e s 
a 
b 
c1 
c2 
Administrative expenditure 
Interest on debt 
Grants, subsidies, pensions 
Sinking fund contribution 
Administrative surplus (+) 
or deficit (-) 
^ X 
0 
d 
f 
g 
h 
^ X 
(b) Trading Services 
Profit (+) or loss (-) 
of trading services 
"inside" the budget ii 
Profit (+) or loss (-) 
of trading services 
"annexed" to the 
budget 11 
Trading surplus (+) or 
deficit (-) 
0 
0 i 
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CAPITAL ACCOUNT 
0 
Administrative surplus (+) 
or def ic i t (-) h 
Sinking fund contribution g 
Borrowing for non-commercial 
a s se t s , advances, e t c , j 
Profit (+) or loss (-) of 
trading services " ins ide" 
the budget 11 
Depreciation and sinking fund 
contribution o 
Borrowing for commercial 
assets, etc, p 
^z2 
0 
Investment in non-commercial 
assets k 
Repayment of debt 1 
Advances to outside bodies m 
Increase (+) or decrease (-) 
in cash n 
0 z1 
Investment in commercial 
assets by trading services 
"inside" the budget q 
Repayment of debt r 
Increase (+) or decrease (-) 
in cash s 
0 z2 
Profit (+) or loss (-) of 
trading services "annexed" 
to the budget 12 
Depreciation and sinking fund 
contribution t 
Borrowing for commercial 
a s se t s , e t c . u 
0z3 
Investment in commercial 
assets by trading services 
"annexed" to the budget v 
Repayment of debt w 
Increase (+) or decrease (-) 
in cash y 
0 z3 
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With this form of statement the surplus on current account -
i.e, the combined administrative and trading services' surplus -
would show the extent to which governmental financial operations 
resulted in "saving" during the year; and thus the amount available, 
together with sinking fund contributions or depreciation, to be 
carried to the capital account for use in financing investment in 
assets or repayment of debt. The capital account would reveal the 
amount invested in assets, the extent of borrowing, and changes in 
the net indebtedness of the government and its trading undertakings. 
Such a statement would represent a considerable gain in clarity 
of presentation, as there are very few government budgets in iMe world 
today which bring this information together in one statement. It is 
not suggested, of course, that a statement of the sort presented above 
would make the budget intelligible to the "man in the street"; but 
that much could hardly be expected, given a situation in which the 
profit and loss accounts of institutions much less complex than 
governments are comparative mysteries to most people. The suggested 
form of summary statement would, however, mkke the budget understandable 
to anyone with a knowledge of the rudiments of book-keeping and would 
also enable the government's financial operations to be seen, not as a 
series of separate activities, but as a reflection of overall policy. 
The relationship of the parts to one another and to the whole pattern 
of governmental finance would be brought out and to this extent the 
accounting aspect of the problem of budget clarity would be solved. 
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Equally important is the consideration that this type of 
statement would meet some of the difficulties in the way of 
achieving clarity of presentation in respect of the economic 
implications of budgeting. Through it the government's accounts 
could be related to the national income accounts, as a distinction 
between items is made partly according to their economic significance. 
It would also permit any one of a number of criteria of "financial 
soundness" to be applied to the government's operations. The 
question of what constitutes "sound" financial policy cannot 
appropriately be discussed here, but we may mention some of the 
criteria, in order to demonstrate that the suggested statement 
includes the type of information which would be required for 
full-employment budgeting. For instance, it might be argued at 
a certain time that in view of prevailing economic conditions, the 
government should endeavour to finance all current expenditure out 
of ordinary or current revenues. Applied to the model statement, 
this would mean that the current account should either balance or 
show a surplus. At another time it might be felt that not only 
current expenditures, but also investments in non-commercial assets 
should be financed out of ordinary revenues. This would mean that 
the surplus on administrative services (h) should be sufficient to 
finance investment in non-commercial assets (k), and that government 
borrowing (j) should be limited to the amount required to finance 
advances to outside bodies (m) - which would normally be very limited. 
Yet another long-run "principle" is that financial operations should 
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not cause governmental debt to increase proportionately to a 
greater extent than the national income. The suggested statement 
allows the increase in governmental indebtedness to be easily 
calculated. The amount of the debt itself is usually readily 
ascertainable; while the proportionate increase in the national 
income can be discovered by reference to "white papers" and other 
general financial or economic statements. 
The descriptions already given of the state budget papers 
presented in Australia, Canada and the United States are probably 
sufficient to indicate that they do not satisfy the condition of 
clarity in the first sense. Very few budgets adequately distinguish 
between trading and administrative services, or between current and 
capital outlays. In numerous instances, too, the practice of 
producing a "balance" by transferring surplus revenue to a trust 
fund or by meeting some current expenditures from loan raisings 
makes it difficult to obtain a clear picture of the overall 
financial operations and their implications. It is now common for 
state budgets to include a summary statement presenting aggregate 
figures for various financial activities. As already indicated, 
several examples of such statements are given in appendix Dr (pp.442 ff.) 
Statements of this type are clear as far as they go. However, they 
seldom set out the financial results of undertakings "outside" the 
budget. Nor do they normally show the results of capital operations. 
They lack clarity, then, in that they do not cover the state's entire 
financial plan. Failure to include all receipts, earmarked or 
otherwise, and all disbursements can only lead to misconceptions and 
confusion about the finances of government. Summary statements should 
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clearly portray the magnitude of governmental operations. 
Classification and clarity 
It has been suggested that budget clarity in the second of 
the two senses in which the word is commonly used is largely a 
matter of classification of the detailed estimates of revenue and 
expenditure. In this, as in most areas of academic speculation, 
attempts to classify bring fundamental questions to the fore. 
42 As Burkhead has pointed out, no single expenditure classification 
can serve all purposes. A budget officer within an agency may be 
helped most by a classification based on intra-agency organizational 
units, whereas other administrations may require expenditure 
classifications designed to serve internal management purposes. 
The legislature may be concerned mainly with programmes and the 
interest groups served by those programmes. The economist may 
require to know the size and character of governmental payments to 
the public. Other budget users will have different needs. 
Compromise will seldom be possible. 
The primary break-down of state budget expenditures is usually 
in terms of organizational units - departments, sub-departments, 
43 bureaux, divisions, and so on. This basic classification greatly 
42. Jesse Burkhead, "The Outlook for Federal Budget-Making," National 
Tax Journal, Vol. II, No* 4, December, 1949, p.293. 
43, Methods of classification commonly used in the United States of 
America are outlined in appendix E (pp. 446 ff,). 
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simplifies control of expenditure by permitting the appropriation 
of a specific sum for each organizational unit, which may then be 
made responsible for keeping detailed a^ fficounts of its outlay. To 
state this proposition in such bald terms, however, is to evade what 
is, as it were, a prior problem: for what level of organization 
should appropriations be made? Here we have a question for which 
there is seldom a single answer for all parts of any department or 
agency. That is to say, some appropriations are made at the 
departmental level, whereas others apply to subordinate levels or 
sections of a department - for example, a teachers' training college, 
museum, art gallery or state library, coming under the control of the 
dducation department. 
Even though subordinate units may be subject to general 
direction and control by senior departmental officers, minister, or 
state governor, the level at which appropriations are made does have 
real significance in terms of legislative control, treasury or finance 
department supervision, and executive-legislative relationships. 
Although some of the issues raised are relevant to parliamentary 
forms of government, the significance of the organizational level 
chosen when appropriations are made is perhaps more immediately 
apparent in relation to the congressional system. In the United 
States legislatures in most instances hear testimony on proposed 
appropriations mainly from officials at the organizational level 
directly involved, and naturally tend to hold that level directly 
responsible for the way in which its particular appropriations are 
subsequently utilized. One effect of making appropriations to 
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relatively low levels of an agency is that the legislature thereby 
gains a substantial degree of control over the agency's internal 
organization, since re-allocation of functions and other changes 
cannot be made without revision of the appropriation structure. 
From the standpoint of budget clarity the making of 
appropriations at different organizational levels in respect of the 
various activities of a department may cause confusion. Where, as 
is usually the case, some appropriations are made for subordinate 
units and some at higher levels or for the department as a whole, 
users of the budgetary documents may incorrectly assume that items 
identified with particular units reflect their entire cost. It is 
true that when appropriations are made for subordinate units the 
budget papers and other financial documents will more clearly reflect 
each department's organizational pattern, but this is achieved largely 
at the expense of clarity in the presentation of data on functions in 
which several such units participate. 
It an earlier period in the development of the budgetary 
process it would have been usual for new departments or agencies to 
be specially created to carry out new functions and responsibilities, 
A classification based on organizational units therefore tended to be 
also a functional classification showing the purposes for which money 
was being spent. Over the years, however, there has been a substantial 
and sometimes rapid expansion of governmental functions, A certain 
amount of functional overlapping has occurred between departments, 
while agencies have also been created whose purpose:- is to provide 
services for departments generally. In most cases, then, an 
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organizational classification will no longer be an accurate 
reflection of functional expenditure, and departmental cost 
statements (showing the departmental break-down of the 
expenditures of departments which provide services for the 
whole administration - e.g, printing and stores) and functional 
classifications have had to be included in budget documents for 
the information of legislators and others involved in budget review. 
Although in some instances a single appropriation item may 
cover all the costs of an organization unit, almost always further 
itemization of expenditure is involved. Various methods of 
classification may be used to itemize expenditures within each 
organizational unit; for instance by function, geographic area, 
nature of expenditure, or object of expenditure. In the large 
number of budgets with which we are dealing examples may be found 
of each of these forms of classification; often several forms being 
used within one set of budget documents, A legislature may, for 
instance, appropriate separately for major capital outlays and other 
expenses of a programme of activity; separate appropriations are 
sometimes made for regional or field operations, thus introducing 
classification by area; or itemization by object of expenditure may 
be used, such as "transportation of commodities" or "procurement of 
agricultural products". For current expenditures the most commonly 
used classification, however, is by the nature of the expenditure -
salaries, allowances, travelling expenses, maintenance, etc. With 
capital expenditures, as we have seen, the classification used 
generally involves grouping according to the type of project with 
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which the expenditure is associated. 
The implications of using one or more of the various forms 
of classification extend well beyond the consideration of clarity, 
of course. The choice made as between the possible kinds of 
breakdown of expenditure at any level has important and wide-ranging 
dffects. Itemization by area, for instance, may help to simplify 
current administration by reducing the number of appropriation 
accounts from which particular offices are supported. On the other 
hand, it may impose more rigid legislative control over the scale of 
operations in various areas. It also places the primary emphasis 
upon geographic distribution of work, rather than upon functions 
or objects of expense. Itemization by function might seem to provide 
more information on which to base effective legislative control. 
The benefits, however, may be somewhat illusory, particularly since 
administration is likely to be made more complicated if the internal 
organization of an agency and the assignment of work are inconsistent 
with the functions named. It becomes difficult to control effectively 
the cost of various functions when in many offices some of the 
employees perform work relating to a number of functions for which 
appropriations are made. Itemization by object increases legislative 
control over the nature of the services to be provided and all the 
items involved in the provision of such services, but tends to 
reduce flexibility in methods of operation. Unless care is taken the 
accomplishment of programmes of activity may be delayed* 
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In general, administrative flexibility is enhanced when 
financial support is given through relatively few distinct items 
and without strictly laid down limitations on the use of funds. 
Under these circumstances funds made available to meet particular 
kinds of needs could legally be used in other ways if changed 
conditions dictated such action. However, the mere legality of 
change would not relieve administrators of the responsibility for 
explaining differences between their original proposals and the 
way in which funds were subsequently used. Because difficult 
decisions calling for individual judgment are involved, many 
administrators prefer not to be given authority to make significant 
departures from the approved budget allocations, even though the 
alternative may be numerous and detailed appropriations and other 
formal limitations on the exercise of discretion; including a 
complex and rigid accounting system and the need to submit requests 
for supplementary appropriations from time to time. Such an 
attitude may lead to minute itemization, with highly detailed budget 
documents which present a confusing or misleading picture of overall 
governmental finances. 
In discussing budget clarity it is, of course, necessary to 
look beyond the problems of determining the appropriate form and 
degree of classification. Many of the difficulties associated with 
expenditure classification arise because the budget is being used to 
cope with varying tasks. It is obvious, for instance, that in order 
to evaluate departmental requests for funds the legislature needs 
information as to the bases on which the requests were built. 
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Estimates set out in the form of personal services, material and 
supplies, contractual services and equipment simply do not provide 
an adequate picture of a department's accomplishments and plans. 
As we have noted, state budgets are commonly set up on a basis of 
major objects or purposes. Today's budgets are large in size and 
may consist of thousands of individual items. It is true that it 
is possible to compare in parallel columns the amount of expenditure 
recommended for each item with actual expenditures for previous periods. 
This form of presentation, however, tells the legislator little more 
than the dollar increase or decrease in departmental activitiess and 
in each major object over the years* It does not indicate whether an 
increase is due to expansion of activity, higher costs, or inefficiency. 
That is to say, the figures as t^ey stand do not enable members of the 
executive or the legislature, to say nothing of the general public, 
to determine whether an agency has too many employees or too few, is 
travelling too much or too little, is buying too much or not enough, 
and so on. There is, in short, no attempt to relate expenditure 
classifications to the functions to be performed. 
On the other hand, although a form of functional classification 
more informative to the legislature may be obtained by telling each 
organizational unit how much it may spend for each of its activities 
or programmes, control of expenditure will usually require the 
preparation of detailed schedules on the basis of objects. This 
sort of clash in the uses to which the budget may be put often leads 
to compromises in methods of presentation, producing a mixture in 
approach which may curtail administrative freedom more than does even 
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a highly detailed classification by object. Although not an 
extreme instance, the Maryland budget document exhibits a number 
of defects arising from this type of compromise. 
In the Canadian provincial budgets, as in those of the Australian 
states, expenditures are customarily grouped under a number of main 
headings (votes or resolutions), which are then dissected in detailed 
schedules. Votes frequently give no clear indication of the purpose 
for which they are to be spent. Often, too, items in the detailed 
supporting schedules are set down at random, with no attempt being 
made to follow a uniform object classification pattern, which would 
be useful for accounting and statistical purposes. Budget analysis 
is made unnecessarily difficult when there is not uniformity of 
treatment of items from one department to another. 
In Canada the provincial government of Saskatchewan has been a 
leader in budgetary practice and has issued a "standard classification" 
of revenues by sources and expenditures by objects, to be applied to 
the estimates and accounting documents. Generally speaking the 
Australian states have achieved a high degree of consistency of 
treatment within their respective budget documents; New South Wales 
having, perhaps, gone furthest in this regard. Varying methods of 
treatment from one set of budget documents to another do, however, 
make interstate comparisons difficult. In the example about lottery 
revenue in Queensland referred to on page 105 for instance, no 
indication is given in the budget document of the source of the 
revenue which goes into the two trust funds involved in hospital 
finance. Nor is any reference made in the budget papers to the 
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"Golden Casket" as the state lottery is called. For information 
about the disposal of lottery revenue it would be necessary to 
refer to the legislation creating the particular trust funds. 
Unless, therefore, one had prior awareness of the likely use of 
lottery receipts, it is probable that the transactions would go 
unnoticed in any examination of the state budget. 
Unlike expenditure, income is rarely classified on the basis 
of organizational units, but is usually grouped according to source -
e.g. income taxation, death duties, rental of crown lands, etc. 
Despite the prevalence of "earmarked" receipts, this is probably a 
reflection of an attitude in which revenues have tended to be regarded 
as forming a single fund available for financing expenditure in 
general. Many of the less important revenues are collected by a 
number of agencies, but they lose their identification with a 
particular agency when they are paid into the "exchequer" account. 
Quite apart from this, of course, the method of classification can 
be justifiead simply on the ground that it is more informative. 
Narrative Presentation and Clarity 
Belated to the general issue of clarity of the budget documents 
are questions about the nature of the budget message or speech, and 
the type and extent of explanatory material which might be incorporated 
into the documents. 
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If the budget constitutes a plan for future governmental 
activity, and is not simply a financial report, then its provisions 
are of vital interest to all citizens. Understanding of the plan 
should not be dependent upon a person's ability to make a detailed 
analysis of a mass of figures and tables. There is need for a story 
about the budget - for an informative and comprehensive budget 
message or speech, framed in such a way that it can be easily 
reported by the press, A letter of transmittal of a few lines, or 
a message merely setting out some of the difficulties encountered in 
preparing the budget, is not enough; though sometimes little more 
than this is given. Differences in the nature of state budget 
44 
messages have already been discussed. 
Apart from budget messages themselves, however, there is a growing 
tendency particularly in the United States, to include in the main 
budget document information in narrative form about programmes of 
activity. Such descriptive material accompanying the budget schedules 
can be an important source of programme information. Usually, the 
legal basis for departmental activities is given, together with a 
description of the actual activities. Data illustrative of past work 
and future plans may also be given. 
A Variety of factors, of course, influences the extent and form 
of such information. Much will depend upon the budget philosophy of 
the administration, as well as upon the information demands of the 
44. See pp,100-102, and appendix B (pp.434 ff.). 
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legislature or the legal provisions governing budget content. 
Sometimes, too, in the United States citizens' organizations 
interested in state activities pressed for and succeeded in 
obtaining the inclusion of information designed to aid both 
legislative and public appraisal of the budget. 
Examination of budget papers indicates that there is a wide 
variation in the nature of the statistical information included 
from state to state and from agency to agency within each state. 
This seems partly to be a reflection of differences in the types 
of programmes being carried out, but it is also indicative of 
differences in what budget officers believe is useful or desirable 
to provide for legislative decision-making. 
Information about changes in the size and composition of a 
state's population is usually given only incidentally, in relation 
to expenditure on education, hospitals, and other functions 
dependent upon population, or in connection with estimated revenue, 
particularly grants-in-aid determined partly or wholly by population. 
The work of institutions is often illustrated with tables of 
admissions, readmissions, and releases, perhaps accompanied by 
explanatory, text outlining the main implications of the data presented, 
Sometimes statistics comparing one year with another are given, along 
with explanations of major variations. Some documents give figures 
to illustrate the volume of particular services provided and the 
type of work done - e.g, the number of inspections made, or the 
number and nature of tests conducted. Frequently personnel costs of 
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new activities or extension of old ones are emphasised. 
Personnel costs form a large part of state government expenditure 
and it is felt by many budget framers that they warrant special 
comment. In other instances textual comment in the budget document 
is limited to new or special activities, it being assumed that 
continuing activities need no explanation unless proposed expenditures 
are to vary markedly from previous years. 
Narrative material and statistics about performance are useful 
supplements to the budget tables, if only because they identify and 
illustrate the work of the various departments and provide an 
indication of the cost of major activities of government, A 
narrative explanation, no matter how simple, will generally be 
informative to the legislator and will provide him with a frame of 
reference for his examination of the detailed estimates. If the 
explanation sets out the legal basis for the department's activities, 
it will also help to bring home to the legislator that he, as a 
lawmaker, is partly responsible for the programmes put in hand by 
governmental agencies. There are, however, possible dangers 
associated with the inclusion of performance data in the budget 
document. Such material may well create a state of mind that leads 
to automatic acceptance of the worth of a particular departmental 
task 
activity. In addition, it is a difficult/to formulate data 
accurately reflecting an agency's output and activities; and even 
if this can be done there remains the problem of expressing quality 
of performance. Careful and periodical review of performance data 
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is essential if it is to be of any value. In general, there is 
the likelihood that inclusion in budget papers of "informative" 
statistics and textual comment will become an end in itself 
leading in time to the over-burdening of the documents with 
figures of doubtful significance in assessing the value of 
departmental activities and with descriptive material that can 
be inaccurate or misleading. If only statistical information is 
included few, if any, members of the legislature are likely to make 
adequate use of it. It is desirable, therefore, that if such 
material is to be included it be accompanied by textual comment 
about the statistics and their significance. 
Specific Authorization 
The principle of specific authorization suggests that the 
estimates of receipts and expenditures included in the budget 
should be detailed and specific in nature, and that lump-sum 
votes to be spent at the discretion of the executive should be 
avoided. In other words, the legislature should not be asked to 
vote large sums for vaguely-defined purposes but should be free to 
authorize expenditure under specific headings. The principle also 
implies that the transfer of amounts from one vote or item to 
another - "virement" - at the discretion of the executive should 
not be permitted. 
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There is no doubt that a case miay be made out in general 
terms for the avoidance of lump-sum or "block" allocations of 
expenditure. In the United States such allocations were originally 
common and there it was found that the practice opened the way for 
administrators to divert funds to purposes for which appropriations 
had not and would not have been made. The swing towards highly-itemized 
appropriations was largely due to the desire to check the unauthorized 
expenditure of funds and to reduce the possibility of corruption. 
Nevertheless, it must be recognized that highly detailed 
appropriations may, as we have already noted, prevent the legitimate 
exercise of administrative discretion or judgment. This will be 
even more likelyr to be so if a detailed appropriation structure 
is coupled with a prohibiting of inter-item transfer of funds. 
Each year's budget almost invariably includes a large number of 
items for which the amounts voted prove insufficient to meet 
requirements, while many other approved expenditures exceed what 
is found to be needed. With restricted flexibility as far as 
virement is concerned the executive has either to submit supplementary 
estimates of expenditure for legislative appropriation or to incur 
unauthorized expenditure on items where the votes were deficient -
45 
even though the total approved expenditure may not have been exceeded, 
45, Most states appropriate an amount which may be used at the treasurer'e 
discretion to meet unforeseen commitments, payments from this vote 
being ratified when the following year's estimates are presented. New 
South W-es allows 0k million per annum for this purpose under the 
heading "advance to treasurer". Commonly, however, this vote is 
greatly exceeded, without there being any prior legislative sanction 
or the issuing of a governor's warrant to cover the amount involved. 
These payments in excess of the vote are made with the approval of 
the treasurer and are presented for subsequent legislative ratificat-
ion as "payments unauthorized in suspense". The practice constitutes 
an open breach of statutory provisions and of the principle of prior 
and specific authorization. 
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Often state governments attempt to avoid this problem by using a 
system of lump-sum appropriations, supported by itemized schedules, 
and by permitting transfers of funds from one item to another at the 
discretion of the executive. Normally in such a system the amounts 
shown in the itemized schedule are binding on the departmeait 
concerned unless cause can be shown for the transfer of funds and 
executive approval obtained. In essence, this is the normal procedure 
in Australia and Canada, though the extent to which inter-item 
transfer of funds is possible varies from state to state. In the 
United States such a system is much less common, although it is to 
be found in several states, which were influenced in the first 
instance by the experience of Maryland in the period before it 
adopted performance budgeting. 
The question of "continuing" appropriations, once common in 
the United States but now largely abandoned, is also relevant to 
the discussion of specific authorization. From the point of view 
of the department or agency there is a good deal to be said in 
favour of continuing appropriations. They do provide some sense of 
security, in that there is a guarantee that failure of the 
legislature to appropriate further funds will, not mean the 
immediate abandonment of the particular departmental activity. 
The agency is thus better able to plan for the future and is not 
involved in annual "bargaining" for resources. Clearly, however, 
continuing appropriations are bad in principle. They may, for 
instance, allow an inefficient organization to remain in existence 
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indefinitely. Alternatively, they may lead to a service's 
being continued after the justification for it no longer exists. 
But more important ihan these factors is the objection that 
continuing appropriations indicate a conception of the budget 
function that places the major emphasis on the needs of individual 
agencies rather than on those of the state as a whole. The motive 
for introducing a state budget system lies in the belief that it is 
inappropriate for each governmental organization to formulate its 
own plan and carry it out independently. Within a budget system 
each unit will develop its initial plan of activity, but will then 
place it before a central agency able to view the needs of all units 
of government and whose prime function is to frame a master plan 
for carrying out the state's work, in the context of the overall 
financial situation. The aim is to produce an integrated 
administrative system, not one which functions through autonomous 
boards. Co-operative not independent action is sought. Continuing 
appropriations might be justified if state administration were viewed 
as being in the hands of a number of separate units of government, 
but they have little place where there is to be one administration 
under a responsible chief executive. 
While one may agree generally with the principle of specific 
appropriation, difficulties arise when it has to be applied in 
practice. There seems to be no hard and fast answer to the question 
of how detailed or specific votes should be. Probably the most that 
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can be said is that votes should be sufficiently detailed to 
indicate clearly the purpose for which each is required, but 
not so detailed as to stultify executive initiative or to create 
the probability of a high degree of inaccuracy in the estimates. 
This formulation, however, leaves the principle far too vague to 
be of much practical assistance to those who must draw up budgets. 
We can say, though, that there seems to be no valid reason, from 
whatever angle specific authorization is viewed, for prohibiting 
transfers of funds from one item to another, where the votes provide 
for functions of a continuing nature and of similar character. 
Accuracy 
The final principle to be examined is that of accuracy. This 
demands that budget estimates "should be as exact as possible: 
there should be no inflation of expenditures as a cushion against 
'cuts', or no under-estimating of revenues to provide 'reserves' 
46 for further spending". It is expected that departments and 
agencies when framing their draft estimates of expenditure should 
not attempt to forestall ministerial or budget bureau reductions 
by allowing a margin over their "real" requirements. Nor should 
the executive hide from the legislature likely revenue yields 
which would later permit expenditure in excess of the ajnount 
budgeted for. Budget officials recognize that departments may 
"pad" estimates as an insurance against reductions and will often 
46, F. A. Bland, op.cit., p.19, 
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find it necessary to make appropriate allowance for this when 
examining the proposals submitted by departments. As the New 
South Wales Manual of Government Accounting puts it: 
"It is the usual experience to find that departments have 
been modest in their estimates of receipts and generous in 
their anticipations of spendings..." 47 
Nevertheless, it is difficult in particular cases to distinguish 
between revenue estimates designed to create a "hidden reserve" 
and those that are merely conservative; or between expenditure 
estimates that are deliberately inflated and those that simply 
provide a margin sufficient to cover likely contingencies, such as 
increases in wages or other costs. Experience of the extent to 
which actual receipts and expenditures differ from what was 
estimated is the only guide, but even this may be unreliable as an 
indication of political manipulation of the estimates. 
Apart from the deliberate falsification of estimates for 
political reasons, budget accuracy is largely conditioned by the 
extent to which effective administrative machinery and procedures 
can be developed to cope with the formulation process. These are 
considerations dealt with in later chapters. We may here mention, 
however, three factors influencing budget accuracy which are seldom 
given the weight they deserve. Firstly, as we have noted, accuracy 
is in part dependent on the detail with which expenditure is voted -
47* Manual of Governmental Accounting in New South Wales, Sydney, 
Government Printer, 1952, p*39» 
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the more detailed and specific the estimates, the less likely 
they are to correspond with actual expenditure* In many states 
in each of the countries we are examining legislative bodies go 
much further than is desirable in attempting to determine 
establishments, salaries, kinds and quantities of supplies, and 
numerous petty details of the day to day activities of departments. 
Inevitably, this invites the "padding" of estimates so that 
departments will not be faced with a shortage of funds for one 
particular item which might hold up the progress of a general 
programme of activity. 
Secondly, the time schedule is significant. Budget accuracy 
will be affected not only by the time available for preparation, 
but also by the length of the period between completion of the 
budget and its submission to the legislature. For many items the 
sums received and spent in one fiscal period provide a reasonably 
satisfactory basis for estimating the amounts likely to be received 
and spent in the next* Accordingly, if the budget is required to be 
prepared so far ahead of the financial period to which it relates 
that information about actual results of the preceding period is 
inadequate, it is far less likely to be accurate than if it were 
48 
prepared immediately prior to the period it is to cover. 
48, As we have already noted, budget preparation in the United 
States may begin up to eighteen months in advance of the 
fiscal period to which the budget relates. 
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Finally, the length of the fiscal period itself has an 
influence on the accuracy of the estimates of revenue and 
expenditure. In the United States budgeting is for the most 
part on a biennial basis. Whatever the advantages of this in 
other respects, it is obviously more difficult to estimate 
accurately the amounts that will be received and expended over 
a period of two years than for a period of a year, Australian 
states and the Canadian provinces prepare annual budgets and 
their problems in the achieving of budget accuracy are 
correspondingly less than in the United States, 
CHAPTER 5 
THE PROCESS OF PREPARATION 
"...So to my office, where by and by we sat, 
this afternoon being the first we have met 
upon a great while, our times being changed 
because of the Parliament sitting. Being rose, 
I to my office till twelve at night, drawing 
out copies of the over-charge of the Navy.... 
This day I read the King's speech to the 
Parliament yesterday; which is very short, 
and not very obliging...." 
Pepys. (19th February, I662) 
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The process of budget formulation is, in essence, similar 
in each of the countries we are examining. In the preparatory 
stage of the budget system there are three levels of responsibility: 
(i) departmental; (ii) budget agency or other organization for 
reviewing departmental estimates; and (iii) political. The 
individual departments are responsible for framing the preliminary 
detailed estimates of resources and requirements for themselves. 
It is then the task of the reviewing agency to revise and co-ordinate 
these draft estimates, and to submit a preparatory overall budget to 
the political executive, with whom rests final responsibility for 
the budget proposals presented to the legislature. 
This bald outline of the process, however, does far less than 
justice, not only to the infinite number of procedural variations 
from one state to another, but also to the significant differences 
arising from the working of the congressional system of government 
as against the parliamentary form. Nor does it bring out important 
differences in budgetary philosophy and approach which closer 
examination reveals, 
AUSTRALIA 
Preparation of Current Estimates 
The degree of sophistication of approach to budgeting as 
well as the size and nature of central budgetary machinery varies 
widely among the Australian states. In procedural terms, however, 
differences are not marked, so it is possible to gain a good general 
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picture of the process of budget preparation in this country. 
Initially, we may take the procedures followed in New South 
Wales as approximating those of the other Australian states. 
New South Wales^ 
Formal preparation of the revenue, or operating budget in 
New South Wales begins about two months before the end of the 
2 
preceding financial year, when the treasury asks the departments 
and agencies to begin compiling for the following year detailed 
estimates of receipts and expenditures under their control. 
Special forms are provided for this purpose, together with 
"explanation sheets" on which must be entered statements in 
justification of the estimates, particularly where likely receipts 
or proposed expenditures vary to any substantial extent from their 
existing levels. 
Departmental Procedures 
Little need be said at this stage about the nature of the 
organization at the departmental level for preparing the draft 
estimates. Almost invariably this is relatively simple. In 
smaller departments and agencies the accountant usually has all 
the necessary information at hand, or can readily consult other 
1. Parts of this section are drawn from K. W. Knight, "Formulating the 
New South Wales Budget," Public Administration (Sydney), vol. XVIII, 
No. 3, September, 1959, pp.238-253. 
2e The financial year of the commonwealth and all states of Australia is 
from 1st July to 30th June. An interesting discussion of the reasons 
for adopting this financial year and its consequences, together with 
an outline of practices elsewhere, is to be found in H. W. Arndt, 
"The Financial Year," The Australian Quarterly, vol, XXXV, No. 2, 
June, 1963, pp,51-56, 
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officers to settle doubtful points. Indeed, even in the larger 
departments the general knowledge and experience of the accountant 
or chief financial officer will enable him readily to estimate 
many of the items of revenue and expenditure. In doing so, of 
course, he, in conjunction with the permanent head and one or two 
other senior officials of the department, will have regard to 
reports submitted by divisional or branch officers outlining any 
special needs or circumstances affecting their part of the department's 
activities. Where the department is organized on a regional basis it 
will also be necessary to obtain subsidiary estimates for activities 
conducted at the regional level, but this seldom creates difficulties 
or involves any complex organization. This is particularly the case in 
Australia where few regional agencies of state departments are given a 
high degree of autonomy. Centralization in the decision-making process 
is a feature of the state systems of administration. 
In a few of the larger departments in New South Wales there 
exist committees which examine budgetary requirements before the 
draft estimates are drawn up for submission to the permanent head 
and then the minister, and subsequent forwarding to the treasury. 
These committees usually consist of several senior departmental 
officials, sometimes assisted by the public service board's inspector 
3 
assigned to the department, A committee would normally take as its 
starting point the suggestions made by the department's chief finance 
officer, but would also discuss particular aspects of the estimates 
3. The public service inspector, if present, may be an independent 
centre of influence, but his role is essentially only an 
advisory one on personnel aspects of the estimates. 
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with the heads of divisions, branches or sections where appropriate. 
It is difficult to assess the effectiveness of this way of preparing 
a statement of departmental needs. Experience suggests that draft 
estimates sent on to the treasury following scrutiny by a departmental 
committee are no more objective than those prepared by only one or 
two departmental officials. Perhaps this is inevitable given a 
situation in which the committee's chairman is the senior departmental 
officer, whose views about departmental needs are unlikely to be 
4 
opposed by the committee members. On the other hand, it may be 
that such committees serve a useful purpose apart from their budgetary 
implications. They may well, for instance, improve departmental 
morale, in that they provide an additional channel of communication 
and an opportunity for officers at the branch level to present a 
case for their particular activities to a gathering of senior 
officials. 
Review of Departmental Estimates 
W^en the departmental estimates have been approved by the 
permanent head and the minister they are submitted to the budget 
branch of the treasury, which has the initial responsibility for 
shaping the estimates from each department into an overall budgetary 
plan. The organizational structure and personnel of the budget branch 
are dealt with in chapter 8 of this study. 
4, Interesting comments about the "pathology" of committees are to 
be found in John Cohen, "Study of Committees and Conferences," 
Public Administration (London), Vol, XXX, Winter, 1952, PP.36I-367, 
and W.J.M. Mackenzie, "Committees in Administration," ibid., 
Vol. XXXI, Autumn, 1953, pp.235-244, 
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After receiving the estimates from a department a l l o t t e d to him 
an officer of the budget branch wi l l normally spend several days 
studying them; making preliminary ca lcula t ions based on h is knowledge 
of the department's organizat ional s t r u c t u r e , functions, and plans for 
future development; and assessing the l ikel ihood of the department's 
being able to f u l f i l the programme on which i t s expenditure estimates 
are based. The end of the f inancia l year has not yet a r r ived , so the 
5 budget analyst does not have f ina l figures of expenditure for the 
current year which could be used as a basis for his ca lcula t ions of 
needs during the ensuing year . His task i s s implif ied, however, not 
only by the fact that the f inancia l year i s well ad^ranced, but also 
because departments are required to furnish to the budget branch 
monthly statements of the progressive expenditure against each item 
on their es t imates . Many expenditures follow regular pat terns and 
in these cases l ike ly trends may readi ly be calculated - though in 
other instances changed circumstances may have to be taken in to 
aocount. 
When he has armed himself with all the material and information 
he is likely to need, the budget officer will visit the department 
itself, where, in a series of personal discussions, each item on 
the draft estimates - no matter how small - will be reviewed in the 
light of factors such as expenditure in previous years, commitments 
already approved, announced policy, possible operating economies, and 
5» The terms "budget officer" and "budget analyst", both common in 
the United States, are used throughout this study to describe 
budget agency personnel engaged in examining departmental 
estimates. The actual titles of such officials vary from state 
to state. In New South Wales they are known as budget inspectors. 
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60 on. The main discussions will, of course, be with the permanent 
head of the department and its chief financial officer, but where 
necessary the analyst will interview heads of divisions or branches, 
or subordinate officials handling particular matters. He may also 
seek the advice of the public service board inspector responsible 
for oversight of the department, particularly about expenditures 
relating to personnel. In short, the budget reviewer will require 
to be satisfied that the amount sought for each specific item 
making up the department's general estimate of expenditure for the 
year can be justified. 
Following these discussions with departmental officers and 
detailed examination of the estimates the analysts of the budget 
branch prepare comprehensive reports on each: department's requirements 
and recommend such changes in the amounts sought as they consider 
appropriate, A summary is then prepared to show what the overall 
financial result would be if the recommendations of the individual 
analysts were adopted. If, as is commonly the case, a budget 
deficit still appears likely, several courses are open. It might 
be felt that in the light of prevailihg circumstances the deficit 
should be incurred. In this context "prevailing circumstances" 
should not be taken to mean simply those of an economic or financial 
nature. Decisions of this sort will be influenced greatly - if not 
predominantly - by political factors. We shall, however, have more 
to say about this aspect later. Generally speaking, if a deficit is 
6, Officers of the budget branch and the public service board work 
closely together throughout the year on various matters and 
usually build up close personal liaison. 
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still likely after the review by the budget analysts, the probable 
decision will be one either to reduce the gap between estimated 
revenue and expenditure or to eliminate the margin completely, and 
so "balance" the budget. If the estimated deficiency results from 
losses by the business undertakings - a significant factor in recent 
years - consideration must be given to the question of reducing costs 
or, if this is not possible without curtailing essential services, to 
the desirability of increasing charges. In this latter event, the 
political implications would be so significant that it would be 
usual for "top level" conferences to be held, detailed material-
prepared, appropriate recommendations made by both the treasury 
and the undertaking concerned, and finally for the matter to be 
considered by cabinet. If the deficit were due to an excess of 
proposed departmental expenditures over anticipated revenue, then 
an assessment would have to be made of the possibility of reducing 
still further the estimated expenditure and/or of obtaining 
additional revenue by raising the level of taxation and other 
charges levied by the state. Cabinet consideration may again be 
necessary here; though it may be noted that as far as adjusting 
the revenue side of the budget is concerned the Australian state 
governments have far less room for manoeuvre than their counterparts 
in Canada and the United States. 
Much of the preliminary consideration of issues of this sort is 
carried out by a committee consisting of the under secretary of the 
treasury (i.e. the permanent head of the department), the deputy 
under secfetary, assistant under secretary (budget and inspection). 
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and the chief budget officer; though suggestions are often made by 
individual budget analysts. However, irrespective of from where 
suggestions emanate, most of the work of assessing the likely 
outcome of particular courses of action will be done in the budget 
branch. When further overall reduction of expenditure appears the 
only way of achieving the desired budget result the committee closely 
examines each budget analyst's report on the department or departments 
for which he is responsible. Analysts appear before the committee and 
are required, in effect, to justify the alterations they have 
recommended be made to the original departmental estimates - just 
as they earlier had required departments to substantiate their 
assessments of needs for the year. Substantial changes in the 
recommended votes are frequently made by the committee members in 
the light of their knowledge of the general financial situation. 
Naturally, the likelihood of the budget officer's proposals being 
accepted will depend very largely on whether or not the forthcoming 
year is likely to be a "difficult" one financially. 
On completion of this review the under secretary is in a 
position to discuss the draft budget with the treasurer, and final 
decisions are reached as to the overall budget result to be aimed at 
and the individual departmental allocations which will go to mak® up 
the total expenditure for the year. Some particular matters may be 
placed before cabinet, but cabinet does not review the proposed 
7 
budget as a whole, as is done at the federal level. Indeed, what 
7» On federal practice see L.F. Crisp, "The Commonwealth Treasury's 
Changed Role and Its Organisational Consequences," Public 
Administration (Sydney), Vol, XX, No, 4, December, 1961, 
pp,324 ff. 
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goes to cabinet depends largely on the personality and political 
strength of the treasurer. When the leader of the government 
holds the portfolios of both premier and treasurer, as is frequently 
the case in Australia, it may well be that very little will be put 
to cabinet for consideration, that body simply being given a 
statement setting out the departmental allocations already decided. 
In this regard the following table, covering a twenty-five year 
period from 1940 to 1964 inclusive, illustrates how common it is 
for Australian state premiers also to hold the post of treasurer. 8 
Sta te 
19^0 - 1964 
Number of Years During which 
the Pos t s of Premier and 
Treasu re r Were Concurrent ly 
Held 
Propor t ion of 
Twenty-five 
Year Per iod 
% 
South A u s t r a l i a 
Vic tor ia 
Western A u s t r a l i a 
New South Wales 
Tasmania 
Queensland 
25 
25 
25 
18,45 
8,12 
1.62 
100 
100 
100 
73*80 
32,48 
6,48 
When the expenditure allocations for the year have been fixed, 
ministers in New South Wales receive written advice of the funds which 
are to be allotted to the departments under their control. They are 
8, These figures were calculated from information contained in (Eds.) 
Colin A. Hughes and B, D, Graham, A Handbook of Australian Government 
and Politics, eanberra. Australian National University Press 
(forthcoming). The joint holding of the positions of premier and 
treasurer is not peculiar to any one political party. 
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asked to arrange for the detailed estimates to be revised to 
conform with these allocations and for their return to the treasury. 
Some latitude is allowed departments in deciding in which directions 
reductions should be applied, although it is usual to specify the 
amounts to be allotted for some items, or even to indicate that 
particular proposals should be omitted entirely. This specifying 
of certain items is designed to ensure that departments do not reduce 
their overall vc^e to the approved total merely by cutting 
"uncontrollable" items like salaries, which would then have to be 
supplemented later in the year. This aspect is, in any event, 
checked when the revised estimates are again briefly reviewed in 
the budget branch before being assembled for printing. 
With the printing of the budget document and the treasurer's 
financial statement - also very largely the work of officers of the 
budget branch in consultation with the permanent head of the treasury 
the preparatory phase of the annual routine has been completed as far 
as the operating budget is concerned. 
Queensland 
At the beginning of this chapter it was asserted that although 
budgetary machinery differs from state to state in Australia, there 
is a high degree of similarity in the procedures which each follows 
in preparing its budget. This similarity is brought out by the 
following account of the steps taken in Queensland, a state in which 
the central machinery for budget formulation is much more rudimentary 
than that of New South Wales. 
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Departmental Procedures 
Preparation of the operating budget in Queensland begins, as 
in New South Wales, with the treasury's requesting departments to 
submit draft estimates of requirements for the ensuing year. For 
the financial year 1966/67 the treasury's request to departments was 
sent on 29th April, 1966, two months before the end of the financial 
year, and they were required to furnish estimates of salary payments 
by 23rd May, Estimates of total expenditure, covering each vote and 
appropriation, had to be submitted to the treasury by 6th July, 1966, 
This latter information was to be accompanied by figures setting out 
actual expenditures during 1965/66 and explanations of any substantial 
variations from those figures in the amounts sought for expenditure in 
1966/67, Departments were instructed that provision for all services, 
"whilst being made at a realistic level, is to be reduced to the lowest 
possible figure consistent with efficiency", and were warned that "an 
overstated provision may affect adversely the allocation to other Votes 
10 
of the Department", 
At the stage of preparation of the preliminary estimates by the 
departments there are two departures from the general procedure 
outlined for New South Wales, 
The firsf of these relates to the section of the estimates 
covering salaries. This is prepared in considerable detail, and sets 
9o Treasury file 65/4l64 Ests, 
10, ibid. 
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out each officer's name, the title of his position, its classification, 
his existing salary, the date on which any increment is due, and the 
total amount required to meet his salary during the year. This 
schedule is then submitted to the public service commissioner, whose 
officers examine it and make any amendments or corrections required. 
Only then may the department incorporate total salary needs in the 
estimates to be submitted to the treasury. 
The second difference from the New South Wales practice lies in 
the fact that in every Queensland department the draft estimates are 
reviewed before submission to the treasury by a committee made up of 
the heads of major divisions or branches, under the chairmanship of 
the minister, and with the accountant as secretary. Where such 
committees operate in New South Wales the minister takes no active 
part, but relies upon consultation with the permanent head to ensure 
that the estimates reflect policies he wishes to follow. 
Review of Departmental Estimates 
The Queensland treasury does not have a budget branch of the 
New South Wales type. Indeed, no other Australian state has created 
a central organization as extensive as that of New South Wales for 
the review of departmental estimates. The Queensland organizational 
situation, consisting of an assistant under secretary and a small 
11 
clerical staff responsible for budgeting, is the typical Australian 
state pattern. It is not one that permits close personal scrutiny of 
every item on each department's estimates, as is possible in New South 
11, This organization will be discussed in chapter 8, 
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Wales, Nor is it feasible for the treasury's budget staff to 
maintain continuous personal liaison throughout the year with 
departmental officials. 
Within the limits imposed by the staffing position, however, 
a close examination of departmental expenditure requests is made. 
Briefly, the treasury officers concerned with budget review attempt 
in the first instance to ascertain what the total expenditure would 
be if each department were to continue to provide services at their 
existing levels. To do this, allowance is made for non-recurring 
items which were included in the previous year's budget, any escalation 
in costs is assessed and added to the expenditure of the preceding 
year, and inescapable fixed charges, such as the servicing of the 
public debt, are taken into account. This provides a strictly "as 
you were" expenditure budget, but this is obviously not going to be 
the final outcome. With such a wide diversity of interests no state 
government can expect one financial year to be the same as the one 
before it. Some services will have to be curtailed and new or 
expanded services introduced to meet emerging needs. In Queensland 
decisions about changes of emphasis will be a matter for full cabinet, 
but the treasury is expected to submit a list of priorities. Thus, 
the basic inescapable departmental costs will be adjusted to conform 
with the treasury's view of priorities and a new total expenditure 
figure will be arrived at. This will almost certainly exceed the 
revenue likely to be available at existing levels of taxation and 
other charges, and it will be for cabinet to decide whether proposed 
expenditures will be reduced or revenue increased, to reach a 
"balance". 
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Cabinet is faced, then, with the problem of reviewing 
estimates that have already been carefully considered, first by 
departments themselves and subsequently by the treasury. Cabinet's 
discussion is usually completed in one protracted session, but this 
is not always possible. Discussions on the 1966/67 estimates, for 
instance, began on 15th August, 1966, and extended over three special 
cabinet meetings. At this stage, of course, the treasurer's role 
is a prominent one. He opens the proceedings with an outline of the 
overall financial position, and explains why it has been found 
necessary to suggest changes in each department's proposals. He 
will be thoroughly briefed on the implications of possible decisions 
about varying levels of expenditure and revenue and treasury 
officials will be consulted as particular issues come up during 
cabinet's deliberations. In practice, it is difficult for a minister 
to obtain an allocation very much in excess of the entitlement for 
his department shown on the treasury's list of priorities. If he 
makes a bid for an allocation which will enable his department to 
proceed with a service not on the list of priorities it can only be 
arranged at the expense of an activity of another department that 
had been accorded a priority rating. While minor adjustments are 
possible, then, changes of a substantial kind are not likely, unless 
cabinet as a whole feels that there should be a completely different 
policy emphasis from that formulated by the treasurer. With thirteen 
ministers each seeking the highest possible expenditure allocation 
for his department, this is unlikely to occur. 
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When cabinet has reached agreement on the total appropriation 
to be made for each department, the treasury formally advises 
ministers of the decision; each department being informed not 
only of its total allocation for the year, but also what reductions 
or additions must be made to specific items in its original estimates. 
Except for these specially advised items each department may apportion 
its total allocation at its discretion. The degree of autonomy that 
is allowed departments in this respect varies between states. In 
New South Wales the list of specific directions issued to departments 
after total allocations have been decided represents a large part of 
those totals. When a department has allowed the amounts nominated by 
the treasury for particular items it may have left to it no more than 
ten per cent of its total allocation for distribution amongst those 
of the remaining items that have not been specifically deleted from 
its draft estimates by the treasury. The degree of treasury control, 
then, is high. This is not so in Queensland, however. In that state 
the treasury deliberately restricts the number of items for which 
specific allocations are made. By doing this it is argued that to 
make best use of its total permitted expenditure the department is 
forced once again to scrutinise its proposed activities carefully 
and to eliminate those that are not absolutely essential, thus 
freeing funds for its more important functions. In addition, it is 
felt that departmental freedom of this kind is inseparable from the 
notions of both responsibility and control. That is to say, the 
placing of budget responsibility squarely on the shoulders of the 
departmental officers who incur the expenditure has two distinct effects: 
it makes them less likely to lose interest in the outcome of the budget 
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than would be the case if they were completely directed in the 
dividing of the total departmental allocation; and it removes 
what would otherwise be a ready-made excuse if a department were 
criticized for non-performance of a particular function. In these 
terms, then, a limited degree of freedom in allocating the approved 
total expenditure may be seen as an effective device of budgetary 
control. Against this, of course, the treasury must accept the 
possibility that a department will allow too little for an essential 
function so that supplementary provision will have to be made later 
in the financial year. 
Preparation of Capital Expenditure Estimates 
As we have already noted, it is the accepted practice in 
Australia for state expenditure on public works and capital assets 
to be financed by borrowing. It is necessary, however, for all 
government spending, whether from borrowings or from revenue 
sources, to be sanctioned by parliament, so another set of 
estimates or special section of the main budget document must be 
prepared to cover dealings on the capital account. 
New South Wales 
In New South Wales a separate document, the Estimates of 
Expenditure from the General Loan Account, is drawn up. Again, 
the budget branch of the treasury plays a prominent part in the 
formulation of this set of estimates. 
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In th i s instance the process of preparat ion i s i n i t i a t e d by 
12 the s t a te co-ordinator of works, who, in March of each year, 
asks the departments and a u t h o r i t i e s to furnish him with de ta i l s 
of the i r public works programmes for the coming f inancia l year . 
Special forms are provided, on which must be shown for each item: 
(a) a description of the work; (b) t o t a l estimated cost ; (c) t o t a l 
expenditure l ike ly to be incurred by 30th June; (d) estimated 
expenditure in the current year; and (e) estimated expenditure 
for the coming year. 
These forms must be returned to the co-ordinator by about 
mid-April, so that the departmental programmes may be reviewed 
by officers of the budget branch a f t e r discussions with the 
departments and undertakings concerned. On the basis of th i s 
review a covering statement of a f a i r l y broad nature i s submitted 
to the t reasurer to a s s i s t in determining the t o t a l borrowing 
authority the s t a t e should seek for the coming f inancial year . 
Inevitably, t h i s decision wi l l be s trongly influenced by 
po l i t i ca l considerations and by the current s i tua t ion as far as 
commonwealth-state r e l a t i ons are concerned. In general , however, 
i t may f a i r l y be said that an a l loca t ion i s sought tha t i s 
" r e a l i s t i c " - irythe sense tha t i t could be spent within the 
financial year on desirable works, without s t r a in ing avai lable 
material and labour resources . Preliminary advice of the s t a t e ' s 
12, Original ly the co-ordinator of works was an off icer of the 
public works department. Since about 196O, however, the 
post has been held by the undep secre tary of the t reasury . 
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requirements is then conveyed to the federal treasurer as 
chairman of the Australian loan council. 
At the meeting of the loan council the requests of the 
various states are examined, together with the report of the 
commonwealth co-ordinator general of works and those of the 
state co-ordinators, and a decision is reached as to the borrowing 
15 authority for each state. 
If the approved loan raisings are as great as were sought 
by the state, the departmental allocations already decided upon 
may be retained. However, if - as is much more likely - the loan 
council's approval is for less than the total sought, a decision 
must be made as to the manner in which the reduction will be 
spread amongst the departments and authorities. Seldom will it 
be appropriate merely to reduce each programme on a proportionate 
basis. 
Here the budget branch comes into the picture again. Its 
officers carefully examine departmental works programmes to see 
which projects could be eliminated, cut down, or deferred without 
seriously affecting the ability of departments to meet their 
responsibilities. Current and future commitments are reviewed and 
13* The procedures followed by the Australian loan council in 
arriving at its decisions on total borrov/ings and the proportion 
to be allocated to each state will not be discussed. Our main 
concern is with the subsequent distribution of a state's share 
amongst its various departments and authorities. For an interesting 
discussion of some of the wider issues arising from the existence of 
the loan council see: C. G. Headford, "The Australian Loan Council -
Its Origin, Operation and Significance in the Federal Structure," 
Public Administration (Sydney), Vol. XIII, No. 1, March, 195^, 
pp.44 to 560 
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an attempt is made to assess the situation being faced by 
particular departments, as well as likely trends. A good deal 
of detailed analytical work goes into this review and further 
discussions are held with departmental officers. On the basis of 
the reports of the budget analysts the permanent head of the 
treasury recommends to the treasurer the amount which might be 
allocated to each department and authority. Subject to the 
treasurer's approval these become the loan allotments for the 
current year and ministers are requested to have draft loan 
estimates prepared. These merely set out in a form suitable for 
presentation to parliament the estimated loan expenditures already 
endorsed by the treasurer, and the amounts which parliament is to be 
asked to appropriate from the general loan account to cover that 
expenditure. After being assembled in the treasury and printed, 
the loan estimates are then ready for presentation to the legislature; 
usually shortly after the introduction of the operating budget. 
Queensland 
In Queensland the co-ordinator general of public works, 
permanent head of a department responsible for state works, 
collates the expenditure requirements of the loan spending 
departments and takes the place of the treasury as arbiter in 
the distribution of available loan funds. 
Meetings of the Australian loan council are generally held 
late in June of each year and states must submit their proposed 
loan programmes to the commonwealth co-ordinator general of public 
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works well before that time. State departments are required, 
therefore, to prepare preliminary works programmes by February 
or early March and to forward them to the state co-ordinator 
general. That officer then examines each department's submission 
and reports to the treasurer concerning the amounts he considers 
should be sought to meet the needs of the departments for capital 
works. In making this review, account must be taken not only of 
departmental requests for new projects, but also commitments for 
works already in progress. In this the co-ordinator general will 
be guided by his knowledge of the government's overall capital works 
policy, priorities, and the need to maintain a high level of 
employment throughout the state. On the basis of the recommendations 
of the co-ordinator general, the treasury prepares a case for 
submission to the loan council. 
When the state's total loan allocation for the year is known 
the initiative remains with the co-ordinator general. He establishes 
priorities, prunes departmental estimates, and assesses the ability 
of each department to complete its programme. In recommending 
works allocations he is expected to be fully aware of the availability 
of resources required to carry out proposed projects. If there is a 
shortage of building materials or construction workers, departments 
with heavy concentration in this field of work will receive a reduced 
allocation compared with, say, departments requiring resources of 
heavy earth moving equipment and labour. 
After his analysis has been completed the co-ordinator general 
puts his proposed allocations to the treasury, where they are examined 
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by t he a s s i s t a n t unde r s e c r e t a r y ( b u d g e t ) , who i n t u r n r e p o r t s t o 
the permanent head and t h e t r e a s u r e r . At t h i s s t a g e f u r t h e r 
d i s c u s s i o n s w i t h t h e c o - o r d i n a t o r g e n e r a l and h i s programmes o f f i c e r 
w i l l t a k e p l a c e so t h a t t h e s u g g e s t e d a l l o c a t i o n s can be r e l a t e d t o 
the a v a i l a b i l i t y of l o a n f u n d s . 
When t h e t r e a s u r y and t h e c o - o r d i n a t o r g e n e r a l have r e a c h e d 
agreement on t h e l i s t of recommended works f o r t h e y e a r , t h e 
l a t t e r p l a c e s t h e programme b e f o r e a c a b i n e t s u b - c o m m i t t e e c o n s i s t i n g 
of t he p r e m i e r , t r e a s u r e r , and t h e d e p u t y l e a d e r s of the two government 
p a r t i e s . Dur ing t h i s s u b - c o m m i t t e e ' s e x a m i n a t i o n of t he p r o p o s a l s t he 
t r e a s u r e r p l a y s t h e dominant r o l e . Of t h e four m i n i s t e r s he a l o n e 
has been f u l l y b r i e f e d i n a d v a n c e and has had e x t e n s i v e d i s c u s s i o n s 
with t h e c o - o r d i n a t o r g e n e r a l . When t h e programme has been app roved 
by t h e s u b - c o m m i t t e e - se ldom w i t h any major change b e i n g made - i t 
goes t o f u l l c a b i n e t f o r fo rma l a p p r o v a l . The d e p a r t m e n t s a r e 
adv i sed of t h e i r a l l o c a t i o n s i n t h e same way a s t h e y a r e i n fo rmed of 
a l l o t m e n t s from c o n s o l i d a t e d r e v e n u e . The l o a n fund e s t i m a t e s can 
then be i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t o t h e main b u d g e t document f o r p r e s e n t a t i o n 
to p a r l i a m e n t . 
CANADA 
Preparation of Current Estimates 
In broad outline the procedures for preparing and analysing 
the draft departmental estimates of revenue and expenditure are 
similar for the dominion government and each of the Canadian 
provincial governments. Nor do they differ greatly from, those of 
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the Australian states, except insofar as the role of the treasury 
board is concerned. This does, however, represent a significant 
departure from Australian practice and will be discussed later in 
some detail. Although, too, the procedures of the various provinces 
are not basically dissimilar, there are several differences which 
must be brought out. We shall, therefore, examine certain aspects 
of the budgetary process in four provinces, British Columbia, 
Manitoba, Ontario and Saskatchewan, Of these, Ontario will be 
treated most fully, since that province's procedures may be regarded 
as typical. For British Columbia, Manitoba and Saskatchewan we shall 
examine only some particular points of difference. 
Departmental Procedures 
Ontario 
The preliminary moves in the process of preparation are like 
those already outlined in our discussion of New South Wales and 
Queensland, On or about 1st June the finance minister formally 
asks each department to prepare draft estimates for the financial 
14 year beginning on 1st April following, and to submit them to the 
treasury board by early September for consideration. These draft 
estimates are drawn up by departmental officials at various levels, 
collated and sometimes analysed by the department's senior finance 
l4. The financial year 1st April - 31st March is now common to the 
Canadian dominion government and all provinces. 
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officer, and submitted to the deputy minister (i.e. the permanent 
head). It is not usual for departmental committees of either the 
New South Wales or Queensland variety to be set up to prepare or 
review the draft estimates. The examination of the expenditure needs 
and proposals drawn up by the departmental officers is the 
responsibility of the deputy minister and one or two of his top 
officials. They examine the draft, question those in charge of 
various departmental activities, and present a revised set of 
estimates for the minister's approval. In the course of this 
examination the permanent head will have directed that some proposals 
be reconsidered and varied or eliminated entirely. The review by the 
minister will be of a less thorough and detailed kind, since he will 
have made known his general budgetary wishes and his attitude to 
particular departmental proposals through the permanent head before 
the draft estimates were prepared. He may, however, have further 
suggestions to offer and may insist upon alterations being made in 
some items to fit in with policies he wishes to follow. 
At the next stage the draft departmental estimates are forwarded 
to the treasury board for consideration, in the first instance by 
officials of the board, and then by the board members themselves, 
British Columbia 
In this province budget preparation by the departments begins 
on 1st October, the budget for the financial year 1st April - 31st 
March being presented to parliament in February of each year. The 
detailed estimates are drawn up by the heads of branches within each 
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department and are then assembled by a departmental finance officer known 
as the "controller". In smaller departments, where this office may not 
exist, the task of assembly is normally handled by the personnel officer. 
This collation of the branch estimates is simply a mechanical operation 
and involves no decision making. As in Ontario, examination of the 
proposals presented by the officials at the branch level is conducted by 
the deputy minister and his assistant, who are guided by their knowledge 
of the minister's ideas in respect of both general policy and particular 
projects. The estimates as revised then go to the minister for approval. 
At this stage in the budget process in British Columbia an inter-
vening level between department and treasury board comes into the picture. 
The estimates of all departments are collated in the controller-general's 
office and are then considered by what is known as the "little treasury 
board" - the controller-general and the deputy minister of finance. These 
two officials acting jointly in this way have no formal standing, but 
their r^ p^ort, which covers each department's submissions and includes 
specific recommendations, apparently carries a good deal of weight when 
the estimates go from them to the treasury board for consideration, 
Manitoba 
Unlike most provinces Manitoba conducts preliminary budget hearings 
of a formal kind after the departmental estimates have been prepared, 
departmental officers appearing before a committee consisting of the 
deputy provincial treasurer, the head of the budget division and several 
senior budget officials, and representatives of the civil service commiss-
ion and the treasury board's organization and methods section. This 
committee has no authority^ to amend the departmental estimates, however; 
it is simply a fact-finding body, seeking information to help the treasury 
board to make its assessment of departmental needs. It may be noted, too, 
that Manitoba, like several of the American states, has adopted the 
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plan of requiring departments to prepare "A" and "B" budget 
estimates - the first being the departmental requirements for 
existing activities, plus normal growth; the second setting out 
the financial needs for new developments and extensions of 
existing programmes. The "A" estimates are examined first and 
the results of this examination determine whether any funds will 
be made available for projects in category "B", Although the "A" 
budget is useful in providing close analysis of progress being 
made with current programmes, the approach as a whole does involve 
the danger that it will lead to "status quo thinking" in budgetary 
affairs. 
Saskatchewan 
Saskatchewan is interesting as an example of a province that 
has given a good deal of thought to its budgetary arrangements 
and has constantly sought to improve them. The formal steps in 
the process of preparation begin on 1st August when the treasury 
board calls for the annual estimates of departmental revenue and 
expenditure and for the capital needs of corporate bodies. At the 
same time the secretary of the economic advisory and planning board, 
asks the departments and corporations to prepare five-year projections 
of their revenue and their requirements for both continuing and new 
programmes. This board is a cabinet committee, the membership of 
which overlaps with that of the treasury board, and which meets only 
once a year, primarily to review overall government policy. 
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Although the provincial budget is not presented in programme 
form, it is formulated with programmes of activity in mind. That 
is to say, within departments an attempt has been made in the 
establishing of estimates of expenditure to link the budget 
preparation units with self-contained work programmes. Different 
parts of the budget may, therefore, be prepared at varying levels 
within each department - by sections, branches, divisions, and so on, 
In preparing expenditure estimates the supervisors of these units 
are required to present a narrative account of the aims of the 
programmes concerned, the specific measures proposed for 
implementation, work loads involved, requirements in terms of 
goods and services, and an overall assessment of the organization's 
effectiveness as a working unit. This supplements the translation 
into dollars and cents represented by the detailed estimates of 
expenditure, and must include a justification for proposed increases 
in expenditure o 
The consolidating of these estimates into a single set for 
the whole department and scrutiny of individual programmes and 
needs, including the five year projections, is the responsibility 
of the deputy minister and his budget officer. As in Manitoba, 
presentation to the treasury board is in terms of "A" and "B" 
estimates of expenditure. 
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The Treasury Board 
Before proceeding further with our examination of Canadian 
budgetary procedures it is necessary to say something about the 
treasury board, so that its place in the process of budgeting 
may be appreciated. There is no comparable body in any of the 
other systems with which we are dealing. 
We need not here examine specific differences in role and 
organization from one province to another. Further information on 
these aspects is to be found in chapter 6, which deals with state 
budget agencies, and in appendix F (pp. 449 ff. )» which 
shows the statutory basis of each treasury board. In any event, 
such differences as do exist are mostly of a minor nature. It will 
be sufficient for our purposes, therefore, to describe the composition 
and functioning of only one treasury board, that of Ontario, 
This board, like that of each of the other provinces, is 
formally a committee of the executive council, established under 
15 the provincial financial administration act. It consists of the 
treasurer, as chairman, and from four to seven other ministers, 
designated by the lieutenant governor in council. The major 
powers and duties of the board, as set out in the act, are: 
15. The history of Ontario's financial administration act is relatively 
short and follows closely the course of development of its 
counterpart at the dominion level of government. 
"This act was enacted by 1954, c.30 and superseded ss.1, 8, 
13(3), 17, 20, 23, 28 and 30 of the Audit Act, R.S.O., 1950, 
C.28; the Consolidated Revenue Act, R.S.O., 1950, c.64; the 
Provincial Loans Act, R.S.O., 1950, c.299; and the Public 
Revenue Act. R.S.O., 1950, c.315." (Ontario Statute Annotations, 
R.SoO., i960, p.185) 
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(1) It shall act as a committee of the executive council on 
all matters relating to finance, revenues, estimates, 
expenditures and financial commitments and on any other 
matter concerning general administrative policy in the 
public service that is referred to the board by the 
executive council or on which the board considers it 
desirable to report to the executive council, 
(2) It may require from any public officer or any agent of the 
crown any account, return, statement, document, report or 
information that the board considers necessary for the 
performance of its duties. 
(3) It may make regulations, subject to the approval of the 
lieutenant governor in council, 
(a) respecting the collection, management and administration 
of, and accounting for, public money; 
(b) for any purpose necessary for the efficient administration 
of the public service. 
The board's jurisdiction is extensive. Not only does it have 
wide powers under the act, but these have been supplemented by 
specific decisions of the executive council requiring numerous 
aspects of finance and general administration to be forwarded by 
departments for the board's consideration. Some of the matters 
which must be placed before the board, with adequate supporting 
data in each instance, are as follow: 
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(i) Proposed expenditures, 
(a) Annual estimates and supplementary estimates of 
ordinary expenditure and capital disbursements. 
(b) Applications for "special warrants" - i.e. warrants 
under section 29 of the financial administration act, 
which may be issued when the legislature is not in 
session, to authorize expenditures not originally 
appropriated. 
(c) Applications for"treasury board orders", issued 
under section 30 of the act, to increase existing 
appropriations. 
(d) Requests for "authorizations for commitment", sought 
under the same circumstances as (c) above, when the 
amount of likely over-expenditure is uncertain and so 
cannot be dealt with by treasury board order, 
(ii) Proposed regulations having financial implications. 
(iii) Recommendations to the lieutenant governor in council 
where there is a financial implication, but excluding 
appointments and salary adjustments for which funds are 
available, 
(iv) Proposals to construct or purchase a building, and to 
purchase or lease land, 
(v) Proposed changes in any financial arrangement with the 
dominion government, 
(vi) Proposed changes or legislation affecting present and 
future revenue or expenditure. 
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(vii) Matters of significant concern to two or more departments, 
(viii) Proposed changes in departmental complement. 
(ix) Any other matter concerning general administrative policy 
in the public service referred to the board by the executive 
council or on which the board considers it desirable to 
report to the executive council. 
The implications of having a body with powers and responsibilities 
of this sort are discussed in the following chapter. We are here 
concerned primarily with budgetary procedures and need only note the 
central place in the Canadian system of this continuously functioning 
committee of senior ministers, exercising very extensive authority in 
all financial matters and in many fields of a non-financial kind. The 
treasury board is a co-ordinating and controlling agency making 
decisions, not only upon the broad outlines of the government's 
spending programme, but also upon the multitude of day to day matters 
required by various statutes to come to the board. In some areas, 
such as construction programmes and departmental establishments, 
its control is continuous, and is designed to ensure that the scale 
of activities and future commitments fall within approved policies; 
that departmental practices are economical and efficient; and that 
the government is informed and approves of any significant transaction. 
In Britain many of the functions and powers of control vested in 
Canadian treasury boards would be exercised by officials of the 
treasury. In Australia they are divided between treasury departments 
and public service boards or commissions. 
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Review of Departmental Estimates 
The methods used to review the draft estimates of the 
departments and agencies vary in matters of detail from province 
to province, A brief description of procedures at the central 
government level has been given by a former Minister of Finance: 
"The staff of the Treasury Board, without reference to 
the Minister in the first place, go at those estimates and 
try to have them reduced. They are successful to a 
considerable extent....But various departments demur, and 
some go even farther than that and vigorously and violently 
protest against the proposed cuts. The matter is then taken 
up by myself with the various Ministers and by the Treasury 
Board with the various Ministers, and after a considerable 
amount of arguing the estimates are still further reduced 
until they reach the form in which they appear before the 
House of Commons," l6 
This statement, however, hardly does justice to what is a 
complex process, and it is necessary that we look in more detail 
at the review procedures in various provinces, 
Ontario 
When the departmental estimates are received by the treasury 
board they are compiled by officials of the board into a 
consolidated statement indicating the approximate overall financial 
position and giving a broad picture of the expenditure demands and 
resources available to meet them during the approaching fiscal year, 
16. J, L. Ilsey, Minister of finance, Canada, House of Commons Debates, 
18th December, 1945, p,3734. The minister added plaintively: "?/e 
talk about putting a watch on expenditures, but how much assistance 
do we get in this House in watching expenditures? Nine-tenths of 
the speeches in this House are asking for bigger and better 
expenditures....At times I feel as though I am against the whole 
world when I try to keep a lot of these expenditures down. We 
just do the best we can, that is all, and keep them down," 
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After this consolidated statement is completed the treasury board, 
at a series of meetings always attended by the premier, reviews it 
along with (a) a paper on the economic situation and outlook, and 
(b) a statement of likely revenue and an analysis of the impact on 
the. public debt of the projected revenue and expenditure programmes -
both reports having been prepared within the board's office. Out of 
this review decisions emerge concerning the general nature of the 
budget to be submitted for the ensuing fiscal period. 
It should here be noted that since the beginning of the 1963/64 
financial year departments and other authorities have been required 
to include in their draft estimates statements giving programme 
descriptions and costs - even though the budget document ultimately 
to be presented to the legislature is not set out in programme form. 
Instead, its method of arrangement is in terms of salaries, travelling 
expenses, maintenance, and so on - much the same basis as those of the 
Australian states. It is argued by treasury board officials that the 
method of classification used in the budget document itself is 
inadequate for the analytical approach the treasury board must adopt 
in reviewing departmental needs. The "traditional" form of 
presentation, while showing the total amount required by a department 
for its operations, does not indicate clearly the various programmes 
or projects it intends to carry out with the moneys voted, or the cost 
of each programme. This failure to show what the expenditures are to 
produce in the way of services makes proper analysis and interpretation 
difficult. 
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As things now stand, the departments include in their estimated 
expenditure submissions detailed statements of the programmes and 
services carried on within each vote. These statements show the 
annual cost of providing each programme or service, together with 
the number of staff required. Departments, moreover, must list 
proposed new programmes in order of importance, according to their 
own evaluation. 
Here we have, then, an attempt to follow a programme budgeting 
approach within the framework of the traditional line-item budget -
an approach which it is claimed makes both departmental forecasting 
and treasury board review more realistic. Some of the possible 
advantages of adopting the programme concept, for departments 
themselves as well as the budget agency, have already been discussed 
in chapters 2 and 4. As far as Ontario is concerned, it is still 
too early to assess whether the advantages claimed have been 
wholly or partly achieved. The move is, however, an interesting 
one and indicates the anxiety of treasury board officials concerned 
with budget formulation to break loose from the restrictions 
imposed by the purely line-item budget. At the same time, 
however, it may well be argued that the change goes either too 
far, or not far enough, and is likely to produce the worst of 
two worlds. In other words, a compromise of this sort could 
easily create more problems than it solves. If the supposed 
advantages of the performance approach are real advantages, then 
there is a good case for presenting the budget to the legislature 
and the public in that form, rather than reserving it for the use of the 
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officials directly engaged in budgetary analysis. Adequate 
analysis can be carried out, even allowing for the limitations 
of the line-item method of budget presentation, provided the 
budget agency is organized and functions in a way that allows 
analysts to build up an intimate knowledge of the work and 
aspirations of the departments whose oversight has been entrusted 
to them. Programming may ease the analyst's burden to some extent, 
but it will not necessarily lead in all cases to analysis of a 
higher quality, A good deal of the value of the programme budget 
approach lies in the broader picture of governmental operations 
it may give to the legislature. But this is not achieved in 
Ontario because no use is made of the statements set out on a 
programme basis, as far as legislative examination is concerned. 
It may be, of course, that the step taken in 1963/64 will 
be simply the first of a series that will lead to complete 
adoption of programme budgeting. On the basis, however, of the 
attitudes of state legislators it does not seem likely that 
budgets in this form will be accepted in the foreseeable future. 
As we shall see in the case of Maryland, some legislative bodies 
pay lip-service to the notion of programme presentation of estimates, 
but still demand detailed information of the line-item type - a 
costly and unnecessary duplication of effort. The Ontario 
legislature has apparently not even begun to think about whether 
or not its deliberations would be improved by estimates presented in 
programme form; despite the strong criticisms of current budgetary 
procedures at the dominion level made by the Glassco commission. 
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Essentially, that commission recommended that all cost elements 
of individual programmes be consolidated in a reduced number of 
parliamentary votes; that estimates of expenditures in those votes 
be prepared on the basis of programmes of activity, rather than 
forms of expenditure, like salaries, travel, etc; and that 
departments be given authority for managing approved resources 
17 
within broad policies laid down by the treasury board. That is 
to say, the commission's objective was to set up a system of control 
tihat operated indirectly through the process of policy formulation, 
and to introduce a method of supervision which would indicate how 
effectively policies were carried out - in short, programme budgeting 
and responsibility accounting. Yet, notwithstanding this sort of 
lead, the public accounts committee of Ontario's legislative assembly 
recommended in June, 1965, that: 
"The Estimates should include in addition to the proposed 
expenditure for the forthcoming fiscal year the following: 
(the presentation to be made in columnar fashion) 
(a) The approved estimate for the last completed fiscal year, 
(b) The actual expenditure for the last completed fiscal year. 
(c) The approved estimate for the current fiscal year," I8 
"The Estimates and the accounts of the Province should show 
a more detailed classification of what is now called 
'Maintenance', so that the cost of the purchase of office 
equipment, the purchase of supplies and other categories of 
expenditure would be immediately apparent." 19 
17, The work of the Glassco Commission, The Royal Commission on 
Government Organization, is discussed by D. C. Corbett in a 
review article, "The Glassco Commission and the Machinery of 
Government," Public Administration (Sydney), Vol, XXIII, No, 3, 
September, 1964, pp.263-267. 
18, Report of the Standing Committee on Public Accounts, Legislative 
assembly of Ontario. Third session, twenty-seventh parliament, 
10th June, 1965, p.2, recommendation 3* 
19* ibid,, recommendation 4, 
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It was further stated that: 
"Your Committee wishes to commend the present policy of 
providing greater detail of expenditure in the Estimates 
and accounts by increasing the number of individual votes,..." 20 
Such an approach is obviously the very antithesis of the notions 
behind programme budgeting. 
We may now return to the outline of the actual procedures 
followed by the treasury board in assessing the needs of departments 
as set out in their draft estimates, prepared initially in programme 
form. When these estimates are submitted to the board its officers 
begin their detailed examination of the proposals made by each 
department. The issues with which they will concern themselves have 
been set out by the secretary of the board in a paper presented in 
March, 1965, in which he suggests that the analysts must obtain 
answers to the following questions: 
"(a) What is the fundamental overall purpose for which the 
program is established? 
(b) What are the quantitative objectives or goals established 
for each program? 
(c) In terms of basic purpose, goals, and objectives, what 
levels of attainment have been achieved in these programs 
since its inception, in the past decade, in the past biennium? 
(d) What are the staff requirements according to the 
department's estimates for this program during the request 
year? What were the staff requirements during the current 
year and the prior year? 
(e) Are all elements of the program consolidated in one Vote? 
(f) Are all elements of the program carried out by one branch? 
20. ibid., recommendation 5* (Similar recommendations are to be found 
on pp.2-3 of the committee's report of 7th May, 1964, during the 
second session of the twenty-seventh parliament.) 
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(g) What are the major components of the program and 
how is it organized?" 21 
The analyst must also assure himself that the existing 
programmes are divorced from new programmes and extensions of 
current programmes, and that the latter two are clearly identified 
in the report he prepares for submission to the treasury board. 
This is, of course, essential in a situation which requires that 
policy matters - and these are usually involved in programme 
extensions and innovations - be decided only by the treasury board 
22 
and the executive council. 
In conducting their examination members of the treasury board's 
staff spend a good deal of time in the departments, seeking out 
supplementary information and explanatory data from various 
departmental officers. Discussions with the secretary of the Ontario 
treasury board suggest, however, that the board's analysts play a 
considerably less positive part in the budget process than is the 
case with officers of, say, the New South Wales budget branch. Their 
role, or method of approach, is much closer to that of the budget 
officials in the Queensland state treasury. This is apparent in 
two particular respects: firstly the analysts tend to confine their 
personal discussions with departmental officers to the period during 
which the estimates are being reviewed, rather than aiming at 
year-round direct contact; and secondly, their reports seldom 
include firm recommendations for variation of the departmental 
21, C, Brannan, The Treasury Board of Ontario, Toronto, March, 1965, 
unpublished statement prepared for submission to the public 
accounts committee, pp,5-6, 
22, ibid,, p,6. 
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estimates. Instead, they aim at summing up the arguments for and 
against requests for funds, leaving it to the treasury board itself 
to make the actual decision. 
This process is one in which the board, armed with detailed 
analyses prepared by its officers, reviews with each minister the 
estimates submitted by his department. In so doing the board attempts 
to assess programmes, existing and proposed, in relation to such 
things as the degree to which they reflect the declared policy of 
the government and progress in the long term plans of the government; 
whether they are financially feasible; and whether they indicate an 
effective administration. When overall financial circumstances 
necessitate reductions in the allocations sought by departments an 
attempt is made to cut back to the desired level of expenditure by 
curtailing or eliminating programmes of lower priority, and by 
administrative economies. It is stated quite categorically that 
"the across-the-board slash is not regarded by the Treasury Board 
23 
as a useful tool in settling the budget". This is probably a 
correct statement of the position as far as Ontario is concerned, 
since this is a wealthy, well-developed province, with established 
budge4,ary machinery and a relatively sophisticated approach to 
budgetary matters generally. It is not so with all provinces, 
however. One former budget director, with experience in several 
provinces, and now occupying a chair in a Canadian university, 
indicated in an interview that it was common for members of treasury 
boards to become impatient about the detailed and protracted 
23* ibid. 
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examination needed to reach budgetary decisions and that they 
often resorted to general reduction of expenditure requests in 
order to achieve a desired overall result. If this happens the 
department that has already reduced its expenditure demands 
following careful internal scrutiny of its activities will be 
placed in an extremely difficult situation. Adequate review of 
departmental plans by officers of a central budget agency can do 
much to ensure that the implications of particular decisions are 
known to members of the treasury board. If the budget agency does 
not or cannot carry out its task effectively, however, the Canadian 
system is likely to lead to a good deal of arbitrary and ill-founded 
decision making by the small group of senior ministers making up 
the treasury board. Although final approval of the estimates to be 
submitted to parliament rests with cabinet as a whole, the budget 
allocations are, to all intents and purposes, settled at the treasury 
board level. The prestige of the ministers making up the board, and 
the place it has achieved as an institution, not only in budgetary 
matters, but in the whole complex of governmental activity, make 
further changes in the estimates unlikely, despite the occasional 
"last ditch" stand by disappointed ministers seeking larger 
appropriations for their departments. 
After cabinet approval the estimates are normally introduced on 
the day the finance minister's budget statement is delivered; although 
there have been one or two occasions when the estimates have been 
brought to parliament in several instalments, beginning in the autumn 
session and finishing on the day the budget statement is made. 
Supplementary estimates may also be presented for the year drawing to 
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a Close, Unlike the practice in New South Wales the budget 
statement is not prepared within the treasury or treasury 
board's office. The main task of preparation is undertaken by 
the department oi economics, the treasury being responsible only 
for some of the appended financial statements. 
British Columbia 
In formal terms treasury board decisions in British Columbia 
are reached in the same way as in Ontario, That is to say, each 
minister individually attends a meeting of the board at which his 
departmental estimates are discussed and a total allocation is 
decided. Departmental officers are then required to adjust items 
in the estimates to fit them to the approved total expenditure. 
However, although officers of the department of finance were 
evasive about this issue, it does seem clear that the members of 
the treasury board rely very heavily when deciding allocations upon 
24 the recommendations made to them by the "little treasury board". 
Since, as we shall see in chapter 8, the central budget examination 
arrangements of the province are extremely rudimentary, a great deal 
of influence lies in the hands of the two senior officials who 
comprise the "little treasury board". This influence and the 
authority of the treasury board in determining departmental 
allocations is strengthened, too, by the fact that the premier 
also holds the finance portfolio, 
24, See p,l86. 
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Manitoba 
In th i s province the review by the t reasury board i s 
somewhat more elaborate and prot rac ted than in other provinces. 
The head of the board's budget sect ion pa r t i c ipa t e s in the hearings 
and each department's minis te r , deputy minis te r , accountant and 
heads of relevant divisions appear before the board to explain and 
justify departmental requests for funds> However, perhaps because of 
this extensive par t i c ipa t ion and consequent lengthy hearings, members 
of the treasury board tend, p a r t i c u l a r l y with large departments, 
simply to decide upon a reduction in the a l loca t ion sought, without 
closely examining individual; expenditure proposals . As in the other 
provinces departments are normally advised ear ly of t he i r t o t a l 
expenditure a l loca t ion and are allowed considerable independence in 
adjusting the i r itemizecS. estimates accordingly. 
When each department's request for funds has been reviewed 
the revised budget i s again discussed by the treasury board and 
i t s budget d i rec to r , and i t i s occasionally necessary to make further 
reductions in the a l loca t ions for pa r t i cu l a r departments or even to 
impose an addi t iona l general cut in order to a r r ive a t the desired 
budget r e s u l t . This process seems very often to be a quite a rb i t r a ry 
one. 
Saskatchewan 
In many aspects of budgeting Saskatchewan has been the leader 
amongst the Canadian provinces. This i s ce r ta in ly the case with the 
procedures associa ted with t reasury board review of departmental 
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estimates and in terms of the thoroughness with which the board 
performs its functions. 
25 
As indicated earlier, departments and agencies in Saskatchewan 
are required to prepare not only an annual budget, but also five-year 
projections of the amounts required to maintain their existing 
programmes of activity and to finance new programmes considered 
?6 
desirable. It is these projections that are first examined by 
the treasury board, after they hage been consolidated by the planning 
27 board, with the assistance of treasury officers. The treasury 
board's examination is made partly on the basis of reports compiled 
by its own staff and including papers on the general economic 
situation and outlook, projected revenues, the impact on the public 
debt of the proposed revenue and expenditure programmes, and special 
surveys of farm incomes, rural economic conditions and the employment 
implications of the plans for public sector activities. 
The board spends a week during October in examining the 
five-year pians; their examination beginning with an assessment of 
overall economic prospects and their likely effect on revenues, and 
going on to the plans of specific departments. Meetings are held 
with the ministers and permanent heads of the major departments and 
25, See P0I87. 
25, Obviously, the first of the five years covered will be a summary 
of the departmental draft estimates for the ensuing fiscal year, 
27, See p,l87, 
2oc Cf. A. W. Johnson, "The Treasury Board in Saskatchewan," 
Proceedings of the Seventh Annual Conference of the Institute of 
Public Administration of Canada 1955, University of Toronto Press, 
1955, pp,102 ff. 
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the managers of statutory bodies and their responsible ministers. 
By the time these discussions have been held the treasury board 
will have gained a picture of the policy emphases of ministers and 
departmental officials and the likely overall financial position. 
It will then have to formulate recommendations for cabinet, 
striking a balance between probable revenues and desirable 
expenditures. This will involve consideration of such factors as 
the political and economic impact of increased taxes and charges, 
the relative importance to be given to various programmes of 
activity, and the varying effects of particular capital transactions 
on the provincial debt and future borrowing capacity. The resultant 
memorandum to cabinet not only recommends revenue and expenditure 
levels for the forthcoming year, but also discusses present and 
future problem areas in terms of available finance and programme 
activities. 
This report is the starting point for further review at a 
week-long meeting of the full cabinet, during which period each 
minister and his chief advisers again outline their proposed 
programme emphases and their short and long-term goals. Cabinet 
also discusses written material presented by each department and 
financial data prepared by the staffs of the planning and treasury 
boards, T^ i^s survey of problems and goals serves to establish the 
background for the decisions to be made about each department's 
budget allocation. As the secretary of the treasury board has said: 
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"This whole process is clearly calculated to make possible 
the rational formulation of policy - the facts are presented, 
the alternatives are discussed, the limitations are recognized. 
And the important role of the Treasury Board as an adjunct 
to the Cabinet is equally clear. In the first place it 
serves the Cabinet as any good committee should: it ensures 
that the facts are accumulated and presented concisely; it 
assists in identifying for discussion the problems of public 
policy which emerge from a more or less continual examination 
of government programs; it pulls together all aspects of 
financial policy in order that a comprehensive review can be 
made," 29 
Cabinet as a whole is presented with a picture of the overall financial 
situation - of the complex of policy alternatives and broad financial 
limitations, which must be taken into adcount in settling the details 
of the budget. 
By the time the cabinet-planning board discussions have been 
held the budget analysts on the staff of the treasury board will 
have completed their examination of the estimates submitted by the 
departments, and with the secretary of the treasury board will meet 
the permanent head and senior officials of each department to outline 
the treasury's views on the financial proposals that have been 
submitted. The way this discussion proceeds is described by Johnson: 
"The discussion centres first on the 'A' budget: the estimates 
of each activity, or 'sub-vote' as we describe our divisions 
of the budget, must be pared down to the minimum required to 
do the job. Any disagreements on this ticklish question, and 
I think they are surprisingly rare, are referred to tha 
Treasury Board, In addition, all new positions requested are 
brought to the Treasury Board's attention, frequently with a 
Treasury recommendation. 
The discussion centres, secondly, on policy proposals evident 
in the 'B' budget, or I hesitate to say, perhaps 'lost' in the 
'A' budget, with an effort being made to identify the policy, 
29, ibid,, p. 103. 
- 207 -
organizationa, and financial implications of each 
proposal." 30 
The discussions also deal with any problem associated with current 
policies which may have been revealed in the preceding cabinet 
examination or during the regular budgetary reviews throughout 
the previous year. 
The next step is for the officials of the treasury board to 
submit to the board a detailed report dealing with virtually all 
aspects of the discussions with the deputy ministers and indicating 
decisions that have been agreed upon in the context of the tentative 
policies fixed during the earlier cabinet deliberations. The treasury 
board is then in a position to draw up final budget recommendations 
for presentation to cabinet, but does so only after further meetings 
with each minister and his advisers, spread over a period of about 
two weeks. These recommendations will deal with the agreed estimates 
for the "A" budget, proposed changes in departmental personnel 
establishments, the "B" category proposals to be adopted and 
incorporated into the budget for the next financial year, and 
particular aspects of specific departmental programmes. The nature 
of the process makes it unlikely that cabinet will alter the treasury 
board's recommendations, so that in the normal course of events the 
budget will receive cabinet endorsement during January, 
30. ibid,, pp. 104-5* 
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Preparation of Capital Expenditure Estimates 
An outl ine of the procedures followed in Ontario and a very 
brief mention of those of Saskatchewan w i l l be suf f ic ien t under 
this heading. There are only minor differences in the provincia l 
procedures for preparing cap i t a l expenditure es t imates . 
Ontario 
Approximately four months before the beginning of each fiscal 
year departments are required to submit their proposed building 
programmes to the treasury board. Listed on these programmes are 
all proposed new capital projects estimated to cost more than 
^25,000 and all purchases of residences or land regardless of 
value. They do not, however, include normal maintenance repairs 
or renovations. These are dealt with directly by the department of 
public works. Only major renovations costing in excess of ^ 50,000 
are shown on the departmental capital works programmes. 
As well as providing information about the purposes of proposed 
projects, preliminary estimates of costs, and details of any land to 
be acquired, depai^ tments are required to assign priority ratings to 
the new projects they are putting forward. 
Before determining what new construction work is to be 
undertaken during the next fiscal year the treasury board arranges 
for its staff to prepare a "capital commitment statement". This shows 
the total cost of all capital works in progress and all works approved 
for construction or planning, allocating costs over a period of five 
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years. From the statement the board determines the total new 
commitment to be approved. It then reviews the programmes of 
each department with the minister concerned; the board's staff 
having meanwhile examined all new capital proposals, and furnished 
a report on them. 
Approvals initially given by the treasury board are for 
planning only within an approximate cost figure. After the 
necessary planning has been carried out, the project must again 
be submitted to the treasury board for authority to construct, 
such approval being determined by the departmental priority 
accorded the project, the treasury board's assessment of its 
priority in relation to proposals by other departments, and the 
total new commitment figure that has been set for the fiscal year. 
Treasury board approval is also required for the acquisition 
of property for government activities, whether that acquisition is 
to be by purchase or by lease. Before the treasury board approves 
any such proposal, however, it must be examined and reported upon 
by both the department of public works, which looks at technical 
factors, and the staff of the treasury board, who consider the 
programme implications. 
Saskatchewan 
As far as capital works are concerned we need only note that 
Saskatchewan has attempted to establish a long-term programme which 
may, however, be varied to meet changing economic conditions. 
Capital projects are, like current estimates of expenditure, the 
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subject of five-year projections which are considered by the 
treasury board and at the cabinet-planning board conference 
referred to earlier. In addition, special allocations are made 
to the public works department to enable preliminary planning to 
begin on projects which may not normally be put in hand for two 
or three years. With plans ready, however, work may be started 
earlier if the financial situation permits. 
It is at the December meetings of the treasury board that 
the capital budget is adjusted to accord with the overall economic 
situation and recommended to cabinet. This late finalization of 
the capital budget means that more is known about the revenue 
outlook and hence about how much of the capital works programme 
can be financed from current revenues; there being no prohibition 
in Saskatchewan against the use of revenue for works of a capital 
nature. 
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
Preparation of Current Estimates 
In the United States budget procedures are, in general, 
considerably more complex than in Australia and Canada, There 
is also much greater variation from state to state. However, in 
forty-three states the budget-making authority is directly vested 
in the governor; in six of the remaining seven states responsibility 
rests with a board of which the governor, or an official appointed 
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31 
by him, is a member. This degree of uniformity, coupled with 
the fact that in the great majority of states the agency that 
actually compiles the budget is responsible to the governor, has 
given rise to enough procedural and organizational similarities 
among the states to make it possible to gain a general picture of 
budgetary procedures by examining only a few systems in detail and 
supplementing this examination with brief references to major 
variations found elsewhere, 
Maryland^^ 
We shall begin with the budget procedures of Maryland, a 
state that may be regarded as one of the most "progressive" in 
the field of budgeting, 
55 
The Budget Calendar^^ 
The formulation process in the United States is commonly much 
more drawn out than in Australia and Canada, In Maryland, work 
31* This information has been extracted from tables in The Book of the 
States, 1964-65, Chicag09 Council of State Governments, 1964, 
pp.159-167* In Arkansas the budget-making authority formally 
rests with the legislative council, chosen by the state 
legislature. However, budget preparation is actually carried 
out by the governor and the comptroller, who is appointed by 
the governor with legislative consent. 
32* With a population of approximately 3'»3 million, Maryland ranks 
twenty-first in size among the American states. 
33* Dates for budget bureau action are established by regulation 
or practice. Dates for action by the governor and legislature 
are mostly specified in the state constitution. The fiscal 
year is established by the state comptroller, (Annotated 
Code of Maryland, 1951, article 19, section 30), 
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on the budget for a particular fiscal year begins a full twelve 
months earlier when on 1st July of the preceding year the budget 
bureau sends out "budget request forms" to each department and 
agency of government. These request forms are accompanied by an 
instruction book of over forty mimeographed pages, laying down in 
detail the form and order of presentation of budget requests, and 
describing the data to be included in each schedule. There is also 
a letter from the governor stating the broad policy he wishes the 
agencies to follow. This is usually quite short - one or two pages 
only - and necessarily is framed in general terms, 
54 With one or two special exceptions, departments are required 
to submit their budget estimates by 1st September and from then until 
November they are in the hands of the analysts on the staff of the 
budget bureau. The budget analysts, who are assigned to assess the 
needs of specific agencies, are given a good deal of latitude in 
the methods they adopt. In general, however, they go over the 
departmental requests carefully to note aspects that seem to need 
close scrutiny, and then visit departments to obtain as much 
information as possible about their proposals. Up to this point, 
then, the procedure, though not the timing, is much the same as in 
Australia and Canada. 
34, e.g. The state roads commission, whose budget must be held over 
until the requirements of the department of motor vehicles and 
the state police have been determined; and the education 
department, which must wait until after the school census in 
October, 
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A significant departure from Australian and Canadian practice 
occurs in the analysis stage, however. From the end of September, 
through November, formal budget bureau hearings are held for each 
agency. For large agencies, hearings may require an entire morning 
or afternoon on two or three separate occasions. Hearings for small 
agencies are held at a rate of up to four a day. The proceedings are 
based on lists of questions drawn up by the budget analyst, and 
intensive discussion may take place among those present. These will 
include the director of the department of budget and procurement, 
the chief of the budget bureau, staff members of the fiscal research 
35 
agency, and representatives of the department whose budget is being 
reviewed. The hearings are conducted in "closed session" and in this 
respect Maryland differs from many other states where all hearings, 
both before and after submission of the budget to the legislature, 
are open to the public. 
Throughout this period and right up to the time of printing the 
section of the budget papers under consideration,the director of the 
department of budget and procurement will be making decisions on the 
allocajbion to be granted to each programme. Decisions may be actually 
made at the hearings, or after further study by the analyst, extra 
hearings, conferences, and consultation with the governor. Although 
in formal terms the responsibility for formulating the budget rests 
with the governor, the practices followed place considerable authority 
35* The organization and role of the department of budget and 
procurement, the budget bureau and the fiscal research agency 
are discussed in chapters 7 and 8. 
- 2l4 -
in the hands of the director of the department of budget and 
procurement, who can decide most questions himself. The director, 
however, is appointed by the governor and is directly responsible to 
him. The system of budget preparation is based on the assumption 
that there will be a close working relationship between the 
governor and director and that, although the governor will concern 
himself mainly with major decisions of budgetary policy, the director 
will nevertheless keep him fully informed during the preparation. 
Certainly, the governor will be made aware of budgetary developments 
in fields in which he has special personal or political interests; 
as well as every significant increase or decrease in amounts allowed 
in previous budgets. It will always be open, too, to the governor 
to include appropriations which the budget director has not 
recommended, or to vary the suggested allotments. Despite the wide 
delegation of authority to the director of the department of budget 
and procurement, then, the budget remains the chief executive's, 
and he must accept full responsibility for it. 
During December and January the entire budget document is, 
following these hearings, conferences, and personal consultations, 
completed by stages and printed, ready for submission by the 
56 governor to the legislature in February, The legislature is then 
36. The actual date of submission varies in odd and even numbered 
years. In odd numbered years the governor is required to submit 
his budget within twenty days of the convening of the general 
assembly - i,e, by late January, In even numbered years the 
assembly does not sit until the first Wednesday in February, 
and the governor must present hi^udget on that day. 
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allowed one month to consider the budget and to make amendments 
37 
it considers desirable. The fiscal year begins on the following 
1st July. 
It will be seen that in Maryland, as in most American states, 
there is a problem arising from the long time lag between the 
formulation of the budget and its execution. The initial phase of 
budget preparation is almost a full year before the beginning of 
the fiscal period covered by the estimates and nearly two years prior 
to the end of that period. For states that prepare biennial budgets, 
as many do, the problem of making accurate estimates of revenue and 
expenditure is still greater, Maryland, as has been noted, has 
adopted programme budgeting, which allows for some measure of 
flexibility, but, even so, firm initial estimates cannot be expected. 
Many variable factors may affect the cost of governmental programmes 
after they have been drawn up. It will also be seen from the time 
schedule outlined above that the interval between formulating the 
budget and its coming into effect is increased as a result of the 
state's fiscal year not beginning for several months after the end 
of the legislative session. In odd numbered years the session 
extends from early January to early April; in even numbered years 
there is only a thirty-day session from February to early March. 
There is, therefore, a waiting period of from three to four months 
before the approved budget can begin to be implemented, 
37. In odd numbered years the legislature has approximately two 
months available for considering the budget. 
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Allocations for the Legislature and Judiciary 
The budgetary procedures discussed above apply only to the 
executive branch of the state government. Alternative arrangements, 
38 
specified in the constitution, apply to financial allocations for 
the legislative and judicial branches. 
The estimates of expenditure of the general assembly must be 
certified by the presiding officer of each house. These expenditures 
consist mainly of the salaries of legislators and administrative staff, 
together with relatively small amounts for such operating expenses 
as travel allowances and printing. The legislature's budget does not, 
however, include the costs of its two staff agencies, the legislative 
reference service and the fiscal research bureau. These are looked 
upon as part of the executive branch of government and are treated 
accordingly in the budget. They are, nevertheless, responsible in 
practice to the general assembly and in their day to day activities 
are not subject to control by the executive. Both the director of the 
department of budget and procurement and the director of the 
legislative reference service assist the presiding officers to 
formulate the legislature's estimates of expenditure, but when they 
have been prepared they are simply inserted into the main budget 
document as they stand. The executive branch, as one would expect in 
a situation of formal separation of powers, has no authority to alter 
these estimates, though the legislature itself may make changes prior 
39 to the final passage of the budget submitted to it by the governor, 
38. Maryland Constitution, article 3, section 52 (II). 
39o ibid., article 3, section 52 (6). 
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Compilation of the budget for the judiciary was originally 
40 the responsibility of the state comptroller. Since 1955, however, 
there has been an administrative office of the courts, the director 
of which prepares the budget estimates for the judicial system. 
This budget covers only the county circuit courts and the courts of 
the city of Baltimore. It consists largely of judges' salaries, most 
other expenses being met by the counties. The budget for the court 
of appeals is treated separately and is formulated by the chief judge, 
but is then reviewed in accordance with the usual budget bureau 
procedures. It is interesting that the court of appeals, the state's 
highest tribunal, is not treated as part of the judiciary within the 
meaning of the constitutional provisions dealing with budgeting. 
Presumably the court could at any time assert its independence as 
far as budget review by an executive agency is concerned. The fact 
that it has not done so provides a good example of the sort of working 
relationships that exist without statutory backing in many fields of 
administration in this and other states. 
It will be noted that, apart from the court of appeals, there is 
no central budget review or subsequent executive control of the 
'fO, The state comptroller is one of the three popularly elected state 
officials, the others being the governor and the attorney general. 
His office is established by article 6 of the state constitution. 
He is elected for a four-year term and has a broad mandate to 
supervise the fiscal affairs of the state, as well as specific 
functions in the pre-auditing of proposed expenditures and the 
collection of revenue. His administrative authority and elective 
status make him second only to the governor as an influence in 
state politics and administration. 
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estimates of the l e g i s l a t i v e and j u d i c i a l branches of government -
except insofar as the s t a t e comptrol ler ' s functions impinge on 
legis la t ive and jud ic i a l opera t ions . However, the combined budgets 
of the l eg i s l a tu re and the judic iary amount to no more than one-half 
per cent of a l l s t a t e appropr ia t ions , so the possible disadvantages 
Qif divided control are unl ike ly to be s i g n i f i c a n t . 
New York 
In budgetary terms New York state has a strong gubernatorial 
system. All departmental heads except four are appointed by the 
governor. Of these four the comptroller and the attorney general are 
popularly elected; the commissioner of education is appointed by a 
board of regents, who are themselves appointed by the legislature; 
and the commissioner of social welfare is appointed by a state board, 
but with the approval of the governor. The budget director, appointed 
by and directly responsible to the governor, has very wide powers of 
control over various financial and administrative activities of 
departments, and in a number of instances, such as requests for the 
re-classification of positions, there is no right of appeal from his 
decision. His general authority is such that Mosher has stated:"...in 
budget preparation and execution, all roads lead to the Governor's 
4l 
administrative right'arm, the director of the budget." 
Reference to appendix G (pp, 453 ff* ) will indicate that the 
budget director is supported by a large staff and a well developed 
4l, Frederic^ C, Mosher, "The Executive Budget, Empire State Style," 
Public Administration Review, Vol, XII, No, 2, Spring, 1952, p,77o 
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budgetary organization. In the complex and large-scale activities 
of a state such as New York, this staff fills a vital role in 
interpreting the governor's thinking and refining for departments 
his broad programme and- policy decisions. 
One of the major concerns of the budget division is to develop 
budget formulation procedures which will serve to force continual 
examination by departments of programme purposes and methods and to 
ensure that all relevant information is not merely brought into the 
deci si on-making process, but is presented in a usable form. The 
budget staff accordingly plays a large part in establishing the 
general procedures to be adopted by departments in budget preparation, 
designs the various forms for submission of requests and information, 
and lays down the time schedule to be followed. All this is set out 
in a budget request manual which is revised annually shortly before 
the work of budget preparation begins. 
Departmental estimates of needs are initially prepared at 
subordinate levels - division, bureau, field office, and so on -
but are then brought into conformity with overall departmental 
responsibilities and objectives by means of a series of internal 
budget conferences under the chairmanship of senior officials, 
usually the head of the department, or commissioner, his deputy, and 
the departmental budget officer. The estimates then go to the division 
of the budget. 
The division's preliminary review begins with an analysis by the 
budget examiners of each department's appropriation requests, its 
programme and work load statements, and the "justifications" submitted 
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in accordance, with budget instructions. Then informal hearings 
and conferences are held with departmental representatives, and 
the analyst also reviews all proposed departmental legislation to 
be submitted through the budget division. 
These informal hearings and conferences, conducted at the 
budget analyst/senior departmental officer level, are followed by 
formal hearings, chaired by the budget director, and attended by 
heads of departments and representatives of the fiscal committees of 
the legislature. Final decisions are not reached at this stage. 
Rather, the hearings are designed to bring out information about 
departmental programmes and aims that was not apparent from the 
departments' preliminary estimates and submissions. The hearings 
are evaluated by the budget analysts, who also obtain additional 
data when necessary, and these evaluations go forward to the budget 
director and the governor who jointly conduct the final review and 
frame the overall budget. 
In reaching budgetary decisions a good deal of material will 
be taken into account by the governor and his budget director. There 
will be first the recommendations of the budget examining staff on 
agency programmes, budget estimates, and proposed legislation. Then 
there will be reports and specific recommendations by budget analysts 
concerning estimated expenditures for local government assistance, 
capital outlays, and debt service. In addition to these basic reports, 
however, there will be presented a wide range of docum.ents and 
statistical material dealing with general economic conditions and 
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forecasts, taxation research, revenue estimates, and recommendations 
made by legislative committees, special investigators, and commissions 
created to study particular problems. These must all be considered 
before final allocations are determined, and related to commitments 
entered into by the governor with department heads, legislative 
leaders, and various individuals and interest groups. Despite the 
detaileda analyses made at different points in the process of 
preparation, the budget that emerges is in some ways a highly personal 
document, influenced greatly by the governor and his budget director. 
Procedural Variations in Other States 
The descriptions of the procedures followed in Maryland and 
New York provide a picture of the steps generally taken in budget 
preparation in states which have strong or relatively strong 
executive systems and developed machinery for central review of 
departmental requests for funds. There will be differences of detail, 
but, for the most part, these will not affect the basic pattern of 
42 preparation. As one examines other states, however, it is apparent 
that some stages in the process are either omitted or varied 
substantially. Often this is simply a result of inadequate or less 
adequate budget machinery, but it may also reflect differences in 
budgetary philosophy or in the influence of the legislature vis-a-vis 
the executive. We cannot here deal with the multitude of variations 
that can be found among the states, but we may briefly mention aspects 
^2, Note, for instance, the essential similarity between Maryland's 
budget calendar and that of Michigan, as set out by Glendon A. 
Schubert and Donald F, Mclntyre in their "Preparing the Michigan 
State Budget," Public Administration Review, Vol, XIII, No, 4, 
Autumn, 1953, p,24l. 
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of budget procedures in several states that may be taken as 
representative of particular approaches. 
Colorado 
The public service of Colorado operates on a closely defined 
merit system and has a well developed central budgetary organization. 
As we shall see in later chapters, budget analysts in Colorado must 
be academically qualified and, like other public servants, are required 
to sit for competitive examinations throughout their careers if they 
are to progress from one classification level to another. 
The degree of "professionalism" thereby developed in the public 
service is particularly marked, however, in the field of budget 
examination. Budget analysts are allowed a good deal of latitude 
in determining the procedures to be followed in examining each 
department's draft estimates of expenditure. Some analysts actually 
participate in the departmental discussions and meetings at which 
the preliminary estimates are prepared, and their advice and active 
participation seem to be welcomed by most departmental officers. 
Interviews with Colorado officials indicated, too, that because 
budget analysts tend to be regarded as skilled officials possessing 
considerable administrative discretion, their recommendations are 
largely accepted by the budget director. In turn, the governor 
seldom makes substantial alterations to the budget presented to him 
following the examination of departgiental requests conducted by the 
central budget officials. 
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Despite the prominent role of the budget organization 
in shaping the budget to be presented to the legislature, however, 
and the expertise that is brought to bear on the process of 
preparation, the budgetary influence of the Colorado legislature 
is more significant than in many other states. This is partly an 
effect of the personalities involved. In any American state, 
whatever the formal powers of the chief executive, much will hinge 
upon his personal abilities, influence, and skill in political 
manoeuvring. The present republican governor of Colorado, John A. 
Love, has had considerable difficulty in winning acceptance for his 
and departmental programmes not only by the legislature, but also by 
45 hxs own political supporters. The personal element is not the 
only consideration, however. Traditionally the legislature's joint 
budget committee has wielded a great deal of power in the field of 
budgeting. The six senior legislators (three senators and three 
representatives) who make up the committee maintain close and 
continuous liaison with departmental officers and have themselves 
developed substantial expertise in financial matters. Their 
recommendations are seldom challenged within the legislature. 
It may be noted, too, that unlike the situation at the federal 
level of government and in states with strong executive systems, 
departments and agencies in Colorado place their original budget 
requests before the joint committee and in appearing at the formal 
sessions of that body are not required to support the governor's 
3^o During part of his period of office the governor has been further 
handicapped by the fact that the state senate has a republican 
majority, while the democrats are dominant in the lov;er house. 
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recommended a l l o c a t i o n s . They may openly seek to have r e s t o r e d to 
them proposed a l lo tments which have been reduced or e l im ina t ed 
following budget agency rev iew. 
Idaho 
This s t a t e provides ano the r example of s t r ong l e g i s l a t i v e 
influence i n budget p r e p a r a t i o n , a l though such in f luence i s exe rc i sed 
in a d i f f e r en t way from C o l o r a d o ' s . 
The s i t u a t i o n desc r ibed i n 1958 by the then governor of Idaho, 
44 Robert E, Smylie, i n a note i n S t a t e Government, s t i l l o b t a i n s , 
Idaho has an execut ive budget system in which the governor i s 
designated as chief budget o f f i c e r and appo in t s a d i r e c t o r of the 
budget who i s r e spons ib l e to him for p r e p a r a t i o n and execut ion of the 
budget during each b i e n n i a l f i s c a l p e r i o d . The l e g i s l a t u r e has no 
permanent budget r e s e a r c h machinery to a s s i s t i t . 
Un t i l 1957 budget p r e p a r a t i o n was e n t i r e l y an execut ive p rese rve 
and the l e g i s l a t u r e was a t a d isadvantage compared with o ther s t a t e s 
in t ha t i t had no po in t of access to the process of p r e p a r a t i o n . 
Departmental budget r e q u e s t s were submi t ted to the d i r e c t o r of the 
budget, c losed hea r ings were conducted, and the proposed budget was 
not a v a i l a b l e for l e g i s l a t i v e examinat ion u n t i l p resen ted with the 
governor 's message on the t e n t h day of the l e g i s l a t u r e ' s s i x t y - d a y 
budget s e s s i o n . 
H , Robert E, Smylie , "The P r e - L e g i s l a t i v e Budget in I d a h o , " 
S t a t e Government, Vol, XXXI, No, 5 , May, 1958, pp .83 -84 . 
- 225 -
In 1957, however, a legislative budget committee was created, 
consisting of three senators, three representatives, and the 
presiding officer of each chamber. By statute this committee is 
required to "advise with the Director of the Budget on the 
preparation of budget recommendations for the forthcoming biennium 
45 
and, in practice, actually prepares recommendations in detail". 
In carrying out this function the committee participates in the 
budget hearings, formerly conducted by the governor and budget 
director only. At the hearings agency requests are examined in 
detail and both the amounts sought and the allocations to be 
recommended by the legislative budget committee are made public 
before the end of November. Biljdget discussion can thus commence up 
to six weeks before the governor's proposals are presented to the 
legislature early in January, and legislators are able to study the 
departmental requests, seek further data, and attempt to gauge public 
opinion before the budget session begins. The budget bureau itself 
assists in stimulating discussion by issuing a summary statement, 
including graphs and charts, which presents the budget position in 
an easily understood form. 
The procedure has been usefu3^in reducing the legislative 
"jams" that frequently occurred under the earlier practice and has 
increased the effectiveness of the legislature's budget scrutiny. 
It has also been of some service to the chief executive in enabling 
him to assess the reaction to the suggested allocations of the 
45, ibid,, po83« 
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legis la t ive budget committee, before having to present his own 
budget proposals. By the same token, however, the influenc^of 
the leg is la ture has been increased by i t s being brought d i r ec t ly 
into the process of budget preparat ion; with the governor being 
placed in a posit ion in which i t i s d i f f i c u l t not to adopt those 
of the committee's recommendations which enjoy favourable 
reception and pub l ic i ty . 
Nevada 
The budget calendar of Nevada is almost identical with that 
of Mai^ -land. Reference is made to its procedures in this chapter 
only because it is an example of a small state in which considerable 
budgetary authority rests with a single official, the director of 
administration. 
Budgeting in Nevada is one function of the department of 
administration, headed by a director appointed by and directly 
responsible to the governor. Within the department there is a 
budget division under the charge of the deputy director of 
administration, who carries out much of the necessary detailed 
review of the departmental budget requests and submits reports to 
the director. On the basis of these reports the director of 
administration makes tentative recommendations as to the allocation 
46, Cfo ibid., p.84, where the governor admits that he "relied 
heavily upon the budget committee recommendations for those 
agencies which had experienced relatively little change from 
the preceding biennium". 
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for each department and advises the head of the department accordingly, 
If the tentative recommendation is acceptable to the departmental 
head it will stand and be incorporated into the budget to be presented 
to the legislature. If, however, the department wishes to challenge 
the proposed allocation, it must present a brief to the director of 
administration defining the specific points at issue, and requesting a 
hearing. Such hearing is conducted by the director, unless the 
departmental head specifies that he wishes to present his case to 
the governor, or unless the director of administration himself feels 
that gubernatorial review is desirable. It is only in these instances 
that the governor is formally involved in the preparation process, the 
bulk of the operating budget being resolved by the departmental 
heads and the director of administration without his intervention. 
Such a system could, of course, operate sudcessfully (as it appears 
to do) only in a state which has a comparatively small public service, 
conducting much of its work on a personal basis, 
Utah 
When this system was examined in September, 1965, the 
arrangements for reviewing the draft departmental estimates were 
of a very rudimentary kind, representing a good example of budgeting 
47 
under a "weak executive" form of government. 
T-7* At that time consideration was being given to the setting up of a 
"little Hoover commission" which it was anticipated would 
eventually make recommendations for the strengthening of the 
executive budget system. 
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In Utah, apart from the governor, the secretary of state, 
attorney-general, treasurer, and state auditor are popularly 
elected, as are the members of the state board of education who 
in turn appoint the head of the department of public instruction. 
The state roads commission is appointed by the legislature and the 
members of that commission appoint the director of highways. There 
is also a four-man bipartisan tax commission which is appointed by 
the legislature, though in this instance the governor has the right 
of nominating one of the members as chairman - an influential post. 
Until 1963 budget preparation was in the hands of a three-man 
finance committee, appointed by the governor. Following an 
administrative reorganization in that year, however, the committee 
was disbanded and there was created a finance department, headed by 
a director appointed by the governor with the consent of the state 
senate. Within the finance department four divisions - budgeting, 
purchasing, accounting and personnel - were set up. At that time 
the budget division consisted of a director, assistant director, and 
four budget examiners. 
The budget preparation procedure instituted in 1963 required 
firstly the drawing up of a report indicating the likely revenue 
situation in the forthcoming fiscal period; this report being 
based upon calculations made by the state tax commission, and 
individual agencies responsible for tax collection, with some 
assistance from the department of finance. Departments were then 
asked to submit expenditure estimates based upon the projected revenue 
picture. In effect they were restricted to an increase in their 
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current levels of expenditure no greater than the likely growth in 
revenue collections at existing rates of taxation and charges. 
Departments wishing to expand their activities beyond that level 
were required to submit estimates in two parts; one setting out the 
"basic request", the other comprising a "supplemental request" to 
enable new activities to be undertaken or existing services to be 
expanded to a greater degree than the "normal growth" dictated by 
the revenue situation. After departmental requests had been examined 
in the budget division, the director of finance reported to the 
governor who, on the basis of this report, submitted his proposed 
budget to the le^slature. No hearings were held, unless the governor 
himself wished for more information before presenting his budget 
recommendations. The state's tertiary education establishments 
prepared separate budgets and submitted them to a co-ordinating 
council for higher education which presented recommendations to the 
legislature independently of the governor. 
This is still the basic pattern for budget preparation in Utah, 
but changes since the system was introduced in 1963 have made central 
budget review of departmental expenditure requests almost completely 
ineffective. During I963 and 1964 the four budget analysts attempted 
to carry out a programme of regular visits to departments to build up 
a stock of basic information about departmental activities. However, 
there was considerable resistance by departmental officers and this 
part of the analysts' work was discontinued when a new governor came 
into office in January, 1965, Subsequently, all four analysts were 
transferred from the budget division to other work in the finance 
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department. The director of the budget division, who resigned 
following the change of governors, was not replaced. By September, 
1965, therefore, the budget division consisted of only one officer 
the former assistant director; a career civil servant, qualified as 
an accountant, with long service in the accounting division of the 
finance department and some nine years' experience in budgetary work, 
having acted before 1963 as an assistant to the single official then 
engaged in budget analysis. As "acting director" the present 
activities of this officer are almost entirely related to budget 
execution, his main function being to check expenditure returns 
submitted by departments to ensure that the expenditures fall within 
departmental appropriations and to prepare expenditure warrants. 
He takes no part in budget review, beyond making a superficial 
examination of each department's expenditure requests and submitting 
a brief report to the director of finance. Indeed, the word "review" 
is hardly appropriate to the present arrangements by which the 
governor and director of finance simply adjust departmental estimates 
to conform to the projected revenue position, with little or no 
direct investigation of the needs of departments. Such review as does 
now exist is conducted on behalf of the legislature which employs 
an analyst and two assistant analysts to report to it before 
49 
appropriations are made, 
H-o, In Utah the governor is constitutionally obliged to submit a 
balanced budget, 
^9* If the legislature alters the expenditures suggested by the 
governor, it must also adjust the revenue side to retain a balance, 
or authorize deficit financing by means of a bond issue. 
Departments' "basic requests" are seldom altered, changes normally 
being made only in the "supplemental requests". 
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Wyoming 
Wyoming is another example of a state in which the procedures 
for budget preparation are not highly developed, but, unlike Utah, 
its situation in this respect is improving. 
Budgetary arrangements are in the hands of the assistant budget 
50 
officer and state purchasing agent,^ a post that was created in 1963, 
when the present incumbent was appointed. Until July, 1965, this 
officer had only two office assistants to help with his budgeting and 
purchasing responsibilities, but there is now a male clerical officer 
on the establishment who has taken over much of the work associated 
with purchasing. There is also to be an assistant on the budgetary 
side, though this will be a clerical post as the legislature has 
refused to authorize the appointment of a qualified budget analyst. 
Before I963 the budget preparation instructions issued to 
departments consisted merely of a short letter which provided no 
effective guide lines. There was no standard format for the draft 
estimates and the resulting budget was a very inadequate document, 
difficult for either the legislature or the general public to follow. 
Since his appointment, however, the assistant budget officer has 
introduced a number of changes. Elaborate instructions go to the 
departments and their budget estimates must now be presented in 
standard form, dividing expenditure by both activity and object, 
and indicating the means of financing activities. Useful narrative 
50, The word "assistant" is used in this title only because by law the 
governor is designated as the state's budget officer. 
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explanations of each department's functions are also included in 
the budget papers. Much of the e a r l i e r de ta i led information has 
been deleted from the document, though th i s i s s t i l l se t out in 
supplementary statements avai lable on request to members of the 
51 leg is la ture . No separate c a p i t a l budget i s prepared, cap i t a l works 
being included in a confusing way among the operating expenditures of 
departments. 
The role of the a s s i s t a n t budget off icer i s a subs tan t i a l one. 
His r e spons ib i l i t i e s include general management s tud ies ; he serves on 
the s t a t e ' s personnel commission; and he i s a member of a committee 
concerned with the int roduct ion of automatic data processing. I t i s 
not surpris ing, therefore , tha t he i s unable to conduct a detai led 
personal inves t iga t ion of each department's budget reques ts , but must 
base his recommendations to the governor upon an examination in broad 
terms of the estimates forwarded to him. Even so, he would be unable 
to cope with his task were i t not for the fact that Wyoming's general 
fund expenditure i s small by comparison with many s t a t e s , being of the 
order of ^50 mil l ion; and he i s not required to analyse the budgets 
prepared by elected heads of departments. The establishments of three 
of Wyoming's e lected s t a t e o f f i c i a l s , the secretary of s t a t e , audi tor , 
and t reasurer , involve only f a i r l y small expenditures, but the budget 
prepared by the fourth such o f f i c i a l , the superintendent of public 
ins t ruct ion, i s l a r g e . These four se t s of estimates are passed d i r ec t ly 
to the l e g i s l a t u r e , without review by the a s s i s t a n t budget off icer or 
51, In 1965 only s ix members of the l e g i s l a t u r e sought copies of 
these supplementary s ta tements . 
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recommendation by the governor, the latter holding the view that it 
would be inappropriate for him to comment on the estimates of other 
popularly elected officials. 
Despite the generally unsatisfactory budget review situation in 
this state, it is apparent that, within the limits imposed by the 
staffing position, the assistant budget officer has attempted to 
introduce more systematic arrangements, The improvement so far 
effected is reflected in the fact that the legislature made very few 
alterations to the last set of budget recommendations presented to it 
by the governor, although earlier budgets had customarily been 
changed extensively following legislative examination. Central 
review nevertheless remains superficial, and subsequent control of 
expenditure is minimal. There is a reliance upon the departments 
themselves for oversight of expenditure and, although the assistant 
budget officer obtains monthly expenditure statements from the central 
accounting agency, he is unable to examine these in any systematic way 
or to analyse expenditure trends to facilitate subsequent budget 
review. 
Estimation of Likely Revenues 
The estimating of revenues is another aspect of budgeting in 
which there are appreciable differences between Australian and 
Canadian procedures on the one hand, and the methods of some American 
states on the other. It is also the feature of state budgeting in 
all three countries which exhibits the greatest weaknesses, A 
commonf]^ ilin:g of state budget systems is that for the most part the 
resultant budget document is, at best, only an expenditure plan. 
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Even states with strong central budget agencies and well developed 
review procedures often devote very little time to estimating future 
revenues and analysing revenue trends. In Australia only cursory 
attention is given to the revenue side of the budget. Estimates 
submitted by tax and fee collecting departments are usually prepared 
simply by adjusting the previous year's receipts to allow for one or 
two obvious variables like population and the rates themselves, 
and these estimates tend to be accepted at face value by the budget 
agency. In Canada only Saskatchewan seems to make any real attempt at 
close calculation of likely revenue; whilst this general picture of 
inadequacy applies throughout most of the United States. As far as 
America is concerned, however, our remarks must be qualified, as in so 
many other aspects of budgeting, to take account of the Md.de variation 
in the procedures and organization for revenue estimating found in 
the various states. This is not due simply to differences in the 
degree of budgetary sophistication from state to state, or to questions 
of size, resources, and administrative structure; although these are 
relevant factors. Understandably, much of the variation results from 
differences in the patterns of state taxation, A state which relies 
on income taxation for the bulk of its current revenue, for instance, 
has quite different problems of estimation from a state depending 
mainly on consumption taxes or licence fees. 
We may look at a few- states which differ from the norm in that 
they have developed procedures for the systematic examination of likely 
revenues, 
235 -
New York 
New York provides us with a good example of a state which 
leans heavily on the taxation of personal and corporate income to 
finance its operations. The bulk of its taxation revenue is 
collected on a current basis - i.e. as the money is earned. 
Consequently, the estimating of revenue for budgeting purposes 
requires a look into the future for two years ahead, in order to 
determine what the economy may then be like and to translate this 
into potential tax collections. 
There is a taxation department which is the main collecting 
agency and which makes the surveys and special studies used in 
estimating. However, although the process of estimation starts in 
that department, responsibility rests in essence with the division 
of the budget, since the governor is required to submit to the 
legislature a budget covering both revenue and expenditure, and 
in the task of preparation his chief financial adviser is the budget 
director. If tax department estimates of revenue were used without 
review within the budget division the assumptions underlying those 
estimates might well be inconsistent with the assumptions made when the 
estimates of expenditure were prepared. 
The procedures which have been developed are designed to avoid, 
or at least minimize, any such inconsistency. In New York, the fiscal 
year begins on 1st April. Budget consideration to all intents and 
purposes begins about nine months earlier. In June, when departments 
are preparing their budget requests, the Division of the Budget puts 
- 236 -
together a "financial plan". Although of a preliminary nature, 
this plan provides a fairly good picture of the current fiscal 
situation since appropriations are known and tax legislation for 
the year has been enacted. Fairly realistic projections of 
expenditure for the current year are possible, but variable factors 
affecting revenue collections make estimating difficult on that side 
of the budget. At this time, too, estimates of revenue for the 
following financial year, nine months ahead, are made and compared 
with expenditure projections. Again, expenditure is the easier to 
estimate as many programmes are of a continuing nature. On the 
basis of this preliminary assessment of revenue and expenditure, 
departments are advised of the likely budgetary prospects for the 
next fiscal 3'"ear, and are asked to frame their requests accordingly. 
The initial Estimates of revenue prepared by the tax department 
are submitted to the division of the budget in October, The material 
on which these estimates are based is drawn from two sources - from 
the collecting agencies and from the tax department's own research 
staff, who analyse the estimates made by the collecting agencies and 
also prepare independent estimates. Experience suggests that for the 
current year's estimated results the collecting bureaus have a good 
record of accuracy. Collection patterns are known, and half the 
financial year is past. In estimating for the following year, 
however, the collection agencies rely largely on trend-line 
projections and make no allowance for the likely state of the economy. 
When the research bureau within the tax department reviews these 
estimates it does so in the light of its assumptions about future 
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economic t rends . In forwarding the estimates to the budget divis ion 
full explanations of these assumptions are included. Review within 
the budget division may r e s u l t in subs t an t i a l changes being made in 
the revenue est imates , but t h i s wi l l be e s sen t i a l l y because different 
assumptions from those of the tax department are being made about 
likely t rends . 
By October, when the preliminary revenue estimates are received 
in the budget d ivis ion, budget preparation i s suf f ic ien t ly advanced to 
provide a reasonably good idea of what the estimates to be submitted 
to the l eg i s l a tu re wi l l encompass. By that time, too, the work 
necessary to i n s t i t u t e any revenue-raising proposals wi l l be in hand. 
In December a second formal estimate of revenues i s submitted by 
the tax department and an independent assessment i s again made by the 
budget d iv i s ion ' s ana lys t s . If there i s any s ignif icant divergence in 
these two estimates a good deal of discussion wi l l take place to 
identify the bas>is of disagreement. As ind ica ted , th i s wi l l usually 
be a ref lec t ion of di f ferent assumptions about l ike ly economic t rends . 
However, since the analysts of the budget divis ion and the tax 
department's research s t a f f work closely together throughout the year 
they are not l i k e l y to dif fer markedly in the f ina l ana lys i s . During 
December and January the budget division formulates specif ic 
recommendations for the governor 's approval, the budget being 
required to be submitted to the l e g i s l a t u r e by 1st February, 
This, then, i s the procedure in New York, a s t a t e with well 
developed general budgetary arrangements<, On the revenue side the 
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process of estimating is, as we have seen, relatively straightforward 
and not unlike the procedures of the central governments of Australia 
and Canada. At the state level in Australia, however, exclusion from 
income and consumption taxation and heavy reliance upon tax 
reimbursement grants from the centre have resulted in the use of 
revenue-estimating procedures that are of a simple kind, but which 
seldom ensure a high level of accuracy of prediction as far as the 
state-raised revenues are concerned. In general, the same may be 
said of most of the Canadian provinces, although their more varied 
sources of revenue have forced them to devote a little more time and 
thought to revenue estimating than is the case in Australia. 
Maryland 
In Maryland, as in New York, the governor is constitutionally 
responsible for the revenue estimates. Before 1945 the actual 
preparation procedures were similar to those already described for 
New York; the estimated revenues being assessed mainly on the basis 
of projections suggested by the comptroller's tax collection figures, 
and then adjusted by the budget bureau to take economic trends into 
account. Numerous weaknesses became apparent under this procedure, 
however; mainly because no official was able to devote adequate time 
to all the processes involved in estimating. To overcome some of the 
problems a board of revenue estimates was created. This board consists 
of the state comptroller (popularly elected), the state treasurer 
(legislatively elected), and the director of the department of 
budget and procurement (appointed by and responsible to the 
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governor). The same legislation also set up a bureau of revenue 
estimates, designed to assist the board in the performance of its 
functions. This "bureau" consists, however, of only one professional 
officer who must himself perform all the technical work required. 
This cannot, of course, be regarded as adequate machinery for the 
complicated task of revenue estimating. 
These arrangements raise interesting issues concerning what 
might be called the politics of estimating. The board of estimates, 
on the basis of reports prepared by its professional officer, 
supplies the governor with the estimated revenue figures for the 
forthcoming year. Only one member of that board owes his appointment 
and presumably his allegiance to the governor. The other two members 
are elected - one by popular vote, one by the legislature - so that 
the governor is required to base his tax recommendations on estimates 
coming from a board which could be controlled by the political party 
in opposition to the governor's. And apart from party affiliations, 
difficulties could arise from the fact that the state comptroller 
occupies a post of considerable political influence, so that he is, 
in a sense, one of the major rivals of the governor, perhaps with 
gubernatorial ambitions of his own. 
Of course, since the governor is constitutionally responsible 
for the revenue estimates put to the legislature, he is not bound to 
accept the recommendations of the board of revenue estimates. In 
52, Cfo Annotated Code of Maryland, 1951, article 4l, section 166, 
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practice, however, the recommendations of a formally constituted 
board of this sort cannot be rejected out of hand, A detailed 
explanation of any departure from the board's proposals must be 
given, and this can easily lead to open political controversy. In 
Maryland it has been possible to develop informal procedures for 
co-operation between governor and board so as to reduce the 
likelihood of public clashes over the revenue estimates, but there 
are, nevertheless, occasional outbreaks of politically-inspired 
disputes. 
California 
A good deal has been done in California towards improving 
methods of revenue forecasting. Its budget officials rightly stress 
the need to obtain a clear understanding of the general economic 
situation, recognizing that the assessment of the economic pattern, 
rather than the conversion of economic assumptions into specific 
revenue estimates, is the most important aspect of the process of 
revenue prediction. If the general economic assumptions are correct 
it is possible to estimate revenue with a high degree of accuracy, 
California's revenue estimating programme begins, like those of 
many other states, with the attendance during the latter part of 
October of one or more of its analysts at an annual conference 
dealing with the estimating of revenue, sponsored by the national 
association of tax administrators. Representatives of about 
twenty-five states commonly attend this conference, at which leading 
economists discuss the outlook for the forthcoming year, both in 
general economic terms and in relation to likely trends in specific 
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aspects of the economy, such as retail sales, agriculture, 
production in various industries, personal income and company 
profit levels, price trends, monetary policy, and so on. 
When the actual task of forecasting the economic outlook 
begins the information gathered at the conference of tax 
administrators provides a valuable starting point for the budget 
division's analysts, particularly when supplemented by the 
assessments of several nationa^^ economic advisory services. At 
this stage the budget division examines the whole framework of the 
national accounts and analyses the elements making up those accounts, 
integrating personal income, expenditures and savings. Income is 
related to such factors as the likely growth in the labour force, 
productivity, the possible extent of unemployment, and anticipated 
changes in wage rates. Predictions about the size of governmental 
expenditure in the national economy are made on the basis of the 
budget requests of federal agencies and the growth patterns of the 
states in recent years. Although experience has shown that the economy 
of California follows the general trends for America as a virhole, 
growth factors sometimes do result in a slightly different economic 
pattern for the state. In addition to the examination of the 
national economy, therefore, the budget division attempts to 
formulate an economic pattern for California itself, based mainly 
on analysis of employment, trade, construction work, profits and 
personal income. 
Even such a brief description as the foregoing is sufficient to 
indicate how complicated is the preliminary process of revenue 
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estimating in California and the de l ica te nature of the judgments 
that must be made. The aim i s to go beyond the formulatingi, in 
isolation as i t were, of estimates for specif ic sources of revenue, 
and to derive from the l a t e s t avai lable data the t o t a l in tegra ted 
economic picture for the ensuing year . 
The second stage in the process i s for the economic pat terns 
for the s ta te and for the country as a whole, as portrayed by the 
budget division, to be submitted to a specia l group of independent 
economic advisers . This group consis ts of twelve economists drawn 
from the major u n i v e r s i t i e s , leading banks, public u t i l i t i e s , and 
several important i n d u s t r i a l undertakings. One of the un ivers i ty 
representatives i s an a g r i c u l t u r a l economist. Late in November th i s 
panel meets for a one-day discussion with the s t a t e ' s d i rector of 
finance, research s taf f of the budget divis ion, and members of the 
legislative a n a l y s t ' s s taf f , topics for discussion having been 
pre-assigned and each panel member having prepared an outl ine of 
developments in his f ie ld of s tudy. The re su l t an t discussion i s 
"off the record", so that the panel can frankly discuss economic 
prospects, 
In making use of t h i s advisory panel, steps have been taken to 
overcome one of the major problems associated with the use of general 
economic forecasts - t he i r fa i lure to se t out l ike ly developments in 
quantitative terms. In s t a t e s where those responsible for revenue 
estimating re ly upon published surveys of economic conditions and 
trends (and th i s i s commonly the case) , d i f f i c u l t i e s are encountered 
because such surveys often use terms l ike "a sharp increase" or 
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"a substantial fall", and these and similar phrases are capable of 
widely different interpretations. The preliminary memorandum 
prepared by the Californian budget staff for presentation to the 
advisory panel, however, includes a table setting out data for 
major sectors and subsectors of the economy; including indices of 
income, prices and production, and covering the two preceding fiscal 
years, the current quarter, the apparent actual figures for the 
current year, and the budget staff's estimates for the forthcoming 
year, A blank column is provided and each member of the advisory 
panel adds his estimate for some twenty-eight major items. The 
tables, completed in this fashion, without individual identification, 
are summarized and distributed to the conference participants. 
These conferences and supplementary material submitted by 
members of the advisory panel provide the basis for the assumptions 
about economic trends which underlie the revenue estimates to be 
included in the budget; though responsibility for those assumptions 
is accepted by the director of finance. In this connection, it may 
be noted that the consensus reached during the advisory panel 
discussions is sometimes modified following further analysis by 
the budget division, or to take account of conditions developing 
after the conference has been held. 
Other States 
Although, as we have seen, both Maryland and New York devote 
a good deal of time and care to the preparation of revenue estimates, 
neither they nor any other state match the emphasis rightly placed by 
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California on the preliminary phase of formulating a picture of 
likely trends in the economy. It is only by doing this, however, 
that revenue estimating can be given a firm foundation. Most 
states recognize, of course, that receipts will vary with changes 
in the general economic situation and that an appreciation must 
therefore be made of likely economic conditions during the 
forthcoming year. Nevertheless, although accepting this, few 
states in practice devote more than cursory attention to overall 
economic factors. For the most part only superficial surveys of 
published statistics are made. Common sources are the statistical 
statements of the federal department of commerce dealing with 
national income and population trends, supplemented by examination 
of state payroll and employment figures, usually issued quarterly; 
as well as by such information as the rate of automobile production, 
state tax collections, and the extent to which business assets are 
accumulating. Inevitably, most of the available material relates to 
the past, although it can, of course, provide useful indications of 
like future economic activity. The leads given, however, can only 
be of a general kind. There is no formula by which the sort of 
information mentioned can be made to produce hard and fast results. 
Different analysts using the same set of data may reach widely 
Varying conclusions. The margin of error may be substantial when 
we are dealing with a highly complex, inter-related, and dynamic 
economic system; and even a small error may have a serious impact on 
the final budget result. In large states, such as New York or 
California, for instance, a difference of one per cent between 
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estimated and actual receipts would amount to more than ^20 million 
in absolute terms. 
It should not be assumed that if a satisfactory forecast of 
future economic activity could be made the task of the revenue 
estimator would become simply that of applying routine procedures 
to assess taxation and other receipts at that given economic level. 
That is far from being the case. It is not easy, for example, to 
relate personal income to probable expenditures for goods and 
services and then to translate those probable expenditures into 
sales tax collections. The impact on consumption of an alteration 
in taxation laws or rates is hard to predict, and even changes in 
the way a tax is collected, or in administrative arrangements, may 
affect receipts substantially. The variables are many and budget 
officers often feel, therefore, that in estimating receipts they can 
do little more than make an informed guess. One may sympathise to 
some extent with such an attitude, but the fact is that much greater 
accuracy in predicting receipts from the various sources could be 
achieved if state budget agencies were to carry out detailed and 
systematic analysis of economic trends generally and then subjected 
the collected data, as California does, to such statistical techniques 
as trend analysis, sampling, ratio computations, and correlation 
analysis. Only in this way can the present obvious weaknesses in 
most states' revenue prediction procedures be overcome. 
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Preparation of Capital Expenditure Estimates 
The substantial differences which have been noted throughout 
the United States in approaches to various aspects of budgeting 
are even more apparent when we turn to the financing and execution 
of governmental works programmes. There is no uniformity of practice 
in determining the types of projects to be included in capital 
budgets. In some states this decision is based on the nature of 
the project - for example, whether it is a.n addition to, or 
conversion of, an asset. In other states the test is simply that 
of cost, irrespective of whether the work involves construction, 
reconstruction or repairs. In such cases the capital budget will 
cover maintenance projects of various kinds which in Australia and 
Canada would normally be included in the operating budget. The 
machinery for preparing and reviewing capital works also varies 
greatly from state to state and is often separate from the state's 
executive budget agency. Nor is there any organization similar to 
the Aiistralian Loan Council to provide at least an underlying 
co-ordinating influence. In these circumstances, to describe the 
procedures in a limited number of states would be of little value 
in providing an overall picture. The most that can be done is to 
offer some broad comments about different aspects of capital 
budgeting and to stress that these may be subject to qualification 
53 
m their application to particular states. 
53. The best source of detailed information is A. M. Hillhouse and 
S. Kenneth Howard, State Capital Budgeting, Chicago, Council of 
State Governments, 1963, which is based on a survey of practices 
in some twenty-eight states. 
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Examination of the practices generally applying suggests that 
very few states appreciate that the project recommendations made at 
subordinate levels and then reviewed within the operating departments 
are crucial to the whole process of capital works decision-making. 
Without careful assessment of capital requirements and priorities 
in the early stages the entire process suffers. Only a handful of 
states have encouraged departments to fit their capital recommendations 
into a framework of long-range departmental planning, which can then 
serve as a liiik: between the operating and central review levels of 
government. 
Maryland has perhaps gone furthest in stressing long-term 
planning by departments; ten-year development plans being required, 
with provision for regular review, and for the assigning of specific 
responsibility for planning within each department. These plans 
provide excellent guidelines and a base for continuing development, 
but the reviewing agency has lacked the staff necessary to make the 
best use of the plans. Capital works analysis has largely had to b© 
conducted on an individual project basis, with little formal 
consideration being given to the broad ten-year plan itself. 
A similar picture is found in some other states. Departments in 
Florida, for instance, prepare ten-year programme projections but, 
although these go to the legislature's appropriations committees, 
they are neither integrated into a master plan nor centrally reviewed. 
Although it does not insist on the preparation of broad departmental 
development plans, Ohio requires departments to assign priorities to 
their capital works requests and to justify projects with studies of 
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population, land use, space utilization, and programme impact, 
which could provide the basic data for overall development planning. 
Like Maryland, however, staffing limitations prevent the making of 
analyses of long-term effects. Broad long-range planning by 
departments and agencies has also been fostered in Colorado through 
its planning division and advisory planning board, in Minnesota 
through the legislative building commission, and in Pennsylvania 
where the state planning board has been active in recent years. In 
each of these states, however, the central review of the capital 
budget is largely limited to its effects in the succeeding biennium, 
so that part of the value of long-term planning at the departmental 
level is lost. 
The procedures followed by central agencies in collecting and 
examining information about departmental works programmes differ 
radically from state to state. The capital works "request form" 
on which departments and authorities furnish details of projects they 
wish to put in hand range from very simple statements to documents 
that are elaborate and complex. In some states projects are classified 
54 
according to type and cost, perhaps with a different request form for 
each category. Sometimes, too, there is an attempt to adapt procedures 
and the information sought in order to take account of differences 
among operating agencies. In Ohio, for instance, special sets of 
forms are used for natural resources projects, for mental hygiene 
5^ . e.g. major and minor construction work, major and minor repairs. 
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projects and for those of correctional institutions, to differentiate 
them from other capital works. The information sought also varies 
to some extent according to the type of reviewing agency which 
exists in each state. If, for example, the state's overall capital 
works programme is collated and reviewed by its construction agency, 
more emphasis is likely to be placed on structural details than would 
be the case if review were in the hands of the budget office or a 
central planning authority. 
Usually the request forms call for a project description, and 
an indication of its location. The amount cf detail sought under this 
heading varies. Sometimes site plans must be provided; Maine requires 
a full page of information about the location alone, even seeking data 
about subsurface conditions. Usually, too, the reviewing agency 
must be informed about such things as the availability of architectural 
plans, site development, associated equipment needs, and the ability of 
utility services to cope with any extra demand caused hy the project. 
Cost estimates are always required, of course, but the elaborateness of 
the breakdown of these costs varies. In many states departments must 
supplement cost figures for specific items with information showing the 
costs on a unit basis - e.g. per square foot - so that comparisons with 
other projects can readily be made by the reviewing agency and any 
56 looseness in estimating will be highlighted. Sometimes departments 
must indicate the impact a capital project is likely to have on their 
55* Cf. A. M. Hillhouse and S. Kenneth Howard, op.cit., p.53. 
56, ibid. 
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future operating budgets, but effective use of this information 
57 
seems seldom to be made. 
Example after example could be given of the differing data to 
be presented and the forms of presentation to be followed by 
departments in each state when attempting to justify their requests 
for funds for capital projects. Sufficient has been said, however, 
to indicate the variety that exists in this aspect of capital budgeting 
and in the consequent analytical methods that are adopted to establish 
58 
overall priorities. Each state's capital budgeting arrangements are 
unique, with the central reviewing body, which may be either the 
budget office or a separate agency, simply seeking any readily 
available information and using as much of it as is feasible in 
establishing priority schedules. The data on which capital project 
decisions are based comes primarily from the departmental estimates 
submitted to the central reviewing agency; programme analyses prepared 
by budget examiners; management and space utilization reports; budget 
research on both general and specific topics; departmental studies and 
developmental plans; engineering and architectural reports and surveys; 
and studies by special commissions or outside consultants. Throughout 
the process of formulating the capital estimates the central agency 
serves as co-ordinator. It sets the process in motion, provides some 
57* Maryland is one of the few states which closely review the 
effect of capital projects on later operating costs of departments. 
58, Hillhouse and Howard distinguish at least six different methods of 
analysis that are followed by central agencies, each of which has a 
number of variations. op,cit., pp,68 ff. 
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of the technical assistance and material needed by departments in 
59 the preliminary preparation stage, "^ ^ and follows up by using 
conferences, memoranda, reporting, and other devices to ensure 
that capital budget work is kept flowing and deadlines are met. 
Although the initial and major responsibility for capital programming 
in most American states is seen as that of the operating departments 
themselves, the central agency has important advisory functions and 
through these, as well as by informal contacts, it not only provides 
stimulus to the whole process of capital budgeting, but also brings to 
bear on project analysis and the fixing of priorities an objectivity 
of approach which it would be difficult to achieve at the operating 
level. 
59* Much of the technical assistance and material needed by 
departments for capital planning can be provided economically 
only if centralized - e.g, the technical knowledge required for 
effective space-occupancy analysis, studies of population changes 
and distribution, and assessment of likely economic trends and 
their effects. 
CHAPTER 6 
THE LOCATION AND ROLE OF THE BUDGET AGENCY 
"...Among others to my Lord Treasurer's, there to 
speake with him, and waited in the lobby three long 
hours for to speake with him, to the trial of my utmost 
patience, but missed him at last, and forced to go home 
without it, which may teach me how I make others wait," 
Pepys. (l4th June, 1665) 
- 253 -
Part I of this chapter deals with the place of budget 
agencies within the overall administrative framework of the 
state, the internal organization of particular agencies being 
mentioned only if this is necessary to illustrate points about 
' 1 
their administrative location, 
. This could open the way to discussion of one of the 
central issues in the field of administration, allocation of 
functions, and beyond this to an area as yet untouched by 
budgetary writings - the influence which budget agencies and 
the budget system itself may exert over the distribution of 
governmental functions. It is not possible to include here the 
lengthy treatment required to deal adequately with these topics, 
The second will, however, form the basis of a later study. 
. Although much may be learned about budget agencies by 
fitting them into organizational categories, agencies having 
similar legal bases and structures often exhibit differences in 
method and approach. Part II, therefore, goes beyond formal 
organizational structures to examine some other factors which 
influence the operating of systems of budgeting. 
ll Organizational patterns for allocating work within various budget 
agencies are discussed in chapter 8. 
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I 
LOCATION 
Australia and Canada 
State and provincial budget agencies in Australia and Canada 
occupy similar places in the overall administrative structure, 
being linked in both countries to the treasury or department of 
finance. In each of the Australian states budgeting is an integral 
part of the treasury; in Canada the budget agency staff is formally 
attached to the treasury board but, as we shall see, the connection 
between the budget analysts and the treasury department itself is 
close and direct. 
Several advantages for both the budget agency and the treasury 
may accrue from this arrangement. The fact that he is part of a 
department as influential as the treasury is of considerable 
assistance to the budget analyst in his oversight of the financial 
dealings of the operating departments and in his relationships with 
departmental officials. From the treasury's point of view the 
presence of an academically well qualified group of officers largely 
divorced from routine work responsibilities and free to concentrate on 
budgetary problems and broad issues of financial policy may do much 
to consolidate its position in relation to other departments. In 
New South Wales, for instance, officers of the budget branch of the 
treasury in the normal course of their activities examine departmental 
reports, budgets, accounts and financial documents of other governments 
in Australia and overseas; analyse economic trends and conditions in 
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particular sectors of the economy; and study a wide range of 
periodical literature and other publications circulated to them 
by the reference library maintained in the branch,^ They are thus 
able to build up an extensive knowledge of public finance in 
Australia and elsewhere and have at their disposal material which 
may be needed in considering the varied aspects of governmental 
activity they encounter in their day to day work. This places 
them in an advantageous position in their negotiations with 
departmental officials, few of whom have the same broad knowledge 
of financial matters or ready access to the wide range of data 
required for assessing the merits of proposed expenditures. Budget 
analysts also develop a much greater awareness of current political 
developments than is usual among the general run of public servants. 
Advantages of this sort, however, may in large part arise only 
if the budget section operates as a specialist bureau within the 
treasury. Much of the benefit of directly associating budgeting 
with the treasury is likely to be lost if the work of budget analysis 
is simply handled by treasury officials temporarily seconded from 
other duties to review departmental estimates once a year, or who 
perform budgetary work in addition to other activities. Before the 
New South Wales budget branch was set up in 1938 such review as was 
made of departmental estimates and financial policy was undertaken by 
2, The budget officer in charge of the reference collection also 
marks articles and data of relevance to the work of particular 
analys ts, 
3. It is probably only among senior officers of the premier's department 
and the public service board that any comparable widespread 
appreciation of the political scene is to be found. 
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members of the accounts branch of the treasury along with their 
ordinary duties of keeping the governmental accounts. Until 
recently this situation applied in Queensland, too, with much of 
the preliminary examination of departmental estimates being done 
by the treasury's chief ledger-keeper. In both states the 
arrangement proved unsatisfactory. Review of draft estimates is 
only part of a budget agency's role and its participation in the 
budgetary process can only adequately take place on a continuous 
basis. 
The methods in most Canadian provinces for providing staff for 
the treasury board recognize both the desirability of establishing 
a close working relationship between budget analysts, other officials 
performing central staff advisory functions, and the treasury 
department, and the undesirability of overburdening the provincial 
budget agency with routine work of a book-keeping nature. In 
chapter 8 we shall examine the staffing arrangements and the 
allocation of functions among treasury board officials in various 
provinces. Here we may simply note that the budget analysts and 
other officers attached to the treasury board's secretariat are in 
most provinces formally appointed to the treasury department and 
if 
then detached for service with the treasury board. The board's 
staff, then, is provided by the treasury and is normally housed in 
the treasury department. Although concerned full-time with analysis 
^. In Ontario since 196O the staff of the treasury board has been 
directly appointed to that organization. This staff is located 
in the treasury department, however, and maintains close links 
with the treasury and its offiicers. 
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of budgetary and financial matters on behalf of the treasury board, 
the budget analysts are not only treasury officers but their working 
relationships with those in the treasury department "proper" are close. 
There is, in effect, an interlocking that ensures that the treasury 
staff both serves and is served by those elements of the department 
concerned with the broad issues of economic and financial policy. 
The United States of America 
In examining American budgeting it is possible to distinguish thre< 
broad categories of budget systems. There is firstly the executive 
system, in which the chief executive is primarily responsible for 
formulation of the budget. Then there is the form of budgeting which 
operates through a board or commission, with budget preparation being 
in the hands of a group of officials or a combination of administrative 
and legislative officers. Finally there is the legislative budget 
system, rare today, in which the budget is formulated by the 
legislature through its committees or agents. As we shall see, these 
are not clearly demarked categories; they shade into each other. They 
do, however, provide a useful frame of reference for examining 
budgetary organization, particularly if further subdivided for 
purposes of detailed analysis. 
Executive Budget Systems 
Most American states today have budgetary arrangements that 
formally place responsibility for budget preparation in the hands 
5o These are broad groupings, each containing sub-categories, 
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of the chief exedutive. This does not necessarily imply, however, the 
existence of a "strong executive" system of administration. Executive 
strength will be derived from a complex of factors apart from the 
formal procedures for preparing the budget - overall organizational 
structure, the existence of agencies of government removed from 
executive oversight, the extent of the practice of earmarking funds 
and so limiting executive discretion in the allocation of resources, 
legislative powers in budgeting, and so on. Nevertheless, the vesting 
of formal responsibility for budgeting in the chief executive has been 
a significant move towards a strong executive system of government in 
many states. 
Where the chief executive is responsible for preparing the 
budget and submitting it to the legislature there are two characteristic 
organizational forms among budget agencies. The first of these 
is represented by the budget agency constituted as one of the 
major units within a department of administration or a department 
responsible not only for budgeting but also for one or more of the 
other central activities required for the support of governmental 
programmes carried out by the operating agencies. The second form 
is the budget bureau placed directly within the office of the chief 
7 
executive. In both examples the budget director exercises his 
6, The actual location of responsibility in most states for budget 
preparation and execution is set out in appendices H and I (pp,462 ff.X 
7, There is a third group consisting of agencies having a formally 
independent status, but these may be regarded as falling within the 
two major categories since, in practice, they seem to operate as 
unitd within either a finance department or the governor's office, 
Cf, Frank M, Landers and Howard D, Hamilton, "A Survey of State 
Budget Agencies," Public Finance, Vol, VIII, No. 4, 1953, p,400. 
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powers as an agent of the chief executive. 
During the past decade there has been a clearly discernible 
trend towards the integration of fiscal and management services. 
Budgeting has come to be looked upon as a positive function of 
management and the tendency has arisen for there to be created 
broadly-based departments of administration, with budget offices 
located within such departments. Budgeting is thereby grouped with 
other staff or service functions of government, the so-called "tools 
of management". These centralized service functions may include 
budgeting, accounting, personnel administration, purchasing, office 
services, the running of motor pools, property management, record 
keeping, architectural and engineering services, and revenue 
collecting. 
Departments into which some or all of these functions have been 
8 
collected are variously named, but they have the common feature of 
gathering together major housekeeping activities of government. Each 
has been formed by taking service functions previously carried out by 
the line departments themselves, by amalgamating already centralized 
but separate staff agencies, or by adding to the functions performed 
by an existing staff agency. Normally the heads of such departments 
are appointed by the governor, are directly responsible to him, and 
serve at his pleasure. Within departments of administration, however, 
the chiefs of the various divisions may be either career officials or 
8» e.g. Department of administration, department of finance, 
department of finance and administration, department of finance 
and control, department of finance and purchasing, 
9* Variously called commissioner, controller, director or secretary. 
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appointees of the governor or head of the department. The 
situation in this regard is set out in appendix J (pp.469 ff.)* 
Where departments of administration or similar organizations exist, 
the departmental head is usually officially designated as the 
state's budget officer* However, his overall responsibilities 
are likely to be such that the great bulk of the budgetary work 
and substantial discretionary power will have to be given to the 
chief of the budget division* Although the budget division is 
commonly among the smallest in a department of administration, 
its chief, because of his extensive area of discretion and close 
association with broad policy issues, will frequently be the 
department's most important official next to the departmental head 
himself. In some departments of administration this de facto 
situation is recognized by combining the posts of deputy director 
10 
and head of the budget division. 
Several arguments may be put forward in support of the inclusion 
of the budgeting function within a wider department of administration. 
Although the various staff or service functions of government may in 
a formal sense be separate activities, they nevertheless exhibit a 
high degree of interdependence. One clear example of this is in 
accounting and budgeting. If a state's accounting system, its 
budgetary procedures and the form of its budget are not complementary, 
then it will be necessary to devise a separate reporting system for 
budget purposes, including control of expenditure throughout the year, 
10. e.g, Michigan, 
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to make adjustments to accounting reports to fit them to budget 
bureau needs, or to treat those accounting reports merely as a 
starting point for complicated calculations designed to produce the 
sort of information needed by the budget officials. In any event, 
additional, and unnecessary, work is involved. This is, for 
instance, the situation in Maryland, There the departmental 
accounting systems have not been fully adapted to fit the programme 
approach used in budgeting, so that departments are required to 
prepare two separate monthly reports of expenditure, one in line-item 
form for the treasurer's department, and one on a programme basis 
for the department of budget and procurement. In New South Wales, 
on the other hand, budget officers are able, daily if necessary, 
simply to use the "control accounts" which the treasury keeps for each 
department, and to have copies of those accounts presented to them for 
each month's examination of expenditure and revenue trends. Similarly, 
where budgeting and purchasing functions are combined in one department, 
the purchasing section can readily assume the task of advising the 
budget section if unusual purchases are made or requested, thus 
relieving the latter of the work of detailed examination of departmental 
requisitions. In the Australian states purchasing is commonly handled 
through a separate government stores department or board, and little 
liaison exists between these bodies and budget officials. 
Quite apart from this sort of support, based upon specific 
"practical" considerations, it may be argued generally that creation 
of a department of administration with wide powers and functions serves 
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to strengthen the governor in his administrative capacity. The 
demands for "positive government" and the social climate generally 
have led to considerable emphasis upon governmental planning, upon 
co-ordination of the varied activities of government, and upon central 
direction by a strong executive. Many view the department of 
administration as one of the most appropriate devices for co-ordinating 
all staff services and making available to the governor the information 
needed both for general policymaking and specific programme decisions. 
The functional consolidation achieved through a department of 
administration may serve, too, to free the governor of a good deal 
of routine administrative work and allow him to devote more time to 
important policy issues. 
One of the major aims of American governmental reformers has been 
to give the governor a positive management role, particularly in the 
area of fiscal administration. As a result of statutory authorization 
and constitutional change governors have gradually acquired significant 
powers over the formulation and execution phases of budgeting, 
accounting, purchasing and, to a lesser extent, personnel. Other 
service activities affecting all departments, such as records management, 
space utilization and transport, are also tending to become the 
responsibility of the governor. The development of the department of 
administration approach has been an important factor in the process of 
increasing the governor's field of responsibility. 
Much of the American support for the idea of a department of 
administration stems from personnel considerations. As indicated, it 
is customary for the various divisions of a department of administration 
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to be headed by career officials. Although the director of 
administration is appointed by the governor and relinquishes his 
post upon a change of governor, continuity is found at the divisional 
head level, so that administrative techniques can be developed and 
professionalism built up despite fluctuations in political fortune. 
In examining the United States' scene as a whole, v;e find that 
in no state is there a single department of administration which 
incorporates all the functions mentioned above. Various combinations 
of functions are found, the pattern depending upon the historical 
background of administration in the particular state and the balance 
11 
of forces leading to its establishment. In some states there are 
departments of administration encompassing an almost comprehensive 
range of staff functions. The Minnesota department of administration, 
for instance, which in 1939 replaced a three-member commission of 
administration and finance, handles budgeting, purchasing, property 
administration, provision of architectural and engineering services, 
and administrative management, including the conducting of organizational 
surveys. It shares personnel responsibility with the civil service 
12 department, also created in 1939* 
Most commonly omitted from existing departments of administration 
is the architectural and engineering function. Sometimes this is carried 
11. Cf. Ferrel Heady and Robert H. Pealy, The lyiichigan Department of 
Administration, Ann Arbor, Bureau of Government, Institute of 
Public Administration, University of Michigan, 1956, p.2* 
12. Omission from the department of administration's functions of 
responsibility for maintaining a centralized state accounting system 
is a serious weakness. This role was given to the state's elected 
auditor general, thus creating a potential source of administrative 
friction should this official and the governor be political 
opponents. 
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out by the operating departments themselves, but more often it falls 
within the office of the state architect or, as in Australia, is 
combined with other functions in a department of public works or a 
13 
department of p l ann ing . Within the United S t a t e s only Kentucky, 
14 
Michigan, Minnesota and Tennessee seem so far to have brought the 
architectural and engineering function within a central department of 
15 
administration. 
Personnel administration is another activity that is often 
carried on separately from the department of administration, usually 
falling within the province of a civil service commission or department 
of personnel. In such cases, however, the budget division of the 
department of administration would customarily have some responsibility 
for personnel matters having budgetary implications - e.g, in the final 
approval of the filling of vacancies and the reclassification of 
positions. 
In Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Ohio and Tennessee 
the departments of administration all include accounting divisions 
within their organization. Two states, Illinois and New Hampshire, 
have converted older existing agencies so that they resemble departments 
13* In Queensland the co-ordinator general's department is not only a 
constructing authority, but also plays a major part in determining 
priorities for state works and allocating funds. 
1^, Recent changes in Michigan are discussed later in this chapter. 
15. Cf, Arlene T, Shadoan, Organization, Role, and Staffing of State 
Budget Offices, Lexington, University of Kentucky, 1961, p.11, 
16. ibid., p.12, 
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of administration in many respects, though they do not go by 
17 that name. In both these cases accounting is a function of 
the organizations. In other states, however, the accounting function 
remains apart - almost invariably under the charge of an elected 
official, the auditor,comptroller, or secretary of state. 
Like budgeting, the purchasing function is almost always included 
when a department of administration is created. The other activities 
mentioned earlier as being appropriate to a department of administration 
property management, office services, records management, and 
transport - if conducted on a centralized basis, tend to be located 
in departments of finance or of public works. Only in Michigan and 
Oregon are all of the above services handled by the department of 
administration. 
As mentioned earlier, in executive budget systems the second 
common administrative arrangement is the locating of the budget agency 
18 
within the office of the chief executive. Again, a strong case can 
be made out for such an arrangement. Since the budget is now seen 
not merely as a record of the government's financial dealings but as 
a plan of its operations, the budget agency represents the chief 
executive's main instrumentality for central planning. It is through 
17, Cf, Ferrel Heady and Robert H, Pealy, op.cit., p.?, 
18, It might be expected that this arrangement would be favoured by 
the smaller states. There is, however, no direct relationship 
between the size of states and the location of budget offices. 
New York and Pennsylvania, for instance, both locate the budget 
agency with the executive office, although, as mentioned on pp.267-8 
this formal statement of the situation must be qualified in the 
latter case. 
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the budget organization that the chief executive works towards 
planned objectives, keeps himself informed about administrative 
developments, and achieves positive direction of the governmental 
apparatus. In these circumstances it may be held that the budget 
function should be placed as closely as possible to the chief 
executive, with the budget agency readily available to assist him 
in the formulation and execution of fiscal policy. That is to 
say, the argument runs, budget preparation and execution are so 
bound up with the governor's platform that he should not only have 
his own appointee as budget director, but that officer should be 
directly associated with the governor without having to operate through 
an intervening level such as that represented by a director of 
administration. 
From the point of view of the staff of the budget bureau it 
may also be claimed that location within the executive office has 
decided advantages. Undoubtedly their activities thereby gain 
gubernatorial prestige and their task of keeping in touch with the 
various agencies of government is facilitated. Against this, however, 
it must be recognized that too close an identification with the 
governor may actually handicap budget officers if rival centres of 
power, in the form of other elected governmental officials, exist in 
the system. 
Easier co-ordination of staff agencies has been put forward as 
19* Cf. Arlene T. Shadoan, op.cit., pp.12-13* On similar grounds 
it may be argued that the appointment of the budget director 
should be left in the hands of the chief executive* 
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one of the main benefits arising from the creation of departments of 
administration covering a wide range of staff and service functions. 
Such departments are often seen as the practical application of one 
of the least questioned of Buck's "principles", the "coordination 
of the staff servicas of administration". As Buck himself put it: 
"These staff services have to do mainly with budgeting, 
accounting and reporting, purchasing, and personnel.  
There are several advantages to having them properly 
.Gsordinated and, if possible, brought together in a 
single Staff department." 20 
However, it is clear that the creation of a department of administration 
is not a necessary condition for the achieving of coordination of staff 
activities. Centralization of staff functions, improvement of 
procedures, and coordination can be effected without adopting the 
department of administration approach. This has been demonstrated 
in New York, for example, where the budget and accounting functions 
fall within the executive office, and in the state of V/ashington, 
where a similar situation exists. In this latter instance a high 
degree of coordination of governmental activities has been achieved 
despite the fact that the functions of the department of general 
administration do not include budgeting and accounting. 
An interesting variation on the pattern of placing the budget 
agency within the executive office is to be found in Pennsylvania* 
20, Cf. A. E. Buck, The Reorganization of State Governments in the 
United States, New York, Columbia University Press, 1938, pp.21-23, 
21« Washington state's department of general administration handles, inter 
alia, the functions of architecture and engineering, purchasing, 
records, management, property management, and regulation of banking 
institutions. 
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Although in that s ta te the budget function i s located in the office 
of the chief executive i t forms par t of an organizat ional arrangement 
which suggests the department of administrat ion approach - there 
being within the governor's office a secretary of administration 
who i s responsible for oversight of the functions of budgeting, 
accounting, personnel, and general management. Oddly enough, th i s 
arrangement r e s t s only on an executive order , although the budget 
22 secretary i s recognized by the s t a t e ' s administrat ive code. That i s , 
the budget function i s placed by law in the executive of f ice , while 
the "department of adjministration", within which budgeting f a l l s , has 
23 
no such s ta tu tory backing. 
The s i tua t ion in Colorado i s somev/hat s imi la r , there being 
within the executive office both a cont ro l le r of finance, s t a t u t o r i l y 
responsible for budgeting and accounting, and a budget d i rec tor who 
reports d i rec t ly to the governor. The division of authori ty between 
these two o f f i c i a l s i s not c lea r ly defined. Within the governor's 
office there i s also a department of planning responsible for the 
archi tectural and engineering funct ions. 
Executive budget systems sometimes l ink budgeting with some 
other cen t ra l ly located function, but without including i t in a 
department of administrat ion or placing i t d i rec t ly in the governor's 
24 office. This i s the case in Connecticut, for ins tance , where the 
22. The budget secre tary i s appointed by and a t the pleasure of the 
governor, 
23* Cf. Arlene T. Shadoan, o p . c i t . , p . l 4 , 
24, See footnote 6, p,258o 
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budget function is performed by a department of finance and control. 
It is also the situation in Maryland, the organization of whose 
department of budget and procurement will be outlined in chapter 8, 
Budgeting by Boards or Commissions 
It was pointed out in chapter 3 that one of the factors working 
against the achievement of budgetary reform in the United States had 
been the reluctance of many states to place substantial budgeting 
powers in the hands of the chief executive. Although there has been 
a general recognition of the need for reform and a willingness to go 
some way along the road, there has also been a fear of the consequences 
of a strong executive. The process of reform, therefore, has not 
always led to acceptance of the executive budget system. 
It is true that in most states the hand of the governor has 
been considerably strengthened as a result of a gradual process of 
administrative integration. However, there still remain numerous 
constitutional provisions in vai'ious states which require the 
governor to share executive authority va.th boards or commissions. 
Executive councils in Massachusetts, Maine and New Hampshire, for 
instance, have authority in numerous fields, including the general 
area of finance. Such boards represent a definite impediment to 
singleness of purpose in executive action. 
In the strict sense the legislative budget system no longer 
exists in America, That is to say, in no state is the budget 
formulated solely by the legislature, v/ithout participation by the 
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executive. In some states, however, the preparation process is 
largely in the hands of budget boards which either inc3-ude or are 
dominated by legislators. The Indiana state budget committee, 
for example, consists of the budget director and four legislators 
appointed by the governor. In the next chapter we shall be 
examining cases where legislators participate in the budget 
formulation process, so we may here confine our attention to 
budget boards that are predominantly of an executive nature. 
There are four states - Delaware, Florida, Mississippi and 
West Virginia - in which the budget agency serves an administrative 
board consisting of the governor and a number of elective officials. 
Of these, Florida will serve as an example of how the system operates. 
The budget commission in that state is made up of Florida's seven 
popularly elected officials: governor, secretary of state, attorney-
general, comptroller, treasurer, commissioner of agriculture, and 
superintendent of public instruction. Although the budget director is 
formally appointed by the governor, the appointment must be approved by 
the budget commission and he serves at the pleasure of that body. The 
governor's only direct link with the budget director is that arising 
from his membership of the budget commission. This general arrangement 
has been carried over into other administrative fields in Florida -
the same elected officials making up boards which govern the operations 
of the personnel agency, state institutions, and the education system. 
25o Texas has a dual budget preparation system which will be 
examined in chapter 7» 
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In effect, there is a collegial executive in existence. Although 
not all of the elected officials mentioned above serve on all 
agencies, some or all of them are members of each of the important 
boards, including the budget commission; and the governor's role 
counts for no more than that of any other official. Indeed, his 
voice may be a comparatively weak one since the other elected 
officials have all served for long periods, their re-election for 
term after term having become almost a convention. 
This is, in a sense, an extreme example, but it does illustrate 
an aspect of American practice that in most states constitutes an 
impediment to concerted executive action - the specifying in the state 
constitution of top officials who are placed in office either by 
popular vote or by legislative election, and the appointment of such 
officials to administrative boards. The practice has the effect of 
blurring both the downwards chain of command and the upwards line 
of responsibility and accountability. The governor's authority and 
status may be considerably reduced by the existence of administrative 
?6 boards in such a significant field as budgeting. Of course, this is 
one of the primary aims of the legislature in creating administrative 
boards in combination with the executive budget system, A second aim 
in some states is the achieving of greater legislative participation 
in the budgetary process. In such cases the boards that are created 
26, The governor's maximum length of service is commonly limited by 
the constitution, though there is seldom any such restriction on 
the number of terms of office of other elected officials. 
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will consist of both officials and legislators. Examples of 
these, like Ohio's controlling board and the finance council of 
Kansas, will be discussed in the next chapter. 
If one accepts the need for effective executive leadership in 
government it is difficult to find grounds for supporting the use of 
administrative boards in budgetary formulation or execution. Service 
on such boards is not only time-consuming, but also diverts elected 
officials from the primary functions of their offices. As Shadoan 
has also pointed out: 
"Much valuable time of administrative officers and employees 
is spent in the preparation of agenda and the explanation of 
issues. Many times members of the administrative board designate 
deputies to serve on the board, and often these deputies differ 
from meeting to meeting. Thus more time must be spent in 
reiterating issues to differing memberships. Along with the 
practice of using deputies, the turnover in political office 
hinders and sometimes prohibits establishing administrative 
policy in areas where such policy should be made." 27 
There is, in effect, a diffusion of executive responsibility for the 
carrying of governmental programmes into effect, along with a 
possible introduction of political controversy into an area of 
activity in whi<^ h this is undesirable. And even opponents of the 
strong executive system of budgeting cannot always draw comfort from 
the existence of administrative boards, since in practice they 
sometimes do little more than rubber stamp the directives or 
recommendations of the chief executive, while operating to delay the 
making and implementation of administrative decisions. It may be, then, 
that these boards are a "type of vestigial organ, existing but not 
27o Arlene T. Shadoan, op,cit., p.20, 
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functioning as anticipated". 
The Effects of Budget Agency Location 
On the face of it the location of the budget office within the 
state's administrative structure should be a prime factor in 
determining the effectiveness of the office in fulfilling its role 
as a major governmental staff agency. No doubt the question of 
location is significant. It is, however, only one of a number of 
factors affecting the manner in which the budget agency functions. 
Much depends upon the often complex relationships between the budget 
agency and the executive, amongst the various staff agencies of 
government, and between the budget office and the line departments. 
Budget officers themselves hold widely divergent views about their 
roles and these views do not seem to be related to organizational 
considerations. However, the location of the budget office does 
appear to be of considerable significance in its effect on the 
relationships among existing staff agencies and between the budget 
office and the operating departments. 
As far as the first of these matters is concerned it is important 
to remember that the extent of the co-operation among staff agencies 
is itself a major factor in determining the effectiveness of the 
individual agencies. The work of the budget agency, in particular, is 
greatly affected by how well or ill performed are other functions like 
accounting, personnel and purchasing. If these are carried out 
28, ibid. 
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ineffectively, or if co-operation between staff agencies is absent, 
the budget office will be forced to devote much time and energy to 
the collecting and interpreting of information needed in budget 
assessment which could be more readily obtained by the other staff 
agencies in the course of their regular activities. The bringing 
together of a range of staff functions into one organizational unit 
such as a department of administration is aimed at improving the 
co-ordination of those functions. But suck, co-ordination is made more 
difficult of achievement if budgeting is not included in the central 
organization. In arguing against the creation of budget agencies 
within the executive office Heady and Pealy suggest: 
"Despite its policy overtones, budgeting is central to state 
administrative management. Any protection from involvement in 
controversy would be more than offset by the ineffectiveness 
of a central management agency stripped of participation in 
budget preparation and execution. The budget function is the 
core of a Department of Administration, not a peripheral 
activity that can be excluded without serious consequences,.,. 
cooperation is facilitated in a combined management agency 
between budgeting and intimately related activities such as 
accounting, purchasing, and public building construction and 
maintenance." 29 
There is force in this line of argument. We have already noted 
the need for complementary budgeting and accounting systems, and it 
should also be recognized that both the personnel and purchasing functions 
impinge upon that of budgeting. The creation of a department of 
administration or similar organization encompassing these and other 
staff functions can lead to effective co-ordination - but it is not the 
only such method, nor is it always effective. Merely to bring staff 
29, Ferrel Heady and Robert H, Pealy, op.cit., p.132. 
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functions together i s i n su f f i c i en t to ensure co-ordinat ion. The 
various divisions of a department of administrat ion may v/ell 
operate as though they were themselves separate organizations i f 
leadership does not ac t ively promote co-operation or i f the d i rec tors 
of divisions do not hold s imi lar yiews about the role of s taf f agencies 
in the process of management. 
Conversely, too, a high degree of co-ordination of s taff functions 
may exist without the i r being brought together in one organizat ion. 
Officials of separate cen t ra l s ta f f agencies may co-operate effect ively 
with each other e i the r because of personal considerations or because 
there i s a recognition that the organizations have common or 
complementary goa ls . The type of co-operation found in New/ South 
Wales between o f f i c i a l s of the t r easu ry ' s budget branch, the premier 's 
department and the public service board i s not uncommon. Information 
may be shared, j o in t inves t iga t ions or projects undertaken, and jo in t 
decisions made without formal organizat ional l inks being created, 
Michigan apparently accepts that th i s can be the case as i t has 
provided in i t s executive organization act of 1965 (section 12) for 
the transfer of budgeting from the department of administration to 
the executive office of the governor. I t has not yet been decided 
whether other management and control functions are also to be 
transferred, but i t does seem l i ke ly that a t l e a s t par ts of the 
existing divis ions of accounting, bui ld ing, and management services 
will be linked with budgeting in the executive of f ice , in order to 
maintain close co-ordination and to preserve a strong budgetary 
organization. This would leave the department of administrat ion with 
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the divisions of office services, property management, and motor 
transport, together with some functions of the accounting, building, 
and management services divisions. The precise role of each unit 
involved in the reorganization and the methods of maintaining 
continuous liaison between them have not yet been laid down, however. 
Although in the achieving of co-ordination there may not be 
much to choose between various possible locations of the budget office 
it does seem on balance, particularly in those American states in 
which there are agencies headed by elected officials, that staff 
activities performed by independent organizations will be less 
effectively co-ordinated than would be the case if they were to be 
brought together with budgeting in a department of administration 
or similar body. 
It has been suggested that in a cabinet system of government 
attachment of the budget office to the treasury can affect its 
relationships with the operating departments. Location is similarly 
a significant influence in budget office/departmental working 
relations in the United States, insofar as a budget agency may 
derive authority and prestige from direct association v/ith the 
chief executive, as well as material gains in the form of such 
things as better communication and closer contact with policy planning 
and implementation. Basically, however, it will be the governor's 
attitude to budgeting and the extent and manner of his participation 
in the budget process that will largely determine the nature of the 
30, As noted earlier, however, disadvantages may also arise from 
direct association with the executive office. 
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relationships between the budget agency and the line departments.^"^ 
We may conclude, then, that the position occupied by the budget 
office in a state's overall administrative structure will play a part 
in determining the effectiveness with which it carries out its role 
in the budgetary process, but that it will hardly be the decisive 
factor in this connection. Organizational location, that is to 
say, can ease or make more difficult the work of the budget agency, 
but it is unlikely to determine the success or failure of the system 
of budget management adopted by a state. 
11 
THE ROLE OF BUDGET AGENCIES AND ANALYSTS^^ 
Commonly accepted views about budgeting may be divided into 
33 two broad categories: those that are defensive or negative in 
character, in that they emphasise the aim of strictly controlling 
departmental expenditures; and those that stress the positive role that 
budgeting may play in the management of both departments and the 
overall economy. 
Recent budgetary writing, particularly that designed to make a 
31, See Arlene T. Shadoan, op.cit., pp.69-72, for examples of how in 
four states the attitudes of governors are reflected in budget 
office/departmental relations, 
32, The budget formulation procedures of various states were outlined 
in chapter 5 and will not be further discussed here. Our concern 
is with the roles played by agencies and individual analysts 
insofar as these may be indicative of concepts held concerning the 
nature of the budgetary process. 
33* These terms are not used with any derogatory connotation. 
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case for the adoption of perform^ance budgeting, tends to 
over-simplify the s i tua t ion by associa t ing the l ine- i tem budget 
with the f i r s t type of budgetary concept and regarding performance 
budgeting alone as f u l f i l l i n g the need for a posi t ive approach to 
management. I t i s , of course, true that a budget agency which sees 
i t s task as primarily that of ensuring economy in governmental 
spending and s t r i c t compliance with l e g i s l a t i v e appropriation i s 
likely to favour budgeting in l ine- i tem form. Certainly, such a 
budget f i t s in with the notion of strong cen t ra l control designed to 
keep departments within narrow appropriat ion l i m i t s , and a budget 
agency may well suppose tha t in enforcing f inancial r e s t r i c t i o n s i t 
is meeting not only the i n t en t of the l eg i s l a tu re but also i t s own 
operating purpose. Conversely, a budget agency whose view of i t s 
role i s management-oriented i s l i ke ly to think in terms of performance 
budgeting since i t sees i t s major function as that of helping the 
operating departments to define and achieve the i r goals . 
The l ine- i tem form of budget was adopted in the United S ta te s , 
however, to overcome p a r t i c u l a r adminis trat ive shortcomings and as 
part of a wide-ranging programme of reform. Once introduced, governmental 
procedures, l ike organizations themselves, tend to continue under the i r 
own momentum and are not read i ly suscept ible to change. I t may be, 
therefore, tha t the existence of l ine- i tem budgeting in a s t a t e i s 
simply a hangover from the past and does not r e f l ec t present a t t i t u d e s 
about the role of the budget agency. Reinforcing th i s view i s the 
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34 factor, discussed earlier, that to alter the budgetary form may 
necessitate changes in the entire accounting system so sweeping that 
many states cannot undertake them. And quite apart from these 
considerations, budget agencies and operating departments may when 
formulating the budget do so in terms of programmes of activity, 
while preserving the line-it.em budget format; whereas an agency 
working through a programme budget may nevertheless adopt attitudes 
and procedures that emphasise control, either by way of strict scrutiny 
of departmental expenditures or by directly making programme decisions 
more properly the province of the department itself. No matter what 
the form of budgeting a measure of control must inevitably be exercised 
by the central budget agency. Its problem is to avoid the eroding 
of departmental initiative in the carrying out of the functions of 
government. 
Some of the factors discussed in part I of this chapter are 
relevant to the problem of striking a balance between control by the 
budget agency and its assisting the operating departments. Inclusion 
of the budget bureau within the treasury, as in Australia for instance, 
may lead to greater emphasis on its role as a financial controller 
than would be the case if the bureau were located elsewhere in the 
administrative structure. The Canadian solution, too, puts 
considerable power in the hands of a board which, by its very nature, 
is likely to be conservative in approach and to place a good deal of 
stress on the need for economy in departmental spending. Centralization 
3^ * See chapter 2, pp,50-55< 
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of service functions in organizations such as departments, of 
administration may also adversely affect the operating departments. 
While there are potential advantages in such centralization, in 
terms of procedural standardization, the bringing together of a 
group with expertise in particular fields, and the provision of 
effective management tools for the chief executive, there are also 
the dangers that departments will be deprived of information and 
personnel with skills needed at the operating level; that there will 
be duplication of effort because departments feel they need a 
different type of information than has to be gathered for the 
central agency; and that departments will become resentful of the 
central body and unsure of their own responsibilities, so that they 
will unnecessarily seek prior approval for decisions within their 
competence, Shadoan reports various instances where such problems 
have been encountered: 
"In one state, a budget examiner who had held a particular 
agency assignment for a number of years established such a 
relationship with the agency that policies were not determined 
?/ithout this examiner's approval. Even the division heads in 
this department looked to the examiner rather than to their own 
central office for advice and approval of their actions. ?iJhen 
this examiner left state service, the budget director and the 
examiner's successor had real difficulty encouraging this 
departmental staff to work together in formulating a unified 
departmental policy and in making decisions. 
In another state, the budget office staff members found 
themselves assuming a number of detailed responsibilities which 
they accomplished only by neglecting their primary functions and 
by putting in many overtime hours. V/hen the budget office decided 
35o Cfo Arlene T, Shadoan, op.cit, , pp.26=-27* 
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that these duties could be better accomplished by the 
individual agencies, the agencies refused to resume the 
responsibilities," 3^ 
The management approach to budgeting recognizes that problems of 
this kind may arise and stresses the need for leaving in the hands of 
the operating departments a high degree of responsibility for 
formulating and executing the budget. It is necessary for the 
budget agency to ensure that proposed departmental programmes of 
activity are compatible with the general policy objectives of the 
government or chief executive, but within that framework the judgment 
of the central agency is not substituted for that of the department. 
It is this sort of reasoning - or perhaps intuitive attitude - that 
induces some budget agencies not to specify the amounts that may be 
spent on particular services when departments are advised of their 
allocation for the fiscal period. The <;j;ueensland approach outlined 
on pages 177-178 is a good example,. That state's assistant under 
secretary (budget and budgetary control) has also stated: 
"This degree of autonomy that is allowed Departments varies 
between States, In some States, the list of specific directions 
that issue from the Treasury to Departments represents the entire 
allocation. This then becomes complete Treasury control of the 
Department's activities and I feel has a certain disadvantage,., 
...except for certain special activities which have received 
special allocations, the Department is completely autonomous 
in the distribution of its allocation. Rarely is a 
Department's allocation sufficient for what it desires to do. 
To get the best result from its allocation, the Department 
again places its activities under very close scrutiny and 
automatically eliminates its own dead wood, to free funds for 
its more important functions. Furthermore, from the 
Department's point of view, it is fair to allow this freedom 
as they are the ones that are answerable for the shortcomings of 
36, ibid., pp,27-28, 
the Department 
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38 As we have already noted, the New South V/ales budget branch 
adopts a very different approach to th i s and exercises considerable 
control over the i n t e rna l break-up of each department's t o t a l 
annual expenditure a l loca t ion . 
One of the basic functions of a budget agency i s , of course, 
that of examining and report ing upon the draft estimates prepared by 
39 
departments. In this activity the budget analyst must work closely 
with departmental officers at various levels. The role of the 
examiner, however, varies widely in practice from state to state and 
sometimes from department to department within a state. Some budget 
officers actively participate in the actual preparation of the 
departmental estimates, others take no part in this at all. Sometimes 
the question of participation by the analysts in departmental budget 
formulation is governed by budget office policy, as in New South 
Wales, for instance, wfhere standing instructions for members of the 
budget branch specify that: 
"It is important, also, for inspectors to understand that it 
is no part of their duty to take an active part in departmental 
37. L. A. Hielscher, "A Broad Outline of the Role of the State 
Treasury," (unpublished address to public administration students. 
University of Queensland, October, 1965), pp.11-12. 
38. See chapter 5, pp.172 and 177, 
39. Budget agencies may carry out a wide range of activities, including 
such things as management analysis, research, accounting, and data 
processing. They will also be involved throughout the year in the 
process of budget execution. This study is concerned, however, 
with the formulation phase of budgeting, and deals with these 
other activities only incidentally unless, like management 
analysis, they have some direct bearing on aspects of budget 
formulation. 
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administration. Their role in that regard is the passive 
one of close observation; their strength lies in their 
recommendations on the provision of funds which itself bears 
so strongly on administration." 40 
Mostly, however, the extent of his participation is left to the 
discretion of the individual analyst, whose decision will be based 
on a number of factors ^uch as type of budget, departmental attitudes, 
and the nature of the department's financial administration. 
Obviously the budget officer must provide departmental officials 
with information needed by them in framing their draft estimates, in 
the sense that part of his role will be to explain, if necessary, 
particular points in the initial instructions to departments issued by 
the budget agency and sometimes to supplement those instructions if 
conditions change during the formulation period. However, as indicated 
above, he may go further than this in assisting the department. Some 
factors governing this have been mentioned; there are others, as when 
a unit of government is too small to have staff adequately trained in 
budget preparation. Here the analyst may feel it incumbent on him to 
help the unit more directly than he would otherwise do or might wish to 
do. Or again, when a budget system is first adopted and a central 
agency created, its officers may have to assist departments quite 
considerably, even at the risk of weakening the sense of departmental 
responsibility that should be fostered. 
Apart from these instances that are largely dependent upon "local" 
^« W, G. Mathieson, "The Budget Branch." Unpublished instructions to 
budget staff, April, 1954, p.5* 
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circumstances, the extent of analyst participation at the 
departmental level may reflect differing schools of thought 
about the role of the budget agency and its officers. At first 
sight it might be imagined that these divergent views would be 
based upon whether a budget agency were "management-oriented" 
or "control oriented". This does not appear to be the case, 
however. In discussions with budi^et officers most justified their 
own participation in terms of the greater insight into departmental 
activities thereby gained and the resultant improvement in the 
efficiency of the review process, or their non-participation by 
reference to the danger of a department's relying upon the analyst's 
views instead of carrying out coherent planning on its own behalf. 
But despite these "justifications" - perhaps "rationalizations" -
of the differing practices, further discussion suggested in most 
cases that participation or otherwise was largely dictated by 
circumstances applying in particular states or departments. Some 
departments include the analyst in their preliminary budget 
conferences as an observer. They do not expect or desire him to 
question departmental personnel or express his own views, but simply 
to become familiar with the department's programmes of activity and 
the reasoning behind the estimates eventually drawn up. Other 
departments encourage the analyst to participate fully by seeking 
information, commenting on proposals, and perhaps outlining the 
- 285 -
4i 
likely attitude of the budget agency. Still other departments 
prefer not to have the analyst present during the preparation 
phase, feeling that planning and fixing priorities are matters of 
internal concern only. Largely these views are conditioned by 
subjective factors. Departmental officers will consider one analyst 
to be "tough", another "sympathetic". Age and experience of analysts 
will colour a department's views about their taking part in the 
departmental formulation process. Attitudes of the budget director 
towards particular analysts may also become known to departments and 
be carried over into their relationships vath those analysts. It is 
intangibles of this sort that largely dictate the extent of an 
analyst's direct involvement in the affairs of the departments whose 
estimates he must subsequently review, and it is often only by hard 
experience that the budget officer learns when and how he can 
42 fruitfully participate at the departmental level. 
The budget agency is the organization which forms the bridge 
in the financial field between the departments and the political 
executive. It must ensure that the budget not only allocates 
4lo This last may be expressly forbidden the budget analyst as in New 
South Wales where the standing instructions already referred to 
state: "...Budget inspectors are expected to be the eyes and ears 
of the Treasury, It does not follow that they, as individuals, 
are the mouth of the Treasury. Broad Treasury policy is 
determined at the highest level and while inspectors are usually 
made aware of the general pattern, it is not desirable that 
such information be disclosed to departments," (p,5) 
^2. Analysts' participation in the departmental budget formulation 
process will also be affected by whether the budget agency is 
specifically charged with management analysis responsibilities -
a factor that will be discussed in chapter 8, 
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resources appropriately but that it also reflects executive policy. 
It is in the budget agency, too, that much of the spadework for 
executive decision-making must be done, for its responsibilities 
include the recognition of problems requiring executive action and 
the analysis that will enable that action to be soundly based. 
However, although the results achieved in these matters will be 
partly dependent on the work of the budget officials as a group, 
at bottom the effectiveness of the budget agency will rest on the 
performances of the individual analysts who conduct the initial 
review of departmental programmes. 
The budget officer will usually be familiar with the estimates 
he is to review before he receives them from the department, his 
information having been accumulated throughout the preceding fiscal 
period when he has been required to investigate the numerous financial 
issues that arise during the execution phase of budgeting, many of 
which will have implications for the future. Often, therefore, 
analysts dispense with broad preliminary surveys of departmental 
programmes and goals and proceed directly to detailed review of the 
items or programmes making up the estimates. In doing this a wide 
range of data may be taken into account or used to provide 
guidelines: standards developed by various professional or 
administrative bodies; estimates of work loads; cost information; 
staff turnover figures; recruitment patterns; sick leave records; 
leave entitlements falling due; policies regarding payment of various 
types of allowances; depreciation or replacement schedules; the 
experience of other governmental agencies in providing similar 
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services; and so on. The list of items which might be considered by 
the analyst is a long one, and the decision about vi/hich tests he 
will use will be largely a matter for his own discretion. 
Similarly, unless the budget agency issues specific directions, 
it is likely that the amount of discretion normally allowed analysts 
will result in differences amongst them as to the stress placed on 
particular aspects of departmental activities. Some budget officers 
will pay close attention to continuing programmes, others will confine 
themselves to proposed new projects; some will strictly scrutinise 
maintenance expenditures, others may concentrate on departmental 
expenditure for official travel. Personal predilection may affect 
this, but an analyst's choice may also arise from his Icnowledge of 
weaknesses in departmental procedures of various kinds, his 
assessment of departmental personnel, or factors associated with 
the size of organizational units and the framework within which they 
operate. Whether or not he actively takes part in formulation of the 
departmental budget an analyst cannot adeo^uately carry out the next 
stage, that of review, unless he has considerable personal contact 
with departmental officers at varying levels. If he confines himself 
to examination of documentary material or to discussion with the 
departmental head, as analysts in small agencies are often forced to 
do, essential information about various programmes and the reasoning 
behind their inclusion in the departmental estimates will be missed, 
and subsequent budget decisions are likely to be feased, at least in 
part, on components of an arbitrary kind. 
In attempting to set down the procedures followed in reviewing 
288 -
departmental estimates it is easy to give the impression that 
budget examination is an orderly process following set patterns. 
This is far from being the case. The methods used in budget review 
differ from agency to agency and from one analyst to another 
within an agency. One can only outline the commonly adopted 
approaches, while emphasising that innumerable variations of these 
are to be found in practice. 
CHAPTER 7 
THE ROLE OF THE LEGISLATURE IN BUDGET FORMULATION 
"Sir G. Carteret tells me to-night that he perceives 
the Parliament is likely to make a great bustle before 
they will give the King any money; will call all things 
into question; and, above all, the expences of the Navy; 
and do enquire into the King's expences everywhere." 
Pepys. (l4th April, 1663) 
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The parliamentary legislature has, or might be expected to 
have, a major role in what we have designated the second and fourth 
1 
phases of the budget system. In the first instance it is the 
body charged with the duty of examining and authorizing the budget 
drawn up by the executive. Subsequently, with the assistance of 
legislative committees and officials, it is responsible for 
reviewing and passing judgment on the manner in which the authorized 
budget has been carried into effect. 
As we have seen, hovrever, the various phases of the budget 
process overlap, and even where there is a system of responsible 
government with well developed and strongly disciplined political 
parties, the legislative body and individual legislators may 
influence the budget during its formulation stage. In framing 
its budget, for instance, the executive must have regard to what 
it believes will be acceptable to or accepted by the parliament, 
as well as to the possible impact in electoral terms of the budget 
debate and consequent publicity. Nor can the expressed or known 
views of members of parliament simply be ignored, particularly if 
these reflect the opinions of groups within the parliamentary or 
extra-parliamentary parties or in the community generally. The 
executive may alienate some of its supporters by over-stressing or 
failing sufficiently to emphasise particular activities or forms of 
expenditure. The budget it presents must adequately take account of 
the views of substantial minorities if political crises are to be 
1. i.e. the phases of authorization and review, outlined in 
chapter 1, p.2, 
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avoided. And although criticisms made in parliament or in the 
party rooms may have no immediate budgetary effect, such criticisms 
must be considered when the next budget is being prepared, and may 
substantially affect the complexion of that budget. The need to 
embark upon works and services of significance to particular 
electorates - or to limit works and services in some electorates -
must also be assessed by the executive. But perhaps this is simply 
to stress something that should be obvious, but which is nevertheless 
often overlooked - that the budget is first and foremost a political 
instrument, reflecting the results of struggles to change or maintain 
the direction of governmental action in various areas. The degree to 
which factors such as those mentioned, and others, will operate to 
shape the budget will vary from time to time and from government to 
government, and generalization about them is possible only to a 
very limited extent. 
Although in a parliamentary system we think of budget formulation 
as being the responsibility of the executive, this is not so clea.rly 
the situation in the American context. There, legislative participation 
in budget preparation is both more direct and more substantial, as 
also is participation by the legislature in the third phase of the 
budget process, execution. As we have already noted, the legislative 
budget as such - that is to say, a budget prepared by the legislature, 
without the executive's participating - has virtually disappeared. 
However, legislative influence remains strong in all states, while 
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marked elements of legislative budgeting are still apparent in a 
number of state systems. The remainder of this chapter concentrates 
on the American scene and examines the role of the legislature in 
budget preparation in several states. It does not cover, except 
incidentally, the way the budget may be altered by the legislature 
after it has been presented for authorization. 
Perhaps the nearest approach to legislative budgeting that still 
exists in the United States is in Texas, That state has a system of 
dual budget formulation in which separate budgets are prepared and 
presented by the executive and a legislative budget board. The 
legislature, then, receives for consideration two budget documents, 
one embodying the governor's recommendations, the other those of a 
legislative committee consisting of the speaker of the house of 
representatives, the chairmen of the appropriation committee and of 
the revenue and taxation committee, and two senators appointed by the 
governor. When presenting his budget the governor may also submit a 
general appropriation bill, but he does not ordinarily do this, so 
only that prepared by the legislative budget board comes before the 
legislature to be passed. To prepare the governor's budget there is 
a budget agency located within the executive office. However, the 
director of that agency is appointed annually not by the governor 
but by the legislative budget board. There is also a popularly 
elected comptroller who not only prepares the revenue estimates but 
also performs other duties incidental to budget administration. This, 
then, is a system heavily weighted in favour of the legislature and 
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designed to maximize its influence in the budgetary process. 
No other state has weakened the governor's control over 
budget formulation to this extent, although where the central 
budget agency is responsible to a board rather than to the chief 
executive, as in Arkansas, Florida and Indiana, legislative influence 
in budgeting will be strong. In Florida's plural executive system,^ 
for instance, there will be a good deal of direct contact between 
the legislature and the budget agency, and in such a setting a 
budget agency probably becomes one which makes, not just supports, 
decisions of a political policy nature. At least the role of the 
budget director is likely to be of this kind, even if the work of 
the agency's budget analysts does not differ greatly from that of 
their counterparts in strong executive states. 
In most states the respective roles of the executive and the 
legislature in the budget process have been fairly clearly defined 
and in general it may be said that the legislature's main influence 
will be exerted during the authorization stage of budgeting. 
However, throughout the prior period of budget preparation the 
governor will be in touch v/ith various members of the legislature 
and some of these members may for personal or political reasons 
influence the shape of the budget to be presented by the chief 
executive. The governor and budget agency staff will also have to 
take into account the known views of various legislators concerning 
Particular programmes of governmental activity, whether or not they 
2. See chapter 6, pp. 270-271. 
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have been di rect ly approached by those l e g i s l a t o r s with suggestions 
for the expansion or contraction of such programmes. The role of 
the legis la ture as such, however, wi l l vary from system to system 
as a resul t of differences in machinery and procedures. 
The l ikelihood of the l e g i s l a t u r e ' s exerting influence in budget 
formulation, for ins tance , wi l l depend to a large extent on the amount 
of secrecy that surrounds the preparation process . Obviously, i f 
formulation i s purely an executive function and the budget proposals 
remain confidential u n t i l the document i s presented to the 
legis la ture , as would normally be the case in a parliamentary 
system of government, l e g i s l a t i v e influence could only be of an 
indirect kind or would be la rge ly confined to that of indiv idual 
leg is la tors . If there i s p r ior disclosure of budget proposals, 
however, as we have seen occurs in Idaho, the l e g i s l a t u r e ' s ro le 
is l ikely to be more d i rec t and s ign i f i can t . 
I t i s rare for de t a i l s of the execut ive 's budget proposals to 
be widely publicized in advance of submission to the l e g i s l a t u r e . 
Nevertheless, in many s t a t e s the budget formulation procedures are 
designed to ensure tha t the l e g i s l a t u r e or some of i t s senior members 
are familiar with a t l e a s t the main features of the budget before i t s 
formal p resen ta t ion . In New York, for ins tance , the chairmen and 
deputy chairmen of the two l e g i s l a t i v e finance comndttees are 
customarily present a t the governor 's budget hearings; the governor 
and the l e g i s l a t u r e ' s budget board in Texas hold jo in t public hearings; 
3* See chapter 5, pp.224-226, 
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in Florida the budget commission conducts public hearings which 
are frequently attended by members of the appropriation committees 
and other legislators. Colorado's joint legislative budget committee 
functions all the year round and holds hearings on departmental 
budget proposals even before the executive budget has been 
4 
formulated. Representatives of the executive attend and participate 
in these hearings. It is also common for there to be informal 
consultation between governors and leading members of the legislature, 
it being felt by some governors that prior legislative awareness of 
major aspects of the budget will facilitate its adoption. 
Apart from these types of legislative involvement there are 
examples of budget machinery which specifically provide for direct 
participation by the legislature in the formulation process. The 
usual way of making such provision is through legislative 
representation on budget boards or commissions. 
We have alr^ eady noted in chapter 6 the existence of boards of 
varying composition to which budget agencies or budget officials are 
responsible. Some of the boards which have been discussed consist 
entirely of elected officials; others are made up partly of elected 
officials and partly of appointed officers. A third type, with 
4, This committee was established in 1959 and consists of the chairman 
of the house appropriations committee, a majority and minority 
party member, from the house, the chairman of the senate finance 
committee, and a majority and minority member from the senate. 
(Joint Budget Committee Statutory Authorization, Colorado Laws of 
1959, chapter 63, article 2, sections l8-23)» Although the committee 
cannot itself decide appropriations, its recommendations to the 
finance committee of each house carry considerable weight. It is 
also concerned with revenue estimating. 
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which we are here concerned, brings together both officials and 
legislators. The finance council in Kansas is one such body, 
being composed of the governor, lieutenant governor, speaker of 
the house, president pro tempore of the senate, and the chairmen 
of the ways and means committees of the house and senate. On this 
council, it will be noted, representatives of the legislature 
predominate. A somewhat similar arrangement exists in North 
Carolina. Although the concept of an executive budget was accepted 
in that state as far back as 1925, when there was introduced an 
executive budget act which has not since been significantly amended, 
the budget system that is in operation does exhibit several 
departures from the notion of "pure" executive budgeting. One 
of these departures is seen in the existence of an advisory budget 
commission which reviews the appropriation requests of all 
governmental agencies before the budget goes to the general 
assembly for authorization. Four of the six membel.rs of this 
commission are the chairmen of the appropriations and finance 
committees of the house and the senate. The remaining two members 
are appointed by the governor but have usually had legislative 
experience. The budget drawn up for presentation to the legislature 
is the product of the joint deliberations of this group and the 
governor. Another example, this time weighted towards the 
5. North Carolina, General Statutes, pp.l43-l43, 
6, Although the executive budget act allows the governor to present 
separate budget recommendations if he cannot reach agreement with 
the advisory budget commission, this rarely happens in practice. 
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executive, i s Ohio's cont ro l l ing board, made up of the governor, 
or the director of finance, or an employee of the department of 
finance nominated by the governor; the at torney general or an 
officer of his department; the s t a t e auditor or an o f f i c i a l nominated 
by him; and the chairmen of the finance committees of the house a.nd 
senate. 
At one end of the scale there are boards composed entirely of 
legislators, Oregon's emergency board is such an instance, its 
members being the president of the senate, the speaker of the 
house, the chairmen of the ways and means committees of the house 
and senate, two other senators (one of whom must be a member of the 
ways and means committee), and three other members of the house 
(two of whom must be drawn from the v/ays and means committee). 
For the most part these boards, whatever their composition, 
have formal powers only insofar as budget execution is concerned, 
although there are a few instances of boards which also have 
limited legal responsibilities in connection with the preparatory 
phase of budgeting. Generally, they handle such matters as the 
approving of inter-item transfers of funds, the releasing of 
finance for capital projects, the authorization of special 
expenditures not foreseen when the budget was prepared, and 
sometimes the ratification of rules and regulations drafted by 
departments of administration and other central agencies to cover 
governmental travel, purchasing and personnel arrangements. 
However, although in formal terms the work of boards of this 
type relates to the execution stage of budgeting they inevitably 
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become influential in budget preparation. Members of the legislature 
commonly serve on such boards for long periods and not only develop 
considerable expertise in financial management but also tend to 
build up close relationships with budget officials and departmental 
7 
officers. In this way they, and through them other legislators, 
often come to play an active part in the budget formulation process. 
This may in turn weaken to some extent the governor's influence in 
budgetary and financial matters, so that legislative boards are 
frequently regarded with disfavour by those who see the strong 
executive system of government as providing the most appropriate 
context for budgetary reform. 
Apart from the above forms of legislative participation in 
budget pr-eparation, there is a feature of American budgetary 
procedures that cuts across the notion of central fiscal control, 
even in some states in which the executive budget is firmly 
established. This is the common practice of allowing departmental 
officials wide freedom to appear before legislative appropriation 
committees to seek restoration of amounts cut from the departmental 
estimates of expenditure by the governor or the state's budget 
formulating agency. At committee hearings the head of a department 
may present a case for an appropriation for, say, equipment that 
greatly exceeds the sum allowed for this item in the governor's budget, 
7* Figures Illustrating tenure are not available. It is clear, 
however, that although the committee system is generally less 
well developed at the state than at the federal level, seniority 
is a significant factor in determining membership of important 
legislative committees such as those concerned with finance. 
Members of these committees tend to have considerable experience 
In the legislature, to be regarded as party leaders, and to retain 
their committee appointments for considerable periods of time. 
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Legislators can seldom assess the merits of such requests with any 
degree of expert knowledge and are placed in a difficult position 
when faced with numerous similar approaches. The legislature is 
asked, in effect, to decide for or against the governor and budget 
agency on the one hand and on the other a senior official who is 
likely to be an experienced and highly regarded administrator 
possessing expert knowledge of the subject being considered. In 
these circumstances legislators will probably feel hopelessly 
confused about what is the appropriate allocation to be made. 
The extent to which departmental officials are free to present 
budget proposals that differ from those of the governor varies from 
state to state and depends upon numerous factors arising from the 
attitudes of participants in the budget process and the organizational 
relationships of particular departments with the chief executive. 
The reasons for the differences in approach need not be examined 
o 
here, however. We need only note that the variations are largely 
a reflection of the strength or weakness of executive government from 
one state to another. Where, for instance, there are numerous 
elected officials or administrative boards controlling governmental 
activities so that administrative responsibility is fragmented it 
will usually be accepted as a matter of course that departments will 
8, Arlene T, Shadoan, Preparation, Review, and Execution of the State 
Operating Budget, Lexington, Bureau of Business Research, College 
of Commerce, University of Kentucky, 1963, pp.40-42, contains a 
useful discussion of some of the personal, procedural and 
organizational factors which may influence the way departments 
and officials operate when participating in legislative budget 
committee hearings. 
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not support the governor's budget recommendations before the 
legislature but will press for the allocations originally sought. 
On the other hand, some states, particularly those with a strong 
executive, endeavour to give the impression that the budget 
presented to the legislature is the result of a unified effort 
encompassing all executive agencies. In such states officials 
will be forbidden or actively discouraged from seeking higher 
appropriations than were recommended in the executive budget, 
whether or not they believe they v/ere treated fairly during the 
process of budget formulation. An appearance of exedutive unity 
is obviously easier to produce when officials are a.ppointed through 
a merit career system or when senior posts are filled by the 
governor's nominees; but even in a strong executive system it is 
difficult to prevent surreptitious lobbying by senior departmental 
officers, or the giving of evidence before legisla.tive committees in 
a way that indicates the official's disagreement with the 
recommendations of the executive budget, without the departmental 
dissatisfaction being actually put into words. 
The manner in which departments handle the presentation of 
budgetary data to legislative committees relates specifically to 
the authorization phase of budgeting, rather than to formulation 
of the budget, which is the main concern of this study. The matter 
has been raised here, however, because in t¥/o respects it does bear 
indirectly on the process of budget preparation. In the first place 
the members of the legislature's financial committees do not normally 
confine their activities to the formal budget hearings, but are 
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usually in regular contact with departmental officials throughout 
the fiscal period. The information they obtain in this v/ay about 
problems encountered in executing one budget inevitably affects 
their consideration of the succeeding budget, and this will be 
reflected not only in the authorization procedures but also in 
terms of legislative attempts to exert influence during the period 
of budget preparation. Secondly, the confusion and frustration 
arising from conflicting budget recommendations presented by the 
chief executive and some departmental officials has led many state 
legislatures to the conclusion that their members must have 
independent information at their disposal when making decisions on 
budget appropriations. Accordingly, it has become common for 
legislatures to employ budget advisory staff, and in many instances 
these legislative budget analysts influence the formulation of the 
executive budget. 
The development of legislative budget committees and their 
staffs is one of the most significant features of the post-world vi/ar II 
budgetary scene, stemming in the main from the growing complexity of 
state government activities and recognition that the importance of 
the budget in both policy determination and programme management 
justifies its special study prior to its authorization. In part, 
too, the development is a reaction to the increasing adoption of 
executive budgeting which produces a budgetary organizational 
framework centring on the chief executive, so that the legislature 
feels the need for staff of its own able to take a detached view; 
while in states in which the executive has not developed its budgetary 
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function and staff the l e g i s l a t u r e has sometimes f e l t impelled 
to f i l l the gap i t s e l f . As pointed out in the discussion of 
procedures in Utah, for example, i t i s only the l e g i s l a t u r e ' s 
budget analysts who make any effect ive examination of that s t a t e ' s 
9 
budget. 
The extent to which American s t a t e l eg i s l a tu re s make use of 
fiscal analysts i s shown by the following f igures , which se t out the 
10 position in July, 1963: 
STATE 
Alaska 
California 
Colorado 
Connecticut 
Delaware 
Florida 
Georgia 
Illinois 
Iowa 
Kansas 
Kentucky 
Maine 
Maryland 
Massachusetts 
Michigan 
LEGISLi 
FISCAL 
2 
31 
2 
(a) 
1 
2 
1 
2 
11 
1 
1 
1 
4 
2 
2 
LTIVE 
STAFF 
(part-
time) 
STATE 
Minnesota 
Nebraska 
New Hampshire 
New Jersey 
New Mexico 
New York 
Ohio 
Oregon 
Pennsylvania 
Rhode Island 
South Dakota 
Texas 
Utah 
Washington 
V/isconsin 
LEGISLATIVE 
FISCAL STAFF 
2 
2 
4 
6 
4 
17 
3 
4 
5 
1 
1 
7 
3 
3 
1 
(a) Temporary s t a f f are appointed from time to time. 
9, See chapter 5, p.230. 
10, This information was obtained through the Council of State 
Governments, Chicago, States not listed either make no use 
of fiscal analysts or draw occasionally on the services of 
budget agency officials or legislative staff not specifically 
employed for budget examination, such as members of the 
legislative auditor's office. 
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It will be seen that by far the largest legislative 
fiscal organization is that of California, This was one of 
the earliest created, having been set up in 194l by a joint 
rule of both houses of the legislature and given statutory 
basis ten years later. It has served as a prototype for other 
states. 
The Californian legislative analyst and his staff are 
responsible to the joint legislative budget committee whose 
statutory duties are to "ascertain facts and make recommendations 
to the legislature and to the houses thereof concerning the State 
Budget, the revenues and expenditures of the State, the organizations 
and functions of the State, its departments, subdivisions, and 
agencies, and such other matters as may be provided for in the 
11 Joint Rules of the Senate and Assembly", Specific duties are 
assigned to the legislative analyst by joint rules of the 
legislature; among these duties being the making of recommendations 
concerning the budget, and the provision of assistance to the 
senate finance committee and the house ways and means committee 
in their consideration of the budget. 
For our purposes it is not necessary to make a detailed 
examination of the tasks performed by the legislative analyst's 
11. California, Government Code (1955), section 9140. The 
composition of this and similar committees in several 
other states is shown in Arlene T, Shadoan, Organiza.tion, 
Role, and Staffing of State Budget Offices, Lexington, 
University of Kentucky, 196I, pp.79 ff* 
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office or the basis on which functions are allocated to its various 
staff members. The significant aspect from our point of view is 
the effects that these activities have on the budget formulation 
process. Here we may note that the legislative analysts examine 
each department's estimates of expenditure before preparing a 
detailed report on the executive's proposed budget. Their analysis 
of the departmental estimates is based partly on the same written 
material as the budget office receives and partly on personal 
contact between the analysts and departmental officials. They do 
not, however, have the benefit of day to day contact with 
departments throughout the year as do officers of the budget 
agency. The working relationship between the legislative analysts 
and those of the budget agency is very close, however, and the 
legislative analysts attend and actively participate in all the 
budget hearings conducted during the formulation period by the 
department of finance. Their influence, then, is strong in both 
the preparation phase and in that of legislative review, which 
revolves around the lengthy report and specific recommenda.tions 
submitted by the legislative analyst's office. 
.In the case of the dual system of budgeting that operates in 
Texas the legislative budget board and its staff play a direct and 
dominant role in budget formulation. Not only does the legislative 
budget board conduct budget hearings jointly with the governor, 
but its staff independently examines departmental estimates, 
confers with officials of each department and prepares budget 
recommendations that are presented independently of the governor's. 
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Another example of direct legislative participation in 
budget preparation is provided by Colorado where budget hearings 
are not held by the governor or budget director but by the 
12 
leg is la ture ' s jo in t budget committee, such hearings taking 
place before the governor's budget recommendations have been 
decided. Subsequently the jo in t budget committee reviews the 
executive's recommended a l loca t ions and considers ?>rritten appeals 
by departments. 
In Maryland, although members of the l eg i s l a t i ve committees 
do not par t i c ipa te in the hearings conducted by the executive 
13 budget bureau, the s taf f of the legis la ture ' s f i sca l research 
bureau are always inv i t ed to be present and act ively to take par t 
in the proceedings. This not only helps to imxorove l eg i s l a t i ve 
understanding of budget problems but opens the way for the 
exercise of i nd i r ec t influence over the shape of the executive 's 
budget. 
l4 
A number of similar instances could be given, but sufficient 
has been said to indicate the nature of legislative participation in 
the formulation process and the grovjing influence of legislative 
budget analysts. Naturally, the role, method of operation and 
12. Analysts from the executive budget agency take part in the hearings. 
13. There is an exception in that the board of regents of the 
university of Maryland is required by legislation (Annotated Code 
of Maryland, 1951. article 77, section 24l) to invite the 
chairmen of the senate finance committee, and the house ways and 
means committee, as well as the budget director, to all meetings 
concerned with preparing the university's appropriation requests. 
14. e.g. the influence in budget formulation of Kentucky's legislative 
research commission, Ohio's legislative service commission, and 
Oregon's legislative fiscal committee. 
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extent of influence of such staffs differ from one state to another. 
When only one or two officials are employed by the legislature much 
of their time will necessarily be devoted to work of a fairly routine 
nature, such as the scheduling of hearings, calling of vri.tnesses, 
and carrying out some basic research for committee members. Some 
statistical analysis, the projecting of the costs of legislative 
proposals, and the drafting of bills may also be involved. There 
is unlikely to be time available for detailed budget analysis or 
direct contact with departmental officers. In other states there 
are sufficient legislative analysts to conduct continuous budgetary 
and management study, with collection and appraisal of data about 
various governmental activities going on throughout the year. 
The building up of legislative budget staffs is not without 
its dangers. It may, for example, hamper the further development 
of the executive budget system. The situation in Utah, referred to 
earlier, gives point to this possibility. If a governor neglects 
the budget function and allows the legislature to fill the gap by 
setting up its own budget examining agency it may be very difficult 
for the chief executive later to regain the initiative in the budget 
15 formulation process. There is also the possibility that the 
establishment of budget offices within the legislature will lead 
to considerable duplication of effort and, perhaps what is more 
significant, that confusion may be created within the operating 
15* It is, however, unlikely that the setting up of a legislative 
budget office will lead to loss of executive initiative when 
there is already a well developed executive budget agency. 
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departments on questions of loyalty and responsibility if they 
are frequently contacted by both legislative and executive budget 
analysts. 
In general, however, it seems clear that possible disadvantages 
of this kind are more than outweighed by the positive benefits that 
accrue from the work of legislative budget examiners. The role of 
the chief executive and his budget staff is to present governmental 
activities in the form of a coherent and unified programme. The 
effects of this programme are so significant, though, that it must 
be subjected to careful review. Budget officials responsible to the 
legislature can scrutinise the executive's proposals, highlight its 
main features for legislators, pinpoint possible weaknesses, and 
suggest alternative courses of action. And even if no defects are 
apparent informed scrutiny is essential in order to protect the plan 
from ill-founded change by the legislature. That is to say, the work 
of the legislative analyst is largely educative in nature and can 
serve a valuable purpose in developing a budget system in which the 
executive and legislature are complementary. If it were to be 
assumed that a well-developed executive budget organization will 
produce plans that need no further examination then it would be 
necessary not only to argue against the appointment.of legislative 
budget analysts but also to question the need for any form of 
legislative budget review. The executive, that is to say, would be 
recognized as the supreme and final policy determinant - a solution 
that would be impracticable in the American governmental context. 
CHAPTER 8 
STATE BUDGETARY PERSONNEL 
"Going out of White Hall, I met Captain Grove, 
who did give me a letter directed to myself from 
himself. I discerned money to be In It, and took 
It, knowing, as I found It to be, the proceed of 
the place I have got him to be, the taking up of 
vessels for Ta,ngler, But I did not open It till 
I came home to my office, and there I broke It 
open, not looking into It till all the money was 
out, that I might say I saw no money In the paper, 
If ever I should be questioned about It, There 
was a piece 1B gold and £4 In silver," 
Pepys, (3rd April, 1663) 
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In preceding chapters we have examined various budgetary 
procedures and organizational forms. So far, however, only 
passing attention has been paid to the relationship between 
the personnel engaged In budgeting, personnel practices, and 
the working of the budgetary process. 
Substantial emphasis on questions of organization and 
procedure Is warranted. The organizational framework within 
which the budgetary process operates Is of great Importeuice In 
determlnlag the nature of that process. At the same time, however, 
Qo matter how well conceived the budget organization and procedures 
may be, the fuaetloalag of the system as a whole will be significantly 
affected by the ladlvlduals concerned with It. A department of 
adminlstratloa or a budget agency may be created In accordeuxce with 
accepted organizational criteria but may nevertheless fall to function 
effectively simply because the director does not have adequate 
leadership qualities, because of personality clashes among senior 
officials, ®r because participants In the budgetary process hold 
differing budget phllesephles. Even a single budget analyst may 
act In such a way as to adversely affect aa agency's whole pattern 
©f budgetary development. Mamy such examples could be given; aad 
it may be acted that the converse Is equally true. Able aad 
sympathetic officials can overcome orgaalzatloaal Impediments aad 
can achieve a unified approach t© budgeting even In a altuatloa 
of extreme administrative diffusion. It Is Impertaat, therefore, to 
examine closely the methods used by budget agencies to select aad 
develop their staffs, and to consider the alms underlying these methods. 
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QUALIFICATIONS AND EXPERIENCE 
The United States of America 
In analysing this aspect of personnel practice la the field of 
budgeting it Is convenient to look first at the United States, since 
we find there the greatest variety of approach. In that couatry, too, 
the changlag role of state budgetlag has brought about aa atmosphere 
ef fermeat and has, to a much greater extent than In Australia and 
Canada, stimulated critical assessment of all the factors iaflueaclag 
the budgetary process. 
We have aoted In earlier chapters one of the major shifts In 
emphasis at the state level that has contributed to the transformation 
ef the role of budgeting - the substantial growth In the status and 
prestige ef the chief executive aad the eahancement of his direct 
administrative powers. Also associated with this change la emphasis 
has beea the reappraisal of the administrative machlaery la the field 
of flaance generally, with a consequent lessening of the problems of 
fiscal control. Impetus for change has arisen In recent years, too, 
from the widespread aeeeptsiace In the private sector of the economy 
of the need to establish systematic budgetary procedures. laflueaces 
of this sort hare pushed budgetlag lat© a traasltloaal phase la which 
it Is beeomlag more of a management than a control function. With 
the Improvement of accouatlng aad audltlag procedures In the United 
States the budget officer need devote less time to ensuring that 
expenditures fall within authorized purposes. Although he cannot 
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divorce himself entirely from this concern, the activities associated 
with It can be subordinated to broader maaagemeat respoaslbilltles. 
Where, too, the budget officer's major task was previously viewed as 
that of reduclag expenditure ©r holding it at prevalllag levels, there 
is now a coaceatratlon on such things as management audltlag aad 
programme evaluation, with his prime function being seen as that of 
assessing the resources needed to provide the services of goverameat 
and ensuring that the best use is made of those resources. la the 
United States In particular this new emphasis Is further highlighted 
by the growing acceptance by state authorities of the techniques of 
performance budgeting. What are the Implications of these changes 
from the point of view of the staffing of budget agencies? 
In the first plaee, as the state widens Its sphere of activity 
aad the administrative demands made en the ehlef executive grow more 
numerous, so It becomes necessary to make greater use of staff agencies 
with decision making powers of their own. The governor can no longer 
carry out the administrative duties of his office without aid, but must 
proceed In most areas of governmental activity by laying down broad 
policies and then allowing the decision making process to go on at 
subordinate levels within the general policy freimework he has established. 
The budget office, as one of the most significant staff agencies, will, 
then, not only retsdn Its advisory function In the collecting and 
interpreting of material needed for programme and broad policy 
evaluation, but will also acquire different powers and responsibilities 
as a decision making body subsidiary to the governor. For this role a 
staff capable of exercising substantial discretionary power In a wide 
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administrative context will be required. 
Of course, the types of persoas actually appointed as directors 
of budget agencies and to posts as budget analysts will differ from 
one state to another, mainly according to how those responsible for 
selection conceive of the budget function. Tabulated Information 
in appendices and Inclnded later In this chapter Illustrates how 
great Is the extent of the variation. In some states the view of 
budgeting as a control activity still predominates aad laflueaces 
the qualities aad skills sought for budget work. Where budgetlag Is 
thought of as basically a maaagemeat function officials with quite 
different backgrounds will be sought. Problems are most likely to 
arise when seleetlon contlnuos to be made on the basis of one view of 
the process of budgetlag, evea though the fuaotioas performed by the 
agency, as Is happealag la almost every case, are chaaglag. Very 
few budget ageacles today caa coacera themselves solely with easurlag 
that the state's administrative units keep expenditures within the 
appropriated amounts. Increasingly they must devote themselves to 
questions relating to the substance of expenditure programmes and, 
irrespective of whether there exists a separate agency concerned 
with management analysis, to the methods needed te carry programmes 
into effect. As we have already noted, the budget official must be 
capable of building up an Intimate knowledge of the orgaalzatlon aad 
procedures of the operating departmeats, must become familiar with 
their programmes, aad must maiataia close aad regular coatact with 
their personnel. 
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Appointment as Badget Director 
Appendix K (pp, 474 ff.) sets out the minimum qualifications 
laid down In forty-six American states for appointment as budget 
director. In twenty-four iastances no formal qualification is 
specified, appointment being at the discretion of the governor or an 
official responsible to the governor. There are a further six cases^ 
in which requirements are framed In general terms, like Indiana's 
"adequate capacity and training", which constitute no real limitation 
on the freedom of choice of those responsible for selection. In four 
states appointment as budget director may be made solely on the 
basis of experience In fiscal management ranging from four to twelve 
years, although in two of these states, Alaska and Connecticut, part 
of the experience Is required to have been In a supervisory capacity. 
South Dakota specifies simply a college degree, without Indicating Its 
nature or requiring experience In fiscal management. Both Mississippi 
and New Mexico list as requirements a knowledge of accounting together 
with experience, but In neither case Is any formal academic qualification 
or length of experience specified. In each of the remaining nine states 
an appointee mast possess both academic or professional qualifications 
1t The Information In Appendix K relates to I965 aad was extracted from 
answers to questionnaires sent by the Council of State Governments 
te all states having budget agencies, 
2« Florida, Indiana, Massachusetts, Oklahoma, Oregon and Tennessee, 
3* Alaska, Connecticut, Nevada and Texas, 
k, Connecticut allows the alternative of a degree coupled with a 
shorter period of experience than would otherwise be required; 
whilst Nevada adds the "qualification" of "formal education necessary 
for the position". 
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in a specified f ie ld and experience in f i s c a l or budgetary work. 
The experience requirement In those s t a t e s which also specify 
a formal educational qua l l f l ca t ioa var ies from four years l a Kansas 
to eight years l a Louisiana and Wisconsin, although in two ins tances , 
Rhode Island aad Utah, ao fixed minimum period i s l a id down, the 
respective references being simply to "extended experience in a 
responsible administrat ive capacity" and "extensive experience in 
public accounting". In Hawaii aad Louisisma the appolatee 's 
experience must have included three years in a supervisory pos i t ion , 
whilst Kentucky requires four years in such capacity, Michigan 
specifies five years a t the leve l of senior aaa lys t , a post that i s 
normally of a supervisory aa tu re . 
As far as academic qua i l f i ca t ioas are coaceraed, i t wi l l be 
noted that of th i s group of nine s t a t e s only Colorado requires more 
than a bachelor ' s degree. There the budget d i rec tor must possess a 
master's degree in public adminis t ra t ion, economics, finance, or a 
related f i e l d . Elsewhere a f i r s t degree I s regarded as su f f i c i en t . 
All of the group except Utah l i s t a f i e ld of spec ia l i za t ion , commonly 
mentioning such subjects as accounting, adminis t ra t ion, business 
administration, p o l i t i c a l sc ience , public adminis trat ion, and public 
finance. Usually, however, there i s an "escape clause" l ike "or a 
related f i e ld" , 
Louisiana 's emphasis i s ©a accouatancy for both qual i f ica t ions 
and experience, A c e r t i f i e d public accountant i s preferred, but the 
holder of a bachelor ' s degree l a accounting, business adminis t ra t ion , 
or a r e l a t ed f i e ld could be appointed. In tha t case, however, two 
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additional years of experience are required, thomgh this Is reduced 
by ©ne year If the appointee has a master's degree and by two years 
fer a doctorate. A Ph,D, Is, In effect, equated with a public 
accountant's certificate! 
Appointment as Budget Analyst 
Below the level of budget director wide variations in 
recruitment policies are also apparent, but, In general, academic 
or professional qualifications are sought. Most budget agencies 
seek those with a college degree which Includes training In one or 
more ef the social sciences - administration, economics, political 
science, psychology, sociology, and the like. Discussion with 
aumeroas budget officers Indicated that for the most part the view is 
firmly held that a broad education In the social sciences leads to an 
understanding of both government and human relations, and provides the 
analyst with the necessary perspective for fitting particular 
governmental problems Into a wider context. It Is commonly believed, 
toe, that such an educational backgromnd enhances analytical ability 
and the capacity to see and appraise alternative solutions to problems, 
Typical of this line of argument Is the following statement attributed 
te the late budget director of the United States department of 
agriculture: 
"Try to find someone broadly trsilned in political science. I 
can teach him what he needs to know about the technical side 
of budgeting In six months. I can't make an educated vaan out 
of him la that time," 3 
5, Quoted, Robert A. Walker, "William A, Jump: The Staff Officer as a 
Personality," Public Administration Review, Vol. XIV, No. 4, Autumn, 
1954, p.238. 
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Sometimes It Is further claimed that a broad educational background 
in the humanities or the social sciences has the additional advantage 
@f having provided training In written e?ipresslon and analysis - an 
ability essential In most budget offices since recommendations and 
evaluations must usually be presented In writing. 
Although most budget agencies recruit generallsts as budget 
analysts there are seme exceptions, a few agencies appointing 
specialists te handle particular aspects of the budgetary process. 
Appendix (T (pp, 453 ff,) sets out the staffing situation In the 
6 
various state budget offices. It will be seen that several agencies 
employ graduate architects and engineers to assist with the analysis 
and execution of capital works budgets. One of the five budget 
officials In Indiana Is an engineer; there are two "building engineers" 
7 
on Maryland's budget staff, one such appointment being required by law; 
New Yerk has beth architectural aad eagiaeerlag sectloas; Oregon 
empleys a construction analyst who Is a qualified architect; Virginia 
has an architectural and engineering assistant. Two states, California 
and Maryland, have agricultural officers on their budget staffs, la the 
latter Instance the appointee being required by the statute already 
mentioned to be a graduate of a recogalzed ccllege of agriculture, aad 
6. The laformatlon In this appendix has been extracted from the 
questionnaires mentioned earlier, 
7. Article 15A, section 24, of the Aaaotated Code of the Public Geaeral 
Laws of Maryland requires the appolatment of a graduate mechanical 
engineer with at least three years' experience la building 
construction and maintenance, whose function It is to examine the 
maintenance and operating costs of all buildings owned and used by 
the state. 
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whose duties are to make recommendations concerning the operations 
©f state farms aad dairies and the food requirements of all state 
institutions. Apart from these instances of budget officials with 
specialized knowledge there Is an adviser on medical fees In 
California and a real estate supervisor in Oregon, 
In the past it was common In the United States, as In Australia, 
fer training In accountancy to be considered a prerequisite for 
appointment as a budget analyst. Although this attitude still 
prevails In some agencies. It seems to have lost ground and to have 
been completely abandoned In some states. Accountancy quaHficatiens 
are frequently listed amongst those which an applicant for an 
Q 
analyst 's posi t ion should have, but in only a few Instances I s i t 
placed a t the head of the U s t , A background in accountancy i s 
unlikely to prove a pos i t ive b a r r i e r to se lec t ion as an ana lys t , but 
in discussion severa l senior budget o f f i c i a l s ladlcated t h a t , other 
things being equal , they would prefer to appoint analysts who did not 
have such a background. This s o r t of a t t i t u d e I s more l ike ly to be 
found In s t a t e s tha t are moving away from l ine-I tem budgeting, since 
i t may be feared tha t the aature of the accounting spec ia l iza t ion 
leads t© over-emphasis upon the f inancia l statements and de ta i l s of a 
department's a c t i v i t i e s , with a coasequent lack of coacentratloa ©a 
i ts pregrammes aad ©verall performance. I t may be, however, tha t the 
attitude stems la rge ly from an "emotional" reac t ion . That i s to say, 
Oo e .g . Iowa, Louisiana aad Utah. 
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management-oriented budget d i r ec to r s may be re luc tant to appoint 
acceuntants as budget ana lys ts simply because accountants have in 
the .past been associated with budget systems that s t r e s s f inancial 
control. Certsdnly there I s no subs tan t i a l evidence to jus t i fy an 
avefsion te the recruitment of accountants to budget s t a f f s . The 
nature ©f candidates* educational backgrounds and spec ia l iza t ions 
dees not provide a r e l i a b l e guide to how they wi l l perform on the 
job and I t i s the ease tha t In each of the countries we are examining 
many off ic ia ls t ra ined In accounting alone have performed as budget 
analysts a t a high leve l of competency. 
I t wi l l be seen from the de ta i led lnformatl©n contained In 
appendix L (pp. 479 f f . ) tha t ten ©f the for ty-s ix budget agencies 
surveyed lay down no minimum academic qual i f ica t ion for appointment as 
analyst, although one of these , Alaska, does express a preference for 
those qualified a t the mas ter ' s degree l e v e l . Twenty-seven ageacles 
specify a bachelor ' s degree as a minimum requirement for appointment. 
Of these, Florida and Louisiana accept a public accountant 's c e r t i f i c a t e 
as an a l t e r n a t i v e ; New York requires a master 's degree for those entering 
through the s t a t e ' s in te rnsh ip programme; whilst Pennsylvania expresses 
a preference for those who have completed a master ' s degree. In 
addition, Massachusetts, although not fermally requir ing a bachelor ' s 
degree. Implies the need for t h i s by I t s general statement tha t am 
aaalyst must have "an academic background in accounting or business 
administration". Only s ix agencies r e c r u i t normally a t the master ' s 
9. This Information has a l so been extracted from the quest loaaalres 
already meatloaede 
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level and three of these, Colorado, Kentucky, and Maryland, are 
prepared te accept a lower qualification In particular circumstances. 
At the time of the surrey ©ne state. South Dakota, had not developed 
its recruitment procedures for analysts but indicated that recruitment 
from those with master's degrees was intended; and Wyoming had no 
budget staff apart from the director himself. 
It must be noted that this formal outline of the situation dees 
10 
net take account of the fact that some agencies, while requiring only 
a bachelor's degree, actively seek analysts with higher academic 
quallfleatlens. In some cases, too, recognition Is given to 
pest-graduate achievement In terms ©f accelerated pr©m©tlon, higher 
classification, or increased salary. Advanced education may also serve 
as a substitute for a certain amount of experience. Maryland's practice 
is a case in point. In that state, graduate trainee analysts are 
required to serve for two years before becoming eligible for pr©m©tl©a 
to the position of budget aaalyst I. Possessloa ©f a master's degree, 
however, reduces the period to one year. In other states no difference 
in classification exists between entrants who have a bachelor's degree 
and these with a more advanced academic qualification, but a higher 
salary Is paid. On the other hand, there are states, like Califorala, 
which make a© dlffereatlati©a la either classlflcati©n ©r salary. 
Where advanced degrees are seught there seems. In general, t© be 
a preference for such degrees to be la the fields of political science, 
10, e,g. Michigan, Minnesota, Ohio, Washington. 
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public or business adminis t ra t ion, and economics. Some agencies have 
a very high proportion of t h e i r s t a f f p©ssesslng master 's degrees. Of 
thirteen budget analysts l a Celorado, for Ins tance, nine have higher 
degrees In one of the f i e lds mentioned above. In Michigan ten of the 
budget s taff ®f twelve have master ' s degrees In e i ther p o l i t i c a l science 
er public adminis trat ion. Kentucky, New York, Pennsylvania and Oregon 
als© have high proportions of budget o f f i c i a l s with higher degrees or 
other pest-graduate q u a l i f i c a t i o n s . Unlike the s i tua t ion In seme 
federal government agencies I t i s ra re for s t a t e budget o f f i c i a l s to 
have completed doctora tes , although a t l e a s t one, Nevada's deputy 
bttdget d i rec tor , has a Ph.D. He, however. I s net a career ©ff lc la l , 
11 but an academic seconded to his present post for a period of two years . 
The extent t© which previcus experience i s taken Int© account In 
the recrui t ing of budget analys ts d i f fers from one s t a t e t© another and 
depends upon factors such as the leve l of entry , the type of experience 
particular appl icants have had, and the objectives of the budget agency 
i t se l f . On the whole, however, experience in budgeting or s imilar work 
dees not seem to be a slgnlflcsuit factor in the select ion of ana lys t s , 
at leas t as far as the lower l eve l s of that grade are concerned. 
Although i t i s true tha t twelve of the agencies l i s t e d In appendix L 
12 
stress the Importance ©f previeus experience, only North Carolina 
requires t h i s , and the r e a l i t y I s that the vast majority of appointees 
11. Assoeiate Professor of P o l i t i c a l Science, University of Nevada. 
12. Colorado, F lor ida , Kansas, Maine, Michigan, Mlaaesota, New Jersey , 
North Carol laa, Ohio, Gregoa, PeaasyIvaala, Texas. 
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t© the post of analyst are drawn from recent graduates without any 
©ccupatienal background In budgeting or financial management, 
Semetlmes this is a matter ef deliberate choice. For instance, 
despite the fact that Michigan, as mentioned above, is ©ne ©f the 
states which stressed the Impertance of previous experience as a 
factor In recruitment. Its budget analysts come mainly from graduates 
of the University of Michigan's public administration programme and 
discussion with the state's budget director indicated that this 
arrangement was working satisfactorily and was likely to continue, 
A similar situation apparently existed In 1960 when Shadoan*s 
investigations were carried out: 
"A ffl®st striking example ef cooperation between universities 
and the budget office is found in Michigan. Most of the 
Michigan budget staff members, either having ©r w©rklng on 
graduate degrees, are graduates ©f the University ©f Michigan, 
Michigan State University, or Wayne State University, all of 
which have well-kaowa uadergraduate aad graduate pr©grams la 
public administration and political science. Also eacouraglag 
cooperation betweea these universities and the budget office is 
the fact that former controllers of Michigan's Department of 
Administration have been drawn from these institutions," 13 
Connecticut, Kentucky, Maryland and Pennsylvania similarly prefer t© 
recruit local graduates for the most part. Other budget agencies, 
hewever, do not do this so willingly. Rather, they are forced t© do 
so fey the general shortage ©f trained budget analysts. 
There are, ©a the other haad, states which have a positive 
prefereace for hiring already experienced budget personnel. Varying 
13» Arlene T, Shad©aa, Orgaalzatlon, Role, and Staffing of State 
Budget Offices, Lexington, University ©f Kentucky, 1961, 
pp.118-119. 
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factors may give rise to this. In the first place, the desire to 
recruit experlenoed analysts will probably be greatest In those states 
which have a high budget staff turnover, so that instead of being able 
t© absorb new analysts Into the ©rganlzatlon gradually, virtually a 
new team must be trained for each budget cycle. To cope with this 
problem, then, experienced officials will be seught and brought Into 
the budget agency at higher grades and salary levels than are offered 
te those recruited directly from the university. However, apart from 
practices dictated by the market situation, there are those that arise 
from Internal civil service factors. In states like Col©rado, 
Minnesota and New York, for Instance, In which well developed systems 
of mezlt appointment operate on a service-wide basis, Inter-departmental 
movement, arising mainly from promotion. Is comm©n. In these 
circumstances, analysts, while not aecessarlly havlag had dlreet 
experience of budget work, are likely to have held responsible 
administrative posts la operating departments or In governmental 
staff agencies. Budgetary procedures may also affect the recruitment 
of analysts. If In the course of budget review and execution there is 
regular contact between the budget office and other units of 
gevernment some officials of those units will be attracted to budget 
work or will be singled out by budget officers seeking to fill 
vacancies for analysts. 
Appendix M (pp. 485 ff.) gives some Indication of the 
extent to which budget agencies draw upon other governmental bodies 
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l4 
in recruiting analysts. It will be seen that eight states -
Colorado, Flerlda, Iowa, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Hampshire, 
New York and Washington - report that officers ©f other departments 
and agencies are frequently appointed as budget smalysts. In seme 
cases these appointees come from personnel or adcountlng agencies 
which have resp©n6lbllltles or roles akin te those of a budget 
bureau, but some budget agencies adopt a policy of recruiting 
fanetional specialists for budget examination work. Fl©rlda, for 
instance, seeks analysts with wide experience la llae departmeats or 
in governmental research. New York also looks particularly for those 
with experience In operating agencies. Such analysts, even though 
they aay possess academic qualifications of a general kind, are In a 
sense specialists. In that they already possess a detailed knowledge 
ef the activities of the governmental unit ©r type of unit whose 
estimates they will be examining after appointment to the budget 
agency's staff. Many budget officials argue that an analyst cannot 
effectively review estimates unless he has an Intimate kncwledge ©f 
the funetiens, organizationaad problems of the agency which has prepared 
tkem, and that this knowledge can best be gained by actual service In 
the agency. 
Appendix M also Indicates that in fifteen budget agencies there 
is ne recruitment of analysts from other state departments, whilst a 
14, The appendix also shows the frequency of appointment of analysts 
to posts in the operating departments, a practice that raises 
c©nslderatl©ns which will be discussed later In this chapter. 
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further six agencies are to© small for recruitment from line 
departments t@ be necessary er feasible. For the remaining budget 
offices the appointment of officials from those who have "made 
their mark" In other civil service employment is only an 
«©cGasl®nal" ®r "rare" occurrence. This should not, however, be 
taken to Imply that these budget offices necessarily rely heavily 
ea the recruitment ef Inexperienced personnel. Analysts are often 
drawn from the staffs of private organizations, particularly those 
engaged In work that brings them Into close contact with governmental 
affairs, such as taxpayers' associations, municipal leagues, and firms 
of management consultants. Sometimes, t®©, appelntees will have had 
experience ®f budget analysis In large cemmercial and Industrial 
15 
undertakings, "^ 
A recmiltment policy that stresses the appointment of personnel 
31.fj 
who have worked fer some years In public or private organizations may, 
of course, stem from considerat ions other than that of experience as 
such. Age, for Instance , may be a factor In i t s own r i g h t . That i s 
t® say, a budget agency may be re luctant to appoint aaa lys ts d irec t 
from ua lvers l ty simply because e f the i r comparative youth. This 
.we,-
attitude aeed ae t a e c e s s a r l l y r e f l e c t a b e l i e f that maturity eahances 
the a b i l i t y to learn quickly the duties of an ana lys t . I t may be 
based on the "pract ical" considerat ion that departmental o f f i c e r s often 
resent youthful a n a l y s t s , f e e l i n g that the ramif icat ions of the ir 
department's a c t i v i t i e s and the nature ef I t s problems can only be 
15. Control-oriented budget agenc i e s , for Ins tance , often look to the 
accounting o f f i c e s of private Industry as a recruitment f i e l d . 
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ftilly appreciated by budget o f f i c i a l s with greater maturity of 
outlook than could. In t h e i r view, be possessed by recent graduates. 
I t dees net matter tha t there may be ne evidence t© supp©rt such a 
view; i t must, never the less , be taken int© account by the budget 
agency when framing I t s recruitment p o l i c i e s , 
Canada 
Although some of the currently used public service personnel 
techniques were Introduced later In Canada than in Australia, the 
bread personnel patterns in the Ceuaadian provincial civil services 
are not unlike those of the Australisin states. Recruitment procedures, 
including a variety of selection tests, are well-developed; merit 
systems operate; aad management is In the hands of civil service 
16 
cemmlsslons with s©me degree of insulation from direct political control. 
16, It would be Inappropriate here to discuss the varying central 
management arrangements In the provincial civil services. 
Personnel c©ntr©l Is usually In the hands ©f a cofflmlssl©n ©r a 
single commissioner, British Columbia In 1917 was the first to 
create a central management agency ©f this s©rt, f©ll©wed In 1918 
by Ontario, Manitoba and Alberta, In 1930 by Saskatchewan, by Nova 
Scotia (1935), New Brunswick and Quebec (1943)* and Newfoundland 
In 1953» some four years after joining the federation. In Prince 
Edward Island civil service management is largely in the hands of 
cabinet, with the treasury board and the provincial secretary's 
department als© being Involved. The extent of the contr©l 
exercised and the degree of Independence which each agency has, 
however, differs from ©ne province to another, the most effective 
arrangements being found In British Columbia, Saskatchewan, Alberta 
and Manitoba (with some qualifications in respect of the last two). 
Useful discussion of this topic is t© be found In Howard A. Scarrow, 
"Civil Service Cemmlsslons In the Canadian Provinces," The Journal 
ef Politics, Vol. 19, No. 2, May, 1957, pp.240-36l, and John J. 
lebal, "Traialag aad Developmeat la the Pacific Northwest: British 
Columbia, Oregon, and Washington," Canadian Public Administration. 
Vol. VII, No. 2, June, 1964, pp.227-247. 
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The methods used for the recruitment of budget analysts and some 
other professional and specialist personnel categcries, h©wever, 
mere clesely resemble United States' practices than these of 
Australia, In that there Is considerable emphasis ©n the appointment 
of graduates from outside the particular civil service,''^ We need net 
examine all the Canadian budget offices in order to present the general 
recruitment picture, as procedural variations and differences of 
approach amongst the provinces are not great. 
The recrultmeat of appropriately qualified budget officials 
presents difficulties throughout Canada, although the pr©blems are 
mest acute in Ontario because of the strong competltl®n f©r graduates 
te fill executive pests In the rapidly growing industrial sector ef 
the economy. Apart from shpporting clerical staff, the Ontarl® 
18 
treasury beard's program analysis braach employs seveateen budget 
analysts, all of whom are graduates, this beiag oae ©f the requlremeats 
fer appolatment to the branch. Vacancies are advertised and are open 
to any qualified person, whether already a civil servant or not, 
Sight of the seventeen analysts majored in economics, the remainder 
19 in commerce or business administration. Four have master's degrees 
1?, Movement of personnel from one provincial civil service te another 
is quite common, unlike the situation in Australia where movement is 
often restricted because of, among other things, uawrlttea 
"gentlemen's agreements" between state public service beards and 
commissions, 
18. The treasury beard has three ©ther branches. Two of these are 
concerned with staff relations aad the maintenance of the civil 
service manual ef admlnlstratl©n. The third, the ©rganlzatlon and 
methods services branch, encompasses several sections and has a staff 
of soae thirty graduates, 
19c In an Interview In September 1965 the secretary ef the treasury board 
expressed a strong preference for generallsts and Indicated that he 
had resisted suggestions made from time to time for the appelntmeat 
of aa architect or an engineer to the budget staff. 
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and ©ne ©f these I s working for a doctera te . Most had had previous 
administrative experience, although th i s i s not l a id down as a 
specific cenditlon for appointment to the branch. In general 
hewever, this previous experience was not extensive, most of the 
appointees having come t© the branch when in the i r l a t e twenties , 
Ontario's budgetary organization I s by far the l a rges t a t the 
prevlnclal level In Canada. More typica l of the provincial 
arrangements for budgetary analys is i s the s i tua t ion In MardLtoba, 
The ec©n©ay branch of Manitoba's t reasury board consists of three 
sections, organizatloa aad methods, research, and budget. The f i r s t 
of these ©rlglnaliy w©rked c lcse ly with the budget sect ion, but in the 
last five years has concentrated almost en t i r e ly on work associated 
with mechanization, pa r t i cu l a r l y the introduct ion and use of e lec t ronic 
computers, and has not pa r t i c ipa t ed d i rec t ly in the process of budgeting. 
The research sect ion has a s t a f f of f ive . Including the sect ion head 
who i s also d i rec to r of the ecoitomy branch. All are graduates in 
economics; two have mas ter ' s degrees, with the section head and two 
others being qual i f ied a t bachelor ' s l e v e l . Although avai lable to 
conduct specia l Inves t iga t ions of budgetary problems from time t© time, 
the research sect ion does not work closely with the budget ana lys t s . 
Mest of I t s s tud ies touch only per iphera l ly on budget I s s u e s , so that 
fer a l l p r a c t i c a l purposes examination ©f the draft estimates ©f revenue 
and expenditure I s sole ly the r e spons ib i l i t y of the budget sec t ion . 
The budget sect ion a lso consis ts ©f f ive ©ffleers . The sect ion 
head and the two most experienced aaa lys t s are qual if ied accouatants ; 
the other two aaa lys t s are gnaduates l a ecoaomlcs. All were appointed 
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to the budget section, following advertisement, from outside the 
20 
civil service, the two econonasts direct from university, the 
others fr©m responsible positions in private business. Although a 
deliberate attempt Is being made to expaad the aaalysts' personal 
contacts with officials ef the operating departments, the budget 
section is toe small to enable detailed programme analysis to be 
carried ©ut ©r fer there to be "on-the-spot" examinations on a 
regular basis. The budget officials do, however, work closely with 
the civil service commission In the fixing of salary figures aad 
21 
departmental establlshmeats. 
As aa example of the central budgetary arrangements in a small 
province we may take New Brunswick. That province's budget office 
was created In 1958 by the present deputy finance minister, who was at 
that time brought from Saskatchewan, where he had been a budget analyst, 
specifically to set up a budgetary organization. Until then departmental 
expenditure allocations had been determined largely by a protracted 
process of bargaining within cabinet. 
Discussions with several New Brunswick officials and a former 
treasury officer now teaching at the university of Toronto indicate 
that there was strong ministerial opposition to the creation of a central. 
budget office and that this manifested Itself la considerable departmental 
20. As undergraduates, however, both had worked at the treasury board 
during university vacations, 
21, Organizational arrangements facilitate this close liaison. The 
civil service commission operates as a committee of the treasury 
board, and the deputy provincial treasurer is a member of the 
cofflolsslon. 
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resistance te "outside" Investigation of the draft estimates. 
Subsequently the premier was forced to Intervene and to insist 
upen the budget analysts belag given access to departmental 
material and information needed In their examination of requests 
fer funds. Resistance to Innovation is, of course, not uncomm©n, 
but in this case It may have beea exacerbated by perseaallty factors, 
the budget director and the first analysts to be appointed being 
inclined to favour a "tough line" in their dealings with departmental 
officials. Now, however, the early opposition and resentment have 
largely disappeared and budget review procedures are apparently 
operating with little friction. The present staff of the budget 
office is a youthful one. The director was appointed several years 
ago while still In his mid-thirties. He is a former Canadian Rhodes 
scholar, with an Oxford degree In modern greats. The three budget 
analysts are young graduates in economics, all appointed from ©utslde 
the civil service. 
Finally, we may briefly discuss a province which makes no use 
whatsoever of professional budget analysts, British Columbia. The 
budget procedures of British Columbia were outlined in chapter 5 
and it will be recalled that before they go to the treasury board 
the draft estimates prepared by departments are examined and reported 
upen by the controller-general and the deputy minister of finance. 
These two officials constitute what is locally known as the "little 
treasury board" aad their recommendations apparently carry a great 
deal of weight In determining the final allocations for departments. 
Both members of the little treasury board are at the permanent head 
.se 
on 
ever 
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level and are able to call on officers of their departments to advi 
on particular aspects of the estimates, but in neither organlzati 
are there ©fflclals wh©se sole function Is budget analysis. What 
detailed examination of departmental estimates is made must be done by 
officers whose main duties are concerned with ©ther aspects ©f finance. 
The present ccntroller-general Is a chartered accountant whilst 
the deputy aalnlster of finance Is a commerce graduate,^^ Both were 
recruited for general administrative work and have risen to the 
pesitions they now hold after having had wide experience In the 
civil service, but la fields not directly related to budget analysis. 
There is in Brltlshi Columbia some lateral recruitment to higher posts 
23 in the civil service, "^  but no expert in budget administration has 
P4 
ever been recruited as such, 
Australia 
The material for our examination of Australian state budget 
personnel will be drawn mainly from Queensland and New South Wales, 
Mest Australian states have budget organizations which are small and 
which use examining procedures of a relatively simple kind, Queensland 
provides an example of such a system. New South Wales Is a-typlcal in 
22. The assistant deputy minister of finance is also a commerce 
graduate and has In addition a dlploosa In public administration, 
23* The present deputy minister ef education, for Instance, came to 
that post from a university appointment, 
24. There Is, however, an excellent course available to public servants 
which would provide a suitable basic qualification for the work 
of budget analysis. This will be mentioned later In this chapter. 
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that it has a large budget staff, using procedures which have been 
developed aad reflaed over a long period, its budget branch having 
been created as far back as 1938. It warrants close attention, 
hewever, fer two reasoas: it Illustrates a sltuatioa towards which 
©ther states seem t© be moving; and its budget officials constitute 
an administrative cadre group or category of officers who are not yet 
at the top of their public service but who, judging by the history of 
the present top, are especially likely to move into the most senior 
25 
posts in the service. 
In the case of Queensland the budget organization consists ©f 
only four treasury officers. At the head Is the assistant under 
secretary (budget and budgetary control), an official who was appointed 
to his present pest the age of thirty-seven when a budget office was 
set up within the treasury In 1964. By Australian state public service 
standards he is well qualified academically, holding a commerce degree, 
26 diploma In public administration, aad an accouatlng certificate. 
The other three staff members are all in their early forties; one, 
the budget officer, was appointed to his present poslti©n in 1962 -
i,e. before the existing budget organization was set up; the second, 
whese title is se«ior clerk (budget), was appointed shortly after the 
assistant under secretary; aad the third, the sealor clerk 
25. la discussing this aspect I shall both be drawing upon and revising 
material obtained during my research for a joint publication: 
B, B, Schaffer and K, W, Knight, Top Public Servants In Two States, 
University of Queensland Papers, Department of History and 
Political Science, Vol. I, No. 1, St, Lucia, University of 
Queensland Press, 1963* 
26. By Qaeensland standards this is very go©d Indeed, Cf, B. B, 
Schaffer and K,W, Knight, op,clt., pp,l4-15. 
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(investigations), came to that newly created post only recently. 
In classification the budget officer ranks at the level of 
departmental accountant, while the two senior clerks are equated to 
smb-accountant. Only the senior clerk (budget) Is academically 
qualified, having cempleted a degree In c©mmerce. 
As was brought out la Top Public Servants In Two States, those 
keldlng senior administrative posts la Queeaslaad have frequently 
27 had previous experience In the auditor-general's department. 
This applies to two members of the budget staff, both the assistant 
under secretary and the senior clerk (budget) having served In the 
audit office. The career of the assistant under secretary exhibits 
a pattern common amongst top administrators in the Queensland public 
service. The basic method of entry to the service for clerks Is 
through the junior public examination taken at the age of about 
28 
sixteen after three years of secondary schooling, an order ef merit 
being established by the marks obtained In certain prescribed subjects 
and appelatments being offered In that order. Entering In this way 
the officer concerned completed his probationary period of six months 
and was then transferred from the state lasuraace office to the 
aadltor-geaeral's departmeat, where he remalaed for some ten years. 
Audit Inspectors In Queensland are regarded in some ways rather like 
27. The other main stepping-stone to the top Is represented by 
service as private secretary to a minister. 
28. There are various other forms of entry, but the junior public 
examination is by far the most comm©n. Cf, B, B, Schaffer and 
K. W. Knight, oia.elt., p.8. 
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officers ef the Censell d'Etat In France, that is, as a reserve 
administrative cadre to be moved permanently or temporarily t© 
other departments. This Is what happened in this case, the officer 
being transferred to the department of education, first as 
sub-accountant, then as accountant. From that post he was 
appointed to his present position. As indicated, the senior clerk 
(budget) also served as an audit Inspector, but came direct from audit 
work to the treasury, with no intervening period In a line department. 
The remaining two budget officials have spent their whole publle 
service careers within the treasury. Neither of these officers 
possesses academic or other tertiary qualifications; they have 
moved to their present appointments largely on the basis of their 
treasury experience. 
The two officials with academic qualifications obtained these 
fey part-time study. Both entered the service from the junior public 
examination and so were unmatrlculated at that stage. The assistant 
under secretary was granted matriculation into the faculty of commerce 
by completing as an evening student b©th an accounting certificate and 
the diploma In public admlaistratlea, a uaiversity course which la 
29 Qaeensland Is open to unmatrlculated students under certain condltieas. 
29, For provisional admission the student must be over the age of 
twenty-three and must satisfy the faculty board that he can 
reasonably be expected to pursue successfully the diploma course. 
Occupational experience and educational attainments are the main 
factors taken Into account. If a student does not within three 
years pass in three subjects. Including public admlalstratloa, he 
is liable to exclusion from the course. 
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His colleague met the adult matriculation requirements and proceeded 
directly to the degree course. With their academic qualifications 
and their background as audit Inspectors, both are likely to receive 
farther progression In the service and their future appointments xaay 
well net be confined to the treasury. The assistant under secretary, 
in particular, will probably move to a permaaeat headship wlthla the 
next few years. 
The budget officials la New South Wales much more ©bvl©usly 
constitute a cadre group likely to be given high administrative 
appointments. 
In what aay be regarded as "professional" budget examining 
positions there are seventeen officers In the budget branch. For 
purposes of analysis, however, one other position may be Included, 
that ef assistant under secretary (budget and laspectioa), slace that 
officer is directly coaceraed with the process of budget examiaatioa. 
Hierarchically the arraagement is: 
Asslstaat uader secretary (budget aad iaspectisa) 1 
ehlef budget ©ffleer 1 
sealor budget laspector 5 
budget laspector 5 
( asslstaat budget laspector 5 
( asslstaat research officer ^ 
18 
All possess tertiary educatloaal qualificatloas, but the nature 
of these quallfleatlens has changed since the survey cenducted f©r 
Top Public Servants In Two States. At that time of the fifteen 
officers In the branch seven held degrees in economics (one with 
honours) and one had both an economics degree aad aa accouataacy 
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cer t i f icate ; there were four with accouatancy qua l i f ica t ions ; 
one with a diploma In commerce; one was without formal t e r t i a r y 
quailfications, but he was considerably older than the other 
inspectors and was a spec ia l case as an ag r i cu l tu ra l s p e c i a l i s t . ^ 
Since then the emphasis has sh i f ted and those with accountancy 
qualifications aow predominate l a the branch: 
ass i s tan t under secre tary 
(budget and inspect ion) B,Ec, 
chief budget off icer B,Ec, 
senior Inspectors B,Ec.(Hons.) - 1 
B,Ec, and Accountancy - 1 
Accountancy - 3 
inspectors Accountancy - 5 
a s s i s t an t Inspectors B,Ec, and Accountancy - 1 
Accountancy - 4(+) 
a s s i s t an t research off icer B,Com and M,Ec. 
( + ) One i s p a r t i a l l y qual i f ied as an actuary and two have par t ly 
completed economics degrees. 
This group of eighteen o f f i c e r s , then, possesses one higher degree, 
six bachelor 's degrees, and fourteen accountancy c e r t i f i c a t e s , a 
concentration of qua l i f ica t ions unequalled by any general administrat ive 
group l a the New South Wales public service with the possible exeeptloa 
of the public service board 's Inspec tora te , 
As a group, too , these budget o f f i c i a l s have had a good deal ©f 
inter-departmental experience. With the exception of the a s s i s t a n t 
30. See B. B, Schaffer and K, W, Knight, o p . c i t , , p . 3 3 . 
31* This I s the other main cadre group in New South Wales. 
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research ©fflcer, who came d i r e c t to the budget branch af te r 
3 2 -zTi 
graduation,"^ a l l have served outside the treasury itself.-^-^ 
Between them the i r experience covers most of the major departments 
and agencies In New South Wales: agr icu l tu re department; audi tor-
general's department; chief s e c r e t a r y ' s department; family endowment 
office; health department; hosp i t a l s commission; i n s t i t u t e of 
auctieneers; jus t i ce department; public service board; public works 
department; r e g i s t r a r - g e n e r a l ' s department; reg is t ry ef co-operative 
societies; stamp dut ies o f f i ce ; and technical education department. 
The picture regarding experience within the budget branch, 
however. I s not as br ight as t h i s . The a s s l s t a a t uader secretary 
has been concerned with budget exsumlnatlon for seventeen years 
since he was f i r s t appointed to the branch as an a s s i s t an t budget 
34 inspector a t the age of 26,- '^ while the chief budget off icer has had 
some nine years In the branch. One of the senior Inspectors has a lso 
had long service i n budget work, h is appointment as a s s i s t an t Inspector 
dating back to 1953* There I s then a subs tan t i a l gap, however, with 
the experience of the other senior Inspectors ranging between four and 
32. This off icer was a t t r a c t e d to the s t a t e public service as a r e s u l t 
ef a scheme i n s t i t u t e d severa l years ago by the public service 
board whereby undergraduates are given part- t ime employment while 
continuing a t the un ive r s i ty e s sen t i a l l y as full-t ime s tuden ts . 
There i s no requirements of subsequent entry to the se rv ice , but 
the board hopes tha t some wi l l do so , 
33« The a s s i s t a n t uader secre ta ry and ©ne ©f the senl©r budget 
Inspectors began t h e i r public service In the t reasury , but beth 
have had periods of secondment to other departments, 
34. This of f icer was promoted to budget Inspector In 1953 a t the 
veiry young age ef twenty-eight and was a senior Inspector In h is 
ear ly t h i r t i e s . 
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six years; each of the five budget Inspectors having three years' 
service In the branch; and the assistant Inspectors having served 
fer one or two years. This Is largely a result of the situation of 
the budget officers as a cadre group. As we shall see there has 
been In recent years considerable movement out of the branch, with 
its personnel going to high posts in other departments or within the 
treasury Itself. Leadership and guidance within each section has 
accordingly to be provided by senior Inspectors who from four to 
six years ago were themselves only newly appointed assistant Inspectors. 
The actual sige distribution of the budget staff will be examined 
in a later section of this chapter. At this point we may merely note 
that the group is a youthful oae. This, coupled with a high level of 
quallflcatioa and considerable inter-departmental experience, makes 
it a particularly attractive cadre for top appointments In the service, 
but this may nevertheless produce Internal stresses and problems In 
cponnectlon with the branch's relations with other departments and 
agencies, 
- 338 -
RECRUITMENT PROCEDURES 
A u s t r a l i a 
La te ra l r ec ru i tmen t to a d m i n i s t r a t i v e pos t s i s r a r e i n A u s t r a l i a 
so that appointment as a budget a n a l y s t w i l l normally come by way ©f 
an o f f i c e r ' s promotion from a p o s i t i o n of lower grade elsewhere In the 
serv ice . To a p p r e c i a t e the ways i n which budget personnel a re ob ta ined , 
therefore , i t i s necessa ry to take account of a p a r t i c u l a r s e r v i c e ' s 
c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s t r u c t u r e and i t s promotion p rocedures . 
Appendix N (pp,488 f f , ) s e t s out the c l a s s i f l c a t i e n arrangements 
applying t e adt l l t a d m i n i s t r a t i v e and c l e r i c a l ©ff lcers i n the A u s t r a l i a n 
s ta te publ ic s e r v i c e s . I t w i l l be seen t h a t a l l are b a s i c a l l y 
s t ra ight forward , c o n s i s t i n g of an automat ic s a l a r y range of varying 
length for male c l e r k s and above t h a t a number of graded or c l a s s i f i e d 
posts to which prom©tlon may be made. 
Queensland 's automat ic s c a l e c o n s i s t s of t h i r t e e n s t e p s , the 
l a s t four of which ove r l ap the s a l a r y of the f i r s t c l a s s i f i e d p o s i t i o n . 
The se rv i ce has no d i v i s i o n a l s t r u c t u r e and the twenty-seven 
c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s above the automat ic range for c l e rk s cover a l l 
"graded" p o s i t i o n s i n the s e r v i c e wi thout d i s t i n g u i s h i n g between 
posts which a r e " p r o f e s s i o n a l " or " t e c h n i c a l " i n na tu re and those 
which a r e " a d m i n i s t r a t i v e " . In New South Wales, ©n the o t h e r hand. 
- 339 -
35 
there is a divisional structure^^ so that the classification shown 
applies only to the clerical division of the service, into which 
budget ©fflcers would fall. Other divisions have separate 
classification arrangements, though the patterns are not dissimilar 
from that ef the clerical division. For the adult clerical officer 
there is, then, a nine-year salary range in which there is automatic 
progression subject to satisfactory reports as to conduct and 
efficiency. Beyond that there are fourteen grades covering 
administrative posts up to, but not including, the assistant under 
secretary level, the salaries for top positions being separately 
determined. At various stages there are prom©tl©n barriers which can 
be passed ©nly after an officer has satisfied the requirements of 
public service examinations or has obtained equivalent "outside" 
qualifications. The third of these examinations, conducted in terms 
of public service regulation 122, qualifies an officer for promoti©n, 
subject to vaeancles, into what is known as the "higher series of 
grades". I.e. grades 4 to l4. The lowest position for budget officer, 
the assistant budget Inspector level* is at grade 5 and therefore 
requires completion of or exemption from all three Internal 
examinations. 
The New South Wales classlficatioa structure ©utHaed above does 
35o The public service act of l884 Introduced a system of divlsloas 
similar t© that of the Vlctorlaa act of the precedlag year. There 
were thea four divisions: special; professional; general 
(equivalent to the present clerical division); and educational. 
The act of 1895 and all subsequent acts have recognized five 
divlsloas: special (I.e. heads of departments and equivalent); 
professional; clerical; general (mainly manual and manipulative 
workers); and educational* 
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not necessarily Involve an officer's slowly working his way through 
the automatic range and each of the series of graded positions which 
follow. It is possible, and Indeed common, for an officer to "break 
out" ef the Incremental range well before he reaches Its top, and he 
may subsequently jump particular grades. The likelihood of an 
officer's by-passing one or more grades will, hewever, depend largely 
36 
on the classification pattern of his department. This factor is 
important In Queensland also, but In that state's public service 
there are proportionately fewer posltlsns in each department classified 
37 
above the autoaatle range and it is much less common for an officer 
to bo promoted to a classified post before completing all steps in the 
automatic salary scale* In beth services "promotion" as distinct from 
mere "advancement" occurs, but it is more frequent in seme departments 
than In ethers, and looking at the services as a whole It may be said 
that Queensland's classification arrangements and general approach 
te personnel management tend to stress the notion of steady advancement 
as the road to the top, whereas these factors in New South Wales lead 
38 
to greater emphasis being plaeed upon promotion, 
36. In the New South Wales department of education, for Instance, the 
second-la-charge of a braach is normally classified at grade 3 
with his next promotiea taklag him t© ©fflcer-la-charge at grade 5, 
la other departments there might be numerous positions classified 
at grade 4 te which prom©tl©n would be made, 
37. See B. B. Schaffer and K, W, Knight, ©p.clt., pp.6-7. 
380 An excellent discussion of the distinction between promotloa aad 
advaacemeat Is to be found in B.B, Schaffer, "Staff Conditions aad 
Careers as a Problem of Maaagemeat," Pabllc Admlalstratloa (Sydaey), 
Vol. XIX, No. 1, March, 196O, pp.3-17. V, Subramaalam, 
"Classlficatioa, Promotion and Arbltratlea - Comparlsoas and 
Contrasts," ibid., pp.66-76, also discusses this distinction. 
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The general promotion procedures in each service are also 
significant. In Queensland a l l vacant c lass i f i ed posit ions must 
be advertised l a the Government Gazette. An officer of the public 
service commissioner's department then confers with responsible 
departmental o f f i c i a l s to determine which applicant sheuld be 
appointed. These off icers repor t to the public service commissiener 
who in turn subsiits h is rec©mmendati©n te the g©vernor-ln-c©uncll. 
Formally promotions are made on the basis of efficiency and not 
seniority, the l a t t e r being taken i n to account only when two or more 
39 
applicants are equally eff icient , -^ Provision i s made fer appeals by 
officers against acceptance by the g©vern©r-ln-councll ©f the 
commissiener's recommendations, but such r igh t of appeal i s l imited 
to officers employed in the department where the vacancy occurred 
who were appllcajits for the posit ion* The ground ef the appeal may 
be either superior eff iciency or equal efficiency plus sen io r i ty 
over the ©fflcer promoted. Public service regulat ion 127 debars 
appeals in respect of appointments to the higher admlais t rat lve 
offices l a the s e rv i ce . Almost lavar iably the appeal t r ibunal consis ts 
of a s t ipendiary magistrate as chairman with a representat ive of the 
cofflfflissloner and a representa t ive of the off icer appointed by the union* 
Counsel may appear and the procedures to be followed are prescribed by 
the o f f i c i a l i n q u i r i e s evidence a c t . The role of the appeal board i s , 
however, only an advisory one, the f ina l decision res t ing with the 
39* These are the provisions found in section 19 of the public service 
ac ts and par t 6 of the public service regu la t ions . 
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gevernor-ln-council, with n© provision for further appeal to any 
40 
ether court or tribunal. 
In New South Wales the power ef recommending pr©m©tl©ns t© the 
govern©r-ln-c©uncll has been vested since 1895 la the public service 
4l 
beard. The board has a strong Inspectorial section which maintains 
continuous and close contact with departments. All proposed promotions 
are carefully examined by the Inspector f©r the particular department 
and in practice the Inspecter will usually be drawn int© the discussicns 
in the initial stages, before a formal recommendation is made by the 
department to the public service board Itself. Unlike the Qaeensland 
situation there is no requirement for the gazettal of all vacancies and 
most are, in fact, filled without advertisement. There is, however, a 
weekly publication. Public Service Board Notices, circulated throughout 
the service. In which advertisements may be placed if a department 
finds difficulty In filling the position from within its own ranks, 
where the p©sltlon is a senior one, and in the case of special groups 
such as the budget branch officers. Newspaper advertisements seeking 
applications from the public are used mainly for professional or ot|ier 
positions requiring special qualifications. 
The public service act provides that In making promotions seniority 
is to be subordinated to considerations of "special fitness". Here it 
'K). The provisions concerning appeals are contalaed in secticns 30, 35, 
35A, and 36 of the public service acts, with certain rights and 
procedures being provided for in the public service regulations. 
4l. Early public service boards tended to delegate the recommending power 
to departments but this practice was severely criticized by the 
Allard Comnisslon of 1917 which recommended that the board should 
strictly supervise promotion and suggested the appointment of an 
Inspectorial staff to assist with this function. 
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should be neted that the term seniority has quite different meanings 
from one service to another. In New South Wales seniority Is not 
determined by length of service, but is based primarily on salary 
or, when ©fflcers draw equal salaries, on the length of time each has 
been at the particular level. Relative seniority changes, therefore, 
as officers receive or fall to receive promotlen. The situation is 
affected, too, by the fact that seniority is not service or 
division-wide. Instead there are many separate seniority lists 
42 
covering departments or sections of departments. This fragmentation 
means that the promotion and transfer of officers frequently Involves 
their seniority being determined afresh, creating considerable 
difficulty In personnel management In the service. In Qaeensland, 
on the ©ther hand, the significance ©f senl©rlty In the making ©f 
promotions Is somewhat indeterminate. Although seniority is stated to 
be a ground of appeal the nature of seniority is nowhere defined and 
it is a number of years since the public service commissioner published 
a list of officers employed In the service as he is supposed to do 
44 biennially. 
The appeal rights of officers of the New South Wales public service 
are more restricted than In Queensland. Appeals cannot be based on the 
claim of superior fltaess, but only on seniority. That is to say, an 
'^ 2. V. Subramanlam, op.cit,, p.74, reports that In 1959 there were more 
than 250 distinct seniority groupings In the service, 
'^ 3. Pabllc service acts, section 36(2) (a), 
^. Section 42 of the mbllc service acts requires the commissioner to 
keep a record showing, amongst other things, each officer's age and 
date of appointment, while section 42(2) specifies that the list is 
to be published biennially in the Government Gazette. 
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officer may appeal only If he has been superseded, either by somebody 
who occupied a lower place on his particular senl©rlty list, or by 
somebody brought Into his department from elsewhere in the service or 
from outside it. There is provision for appeal to special promotions 
committees, but this avenue Is seldom. If ever, used. An officer may 
also appeal to the public service board against any decision made by 
the board, but, again, this is a right that is seldom used la matters 
related to prometlea. The mala aveaue ©f appeal is the crown employees' 
appeal board, created la 1944, with a chalrmaa who has the status of a 
supreme court judge aad who sits with a representative respectively of 
the employer and employees. Through its successive decisloas the appeal 
beard has built up a useful body of case law on efficleacy and 
semiorlty, th©ugh It has beea criticized from time to time because 
of the publicity attendaat upoa its activities and the legalistic 
nature ©f the proceedlags, duriag which sealor officials may be 
subjected to cross-examlaatloa by their subordinates aad their counsel. 
These, then, are some of the c©ndlti©ns under which the struggle 
for prcmetlon ensues and which must be taken Into account In Australian 
public services In obtaining personnel for budget examination. 
The formal provislens cenceraiag sealorlty aad pr©motlen appeals 
Might suggest that inter-departmental m©vement of officers would be 
more frequent In Queensland than In New South Wales, since In the former 
state all vacancies are advertised suid there are not the problems caused 
by the existence of numerous separate seniority lists. This is not the 
case, however, at least for those officers occupying top positions in 
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each service. In general, senior officials in Queensland have 
much less Inter-departmental experience than their counterparts 
in New South Wales. The members of the two important administrative 
cadre groups in New South Wales, the budget and public service 
inspectors, are normally appointed to such positiens only after they 
have demonstrated their capacity la one or more of the operating 
departments. For the budget branch recruitment is normally by 
advertisement throughout the service, with accountancy or econ©mlcs 
quallfleatlens specified, and the status ©f the branch is such that the 
number ®f applicants for the advertised positions is likely to be 
:?ery high: up to a hundred applications for two posts, for example. 
Nor, In practice, do the general appeal provisions limit the exercise 
of free choice in the making of budget branch appointments. The 
treasury Is a cemparatively small department and few ©f the officers 
in its other sections possess the formal academic qualifications laid 
down fer appointment to the budget branch. Experience suggests, 
moreover, that for the public servant with prospects of becoming part 
of the administrative eUte the exercising of his right of appeal is 
unlikely to be effective, and may, indeed, be dangerous, except at an 
early stage in his career or if he is in ©ne ©f the larger and more 
impersenal departments. A victory in appeal proceedings is hard to 
45 
achieve and may, in any case, be a Pyrrhic one, 
^5* Since the crown employees' appeal board was established la 1944 
there has beea oaly oae appeal agaiast aa appointment as asslstaat 
budget laspeetor, and this appeal was unsuccessful. 
on 
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Canada and the United States pf America 
Although In Canada there is a higher degree of centralizati 
in public service personnel maaagemeat than is normally found in 
American states, we aay treat the two countries together In this 
section since they have similar procedures and approaches to the 
recruitment of specialist personnel such as those engaged in 
46 budgetary analysis. 
In m©st states, even those which have central personnel 
agencies, the recruitment of analysts is largely in the hands of the 
budget office itself.^^ Various methods may be used. Sometimes 
advertisements are placed in professional journals published by the 
associations to which administrators, tax officers, city managers, and 
80 on may belong; or recruiting booths may be set up at the annual 
conferences of such organizations. Most commonly, however, recruitment 
results from the regular liaison between budget officials and bodies 
©r groups likely to constitute a source ©f potential budget staff. 
The universities provide one ©f the main such sources, the usual 
method ©f approach being aot the fermal canvassing of graduating 
students but the building up of close contacts with appropriate 
members ©f the academic staff. When relationships of this sort are 
established and academics are made aware of the needs of the budget 
®ifice and the type of appointee seught they are well placed t© refer 
*!•&, For Australian students the readiest source ©f material ©n general 
persennel practices la Canada is the excellent c©llecti©n ©f readiags 
la part III of J, E. Hodgetts aad D. C. C©rbett, Caaadiaa Public 
Admlaistratlon, Toroat©, Macmillaa, 1960, pp,249-^ f33l " 
*7o Callforala and New Y©rk are notable exceptions. 
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suitable candidates for Interview, This wi l l be even more 
particularly the case when a nearby univers i ty conducts specia l 
courses in public adminis t ra t ion , since the existence of a 
programme ©f ins t ruc t ion of t h i s so r t wi l l often predispose the 
faculty members lnv©lved t© seek posi t ions for the i r graduates. 
In this they may be motivated largely by the desire to enhance the 
prestige of the t ra in ing programme both within the univers i ty and 
in the community genera l ly . 
Another common source of r e c r u i t s i s to be found In the range 
ef prS.vate organizations with which budget o f f i c i a l s have professienal 
relati©nships: bureaus ©f research, managements consul tants , 
taxpayers' a ssoc ia t ions , and the l i k e , Nevada's f i r s t budget 
director, for instajace, was executive secretary of the s t a t e 
taxpayers' associa t ion before he was appointed in 1959* and the 
present budget d i rec tor a l so previously held that posi t ion; whilst 
one of the budget analys ts had experience in the assoc ia t ion ' s 
office and ainother was formerly employed with a firm ef management 
consultants. In each Instance recruitment came as a r e su l t of 
infermal contact between s t a t e o f f i c i a l s and the pr ivate organization 
concerned. 
Even though the budget agency I t s e l f may play the major ro le 
in recru i t ing a n a l y s t s , the s t a t e ' s personnel agency wi l l normally 
part icipate In the se l ec t loa process by: ( i ) re fe r r ing apparently 
qualified persons to the budget o f f ice , but allowing that office 
freedom of s e l ec t i on ; (11) d i r ec t l y ©©-©perating with the budget 
agency l a seeking r e c r u i t s ; and ( i l l ) conducting examinations for 
- 3^8 -
prospective appointees, Oregon provides a good exeimple of the 
second of these forms of participation. There the civil service 
commission Is responsible for recruitment of analysts by advertising 
In state and nati©nal professional journals and manning recruiting 
booths at conferences, while the budget office concentrates ©n 
contacts with universities and budget agencies In other states In 
the search for qualified appointees. As far as examinations are 
concerned these are semetlmes devised by the pers©nnel agency Itself 
but mere often they are drawn up, as In Michigan and Oregon, jointly 
by the budget and personnel agencies. The tests may be designed to 
assess general aptitude and/or kaowledge of financial administration, 
depending upon the level in the service at which the analyst Is to 
enter. At the lower levels of the analyst grade there tends to be 
an emphasis upon general aptitude testing, with tests of management 
er administrative knowledge being added fer higher pests. For the 
mest part, however, formal examinations are not held, applicants 
qualifying for appointment on the basis of their general education 
and previous experience, and selectloa belag made by competitive 
interviews, with the nature of the Interviewing panel varying 
according to the level of the position to be filled. In some cases 
examinations may have to be held to c©nf©rm t® general civil service 
regulations, but the Interview still remains the decisive element, 
California and New York are examples of states In which reertiitment 
©f analysts Is in the hands of the central personnel agency, although 
in beth states final selection Is left to the budget office. In 
California the personnel agency seeks possible appointees for the 
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budget office by bi-annual recruiting in the major colleges aad 
universities, classified advertising, aad by contact with departmental 
personnel offices te locate suitable candidates already In the civil 
service. Written examinations designed to assess general intelligence 
and aptitude fer budget work are held and after further screening the 
successful applicants are passed to the budget agency for final 
interview to determine whether appointment as an smalyst will be 
offered. Similarly, the New York civil service commission is 
responsible for Initial recruitment in that state. Here, however, 
the main avenue of entry for those with no previous experience is 
through a well established state-wide internship scheme open to 
these having an appropriate master's degree who pass a written 
aptitude test and oral examinations which aim at evaluating ability 
to speak clearly and effectively, rapidity of comprehensl©n. Interest 
in administration, and ability to deal with people and problems of 
an administrative kind. For those who satisfy the civil service 
commission's general requirements selection then becomes a two-way 
process. In the sense that departments seeking Interns interview 
candidates directly, but the Interns themselves have a degree of 
choice and may approach a number of departments before accepting an 
appointment. To facilitate this process candidates are furnished with 
details of the posltl©ns available in each department, the 
qualifications sought, the type of training offered, and the name of 
the prop©sed supervisor. The internship period is one year and at 
the end of that time the Intern may remain with the department In an 
established position or may eleet to transfer to another department* 
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Although the budget division Is only one of the organizations covered 
by this scheme It uses it extensively as a recruiting medium and is, 
in fact, one of the key agencies Involved, 
Throughout Canada and the United States there is an acute 
shortage ef staff with the background and qualifications for budget 
analysis. There is, therefore, strong competition in recruitment from 
the limited pool of staff available and a high degree ef mobility 
of personnel is apparent. There is substantial staff turnover in 
some budget offices, particularly since there is net only nruch 
interstate but also Interdepartmental c©mpetitl®n as expansl©n ©f 
services emphasises the need f©r m©re highly skilled administrators 
at the operating level. Arrangements permitting relatively free 
interdftpartmental movement may be a two-edged sword f©r the budget 
agency since Its officers are usually well qualified compared with 
the rest of the service and departmental officers will tend te look 
te them as a possible means of filling gaps at senior levels in the 
departments. 
The ability to attract analysts from elsewhere varies widely 
from one budget agency to another and is affected by a long list of 
variable factors relating not only to the office itself and conditions 
of employment but also to the general social context in which the 
office functions. Material eonsiderati©ns will, ©f c®urse, be of 
considerable Importance and here we may note that there are substantial 
differences in salary levels and condltl©as fr©m agency t© agency. 
Differing resp©asibllltles aad systems ©f classlficatioa make it 
difficult to make iaterstate comparisons of the salaries paid to 
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ana lys t s . The s a l a r i e s r e c e i v e d by budget d i r e c t o r s i n 1965, 
48 however, are shown he reunder : 
S t a t e 
C a l i f o r n i a 
New Yerk 
Maryland 
New J e r s e y 
Pennsylvania 
Michigan 
Georgia 
V i rg in i a 
Alaska 
Nevada 
Indiana 
Texas 
Washington 
I l l i n o i s 
Wisconsin 
F l o r i d a 
Massachuse t t s 
Ohio 
Connec t i cu t 
Hawaii 
Colorado 
North C a r o l i n a 
Oklahoma 
S a l a r y 
30 
28 
0 
,300 
, 900 
2 3 , 4 0 0 
19 
18 
18 
18, 
17 
15 
15. 
15, 
, 000 
, 5 0 0 
, 100 
, 000 
,000 
,800 
,100 
,000 
1 5 , 0 0 0 
15, 
1^, 
1^ , 
14 , 
1 3 , 
1 3 , 
1 3 , 
,000 
,500 
,200 
,000 
,600 
600 
500 
1 3 , 5 0 0 
13 ,400 
1 3 , 
1 3 , 
200 
200 
S t a t e 
L o u i s i a n a 
Iowa 
Oregon 
Nebraska 
Rhode I s l a n d 
Tennessee 
Vermont 
M i n n e s e t a 
New Hampshire 
M i s s i s s i p p i 
Kentucky 
M i s s c u r i 
Nor th Dakota 
Maine 
New Mexico 
Kansas 
Delaware 
Sou th Dakota 
Utah 
Montana 
West V i r g i n i a 
Wyoming 
Idaho 
S a l a r y 
13 
13 
12 
12 
12 
12 
12 
12 
12. 
12, 
12, 
12, 
12, 
11 , 
11 , 
10, 
10, 
10, 
10, 
10, 
10, 
10 , 
9 , 
0 
,100 
,000 
,600 
, 500 
, 500 
,500 
,500 
,400 
,300 
,200 
,100 
,000 
,000 
,200 
,000 
,800 
,500 
,500 
,500 
,000 
000 
,000 
600 
hS, This information has been extracted from answers to the 
questionnaires already referred to. Figures have been rounded 
t© the nearest ^100, Where there is a salary range the 
mid-point has been taken. An alphabetical listing which also 
indicates ranges is included as appendix 0 (pp, 492 ff,). 
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It will be seen that these salaries range from ^ 9,600 t© 
^30,300 and are distributed as foll©ws: 
Salary No, of States 
0 
- 9,900 1 
10,000 - 11,900 t 
12,000 - 13,900 2© 
14,000 - 15,900 i 
16,000 - 17,900 1 
18,000 - 19,900 4 
20,000 + 3 
46 
Although the salaries of twenty (i.e, 43%) of the budget directors 
fall within the ^ 12,000 - ^ 13,900 bracket the spread is nevertheless 
sufficiently wide for differences in remuneration to be of significance 
49 in inducing movement between budget agencies. The variaticns will 
49. It is ©f Interest t® note that there is no positive correlati©n 
between the amount ©f salary offered and the qualifications required 
for the post of budget director. The formal requirements for 
appolatmeat as budget dlreeter outlined earlier may be categorized 
as: (a) a tertiary educational qualification and experience; (b) a 
tertiary educational qualification ©r experience; and (c) none 
(i.e. at the discretion ©f the app©lntlng auth©rlty). It might have 
been expected that states offering high salaries would specify 
requirements as for (a) above. If, however, we take four broad 
salary bands - (I) {«fl8,000 p.a. and above; (2) ^ l4,000 - ^ 17,900 
p.a.; (3) ^ 11,000 - ^ 13,900; and (4) below ^ 11,000 p.a. - and set 
these against the specified appointment requirements the following 
picture emerges: 
Qualifications 
(a)] 
(b) 
( c ) 
r 1 
0 
6 
( 1 ) 
1 
3 
5 
(2) 
6 
6 
10 
(3) 
Salaries 
2 
1 
5 
(4 
That is to say, six of the seven agencies in the highest salary 
grouping, aad eleven ©f the sixteea ageacles falllag in the two 
top salary brackets, lay down no specific requirements for 
(Continued p,353) 
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net necessarily be ©f the same order a t the analyst leve l but they 
are substant ia l , however, and the pa t te rn i s similar since the 
salaries shown impose a ce l l i ng on a n a l y s t s ' s a l a r i e s in each agency. 
Salaries and conditions of employment may great ly affect the 
ability of some budget agencies to r e c r u i t experienced personnel 
50 frem ether s t a t e s , but they are not the only such fac tors . Many 
other tangible and in tangible considerations are Involved. Social 
or cultural d ive r s i ty , as for example between English-speaking and 
French-speaking provinces i n Canada or eastern and mid-western s t a t e s 
in America, may serve to reduce the movement ©f analysts between 
agencies. The absence of a merit system and consequent Insecur i ty 
of tenure may ser ious ly handicap a s t a t e ' s attempts to obtain 
qualified budget personnel, as may l ega l provisions l imi t ing employment 
to residents of the s t a t e ©r making i t mandatory to give preference to 
ex-servicemen;, or "veterans" in the American terminology. The prest ige 
of the pa r t i cu la r budget agency, the quali ty of i t s personnel, and 
beyond th i s the reputat ion of the s t a t e ' s c i v i l service as a whole 
49. (continued) 
appointment as budget director, compared with ten out of 
twenty-two agencies in salary group (3) and fifteen ©ut of 
thirty for greups (3) and (4) combined. There is, in fact, a 
slight negative correlation between salaries and qualifications, 
the budget offices In the two higher salary brackets being slightly 
less likely to specify qualifications than those in the lower 
brackets, 
50. To assess the effect on recruitment from within the civil service 
or from the private sector in the state it would be necessary to 
make a detailed analysis to determine whether salary levels in 
the state or the civil service were generally depressed or 
whether this applied only t© the budget agency. A starting peint 
f©r such an examination would be provided by figures published 
annually by the council of state governments; e.g. The Book of the 
States, Vol, XVI, 1966/67, pp,l40-l4l, gives the salaries of heads 
of the major departments and agencies in each state. 
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will have a significant bearing on recruitment, particularly Insofar 
as these are relevant to a prospective analyst's assessment of his 
prospects of further progression, either within the budget agency 
or in other departments. These sorts of considerations are forcing 
some budget agencies, which might not otherwise have done so, t© 
extend their contacts with local universities, to attempt t© attract 
undergraduates by pr©vldlng part-time training and empl©yment 
opportunities, and to Introduce various training schemes designed to 
enhance the effeetlveaess of staff members after their appointment 
and te Improve their promotion prospects. 
Post-entry training is discussed in the next secticn. We may 
note here, hewever, that as a recruitment measure some states have, 
as in New South Wales, Introduced part-time "laternshlp" schemes which 
provide an opportunity for selected university students to work In 
government agencies, with the expectation that some will take up 
permanent pests after graduation. The present arrangements in 
Pennsylvania are a go©d example. Siac« 1959 tw© ©r three students 
annually have been given internships during the summer vacation period, 
their work assignments in agencies like the governor's office and the 
budget bureau being designed partly to allow for their being performed 
by those with only limited knowledge of governmental organization and 
procedures, and partly to provide coverage of a wide range ©f state 
activities. If assignments are carefully ehssen and supervised an 
agency should not only receive useful services from these trainees, 
but has a good chance of meeting part of its continuing need for budget 
analysts created by the highly competitive recruitment situation. 
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As we ha*e noted New South Wales has a similar scheme in operation, 
and its most recent appointee to the budget branch was attracted to 
his post as a result of his part-time employment. 
TRAINING AND STAFF DEVELOPMENT 
Methods of training budget analysts do not differ substantially 
in the three countries with which we are concerned, alth©ugh as we 
shall see, there are individual budget ©fflees which concentrate on 
trialnlng to a greater extent than is usual. 
Almost all agencies provide some form of orientation training 
immediately following an analyst's initial appointment. Such 
training is usually of brief duration and is often given informally. 
At least tw® distinct alms are evident, some types of introductory 
training taMng a broad perspective, others being specific in 
approach. That is to say, the orientation period is sometimes used 
to give the new appointee an overall picture of the place of the 
budget bureau in the state's administrative structure and to relate 
the role ©f budgeting to governmental activities generally, whereas 
in other Instances there is a concentratien on making the appointee 
familiar with the actual routines associated with the work of the 
budget agency. In agencies in which no formal induction training or 
"settling in" period is provided, an attempt may nevertheless be made 
t© meet both these aims by assigning the newly appointed analyst to 
particular types of work or arranging for him to handle special 
projects. He may, for instance, be asked to examine and report on a 
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departmental proposal which raises issues affecting a number of 
departments - perhaps an organizational question bearing on allocation 
of functions, consideration of a superannuation scheme, revision of 
regulatiens covering departmental travel arrangements, or review of 
programmes which attract financial assistance from the central 
government. 
Levels ©f responsibility for providing induction training and 
for supervising new appointees differ from one ageacy t© aa©ther, 
and depend largely ©n the size ©f the budget ©ffice and its lateraal 
organizational arrangements. In general, h©wever. It may be said 
that when there is a specific programme of orientation training, 
as in, say, Kentucky and Oregon, it is most likely to be conducted 
by the budget director himself, with the assistance of one or two 
senior officers of the ageacy, whereas more Informal orientation 
procedures will normally be left to ©ne ©r m©re ©f the experienced 
analysts at the middle level. Of ccurse, the existence of formal 
induction procedures does not preclude there being supplementary 
training of an Informal kind or the assigning ©f an experienced 
analyst t© ©versight the work of a newcomer. 
Orientation is, perhaps, a comparatively minor aspect of the 
general field of training and staff development, particularly when 
recruitment is for the most part at graduate level. It may 
reasonably be expected that a newly appointed budget officer will 
fairly quickly be able t® master the salient p®lnts in the acts, 
regulati©ns, administrative and fiscal cedes, manuals, and 
©ther written material relating t© his duties. Often, too, he will 
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already be familiar with basic texts in the field of government and 
sometimes with specialized material relating to governmental budgeting. 
Whether this is so or not, however, it may be assumed that an appointee 
at the level ef analyst can readily acquire the knowledge he needs 
about the state's general political and administrative structure 
and about the place and role of the budget agency. Of more significance 
are the steps takem to acquaiat aaalysts with the infermal aspects of 
their w©rk and relatioashlps, and the staff develepment procedures 
designed t® fit analysts f®r appointment to higher posts either in 
the budget agency Itself or in other governmental bodies. The 
picture in this respect is not a bright one in any of the countries we 
are examining. 
The budget agencies in the United States which in 1965 provided 
formal in-service training for analysts are listed below and an 
indication is given of the nature of the training given in each case. 
Agencies not listed have no formal training programmes, except in a 
few iastances for brief periods of orientation instruction, 
California - Junior staff members are supervised by 
experienced analysts and their work assignments 
are changed aaaually, 
Colorado - A special la-service training programme of nine 
months' duration is conducted by the principal 
administrative analyst in charge of each section 
of the budget office, 
Connecticut - The budget officer in charge of each section 
holds weekly meetings with analysts during their 
first year of service, 
Illinois - Staff members are supervised dally during their 
first six months' service by a research supervisor 
or a senior analyst. Thereafter, weekly training 
sessions are conducted. 
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Kansas -
Maryland -
Minnesota -
Missouri -
New Mexico -
New Yerk -
Ohio -
Pennsylvania -
Rhode Island -
West Virginia -
Wisconsin -
Staff training meetings are held "ocGasi©nally", 
A pr©gramme of two years' duration conducted by 
the chief of the budget bureau, the supervising 
analyst and the senior analysts is provided fer 
trainee budget analysts. New appointees with 
previous budgetary experience are not required to 
participate. 
There Is an initial training prcgramme ©f six 
m©nths• 
Three t© six months training is provided, 
A short training programme for new staff members 
is conducted by the budget program analyst. 
Each unit within the division of the budget 
conducts its own training programme, in addition 
to the service-wide internship scheme and 
laterdepartmeatal programmes in specialized 
fields such as EDP aad research aad statistics, 
A training scheme to be administered by the 
assistant chief ef the budget division was being 
formulated. It was to consist of five two-hour 
orientatlen sessi©ns, f©ll©wed by thirty 
two-hour training sessions. 
There is a service-wide management trainee 
scheme of ©ne year's duration managed jointly 
by the civil service commissi©n and the pers©nnel 
bureau. 
A four-course programme covering aspects of 
public finance is administered jointly by the 
division of personnel and the university of Rhode 
Island, Trainees als© spend one month in studying 
state budgetary procedures before beginning work 
under the supervision of am experienced budget 
examiner. 
There is a one-year training programme fer newly 
appointed budget analysts. 
An orientation programme of several weeks is 
provided. 
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It will be seen that only fifteen agencies claim to have 
training programmes, and In several instances^'' these can hardly be 
regarded as constituting regular ©r substantial training designed t© 
familiarize staff members with new techniques, t© increase their 
skills, ©r te expand their horizons. In Australia and Canada the 
emphasis is almost eatlrely upoa "on the j©b" training, with newly 
appointed analysts being supervised fer a period by their more 
experienced colleagues. 
Saskatchewan does, however, have a scheme^^ under which the 
budget bureau takes three ©r f®ur trainees a year ©n the understanding 
that mest will be pested to other departments and agencies after a few 
years. These trainees are given an intensive orientation course and 
then for some eighteen months undertake a series of training projects 
largely in the form of organization and methods studies. Part of 
their training also consists ©f up to forty lectures given by senior 
officials and academics on topics such as provincial history and 
eeonoaic conditions, machlneiy ®f gevernment, administrative analysis, 
and the working of the federal system. These lectures are thrown open 
te a limited number of senior officers from other departments and all 
deputy ministers, so that discussion gains frem the participation of 
officials directly associated with major areas ©f g©vernmental 
respenslbllltye This scheme is a valuable means ©f staff development 
51. e.g, California, Kansas and Wisconsin, 
52, See K, B, Callard, Advanced Administrative Training in the Public 
Service, Toronte, Institute ©f Public Administration of Canada, 
1956, chapter IV, "Administrative Training and Development," reprinted 
in J. E. Hodgetts and D. C. Corbett, op.cit., pp.311-321, 
Saskatchewan's arrangements are described on pp.315-316, 
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not only f©r the budget bureau i t s e l f , but als© for ©ther un i t s of 
government, 
In some other s t a t e s there are s taff development programmes 
that are relevant to our discussion of t ra in ing but which are 
service-wide in the i r appl ica t ion and not directed spec i f ica l ly to 
budget o f f i c i a l s . New York s t a t e , for ins tance , has an in te rnsh ip 
programme which Includes academic t ra in ing in management and supervised 
work experience. This scheme was or ig ina l ly confined to new entrants 
te the c i v i l service who were graduates, but was subsequently extended 
to take in serving o f f i c i a l s under the age ©f t h i r t y - s i x and n©t 
necessarily having formal academic qua l i f i ca t ions . Up te s ix such 
trainees may be nominated annually by each department. They at tend 
the same courses on various aspects of management as i n t e r n s , but are 
also given specia l assignments and supervision within the i r departments. 
In some circumstances the work done may be credited towards a 
bachelor's or advanced degree. The programme as a whole i s spoasored 
by the perseaael department, but i t i s s t reagly supported by the budget 
division which regards i t as providing excel lent background t ra in ing for 
budgetary work. S imi lar ly , Oregon has a service-wide s ta f f development 
programme of eight weeks' duration which i s conducted by the s t a t e ' s 
management d iv i s ion . 
Such t ra in ing courses are n©t common in the Australian aad 
Canadian s t a t e public s e rv i ce s , though l imited use i s made by 
Australian s t a t e services ©f the t ra in ing f a c i l i t i e s of the administrat ive 
- 36l -
staff college,^^ while New South Wales also provides courses of 
instruction fer officers studying for the internal grade examinations,^^ 
In this latter instance, however, it may be noted that all three 
examinations would have had t© be completed before an officer would 
be eligible for appointment to a position of classification equivalent 
te even the most junior posts in the budget branch of the treasury. 
The civil service in British Columbia also has an executive development 
training plan conducted in con junction with the university of British 
Columbia, This programme was instituted in 1956 under the direction 
of Dr, D. C. Corbett, then professor of economics and political science 
at the university ®f British Columbia.^ It takes in about thirty 
civil servants a year. The concentratien is ©n middle-management 
personnel, there being initial entrance requirements of five years' 
state governmental service, a classification of at least senior clerk, 
and a departmental rec©mmendati©n, with subsequent screening by a 
selecti©n cemmlttee. The subjects taught are: government of Canada, 
53* This institution, modelled on the administrative staff college at 
Henley-®n-Thames, has been in ©peratien since 1957. An advanced 
course ®f ten weeks is offered three times a year, and an 
intermediate course of four weeks is conducted twice a year. 
Forty are admitted to each course of wh©m about two-thirds come 
from business, with the remainder being drawn frem governmental 
and semi-governmental bodies, trade unioas, and the armed services. 
54, New South Wales is the oaly Australian state public service having 
examinations which constitute barriers to progression in the 
clerical and administrative field. 
55, This course is described and favourably commented upon by John 
J, Hebal, op,Glt,, pp,230-231, See also K. B. Callard's 
description in J, E, Hodgetts and D. C. Corbett, op.cit., p.3l4. 
56, Dr. Corbett Is now Professor of Political Theory and 
Institutions at The Flinders University of South Australia, 
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psychology, economics, accounting, law, English, public administration, 
personnel administration, and public finance. As an administrative 
tradning medium Hebal assesses the programme's effectiveness as 
follows: 
"The culmination of a successful three-year program In 
the Executive Developmeat Traialag Plaa is the awardlag of 
a Diploma la Public Admlaistratlea by the University, 
Beyond this tangible evidence of accomplishment, what 
evidence have we of the contribution this training program 
makes to more effective administration? Neither the number 
of studeats nor the size of the Commissien staff has permitted 
any controlled evaluation. The students are enthuslastie 
about Its value, including tw® wh© entered the pr©gram with 
a Ph.D, The fact that departments continue to support It 
with students is persuasive. Given the university-level 
emphasis, especially notable in the third year administration 
courses, there can be little doubt that those who complete the 
Executive Development Training Plan are better equipped as 
decision makers than those who have not had similar training." 57 
Within budget agencies themselves staff development techniques 
are usually of an Informal nature, academic-type training methods 
being seldom used. As has already been mentioned training is most 
commonly arranged by assigning the new staff member te a senior budget 
analyst who is made responsible both fer task allocation and for 
supervision. Considerable variation is therefore apparent In the 
quality of staff development training from agency to agency; some 
supervisors do little more than ensure that the new analyst carries 
out his allotted assignments, while others make a genuine attempt to 
explain the sigaiflcance of each ©perati©n and its place in the 
agency's overall functions, 
57. John J. Hebal, op.cit,, p,231. 
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In selecting appropriate assignments for the newly appointed 
budget officer it is frequently argued that work of a detailed 
and elementary kind provides the most suitable basic training in 
that it makes the analyst familiar with the organizati©n and routines 
of the budget office and of the departments with which he must deal. 
It is sometimes also suggested that t© require an analyst to apply 
himself to detail Is a good thing per se; that an officer's future 
develepment is contingent upon his possessing the ability and 
persistence needed in the handling of the routine and pedestrian 
tasks that are part and parcel of any organizational situation. 
This line of argument is not, ef course, applied only in relation 
to budgeting. It is common in a variety of administrative fields and 
in some cases it may have much to commend it as a training medium. 
As far as budget work is concerned, however, the usefulness of such 
training is questionable to say the least. Most budget officials 
are recruited at a level of qualification and experience considerably 
higher than applies generally in their particular public service, or 
have acquired academic qualifications by part-time study before 
app®intment as analyst. To require such personnel to perf©rm 
elementary clerical tasks is wasteful, and quite apart fr©m that, 
concentratien ©n detail may make it difficult f©r new staff members 
to appreciate the significance of the roles of analyst and budget 
agency or the broad pattern of relationships between the various state 
organizations . 
- 364 -
A careful choosing of assignments is essential for the 
development of experienced analysts as well as those ©nly recently 
app©lnted. S©me agencies, for instance, consciously change 
analysts' assignments at regular Intervals. This may be done to 
minimize the likelihood of an analyst's identifying himself too 
closely with the departments wh©se estimates he is responsible for 
examining and so impairing his objectivity of approach. In budget 
offices where the analysts occupy career p0sitl©ns, h©wever, j©b 
rotation is als© used as a meaias ©f staff devel©pment, enabling 
the analyst t© gain a wider view and to enhance his suitability for 
higher management positions. The New York budget division practises 
job rotation for this reason, as does California where analysts are 
58 
shifted at Intervals of approximately two years. In large 
agencies, of course, it is sometimes unnecessary to establish a 
rotation plan as a good deal ©f change in assignments will come 
about in the normal course of events f©ll©wing transfers, resignations 
and retirements. 
There are certain obvious advantages in changing an analyst's 
assignment from time to time. However, the effectiveness of budget 
examination is largely dependent upon the analyst's possessing an 
intimate knowledge ©f departmental functions, organization, procedures 
and personnel. The required depth of knowledge cannot be gained in a 
58. Promotion conditions In California require an analyst to have held 
at least two assignments before being promoted to the level ®f 
ass©ciate analyst and at least three assignments before being 
eligible for appointment as senior analyst. 
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short period, but must be built up in a slow and painstaking fashion. 
Inevitably, then, job rotation will involve some degree of disruption 
of the work of the budget agency. There is, too, the factor that 
departmental officers frequently resent the break in continuity of 
budget examination that comes with the change of analyst, believing 
that the departmental viewpoint cannot be appreciated except by an 
aaalyst who is thoroughly conversant with all the ramifications of the 
department's activities. Lack of ce-operation is sometimes apparent, 
therefore, during the early stages of a budget examiner's assignment 
to a particular department. These sorts of disadvantages must be 
weighed against the possible benefits ©f j©b r©tati©n as a meth©d ©f 
staff develepment and as a way of preventing staleness in budget 
examination or over-identlfication by the aaalyst with the department 
whese estimates he must scrutinise. The answer arrived at will differ 
from one budget ©ffice to another, but in general the larger agencies 
which have a career view ®f the poslti©n of budget examiner will tend 
to favour regalar change of assignment if this does not occur normally, 
whereas the agency which does not look upon the job ©f the budget 
analyst as a career position will be likely t© leave the examiner with 
the same assignment for as loag as possible in ®rder to achieve 
59 
maximum productivity. 
Budget offices comm©nly use a number of other Informal methods 
of staff development. One of the most effective of these Is the staff 
59. Both job rotation and analysts' prospects of progressl©n als© 
depend in part on internal organizatienal factcrs, which will 
be examined in a later section. 
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meeting, which may be conducted along the lines of an academic 
seminar with presentation of papers and reports, ^ ° or which may 
serve simply as a forum for the exchange ©f information and ideas. 
Both these roles are Important la the ccntext ©f budget bureau 
operations. In the larger agencies if there are not regular staff 
meetings information about departmental programmes of activity and 
the problems that have been encountered will be known only to the 
analyst concerned, these t© whom he reports, and perhaps to a few 
of his colleagues with whom he may have informal discussions. 
Other analysts may not be aware of a problem's existence, its 
seriousness, its incidence, ©f the way it was handled, or of the 
lessens that can be learned from it. In the early stages a staff 
meeting enables a wide range of ideas and experience to be directed 
towards solving a problem, while even after the event discussion is 
valuable in making analysts aware of the way varieus departments 
operate and of their difficulties, s© that they breaden the 
perspective with which they view the work and problems of their own 
departments. 
In Kentucky the staff meeting has been formalized to the stage 
where after reviewing a department's estimates each analyst is required 
to prepare a report for distribution to his colleagues, setting out the 
department's programmes and goals, the allocaticns he has rec©mmendedq;i 
and the reasons for such recommeadatioas. These rep©rts are subsequently 
^, This Is d©ne in Michigan, 
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discussed at staff meetings so that differences of approach to 
similar preblems can be br©ught t© the surface and any duplicaticn 
or overlapping of departmental services can be detected. The 
procedure is also useful as a way of giving analysts a picture 
©f the whole governmental programme and adding to their detailed 
knowledge of the activities of individual departmeats. 
As a device for personnel development the staff meeting is 
most used and is of most value in medium-sized agencies. In the 
large budget office the general staff meeting tends to be unwieldy 
and t© restrict discussion and the flow of infermation. Some 
agencies, therefcre, hold meetings only for senl©r staff. In 
Oregon, for Instance, section leaders meet weekly, while in 
California there are regular meetings to enable the senior budget 
analysts to discuss prop©sed new procedures and to examine current 
policy matters. There are also in Calif©rnla special training 
sessicns in supervision for senior members of the budget staff. 
In neither state, however, is any provlslenmade f©r subsequent 
meetings t@ pass ©n Infermation to analysts at lower levels, it 
apparently being assumed that this will occur by a process of ©smosls. 
Generally speaking, small budget offices do not consider it necessary 
to conduct regular staff meetings aad there is a good deal t© support 
this attitude. Smallness encourages communication and the analyst 
working in close proximity to a handful of others will in the normal 
course of events accumulate a considerable amount of infermation 
about their activities. Nevertheless, even in numerically small 
agencies Increasing activities and coasequeat pressure on staff members 
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are creating problems of communication that may make it difficult 
in the absence of staff meetings for analysts to ensure that there 
is a unified approach to the task of budget examination. 
The maintenance of a library within the budget agency and the 
circulation of periodicals to analysts may also be regarded as a means 
of staff development. This is a common practice in America and 
Canada, where even small budget offices often maintain an extensive 
library and subscribe to a wide range of journals. In the Australian 
states departmental libraries are less frequently found, though 
both the New South Wales budget branch and the Victorian treasury do 
have substantial collecticns of books, journals and official 
publications for the use of budget officers and other members of staff. 
Finally, we may note that in some budget offices analysts are 
actively encouraged to join and participate in pr©fessl©nal 
0rganizati©ns related to their work: the American Society for Public 
Administration, the National Association of State Budget Officers, 
the Canadian and Royal Institutes of Public Administration, varieus 
societies f©r accountants and economists, and so on. Frequently 
special leave is granted for attendance at the national and regional 
sta 
63 
62 
conferences of such bodies and in some American tes research and 
publication by budget analysts is also encouraged. 
61, In most states it is ©nly the larger departments that provide an 
organized library service for members of staff. 
62, This Is more common in America and Canada than In Australia, although 
for several years two or three New South Wales budget officers have 
attended the annual conferences of the Australian regional groups of 
the Royal Institute of Public Admiiaistratlon, 
63, In Australia aad Canada the system of responsible government and the 
tradition of public service anonymity serve to inhibit publlcatl©n 
by civil servants, alth©ugh in both countries articles by ©fflclals 
d© appear in prefessional journals. In practice the situation seems 
somewhat easier in Canada than in Australia. 
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PROMOTION 
In each ef the countries we are examining there is a high 
degree of mobility among budget personnel, although, as we have 
seen, certain variables produce differences from agency to agency. 
Part ©f this m©billty results fr©m the pr©m©tion of analysts 
within their own budgetary ©rganlzatlon or their appointment to 
senior budget posts in other states. 
For most analysts promotion within the field ef budgeting is 
likely t© be very rapid indeed. We have already seen an indicatien 
of this la New S©uth Wales where four of the five senior budget 
inspectors In charge of sections have had less than six years' 
experience in budget examining. Even more striking examples could be 
given, such as Kentucky where some entrants as trainee examiners 
have reached the second level among the operating analysts In less 
than a year, an appointee at the lowest grade ©f analyst became 
64 
assistant budget director six months later, and one budget 
65 
director was appointed after only two years in the budget agency. 
These are exceptional cases, however, and although quick pr0gressl©n 
is cemmon, only special circumstances would produce that sort of 
movement. 
Leaving aside the very small agencies which afford little or no 
opportunity for pr©gressi©n within the state's budget organization, 
64, This officer was highly qualified academically and had entered 
the budget office from a university teaching appointmeat, 
65. Although the positiea of budget director in Kentucky does net fall 
within the state's "merit system" this appointment was not made 
for political reasons* 
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Maryland provides a good example of what an analyst may normally 
expect in the way of career prospects in this field. The situation 
in that state also provides further illustration of a number of 
points already made about recruitment and staff development. 
Prior to 1954 the budget division within Maryland's department 
of budget and procurement consisted ©f ©nly a dlreeter, an 
assistant director and two analysts, together with supporting 
clerical staff. In that year the organization was enlarged te cepe 
with the projected introduction of programme budgeting and the 
assumption of a more positive role by the central agency. Until 
1958 analysts were recruited almost entirely from budget agencies in 
other states. There was, however, a high degree ©f staff turnever, 
with four ©f eight aaalysts resigaiag la one year, and interstate 
recruitment of experienced personnel became increasingly difficult. 
The agency accordingly decided to develop its own analytical staff 
and in 1959 set up a budget analyst trainee programme under which it 
takes in two trainees a year. The lowest pr©fessl©nal level la the 
budget dlvlsloa, thea. Is that of traiaee analyst, with four 
aon-supervisory grades above that. The staffing sltuatioa la late 
1965 may be shown as f oll©ws: 
"6, Als© head of the department. 
^7. The staff has not been Increased since the introduction of 
programme budgeting, although the biennial operating budget 
has risen from about ^ 400,000,000 to ;if700,000,000. 
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Director ef Budgeting and Procurement 
Chief, Division of Budgetlnp^  
Supervising Analyst (l) 
Aaalyst IV Analyst III Analyst II Analyst I Trainee Analyst 
(1) (1) (2) (2) (2) 
In addition, there are two building engineers who rank at the 
Aaalyst IV level, an agricultural adviser who is equivalent to 
analyst I, and two accounting officers at the sub-professional level. 
For recruitment as trainee analyst the agency seeks applicants 
with a master's degree in political science, public administration, 
or business administration. At a salary in 1965 ©f ^ 5,300 p.a, 
for the tw© years ©f the training peri©d, however, it had been found 
difficult to obtain trainees with a master's degree and as an 
alternative possession of a bachelor's degree and two years' working 
experience Is accepted. Although the three fields of study mentioned 
above are these preferred, no otherwise eligible candidate would be 
rejected because he had majored in a different subject. In practice, 
any degree la the humaaities or social scieaces would meet the 
requlremeat for appolatmeat as a traiaee. 
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la dlscussloa with sealor officers of the division the likely 
rate ef pregressloa for tralaees and aaalysts was stated to be: 
(a) Tw© years as a traiaee, worklag uader the supervisioa 
of an experienced analyst and being gradually given 
assignments of greater responsibility, 
(b) Appointment as analyst I following satisfactory completion 
of the training programme. This level has a salary range 
of from |i^ 7,000 to ii?8,800 p.a., and the officer would be 
cencerned in the main with examining the estimates of a 
68 group of relatively small governmental agencies, 
(c) Promotlen from one grade to the next at about tw®-yearly 
intervals. An analyst II (^ 8,940 - ^ 11,200 p,a.) would 
examine the estimates of larger and more complex 
@rganlzati©as aad would also be given some special 
assignments. Including policy development. At the levels 
of aaalyst III (^ 9,700 - ^ 12,125 p,a.) and analyst IV 
(^ 11,100 - /8fl3,850) examining is confined to the estimates 
of one or two large departments and there is a greater 
concentration on investigation of matters relating to broad 
financial policy. 
68, The ease or difficulty ©f the examiner's task is n©t necessarily 
related to the size ©f the pr©grammes being reviewed, however. 
Some small boards deal with politically significant functions 
or are headed by political appointees and may pose hard problems 
for the analyst* 
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None ef the positions in the four analyst grades is supervisory 
in nature, although each of the analysts may be required fr©m time 
to time to ©versight the w©rk of the trainees. The analysts d©, 
however, function Independently of each other, submitting their 
reports dlreetly t© the supervising analyst, whose position is in 
the salary range ^ 12,000 - Jfl5,000 p,a,, and through him to the 
chief ©f the division ({ifl4,000 - $17,500 p,a.). 
Since the office is not organized in sections each arragned 
hierarchically, promoti©a from trainee analyst to analyst IV is 
not depeadeat upea the ©ccurrence of vacancies. Promotion can be 
given when it is felt that an analyst's worth justifies it and, as 
indicated, the agency's senior officers suggest that the traiaee 
could expect t© reach the analyst IV level after about eight years' 
service if his performance remains satisfactory. 
It was claimed that the budget analyst trainee programme had 
worked well. However, examination of the background of the 
existing staff indicates that only tw© ©f thirteen ©fflcers 
completing their tralneeships since 1959 are still with the budget 
division, the remainder having been lost to ©ther state departments, 
to federal government employment, or to budget agencies in ©ther 
states. This high rate ©f turn©ver has als© made it impossible to 
apply the pattern ©f progression suggested as "normal". 
The three tq> positions are occupied by officers described by one 
analyst as the "old guard" who were in the budget agency before the 
1954 reorgaBlzatl©n. The director of budget and procurement is 
appointed by the govern©r but is a career civil servant, aged 
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sixty-seven and with t h i r t y - e i g h t years ' service in governmental 
organizations. He was f i r s t an auditor in the comptrol ler 's off ice , 
became chief of the budget divis ion a t the age of th i r ty -n ine and 
director of the department In h is mid- fo r t i e s . He has held that 
post, theref©re, under severa l govern©rs ©f differing p©l i t ica l 
persuasion. The chief of the divis ion i s aged fifty-tw© and i s 
als© a career c i v i l servant with experience in the s t a t e employment 
service and as head of the bureau of management before coming to h i s 
present posi t ion in 1951* The supervising analyst i s the same age 
as the chief of the divis ion and has had some twenty-five years ' 
service, the f i r s t five ©f which were spent in the c©mptr®ller's 
office and the remainder in the budget d iv is ion . None of these 
officers i s qual i f ied a t the t e r t i a r y l eve l , although the chief 
of the division completed two years of college before entering 
the c iv i l service* Each had experience in governmental accounting, 
however, before appointment to the budget agency. 
The analysts and t ra inees a l l have t e r t i a r y qua l i f i ca t ions . 
Details of these qua l i f i ca t ions , length ©f service in the budget 
divisicn, and previous occupational experience are se t out below: 
Position Age Qualifications Service In Previous Occupational 
Budget Division Experience 
Aaalyst IV 40 B,A.(Maryland) 9 years 
(appointed as 
analyst I) 
Scho©lteacher, f©Hewed 
by 4^ years as ehlet 
Classification sLnalyst 
in the state personnel 
office. 
it III 43 B.A. and M,A. 
(Ohio) 
2 years 
(appointed as 
analyst III) 
Assistant Sity Manager, 
Rockville, Md,, 61ty 
i^ nnager, Salisbury, Md,, 
Staff Assistant, fiscal 
research bureau. 
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Analyst I I 32 B,A*(Maryland) 
Analyst II 
6 years 3 years as social 
(appointed as worker, city welfare 
trainee analyst) department, Baltimore 
40 Associate of 13 years Accountant, state 
Arts (Maryland) (appointed as department of 
- 2 year course, accountant, then welfare. 
Public Account- promoted to 
ant's Certific- analyst I) 
ate. 
6 years' administrative 
experience with state 
econ©my and 
efficiency corp©rati©n. 
Analyst I 
Analyst I 
Trainee 
analyst 
Trainee 
analyst 
58 
40 
26 
26 
B.A, (Loyola 
College) 
B,A.(Maryland) 
B,A,(Loyola 
College) 
B,A.(Maryland) 
10 years 
(appointed as 
analyst I) 
6 years 
(appointed as 
trainee analyst) 
6 months 
6 months 
Drug salesman. 
2 years as academic 
assistant, university 
of Maryland. 
3 years' administrative 
experience in county 
health department. 
The officer at the grade IV level had held that appointment for 
approximately two years, so his pr©ffi©ti©ns had occurred more or less as 
predicted. Similarly, the analyst II wh© had commenced as a trainee had 
had n©rmal pr©gressl©a, having moved to grade II after four years' 
service and belag due for further promoti©a at the time ©f the laterview. 
The aaalyst III had beea recruited at that level t© fill a vacancy 
caused by the transfer of an analyst to a senior post in another 
department. The remaining three analysts, however, do not fit the 
suggested pattern, Oae of these, now at the grade II level, had been 
transferred from an accounting post, again to fill a vacancy caused by 
transfer of another officer to a senior administrative appointment 
elsewhere, and it was underst©©d that he was likely to receive further 
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promotion. Both the grade I analysts, on the other hand, had failed 
to receive pr©m©ti©ns when due and were unlikely t© progress beyond 
the next level In the foreseeable future. 
Compared with most governmental organizati©ns budget ©fflces 
are usually small and analysts normally work cl©sely with each ©ther 
since the estimates ©f the departments they are examining touch and 
overlap at various peints. There is a degree ©f Intimacy in the 
analysts' w©rk situati©n that pr©duces an atmcsphere n©t unlike that 
of many university departments. In which the strengths and weaknesses 
of individuals become well known to their colleagues and to those 
above and below them In the hierarchy. Analysts also come into close 
contact with senior officers of bot]^  the operating departments and the 
staff agencies functicning at the centre ©f the gevernmental machine. 
These fact©rs, taken in conjunction with a situation in which few 
budget ©fflces are hampered in their promotion policies by established 
personnel complements requiring vacancies to occur before promotions 
take place, enable the ability displayed by analysts to be given 
considerable weight in determining their rates of progressi©n. 
Seniority is unlikely to be as important a factor in decisions ab©ut 
prom©ti©n of analysts as it is in larger and more impersonal 
organizations,^ This general situation produces varying patterns of 
progression even among agencies of similar size and internal structure 
69, This is not true only of budget agencies, of course. It applies 
also to the promotion policies of some other central staff 
offices - civil service commissions, some categories of treasury 
©r treasury b©ard staff, and s© on. 
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and which follow similar promotion policies. Generalization 
from statistical material may be misleading, therefore. 
Interviews with a large number ©f budget officers in Canada and 
the United States, however, suggest that the analyst whose 
perfcrmance is satisfactory and who is empl©yed in an agency 
with a staff ©f ten ©r more could reasonably anticipate progressl©n 
te the top range of the classifications for analyst without spending 
more than two to three years at any ©ne level. He will n©t 
necessarily, however, continue to progress steadily into the t©p 
positiens in the agency. Budget directors and assistant directors 
are usually drawn from the ranks of experienced analysts,'''^  but 
71 this is not always the case and the situation is further 
complicated by the nationwide competition for staff and the 
consequent likelihoed of interstate movement or other forms of 
lateral recruitment at the most senior levels. We have already 
noted instances of this in discussing budget agencies in various 
states. 
There are several ©ther factors tending to give rise to 
varying rates of progression amongst agencies. One of the most 
significant ©f these is the existence in seme budget offices of 
70, This d®es not seem to be governed by the existence or otherwise 
©f a merit system in the state's civil service. In Kentucky 
and Tennessee, for instance, the present budget directors and 
their immediate predecessors were all drawn from the budget 
staff, even though neither state had a merit system covering 
the budget agency, 
71, Connecticut's budget director, for example, was selected after 
he had gained first place in the civil service examination for 
the post, but had no previous experience in budget examination. 
- 378 -
specific condltl©ns which must be fulfilled bef©re an analyst 
qualifies fer promotion. In California, as we have seen, there 
are requirements related to the number of separate assignments 
an analyst must have carried out before becoming eligible for 
promotlen beyond certain points. More common than this, however, 
are examination barriers, analysts oftea belag required to pass 
examinations to establish their eligibility fer progression. 
Usually these examinations are of a general nature, identical 
with those set under civil service rules for entrance to the 
service at the level to which the analyst would move by prom0ti©n, 
although the competitive element may be absent so that the 
prospective promotee does n©t have t© be placed high In the 
order of merit In order to qualify for progression. Colorad© is 
a good example ©f such a system; there the juaior aaalyst after 
one year's service must establish his eligibility for promotion 
by passing a written ajad oral examination, and must take further 
/ 
examinations at eadh level before he can move up t© fill a vacancy, 
7? 
In that state, hewever, the element ©f c®mpetiti©n is retained. 
Another factor likely significantly to affect rates of 
progression which sheuld be mentioned here is the internal 
organization of the budget agency. Seme budget offices, like 
Michigan, follow the staffing pattern described for Maryland 
under which all aaalysts, whatever their grade, have individual 
72, Colorado's civil service classification scheme is set out in 
appendix P (pp. 494 ff.). 
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assignments and work without direct supervision. Other agencies, 
hewever, arrange their staff in sections with a senior analyst 
at the head of each and analysts of lower grade working under his 
direction. This we have seen is the practice in the New South 
Wales budget branch which has five sections each consisting ©f a 
senior budget Inspector, an inspector and an assisteint inspector, 
whilst the same general arrangement is found la a number of 
American and Canadian budget offices, including Calif©rnla, 
Colorado, Connecticut, New York, Ohio and Ontario,'^ Apart from 
the possible benefits to be derived from cons©lldatlng the 
examinati©n ©f the estimates ©f departments operating in related 
fields, the sectional arrangement of staff does have certain 
advantages in clarifying lines ©f ccmmand, facilitating the 
smpervisicn ©f inexperienced perscnnel said staff develepment 
generally, and providing specific avenues of progression for 
analysts. It is, however, less flexible than the other main 
organizational pattern since promotlen is more likely to be 
74 dependent upon the occurrence of vacancies. This may result 
in periods ©f little upward movement amongst analysts or, conversely, 
periods during which rapid turn©ver forces agencies to fill vacancies 
by promoting officers with insufficient experience at lower levels, 
73, The allocation of functions amongst sections within budget 
agencies is discussed later, 
74. The extent ©f this dependence varies. The close relationships 
between some budget agencies and the chief executive, civil 
service commission or other personnel auth©rities may give 
them more scope for arranging changes in establishment than 
other agencies are allowed* 
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STAFF TURNOVER 
Obviously there is a close relationship between rates of 
promotion and the extent of the staff turnover due to analysts 
leaving the field ©f budgeting for positions of a general 
administrative kind. The nature of the analysts* role and the 
place of the budget agency in the overall administrative structure 
contribute significantly to the potential movement in all states, 
while in some this potential has been translated into actual 
movement that is frequent and extensive. 
N®t all budget officers accept the view that the analyst 
sheuld occupy a career position. There are, in fact, two opposing 
echeels ef thought ©n this matter. Some stress the desirability 
of extended service in budget examination, putting forward two 
main arguments in support of this prop©sition: (i) that there is a 
need f©r c©ntinulty in the process ©f budgeting; and (11) that it is 
©nly after considerable experience that a budget analyst becomes 
fully effective, so that short tenure in office is wasteful of 
scarce talent. In contrast, other budget officials believe that 
budget examiaation provides excellent training for general 
administration and, going beyond that, look upon the r©le of 
budgeting as extending to the improvement of departmental management, 
On this basis, they would not merely accept but would encourage the 
transfer of budget analysts to administrative posts in operating 
departments. This, they argue, represents a gain not only for the 
state as a whole but also for the budget office, since departmehts 
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will acquire senior ©fflcers experienced in the process of 
budgeting, aware of the requirements ©f the budget agency, and 
needing only a bare minimum of subsequent oversight by the budget 
analysts, B©th these views represent extremes, ©f ccurse, and 
most budget officeri^ /bake up a middle position, supporting the 
need for lengthy tenure by analysts to ensure budgetary continuity, 
but accepting the fact that because of the general demand for 
capable administrators and the high qualifications of most analysts 
few will make their whole career in the field of budget examination. 
However, although some budget offices have classification 
structures for analysts that encourage the development of the 
career concept, and although in other ways it may be p©ssible t© 
previde incentives fer analysts to remain with an agency, almost 
all the budget organizations examined in connecti©n with this study 
are enc©untering severe pr©blems arising from the loss to other 
75 departments of experienced budget examiners. In discussing this 
situation as It then related to New South Wales, Top Public Servants 
in Two States commented: 
",,,there is a tradition of movement from the Budget Branch to 
top positions in the Treasury; though perhaps there is not s© 
much m©vement ©ut ©f the branch t© ©ther departments. This 
may partly be due to the very go©d promotion prospects within 
the Treasury itself. There were fifteen officers in the 
Budget Branch, and approximately seven positions classified 
above them In the Treasury to which they could and are fairly 
likely to go. There had been some movement out of the branch 
75, That this is a widespread p^enomen©n is confirftied by other 
observers. Cf, Arlene T, Shadoan, Organization, Role^  and 
Staffing of State Budget Offices, Lexington, University of 
Kentucky, 1961, pp/150-152. 
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te e ther depar tments : tw© had moved to p o s i t i o n s as pub l i c 
service i n s p e c t o r ; one had gone to the P remie r ' s Department, 
There had a l s o been o t h e r movements, as to the Transpor t 
Department, bu t on the whole these i n t e r - d e p a r t m e n t a l 
movements were compara t ive ly r a r e . This i s i n c l e a r 
con t r a s t with the pub l i c s e r v i c e I n s p e c t o r a t e , a l though 
some r ecen t t r a n s f e r s from the Budget Branch sugges t 
t ha t the c o n t r a s t may be becoming l e s s marked," 76 
Since tha t assessment was made the re has been ample confirmati©n 
of the sugges t ions t h a t budget o f f i c e r s would continue to f i l l 
the t r e a s u r y ' s s e n i o r p o s t s and t h a t i n t e r - d e p a r t m e n t a l movement 
would I n c r e a s e , The t r e a s u r y ' s top echelon now c o n s i s t s e n t i r e l y 
of former budget i n s p e c t o r s : under s e c r e t a r y , deputy under s e c r e t a r y , 
both a s s i s t a n t under s e c r e t a r i e s , ch ie f accountan t , a s s i s t a n t ch ief 
accountant, accountan t ( r e v e n u e ) , accountant ( e x p e n d i t u r e ) , 
o f f iee r - ln -charge ©f 0 & M branch, and ©f f i ce r - ln -cha rge ©f 
correspondence b ranch . In a d d i t i o n , t he re now are former o f f i c e r s 
of the budget branch i n a wide range of top po6it i©ns throughout the 
service . Some examples a r e : a u d i t o r - g e n e r a l ; chairman, e l e c t r i c i t y 
commission; chairman, me t ropo l i t an water sewerage and dra inage 
board; ' chairman, r a i l w a y * appea l s t r i b u n a l ; s e c r e t a r y ( f i n a n c e ) , 
railways depar tment ; v i c e - p r e s i d e n t , maritime s e r v i c e s board; under 
secre ta ry , m i n i s t r y of t r a n s p o r t ; and sen io r i n s p e c t o r , pub l i c s e r v i c e 
76, B, B, Schaf fe r and K, W, Kalght , o p , c i t , , p , 3 3 . 
77. This o f f i c e r was oae of a handful ®f " a d m i n i s t r a t i v e c a d e t s " 
s e l e c t e d for u n i v e r s i t y t r a i n i n g i n 1940 and 194l dur ing a 
s h o r t - l i v e d scheme In t roduced by the New South Wales pub l i c 
s e r v i c e a t t h a t t i m e . His c a r e e r i n the t r e a s u r y i s b r i e f l y 
o u t l i n e d i n K.W. Kalgh t , "Admia i s t r a t lve Cadets l a the New South 
Wales Publ ic S e r v i c o , " Publ ic Admla l s t r a t l oa (Sydaey) , V©1. XX, 
No. 4 , Decefliber, 1961, pp,356-362 (see p a r t i c u l a r l y p . 3 5 8 ) . 
Before t a k i n g up h i s p r e s e n t appointment he was permanent head of 
the t r e a s u r y . 
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board. The officer mentioned In the above quotati©n as g©ing t© 
the premier's department subsequently resigned from the public 
service t© accept a university teaching post; another left te 
become accountant of the university of Sydney. In less than ten 
years the budget branch has lost all except one of its staff of 
analysts, 
Infermation as detailed as this could net be obtained for 
Canada, All the indications are, however, that staff turnover 
rates are high in the provincial budget offices, Saskatchewan 
accepts the fact that mest of its trainee budget analysts will 
transfer to other departments within three er four years ;''^  the 
secretary ©f the treasury beard in Ontarl© indicated that not only 
had there already been a go©d deal of movement of analysts to senior 
posts elsewhere but that most of the existing staff of analysts 
would ©btala pregressloa outside the treasury board's establlshmeat, 
with ao mere than one ©r tw© making their careers in budget examination. 
While conducting Interviews in Ontario the writer met two professors 
who had previously served as budget directors in other provinces, 
twe federal treasury officers who had had experience in senior 
budget pests in different provinces, and three officials occupying 
top posts In operating departments who had been appointed to those 
78. The rate of turnover is even higher than this suggests, since 
several officers have come and gone within the period. An 
element of continuity in budgeting is preserved, however, by 
the filling ®f the treasury's t®p p®sts from the budget inspectcrs' 
ranks• 
79. See K, B, Callard, "Administrative Training and Devel©pment," in 
J, E, Hodgetts and D. C. Corbett, ep,clt,, p.315. 
- 384 -
pests after service in Ontario's budget organization. 
Reference has already been made to the extensive staff 
turnover in some American budget agencies. In California, despite 
high salaries and a classification structure allowing substantial 
progression in the budget division, there is an annual turnover 
of between fifteen and twenty per cent, mostly due to analysts 
moving to general administrative positions in ©ther state 
departments, Shad©an rep©rts, too, that in Oregon's budget agency: 
"...apart from the management administrator and the two 
assistant administrators, at the time of the visit only 
five men had been there two years or more and only one 
man had been through the full budget cycle. In a six 
month period the mortality rate,,,was six men, all of 
whom left for better administrative jobs or to return 
to graduate school. Kentucky and Tennessee have had 
similar turnover histories," 8l 
In these and numerous other budget agencies continual staff 
change creates severe problems in the maintaining of efficiency 
and continuity in budget examination. Analysts often have to be 
given assignments which demand a higher level of personal and 
professional development than they have reached, and experienced 
analysts as well as those in supervisory p©siti©ns frequently w©rk 
under considerable stress as they are called upon both to carry out 
their regular assignments and to train or guide newly appointed 
personnel, 
oO, These were mostly chance encounters, suggesting that movement of 
analysts between pr©vinces, t© ©ther departments, to federal 
gevernment posts, or to universities, is quite common, 
81, Arlene T, Shadoan, op,cit,, p,151. See also the lengthy list of 
former analysts now occupying senior administrative posts in 
federal and state governments given by Shadoan on pp*15^-155* 
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A few agencies have been relatively free of the problems 
caused by massive staff turnover, but it is difficult to pinp©int 
the reas©ns f©r this. Certainly it is not simply a matter of 
whether or not an agency accepts and fosters the career concept 
in budget examination, since California's turnover rate is high; 
though this is a factor to be taken into account. The sources of 
supply of trained personnel will obviously be a relevant consideration 
also. New York's budget staff turnover has been as low as 6 per cent 
in recent years and this seems partly attributable to the internship 
programme which permits careful initial selection of personnel 
suitable for budget work. Michigan, on the ©ther hand, has had 
considerable movement out of the budget office, but this has been 
a reflection ef a deliberate policy favouring short tenure and 
transfer of analysts to administrative posts in line departments. 
The problems involved in this policy have been niinlmized, firstly 
because It has been possible to adjust the turnover so that new 
appointees have been absorbed singly into the budget agency and 
secondly because junior analysts of good calibre have been obtained 
as a result of the agency's very close relationships with three 
major universities. The budget office in Michigan has its "alumni" 
spread throughout the civil service in senior posts, but seldom 
8? 
recruits from wlthla the service. Another factor in both New 
lerk and Michigan is the prestige of the civil service as a whole 
and within the service the high status of the budget bureau. These 
82. It occasionally obtains an analyst by transfer from the civil 
service commission which has a staff of high calibre, but whose 
lines of progression are limited. 
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are strong budget agencies which have been in existence for long 
periods and which are part of strong civil services. With good 
candidates offering for appointment the problems associated with 
staff turnover will not loom large. 
FUNCTIONAL ORGANIZATION AND PERSONNEL 
There is today wide agreement amongst budget officers that 
whatever may be specified in formal statements of functions the 
process ef budget examination carries with it an Implicit 
responsibility to assess the effectiveness of departmental 
management and to help improve managerial procedures and techniques, 
Thd budget sets out the decisions that have been taken about the 
allocaticn ©f resources eimeag ccmpetiag ends, but more is 
involved in the making ©f th©se decisicns than simply the 
weighing up ©f relative needs. While the government is concerned 
with providing the services that will satisfy state needs it must 
also ensure that expenditures produce the maximum possible return. 
In these circumstances one factor to be taken into account in 
deciding upon allocation of funds must be the probable effectiveness 
of the various departments in carrying out the functions for which 
expenditures are to be authorized. If proposed programmes are 
considered to be of equal priority, management efficiency is likely 
to play a significant part in determining which are to proceed. 
That Is to say, the past management performances of departments 
as well as their plans for managing proposed new schemes will be 
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examined by the budget agency as part of its review of departmental 
expenditure estimates. This raises, then, questions about the 
organization and effeetiveness of budget agencies for carrying out 
management analysis as distinct from the financial implications of 
preposed pregrammes ©f activity. 
Management analysis goes well beyoad the activities we 
associate with orgaalzatloa aad methods or systems work, although 
these are Importsmt aspects ef the general management field. The 
management analyst must concern himself with such things as 
defining work units so that programme evsuLuatlon can be carried 
out effectively, assisting the operating departments to Introduce 
new programmes ©r to conduct pilot programmes where necessary, 
establishing standards, co-ordinating activities, and identifying 
overlapping or duplication In the varied departmental functions. 
Much of this can be performed by a generallst, but particular 
facets will require advice from or active partlGlpatlen by 
specialists. For this reason budget offices frequently Include 
officers with specialist qualifications among their staff of 
analysts or. In some cases, set up specialist sections. 
It should be noted, however, that "specialist" need n©t here 
imply the possession of a professional academic degree. That is to 
say, a budget office would be unlikely to recruit a medical 
practitioner to review the estimates of the health department, a 
mining engineer for the department ©f mines, and so on. What may 
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be done, though, is to recruit an officer of a particular department 
to be the budget analyst for that department or others of a similar 
kind. Alternatively, there may be recruitment of an officer from 
another central staff agency who has special knowledge of a 
department fer which the budget office requires an analyst. The 
mest likely sources of such recruits would be the audit office or 
civil service commission. This type of "specialist" approach to 
budget analysis rests upon the belief that for effective budget 
examination the analyst must not only have a good grasp ©fa 
department's activities but must be accepted by departmental 
officers as being knowledgeable about their particular field. 
Although the great bulk of aaalyst recruitment is of 
generallsts, budget agencies often attempt to achieve some of 
the advantages of speciallzatloa by dividing w©rk ©n a functional 
basis s© that analysts have an ©ppertualty t© develep expertise 
in particular areas of governmental activity. The Oregon pattern, 
or some variation of it, is one of the most common among agencies 
of medium size. In Oregon there is a four-fold classification, 
health and welfare, education, natural and econemic resources, 
and general government, into which the departments are fitted and 
analysts tend t© specialize in one ©f these br©ad areas evea th©ugh 
they may be all©tted different departments wlthla the category 
from time to time. Larger agencies are, of course, la a better 
positiea to adopt finer classifications than this, often using a 
basic division lato institutional and non-institutional departments 
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and agencies and then further subdividing these on functional lines. 
Both California and New York have so organized divisions of the 
budget agency and sections within those divisions. The pattern 
consists of one unit which deals with the estimates of 
institutional-type agencies and another handling non-institutional 
budgets, each headed by a chief analyst and under him an assistant 
chief and principal analysts; these are supervisory posts. The 
operating analysts are divided into functionally-based groups, each 
under the charge of an associate analyst whose role is largely 
supervisory but who als© carries out some budget examination duties. 
Assignment of the examining task is to the gr©up rather than to 
individual examiners and, subject to approval from the chief of 
the division, the associate analyst may allocate particular 
departments to members of his group or may adopt a team approach 
to all the estimates for which he is responsible. The size or 
nature of a particular set of estimates largely determines the 
number of analysts participating in the review process. Among 
smaller agencies which have adopted the institutlonal/non-institutional 
dichotemy is Col©rado where one of the budget teams specializes in 
institutions and agencies concerned with health, welfare and 
rehabilitation, and another examines the estimates of all other 
authorities, 
Even If a budget office does not organize its staff in sections 
it may nevertheless assign to individual examiners a set of 
83o i,e, treating separately those departments whose activities are 
mainly concerned with managing institutions of various kinds. 
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departments that constitute a functional group. Without a definite 
sectional arrangement, however, the initial functional distribution 
is likely in time t® break d©wn. This has been found, for example, 
in both Maryland and Michigan when the functionally allocated 
assignments of analysts who have resigned have had to be re-allocated 
amongst those who remain and subsequent appointees have not 
automatically been made responsible for oversight of the same 
departments as their predecessors. 
Agencies may adopt a deliberate policy of non-functi©nal 
allocaticn of work amongst the analysts, but this is comparatively 
rare. Until 1961 Kentucky consciously avoided functional 
alignments, emphasizing its view ©f the generallst nature ©f 
budget analysis by attempting t© include in each examiner's 
assignment a wide range of governmental functions. This was 
found t© be difficult to maintain in practice, however, and the 
agency now places greater stress on the development of functional 
expertise, while maintaining a generallst approach to recruitment. 
Apart from the specialisms arising from arrangements for work 
all©cation budget agencies sometimes employ professional officers 
of variotiis kinds to meet particular needs. The main example of 
this is the appointment of architects and engineers to assist in the 
examination of departmental proposals for capital works. The 
extent of this practice can be seen by reference t© appendix 0 (pp.453 ff. 
which sh©ws United States budget personnel below the level of 
budget director. It will be noted that the employment of such 
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prefessional ©fflcers is by no means common. The only states 
which have graduate architects or engineers as staff members of 
the budget agency are Indlaaa, Marylaad, New Jersey, New York, 
Oregoa, Rhode Islaad, aad Vlrgiala. Four of these states^^ 
each employ oaly ©ae such techalcal adviser; there are tw© la 
the Marylaad aad Oregoa budget offices; New York is the only 
agency which makes extensive use of architects and engineers in 
the preparaticn and execution of the capital budget, la that 
state there is a ualt of the budget agency, set up similarly to 
the tw© units already deseribed, which is responsible for preparing 
the capital budget and for examining the estimates of those 
departments whose major functions involve capital outlay. One of 
Colorado's budget teams also specialises in capital works 
examination, but Is staffed by generallsts. A similar situation 
exists In the states of California and Washington, 
This points to the fact that there are not only differences 
amongst budget agencies In personnel policy but also in organizational 
arrangements for review of the capital budget. In some the work of 
examining capital requirements is separated from exeuninatlon of 
departmental operating budgets, while in others the same staff 
perform both functions; the analyst for the health department 
84. It Is not the practice in Australia to employ technically 
qualified budget personnel; nor was any example of this 
found la the Caaadiaa budget ageacles that were examined. 
85. ladlana. New Jersey, Rhode Island and Virginia* 
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reviews capital proposals related to health and hospitals, 
the agriculture department's analyst examines capital projects 
la that field, aad s© oa, with an overall view of total capital 
requlremeats belag gaiaed oaly whea the separate sets of 
departmeatal estimates are brought together at levels above 
that ©f the operating analyst. 
We have earlier noted the employment in California of an 
agricultural adviser and a medical fees consultant and of an 
agricultural adviser la Marylaad, but these seem to be the ©aly 
instances in which professl©nally trained personnel are employed 
86 
as such in budget examination, ©ther than those concerned with 
capital works. There are real estate and property officers, 
statisticians, research officers of vari©us kinds, data processing 
staffs, organization and methods specialists, and so on, in a 
number of budget offices, but these are seldom directly involved 
in budget examination. Often their work relates to functions 
which have been located with the budget agency but which are 
peripheral to Its msan activity of budget analysis, or to the 
ass®ciated function of management analysis. 
Various forms of governmental ©rganlzatl©n exist f©r conducting 
management studies and we are here concerned only with those that 
are linked with the process of budgeting. It has been suggested that 
86. For a period the New South Wales budget branch included a 
specialist in agriculture, but he was not replaced f©ll©wlng 
his retirement several years ag©* 
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budgeting is a vital management tool. Recognition ©f this, 
hewever, is a comparatively recent development and it is ©nly 
within the last ten years that there has been any substantial 
development of managerial studies as an integral part of the 
budgetary process. Prior to that few administrators would have 
agreed that budget analysts had a responsibility to assist 
departments to define their objectives. Today there is wide 
acceptsinee ©f the view that with the greatly increased complexity 
and cost ©f governmental operatl©ns budget ©fflces have not only 
a right but an obligation to probe every aspect of departmental 
activities through management studies and to develop Improvement 
plans, 
The most direct association between budgetary siad management 
analysis is found in those states which simply combine the two 
functions so that they are carried out by the same personnel. 
This is a common situation, arising sometimes as a result of 
deliberate choice and sometimes because a state's operati©ns are 
not large enough to warrant the creation of a separate organization 
for management analysis. The Kentucky budget agency, which has 
consciously attempted to develep a management orientation in its 
budgetary work, feels that this is fostered by complete integration 
of budget and management analysis, with the use of consultants from 
outside the budget office or the civil service itself when this is 
occasionally necessary for the examination of major problems of 
inanagement. In Tennessee management studies are also usually 
conducted by the budget analyst assigned to the department concerned. 
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with "outside" assistance when required. If, for example, there 
were to be a study of the management of the state's rural road 
programme the budget analyst might seek the help of an officer of 
the audit department and an engineer, making up a team whose 
combined qualifications and experience would obviate the need 
for extensive preliminary investigation. Most commonly specialists 
are obtained from within the civil service, but use is also made of 
experts from universities, and private organizations such as firms 
manufacturing ©r supplying vari©us forms of equipment. Occasionally 
more extensive use is made of outside assistance, as when management 
consultants are employed to investigate particular problems like 
space utilization, data processing or capital budgeting, Oreg©n 
is another state in which there is an Intimate connection between 
budget and management analysis, by virtue of the 196O merging of 
the previously separate budget examnation and management sections 
of the department of administration into a single management 
division. 
An alternative organizational form is represented by the 
special management section located within the budget agency but 
operating separately from the budget examination units. New York, 
Connecticut and Ontario being examples of this arrangement. When 
this form of organization is used it is likely that the budget 
examiners will have little responsibility for management analysis, 
though they will be la close touch with the staff of the management 
unit and will be in a position to pass on information and offer 
advice about various management studies. The extent to which 
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informal interaction will occur, however, will be partly governed 
by the staffingand organizational characteristics of the particular 
agency. The management unit in Connecticut, for instance, consists 
of three specialized groups dealing respectively with organization 
and methods, forms and records, and institutional services, and 
recruitment to positions in these groups is mainly firom those with 
qualifications and experience specifically related to the particular 
field, whereas the budget examiner will normally have had a broader 
background, Ontario similarly has several groups of a specialized 
nature within its treasury board, so that its organizational 
arrangement may be set out as follows: 
Secretary 
ihief, ^^--'-- ^^^ ^ r J Director, Supervisor, 
Programme Manual 
Chi  Director, Direct'or, 
Organization A,D,P, Staff Relations 
Analysis of Administration and Methods Standards 
Services 
Budget 
Analys t s 
Training 
and 
Information 
Staff 
Spec ia l i s t s 
Supervisgr 
of Special 
Projects 
Super i. s o r 
of General 
Studies 
Systems 
Analysts 
In both these s t a t e s , but pa r t i cu l a r l y in Connecticut because of i t s 
recruitment pol icy , the informal contacts and in te rac t ion in work 
assignments w i l l be l ess than in New York where there i s a more 
fluid organizat ional s i t u a t i o n . Although New York's management uni t 
includes some off icers with exper t ise in pa r t i cu la r f ie lds or 
possessing spec ia l knowledge of some department or function, the 
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unit is organized so that most of its members carry out a 
variety of general management assignments. At the entrance 
level, moreover, they tend to have a background ©f experience 
and quallficaticn similar to that of the budget analysts and 
there is a good deal of interchange of personnel between the 
budget and management units. 
Various factors outside the control ©fa budget agency 
may influence the declsi©n ©n whether the work of budget and 
management is t® be fully integrated or is to be conducted by 
separate sections. Where there is freedom of choice, however, 
the budget ©ffice must weigh up the advantages and disadvantages 
of each arrangement Insofar as these apply to its particular 
situation. Various problems are likely to arise from integration 
ef management analysis and budget examination: the pressure of 
work directly related to budget formulation may lead to management 
studies being deferred or ©nly partly cempleted; the analyst nay-
net possess the technical knowledge needed for some types of 
management investigati©n and may n©t be able t© ©btain the necessary 
outside help; general management studies not specifically related 
to particular departments may be difficult te put into effect; the 
analyst's close Involvement with the department whose estimates he 
examines may reduce his objeetivity when investigating the management 
effectiveness of departmental personnel; without a separate 
management study unit there may be considerable differences in 
approach by individual analysts to their management responsibilities. 
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Against these possibilities, however, the budget analyst's 
intimate knowledge of departmental operations suid procedures 
may enhance his capacity to conduct effective management studies, 
t© initiate investigati©ns ©f the m©st significant pr©blems facing 
the department, and t© recommend changes that are realistic in 
the sense that they will be accepted by the departmental officers 
wh© are to Implement them. Involvement of the budget analyst in 
management study als© represents an excellent training medium, 
enhancing the capacity of the budget office to aid the decision-
making process, whilst if members of the budget staff can work as 
a team on broad management studies there will be added development 
©f the individuals Involved arising from the interchange of views 
and information about problems comm©n to several departments. 
There is a third pattern which is in essence a compromise 
between the two organizational forms discussed above. This is the 
arrangement adopted in Ohio whereby there is a management seeticn 
within the budget office but its role is limited to major studies 
or t© Investigations of a technical kind such as those in the field 
of organization and methods, while the budget examiners continue to 
retain general management responsibilities, A somewhat similar 
plan has been adopted by Wisconsin's bureau of management which 
handles budgeting and which is one of the major bureaus of the 
state's department of administration. Budget analysts in Wisconsin 
are recruited as generallsts and handle a wide range of activities, 
including budget examination, programme development, the analysis 
of both short and long-range administrative problems, the provision 
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of management assistance for departments, and the conducting 
of special comprehensive management audits. In addition, however, 
the bureau empl©ys management specialists, organized separately 
from the budget analysts and providing services in fields such 
as records management, design and control of forms, space 
utilization studies, systems analysis, and data processing. In 
these and other management areas the specialists develop state-wide 
standards. They are also available to assist the budget analysts 
in broad management studies. The system has worked well and has 
allowed the budget analysts to concentrate their attention on 
programme development and the effectiveness of management rather 
than on departmental expenditure as such. The allocation of 
responsibilities within the bureau is illustrated in appendix Q 
(pp, 497 ff,). 
Finally we may note that in some states the agency concerned 
with management study is organizationally completely separate from 
the budget bureau. There are varying reasons for this. It may be 
that, as in Australia, civil service commissions are firmly 
established and have wide statutory powers in the management field. 
It may be that with annual budgeting the examination of estimates 
and subsequent control of expenditure leaves the budget agency 
little time for expensive management studies. It may be simply 
that in large states time-consuming management problems are likely 
to be so numerous as to warrant the building up of a permanent 
staff of management specialists who cannot easily be located with 
an already large body of budget analysts. Whatever the reason. 
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however, the fact is that even if there are separate agencies 
specializing in various kinds of management investigation the 
budget bureau cannot rid itself of responsibility for ensuring 
that there is effective governmental management. This is part 
and parcel of the process of budgeting which must concern itself 
with obtaining full value for funds to be spent in the provisi©n 
of services by departments. If he is to be effective the budget 
analyst must be skilled in general administration and must have 
a wide knowledge of administrative procedures and the whole field 
of governmental activities. He cannot restrict himself to narrow 
considerations of departmental finance. 
CHAPTER 9 
THE LITERATURE OF STATE BUDGETING 
",..And there I did give them a large account of 
the charge of the Navy, and want of money. But 
strange to see how they held up their hands crying, 
'What shall we do?' Says my Lord Treasurer, "Why, 
what means all this, Mr. Pepys? This is tnie, you 
say; but what would you have me to do? I have given 
all I can f©r my life. Why will not people lend 
their money? Why will they not trust the King as 
well as Oliver? Why do our prizes come to nothing, 
that yielded so much heretofore?' And this was all 
we could get, and went away without other answer,,," 
Pepys. (12th April, 1665) 
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Few aspects of government receive closer scrutiny than those 
associated with finance. People are quick to criticize government, 
and published financial statements serve as a focussing point for 
much of that criticism. Public discussion of even the broadest 
policy issues, like some of those related to defence, often 
centres on the financial Implications, As a key factor in the 
overall fiscal systeqi the budget inevitably comes in for a good 
deal of attention after its contents are known. The process of 
budgeting and budgetary machinery have also develeped remarkably 
since the 1920's, partly reflecting a greater emphasis on economic 
planning, and the course of that development has been marked by a 
substantial extension of centralized controls over departmental 
spending. Nor is the situation a static one. Budgetary arrangements 
remain in a state of flux as newer ideas, particularly those 
associated with the performance approach, gather momentum. 
In these circumstances one might expect there to be a large 
volume of literature on all phases of the budget system. This is 
not the case, however. The procedures and organizations associated 
with the preparation stage ©f budgeting and the relati©nships between 
participants in the fcrmulatlen process have largely escaped detailed 
scrutiny from the outside. The bibliography that acccmpanies this 
study may seem extensive, but much of the material included in it is 
quite peripheral to the field of budget formulation. Very few of the 
items deal directly with the ways in which budgets are actually 
prepared and with the organizations and personnel engaged in that w©rk. 
This is so both for studies of the financial arrangements of central 
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governments and for the considerably less numerous works concerned 
with state government. 
In chapter 3 we looked briefly at the early development of the 
administrative machinery and procedures associated with budgeting, 
discussing the extent to which British practices influenced each 
of the countries with which we are dealing. The history of the 
British treasury and its present organlzatl©n and procedures are 
reasonably well documented, several published works being concerned 
specifically with the department, its growth, and changes in its 
role ever the years. Apart from various official and parliamentary 
reperts and archival material there is av8Lilable in translation the 
twelfth century study by Richard, son of Nigel, Dialogus de Scaccari© 
et Constitutio Domus Regis (The Course of the Exchequer and the King's 
Household), whilst we are also able to draw upon the voluminous 
writings ©f T©ut, including his six-volume work. Chapters in the 
Administrative History of Medieval England, and Francis J, West's 
recently published The Justiciarship in England, 1066-1232, For 
later periods there are such sources as Baxter's The Development of 
the Treasury, 1660-1702 and Binney's British Public Finance and 
Administration, 1774-92, Historical and contemporary information is 
also to be found in books by Beer, Bridges, Brittain, Brittan, 
Compton, J, R. Hicks, Ursula Hicks, Prest, and Williams, and in 
articles by Caulcott, Chester, Collins, Ursula Hicks, Marre, 
1. Footnotes giving bibliographical details will not be included in 
this chapter. All works referred to are listed in the bibliography. 
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Schaffer and Tribe, all of which are listed in the bibliography. 
Then there are studies primarily concerned with the development 
of financial procedures or with parliamentary control ©f finance, 
but which contain useful inf0rmati©n about the treasury or leads t® 
such inf©rmati©n. In this categery we may note books by Chubb, 
2 
Einzig, Johnson, Reid, and Wheare, and articles by Barker, Fellowes 
and Tribe. Erskine May's Parliamentary Practice, of course, als© 
deals in detail with financial pr©cedures. And moving to the 
perimeter ©f this area there are the various studies of parliamentary 
procedures generally - e.g. Campion, Hanson, Jennings, Kenneth 
Mackenzie, and Taylor - which contain some material bearing upon 
treasury procedures; and others, like those of Allen, Hill and 
Whichelow, Hollis, and Keeton, which t© greater or lesser extent 
may be thought of as being in the Hewart tradition, in that they are 
largely concerned with legislative-executive relationships, the 
declining prestige of parliament, and "usurpation" of power by the 
executive. These books serve to pr©vide essential background for 
examination ©f budget preparati©n, but include little that bears 
directly ©n the topic. 
The assembling of material for this study has revealed a number 
of serious gaps in the literature of the subject. The first of these 
is found whea an attempt is made to discover in detail the process by 
2, Reid's The Politics of Financial Control contains an excellent 
select bibliography (pp,165-172) indicating most of the 
significant studies in this field. 
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which Brit ish governmental procedures, pa r t i cu la r ly those r e l a t ing 
to finance, spread to and took root in the colonies . I t i s obvious 
that some major i n s t i t u t i o n s of government were del iberate ly 
re-created in the colonial s e t t i n g , sometimes with var ia t ions to 
take account of l oca l condi t ions , and there are various writings 
providing general Information about t h i s : e ,g , Keith, Constituti©nal 
Hist©ry of the F i r s t B r i t i sh Empire; Wight, The Development of the 
Legislative Counciib, l6o6-1945; Williamson, A Short History of Br i t i sh 
Expansion; and (ed,) Burns, Parliament as an Export, In the i r Br i t i sh 
Colonial Developments 1774-1834 Harlow and Madden provide ready access 
to a go©d deal of the re levant correspondence and other documents, and 
there are also h i s t o r i e s of the col©nial ©ffice by Je f f r i es and Y©ung, 
Fer the most pa r t , however, these books look a t the subject from the 
centre, as i t were, and deal with colonial policy ra ther than the 
on-the-spot adminis t ra t ion . There i s l i t t l e that bears on the spread 
of ©rganizational forms and administrat ive procedures, e i the r generally 
or in terms of the adminis t ra t ive arrangements of pa r t i cu la r colonies 
in their formative yea r s . 
In the case of America some of the older wide-ranging s tudies 
contain useful mater ia l on early administrat ion - e .g . Bryce's 
The American Commonwealth. De Tocqueville 's Democracy in America, 
and N e t t e l s ' The Roots of American Civ i l iza t ion - as do reports of the 
federal convention proceedings, such as (ed,) Farrand, The Records of 
the Federal ConveBtl©a, 1787. Of more d i rec t use , however, are 
Dickerson's American Colonial Government. 1696-I765. Labaree's Royal-
government l a America, and pa r t s of what are perhaps the most 
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significant works yet published, on American administrative history. 
White's trilogy, The Federalists, The Jeffersoni..... and The Jacksonians. 
Although mainly concerned with a later period, the intr©ductory 
chapters ef Browne's The Control of the Public Budget also give an 
excellent account of aspects of col©nial financial arrangements. 
As we have noted, American budgetary divergences from the British 
model are partly explainable by the fact that the American col©nles 
achieved independence befcre British fiscal organization and procedures 
were fully developed. Australia and Canada, on the ©ther hand, 
retained the British connection and were able at a later period to 
take over many well established British practices. For neither 
country, however, have sufficient studies in administrative history 
been undertaken to demonstrate precisely how administrative forms and 
methods were Imposed upon them, changed, or substantially influenced by 
external forces. Although distance and poor communicaticn caused 
lengthy delays in the reaching of final decisions and made oversight 
from London difficult, the colonial office's reserving for Itself the 
decision-making power in numerous fields did lead to the standardization 
of many procedures and governmental organizations through©ut the 
colonial empire, and this teadeacy towards uaiformity was no doubt 
strengthened by the movement of career officials from one colony to 
another. Much of this can oaly be speculative, however. Apart from 
the works already meatioaed, the available material is very thla ladeed,^ 
3» New that the first two volumes of the Australiaa Dictionary ©f 
Bi©graphy have appeared it will be possible to make some assessment 
of the extent of inter-colonial movement of officials by examining 
the background ©f at least th©se officials who were prominent in 
the various Australian colonies prior to 185O0 
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There are some leads l a Abbott 's A Short History of the Crowa Agents 
and Their Office and in Burton's a r t i c l e , "Treasury Control and 
C©lonial Policy In the Late Nineteenth Century," Public Administration 
(London), Summer, 1966; but there i s a major stumbling block because 
of the almost complete neglect of the early period by students of 
administration In what were the former colonies now making up 
Australia and Canada. 
For Austral ia there are a few books which have sections dealing 
with aspects of adminis t ra t ive h i s to ry : Bland's Government in Aust ra l ia , 
Davis's The Government ®f the Austral ian S t a t e s , Hasluck's The 
Government and the People 1939-1942, Parker ' s Public Service Recruitment 
in Austral ia , Spann's Public Administration in Austral ia , pa r t i cu la r ly 
the chapter by J,O.A, Bourke, and, more recent ly , Caiden's Career 
Service and, to a l e s s e r ex tent , his The Commonwealth Bureaucracy. 
As far as budgetary p rac t ice i s concerned, however, these provide only 
background. 
Of the ind iv idua l s t a t e public services tha t of New South Wales 
is m©st fully documented, but , even so , the amount ©f secondary 
material r e l a t i n g to the h is tory of the service i s p i t i f u l l y small . 
Only McMartin has dea l t with the period before responsible government 
in any depth. There are a r t i c l e s by Loveday and McMartin dealing with 
patronage in appointments 1786 to I836 and 1856 to 187O (Public 
Administration, Sydney, December, 1959) and by Knight on the same topic 
up to 1895 (Australian Journal of P o l i t i c s and History, November, 1961), 
Theses by Cawardine and Knight cover the development of the service from 
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1856 to 1895 and from l895 to 1915 respectively. Penny has 
written about the establishment of agencies-general by the various 
colonies during the nineteenth century, A note by Caiden discusses 
the early career of D. C. McLachlan, the first Commonwealth public 
service commissioner, who was originally a New South Wales public 
servant. There is the Schaffer and Knight paper, Top Public Servants 
in Two States. But, again, none ©f these relates specifically to 
budgeting, so that they merely provide background material or 
isolated items of relevance to our present study. Indeed, the 
only writings having a direct bearing on early financial administration 
that could be located are McMartin's "The Treasury in New South Wales, 
1786-1836," Public Administraticn (Sydney), September, 1958, and the 
unpublished studies by Cohen and Lamb listed in the bibliography. 
And even for later periods we have only the various writings of Bland, 
including his Budget Control, Campbell's Australian State Public 
Finance (which deals almost exclusively with New South Wales), 
Headford's examination of the origin and operation of the loan council, 
appearing in Public Administratien (Sydney), March, 1954, brief 
references In Ratchford's Public Expenditures in Australia, and articles 
by Goodsell and Knight on financial adinistration and budgeting. 
This is hardly a substantial list, and when it is realized that the 
4 
other states are even less well documented it will be appreciated that 
4. For Queensland's administrative history there is, apart from 
official reports and archival material, nothing except the information 
in two brief papers on "The Public Service of Queensland," which were 
the text of an address by D, W, Fraser to the Queensland Regional 
Group of the Royal Institute of Public Administration, and a thesis 
by A, C, Coulter, Women in the Public Service in Queensland, 
we 
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have so far hardly scratched the surface of what is an enormous 
field offering many opportunities for further investigation. 
Nor is the position very much better as far as Canadian 
provincial government is concerned: 
"Provincial government has been little studied in Canada, 
and nothing has been printed on the governments of the two 
largest provinces, Ontario and Quebec, Three doctoral theses 
on individual provinces have been published, there is an 
analysis of the office of lieutenant-governor, and very 
little more of value on provincial institutions," 5 
In general, this seems a fair assessment of the Canadian situation. 
Leaving aside official publications, the amount of published material 
on the government of the Canadian provinces is surprisingly small 
considering the number of active departments of political science 
and public administration to be found in Canadian universities and 
the much more prominent role of provincial government in that country 
as compared with state government in Australia* Grasham's statement 
about there being three published doctoral theses presumably refers 
to Beck's The Government of Nova Scotia, Donnelly's The Government of 
Manitoba, and Mackinnon's The Government of Prince Edward Island, the 
only studies of provincial government that have so far appeared in 
the "Canadian Government Series" published by the university of Toronto 
press. Each of these discusses provincial financial management. The 
"analysis of the office of lieutenant-governor" is by Saywell and is part 
of the same series. Grasham fails to mention, however, Hodgetts' 
excellent study. Pioneer Public Service, which is a valuable source of 
information on administration from l84l to 1867, Cole's The Canadian 
Bureaucracy also has some brief discussion of early administrative histor; 
5« W. E. Grasham, Provincial Government, University of Toronto, 
unpublished mss,, 1965, p.1* 
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As far as provincial budgeting and finance is concerned the 
standard works on government, like R, McGregor Dawson's The Government 
of Canada, and Corry's Dem©cratic Gevernment and P©litics, give 
insufficient detail for our purposes and there is little that is 
directly relevant in Hodgetts and Corbett, Canadian Public Administration; 
A Book of Readings, though this does contain several articles that are 
useful in providing background on organization, statutory bodies, and 
personnel. Several sections in (ed,) Rowat, Basic Issues in Public 
Administration, Including that on financial administration, have 
material that bears on budgeting, but this collection of readings is not 
oriented towards Canadian government and for the most part its contents 
are well known in their ©wn right and would be located in the normal 
course of bibliographical investigation in the early stages of any 
major project concerned with finance. Corry's The Growth of Government 
Activities Since Confederati©n, prepared in 1939 for the royal commission 
on dominion-provincial relations and the report of that royal commission 
both contain much basic historical information and data about public 
finance and the economy, but they do not examine budgetary machinery 
in any detail. 
There are Canadian studies dealing specifically with aspects of 
governmental finance, like Musolf's Public Ownership and Accountability: 
The Canadian Experience, Perry's Taxation in Canada, and Ward's The Public 
Purse; A Study in Canadian Democracy, but again the emphasis in these is 
upon the federal level of government. Two books directly on budgeting 
are listed in the bibliography: Buck, Financing Canadian Government; and 
Villard and Willoughby, The Canadian Budgetary System; but the latter is 
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almost fifty years old while the other was published in 1949 and 
so does not encompass the post-war period in which so much budgetary 
development has occurred. Of twenty articles relating to budgeting 
c 
which are shown in the bibliography, only five deal specifically with 
n 
provincial financial arrangements,' One of these, Villard's "Canadian 
Provincial Budget Systems and Financial History," was a 1917 publication 
and is of use only in giving an historical perspective; the others, 
however, by Johnson and McLeod, contain valuable insights into the 
budgetary process by experienced practitioners. Of the unpublished 
papers there are three relating to provincial government. Two of 
these, by Brannan and Grasham, have been cited elsewhere in the text. 
The former is a useful, though formal, account of the organizatl©n 
and functions of Ontario's treasury board; Grasham's paper is concerned 
mainly with constitutional issues and cohtains nothing directly on 
budgeting. There is a university of Toronto thesis by Brown-John 
comparing the functions and powers of Canadian treasury boards, but 
containing no Interpretative discussion. This thesis was drawn upon 
©nly for some of the material included in appendix 
As might be expected, there is considerably more published 
material on the government of the American states, both collectively 
and individually. The various general studies of state government 
need not be mentioned here; most are well known and several figure in 
6. See entries f©r Balls, Bates, Bennett, Clark, C©utts, J©hnson, 
Maclean, McLeod, Mace, Sager, Stead, Steele, Villard, and Wagdin, 
7. Some of those slanted towards federal government do, however, 
include material concerning the prevlnclal level. 
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the bibliography. Apart from these there are listed over seventy 
books dealing with the government of particular states. Since 
budgeting is intimately linked with general processes of political 
and administrative decision-making, such books are essential in 
providing an appreciation of the overall governmental setting, 
without which budgeting and budgetary organization cannot be properly 
understood. However most of these state government studies deal with 
financial management in such broad terms that they add virtually 
nothing to our knowledge of budget systems as such. 
We must rely, then, on publications which deal with budgeting 
itself, either in broad terms or as it operates in individual states. 
In the first of these categories several names stand out. These are 
the authors of standard works on budgeting, concerned in the main with 
federal financial arrangements, but also including a good deal of 
information about the state level of government: Burkhead, Government 
Budgeting, and Smithies, The Budgetary Process in the United States,^ 
From our point of view, part of the significance of these books lies 
in their summing up of the trends apparent in approaches to budgeting 
over the years. Then there are writers who reflect those trends, as 
it were; or perhaps more accurately, who have helped to create the 
8, Some less well known but useful works are the short background studies 
of various aspects of state government sponsored by the National 
Municipal League in its "State Constitutional Studies Project," of 
which those by Heady and Rich were consulted for this thesis; and the 
compilation of executive orgsinization charts by Darrah and Poland. 
9, To these might be added Groves' Financing Government and Due's 
Government Finance; An Economic Analysis, though the first is inferior 
t© the two books mentioned and the second is concerned more with the 
ec©n©mlc lmplicati©ns of budgeting than with the organizations 
Involved in the process. 
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trends. Here one thinks particularly of those who were part and 
parcel ©f the re©rganlzatioa movement of the 1920's and later; who 
pressed for a strengthening of executive government and who saw the 
introduction of budgetary systems as an important move in the whole 
process of creating a strong chief executive who could then be held 
accountable for his actions: Buck, Cleveland, Goodnow, Gulick, 
Willoughby, and others. The influence of this school ©f thought was 
very considerable indeed, and can be seen in such documents as the 
report of the Brownlow committee''^ and in much of the later academic 
writings about governmental organization, James W, Martin, for 
instance, who concentrated on the state level of government and made 
the university of Kentucky one of the outstanding American centres of 
budgetary research, is clearly in the "executive supremacy" tradition; 
while in Australia the work of F. A. Bland in some respects derives 
from the same source, even though Bland, writing about a different 
form of government, stresses in overall terms the ideal of parliamentary 
rather than executive supremacy. 
Although the need for strong executive budgeting arrangements is 
still the main strand of argument running through budgetary literature, 
more attention is beginning to be paid to budget form and procedure, 
insofar as these bear on such things as performance budgeting, 
Management analysis, and the relating of the budget to movements in 
the economy generally. The amount of writing on these aspects of 
10. The "president's committee on administrative management". 
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budgeting is still small, however. On the form of the budget there 
is material in A. A. and G. E. Fitzgerald, Form and Contents of 
Published Financial Statements, and in articles by Crossley, 
A. A. Fitzgerald, Heinig, L. J. Hume, W. R. C. Jay, and R. L. 
I.Mithews; Gates discusses the topic briefly in his chapter, "Finance 
of Government" in Spann's Public Administration in Australia; 
official documents such as reports of public accounts committees in 
and 
Australia and England/the Crick committee's report deal with some of 
the issues involved, as does Fitzgerald in his "Controversial Issues 
in Governmental Accounting"; J. R. Hicks, Ursula Hicks, and R, L, 
Mathews are among those who have stressed the need for budget documents 
which mesh in with national income accounts; reform of both documents 
and governmental accounting methods has been discussed by a number of 
observers, including Cupit, A. A. Fitzgerald, Jay and Mathews; and 
there are interesting and useful articles on the Canadian documents 
by Balls^ '' and Wagdin, Despite the interest in performance budgeting 
and the relationship between budgeting and management very little 
worthwhile writing about these topics has so far appeared. What 
contributions there are to the literature of budgeting do not seem 
to add muc^ to the comments of the Hoover Commission and the subsequent 
writings of Mosher, Program Budgeting; Theory and Practice with ParticulaJ 
Reference to the U.S. Department of the Army, and Recent Trends in 
Governmental Finance in the United States. Many of the articles on 
this subject talk in general terms of the advantages to be gained by the 
11. Balls' article, "The Public Accounts, Their Purposes and Factors 
Affecting Their Form; An Administrative View," also contains some 
historical material* 
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performance approach, without ever subjecting these alleged 
advantages to critical examination or taking into account the 
difficulties involved in implementing performance budgeting. 
As far as individual American states are concerned there are 
books dealing with financial management in Arkansas (Alexander) 
California (Stockburger), Kentucky (Martin and Briscoe), Maine 
(Jewett), Maryland (Bell; Miles), Massachusetts (Gulick), and 
Oklahoma (Allen; Pray), These are all descriptive in approach and 
contain a good deal of factual material. The most recent of them, 
however, are the I957 accounts of Maryland and Oklahome, while one, 
Gulick's Evolution of the Budget in Massachusetts, dates back to 1920. 
They must, therefore, be used with caution by those concerned with 
current financial practice. There are also two more recent studies in 
the "I.e.P. Case Series" covering aspects of budgeting in Minnesota 
(Flinn, 1961) and New York (Herzberg and Tillett, 1962), but both 
these deal with specific issues and have to be read in conjunction with 
wider ranging books about those states. Similarly, the work by Heady 
and Pealy on the Michigan department of administration, although 
containing valuable data and comment, must be supplemented by other 
reading to fit it into the general context of government in that state. 
Information on aspects of budgeting and finance in particular states 
. '• 12 
IS also to be found in a number of articles, but, again, many of these 
12, See bibliography citations for: Appleby, Arnold, Buck, John E. 
Burton, Driscoll, Gilchrist, Johnston, Joyner, Kammerer, Keddy 
and Kerrigan, Mosher, Schubert and Mclntyre, Smylie, and Weber, 
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contain out of date material. The studies of New York's budgetary 
arrangements by Keddy and Kerrigan (1917) and Buck (1918), and of 
the budget in Maine by Gilchrist (1917) are good examples of the work 
being done at that time through the bureaus of municipal research that 
exercised such a strong influence in the American governmental 
13 
reorganization movaent. Of the others the most significant are 
the articles on New York by Mosher (1952) and Appleby (1957) and the 
1953 study by Schubert and Mclntyre dealing with the preparation of 
Michigan's budget. These are all perceptive analyses containing much 
that is still relevant even though some of the factual information in 
them is no longer applicable. 
There are a few books or monographs dealing in a general way 
with American state budgeting. One of these. Earth's Financial Control 
in the States, with Emphasis on Control by the G©vernor, was published 
in 1923 and is now only of interest as yet another example of the 
approach that saw the strengthening of the chief executive and the 
development of the executive budget system as major steps towards 
curing some of the ills of American government of the period, A 
number of useful papers are collected under the title The Budget 
Analyst in State Management, edited by Fulmer, Conrad and Byrley, 
This is the record of a conference held in 1964 and attended mainly 
by members of the Nati©nal Association of State Budget Officers, All 
the papers are by serving or former administrators with experience in 
13, Note also the more general studies by Moley, "The State Movement 
for Efficiency and Economy," Municipal Research, No. 90, October, 
1917 and Powell, "The Recent Movement for State Budget Reform; 
1911-1917," Municipal Research, No, 91, November, 1917. 
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particular aspects of budgeting. They cover a variety of topics 
and provide much useful information about state budgetary practices. 
Unfortunately, however, most of the papers are short and do not g© 
beyend descriptien; In many instances what comment there is tends to 
be platitudinous. Other excellent sources are Shadoan's two 
menegraphs published in 1961 and 1963, These are of major 
significance as "pioneering" studies, and are two of the very few 
references found to be of direct relevance to the process of budget 
preparation that are also detailed enough to enable comparisons to be 
made of budgetary practices in a number of states. At the same time, 
both are irritating in their failure at various pointsvi/to particularize 
sufficiently to facilitate further study of some aspects in depth. 
We are frequently told that "one budget office" follows a particular 
practice, or that "several" adopt different methods, and although the 
agencies concerned can sometimes be identified from other available 
sources, this is not always possible. This depreciates the value of 
these monographs as basic reference sources, though they do nevertheless 
stand on their merits as amongst the most important studies yet carried 
out in this field. 
Apart from the longer items mentioned above, there are articles 
which attempt, with varying degrees of success, to present a broad 
picture of state budget practices. Mostly these are too short to be 
able to give an adequate account of such a complex activity as 
budgeting in even one state, let alone many. Taken together, however, 
they do add a number of pieces of knowledge to what is, after all, a 
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very small store of published material,''^ Of this group specific 
mention might be made of Sundelson's "Budgetary Principles " 
Political Science Quarterly. Vol. L, No, 2, June, 1935, as an 
important example of the older approach to budgetary studies; and of 
"Budgetary Concepts: A Symposium," The Review of Economics and 
Statistics, Vol, XLV, No. 2, May, 1963, which brings together a 
number of interesting papers mainly looking at the budgetary process 
from the vantage point of economics. Of more immediate use, however, 
are two other articles whose coverage extends beyond one state: 
Landers and Hamilton, "A Survey of State Budget Agencies," Public 
Finance, Vol, VIII, No, 4, 1953, which not only includes some 
excellent general commentary about the nature of the budget analyst's 
task, but also assesses the relative strengths of the state budget 
agencies then operating; and Schick, "Control Patterns in State 
Budget Execution," Public Administration Review, Vol. XXIV, No, 2, 
June, 1964, We have noted earlier in this study the existence of 
claims by budget officers that their role is essentially a management 
function and also actual examples of the organizational linking of 
budgetary and management analysis, Schick's article is significant 
in that it casts doubt on the genuineness of the professed management 
orientation of many budget offices, suggesting that behind the 
expressed aim of providing management assistance there often lies 
the real objective of securing control over departmental activities 
14, Authors of some such articles are; Brazer, ford. Freeman, Lawton, 
Links, Lynn, Mahin, Mauck, Nusbaum, Tannery, and Tarrant, 
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and expenditures. There is evidence to support this contention, 
particularly as far as the execution phase of budgeting is concerned. 
Frequently stringent controls operate over departmental spending 
after the budget has been approved, even in states that allow a good 
deal of departmental initiative in formulating the budget, SShick 
examines some of the major reasons which account for various control 
patterns in budget execution, including the views of budget officials 
about their role, the political environment in which they must 
operate, the impact of budgetary traditions, suspicion of the 
spending departments, the lack of standards by which to measure 
performance, and the way in which the need to collect information 
opens the way for control. One cannot validly generalize about this 
issue. As we have noted, there are wide variations amongst budget 
agencies in the extent to which in practice they adopt a management 
orientation in their dealings with departments. It can be said, 
however, that although such an approach to budgeting is becoming more 
common, many budget agencies still hold a view of their role that is 
strongly control-oriented, designed to resist the inbuilt pressures for 
expansion of departmental activities, even if they do not make this 
explicit, as Appleby did during his term of office as New York 
state's budget director; 
",,,there is no point in denying, the budget function is 
preponderantly negative. It is on the whole rather strongly 
against program and expenditure expansion. This approach is 
desirable because the programmatic agencies and most of the 
potent pressure groups are so expansive that there will be 
little danger that the undeniable values they represent will be 
overlooked or smothered by budgeteers," 15 
15, Paul A, Appleby, "The Role of the Budget Division," Public 
Administration Review, Vol. XVII, Summer, 1957, p.15^^ 
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Much of the work of state government is of a development 
nature, requiring extensive capital investment. The capital works 
programme is one of the most important features of a state's budget 
plan. Despite this, however, capital budgeting hardly figures at 
all in the literature of state budgeting. There are only two recent 
16 
major studies devoted to this area of fiscal management, but 
fortunately both are excellent works. One, James W, Martin, A 
Framework for State Capital Budgeting, examines the context in which 
capital works programmes must be developed; the other. State Capital 
Budgeting, by Hillhouse and Howard, surveys the whole field of capital 
budget practice in the United States and brings together a great deal 
of basic information which will be an invaluable source for further 
analytical studies. There are also three short papers on capital 
budgeting in The Budget Analyst in State Management and articles by 
Dietrich and Marx listed in the blbli©graphy, but little else of a 
worthwhile nature. 
The final point that may be noted about the literature of budgeting 
is the very limited amount of theoretical writing that has so far been 
undertaken. An appeal for the development of a budgetary theory was 
made by V, 0, Key in his 1940 article in The American Political Science 
Review, but this plea has not yet been finally answered. There have been 
long intervals between the few publications of a theoretical nature: 
Buchanan's 1949 article in the Journal of Political Economy; 
16, A useful earlier work (1955) is Elkins' Program Budgeting; A 
Method f©r Improving Fiscal Management, 
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McKean's Efficiency in Government Through Systems Analysis (1958); 
Wildavsky's 19^1 article "Political Implications of budgetary 
Reform," largely incorporated into his The Politics of the Budgetary 
Process, published in 1964; and most recently the Davis, Dempster, 
Wildavsky article, "A Theory of the Budgetary Process," which 
appeared in The American Political Science Review, Vol, LX, No. 3, 
September, 1966, Why should there be so few studies of this kind 
when in virtually every other area of political science we have 
witnessed a breaking away from the earlier formal, legal, historical 
and descriptive traditions, and the development of new approaches of 
a behavioural and sociological kind, subjecting data to rigorous 
examination and attempting to constmct broad theoretical 
explanations? Public administration was among the first of the 
sub-disciplines of political science to cut loose and establish 
itself as a separate entity. There were "practical" reasons for the 
17 • • 
attempts from Woodrow Wilson onwards to make a sharp distinction 
between policy and administration, stemming from the demands for civil 
service reform and the emphasis on economy and efficiency by exponents 
©f "scientific management". Now, however, public administration as a 
whole is moving back into the main stream, represented by what is 
perhaps developing into a new body of knowledge, cutting across the 
beundaries of older established disciplines and drawing its inspiration 
from the "human relations" school in psychology and the "organizational 
17, See his famous essay, "The Study of Administration," Political 
Science Quarterly, Vol, II, l887, pp.197-222. 
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theory" of the sociologists. Yet the impact of such developments 
does not seem to have affected budgetary studies to any marked 
extent. This is partly because our factual knowledge about the 
processes of budgeting is still very limited and it is difficult to 
construct models and build general theories without a large body of 
data which has been rigorously tested. Although budgeting is a field 
of very great significance and potentially "explosive" in a political 
sense, much of the day to day work of the budgetary practitioner is 
in essence dry and technical, and requires meticulous attention to 
detail. It is often only through close and detailed scrutiny that 
major problems in departmental activities are revealed. This, and 
the fact that much of the work of the budget analyst must of necessity 
be conducted in secret and by personal contact between analysts and 
departmental officers, has tended to make the field both unattractive 
and inaccessible to the academic investigator. Wildavsky has, 
nevertheless, pointed the way towards the type of systematic study 
that can be carried out, even though it is by no means certain that 
his model correctly identifies and takes account of all the social 
and political factors affecting budgetary decision-making. It does 
seem the case, however, that budgeting, as a major governmental 
conversion process concerned with input demands and outputs, is a 
key area in the field of political studies. 
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STATE BUDGET DOCUMENTS : SAMPLE PAGES 
APPENDIX A: - 423 - NEW SOUTH WALES 
MINISTER FOR MINES 
Sub-head» under which this Expenditure will be Accounted for 
Al. 
A2. 
A3. 
A4. 
A5. 
Bl. 
B2. 
B3. 
34. 
CI. 
CI. 
C3. 
C4. 
C5. 
C6. 
a. 
C8. 
C9. 
CIO. 
Cll. 
C12. 
C13. 
C14. 
DEPARTMENT OF MINES 
Salaries and Payments in the Nature of Salary 
Salaries and Wages, as per Schedule, page 175 
Temporary Assistance 
Allowances 
Payments for Leave on Retirement, Resignation, etc. 
Overtime 
Maintenance and Worlung Expenses 
SUBSIDIARY STAFF CHARGES— 
Workers' Compensation Insurance 
Employers' Contribution to Coal Mine Workers' 
Superannuation Fund 
Tea Money 
EXPENSES IN CONNECTION WITH BUILDINGS— 
Rent, Rates, etc 
SUBSISTENCE AND TRANSPORT EXPENSES— 
Travelling, Removal and Subsistence Expenses . . 
Motor Vehicles—Running Costs, Maintenance, Hire and 
Insurance , 
Freight, Cartage and Packing 
GENERAL EXPENSES— 
Books, Periodicals and Papers 
Postal Expenses 
Fees for Services Rendered 
Stores, Provisions, Furniture, Equipment, Minor Plant 
etc. (including Maintenance and Repairs) 
Other Insurance 
Advertising and Publicity 
Minor Expenses not elsewhere included . . 
Otiier Services 
Administration of the Act for the Regulation of Collieries.. 
Ambulance Classes 
Contributions 
and Safety First Operations— 
Miners' Superannuation—Government Contribution.. 
Mineral Exploration and the Encouragement of Prospecting, 
including grants and advances—Amount to be carried to 
" Mines Department Exploration and Prospecting 
Account " in Special Deposits Account 
Protection of Abandoned Shafts and Excavations 
Maintenance and Improvement of Mining Museum Display 
Contribution to Joint Coal Board's Welfare Fund 
State's share of cost of administration of Joint Coal Board 
Purchase of Major Equipment • 
University fees. Trainee Geologists and Chemists 
Contribution towards Research on Wire Rope by the 
University of N.S.W 
Establishment of Bore Core Library and Testing and Research 
Station . , • 
Overseas visits by Departmental Officers 
National Coal Research Advisory Committee—Government 
Contribution 
Non-recurring Service - • •« 
Total—Department of Mines 
196S-66 
Estimate 
443,855 
50 
793 
3,250 
2,500 
450,448 
2,236 
1,140 
300 
19,001 
28,000 
9,000 
400 
1,500 
1,650 
9,200 
6,000 
300 
2,850 
300 
81,877 
1,900 
600 
160,000 
200,000 
500 
1,200 
50,000 
106,000 
16,000 
4,500 
334 
30,000 
1,000 
40,000 
612,034 
1,144^59 
1964-65 
Appropriation Expenditure 
409,000 
450 
1,700 
7,680 
3,200 
422,030 
1,831 
1,079 
235 
18,484 
25,500 
9,000 
200 
1,400 
2,200 
10,000 
4,500 
300 
1,000 
350 
76,079 
1.700 
600 
80,000 
200,000 
1,500 
1,000 
50,000 
91,500 
20,000 
700 
333 
1 
40,000 i 
487,333 
457,900 
440 
1,756 
5,112 
2,064 
467,272 
1,83! 
972 
168 
18,168 
25,865 
7,199 
147 
1,387 
2,199 
8,761 
4,742 
279 
960 
262 
72,940 
1,469 
540 
80.000 
200,000 
328 
992 
50,000 
100,500 
11,300 
2,437 
333 
10,063 
3,209 
55,66o 
516,171 
985,442 1,0563^3 
APPENDIX A: - 424 - NJ^ W SOUTH WALES 
MINISTER FOR MINES 
ScMale showing Details of the Amounts provided for Salaries and Wages 
^0. of Officers 
196*^ 5 
4 
3 
34 
14 
16 
16 
113 
32 
23 
10 
28 
65 
373 
I 
1 
1 
9 
8 
17 
LI 
1965-66 
4 
3 
40 
14 
17 
16 
113 
36 
23 
10 
27 
65 
379 
I 
I 
1 
9 
8 
18 
38 
PARTICULARS 
. . . ^ DEPARTMENT OF MINES 
Under Secretary and Warden, and Superintendent, Explosives Department 
Assistant Under Secretary . . . . . 
Government Geologist .! . . [] 
Chief Inspector of Mines .. .. ., 
Chief Inspector of Coal Mines . . '.'. 
Chief Analyst 
Mining Warden 
Chief Clerk ; ' 
Registrar, Mine Workers' Superannuation Tribunal 
Curator and Mineralogist 
Chief Draftsman ]. 
^®J?^ -^ r P"^^™™^"* <3eologist. Deputy Chief inspector of Mines, Deputy 
Chief Inspector of Coal Mines, Deputy Chief Analyst 
Accountant and Royalty Officer, Registrar and Officer-in-Charge Lease 
Branch, Administrative Clerk 
Supervising Geologists (2), Senior Geologists (9), Geologists (21), Research 
Scholar (Temp.), Supervising Geological Cartographer (Temp.), Geological 
Cartographers (Perm. 4, Temp. 2) 
Senior Inspector of Mines, Inspectors of Mines (12), Technical Officer (Temp.) 
Senior Inspectors of Collieries (2), Inspectors of Collieries (Perm. 13, Temp. 2) 
Senior Analysts (7), Analysts (8), Technical Officer 
Deputy Accountant and Deputy Royalty Officer, Assistant Accountant, 
Assistant Royalty Officer, Deputy Registrar and Deputy O.I.C. Lease 
Branch, Personnel Officer, Legal Officer, Publicity Officer (Temp.), Clerks 
(Perm. 47, Temp. 12), Office Assistants (Perm. 5, Temp. 19), Shorthand 
Writers (Perm. 4, Temp. 16), Machine Operators (Perm. 1, Temp. 1), 
Telephonist (Temp.) 
Draftsman-in-Charge, Draftsmen (Perm. 25, Temp. 1), Mine Surveyor 
(Temp.), Tracers (Perm. 5, Temp. 3) 
Technical Assistant to Curator, Museum Caretaker, Lapidary (Temp.), Dust 
Samplers (2), Car Driver (Temp.), Attendants (Perm. 3, Temp. 9), 
Messengers (Perm. 2, Temp. 1), Ore Samplers (2) 
Examiners Mineworkers' Superannuation Tribunal (Perm. 8, Temp. 2) 
Trainees (Temp.) 
Wardens' Clerks and Mining Registrars, BaiUffs 
Provision for Supernumerary Staff 
Provision for New Appointments 
Adjustment of Salaries »• > • 
Less Estimated Savings consequent upon Retirements, Resigna-
tions, etc 26,000 
„ Recoup for Salaries of Mineworkers' Superannuation Staff 
and Mine Subsidence Board Staff 66,410 
Total . , , . , , . . - . . *. .. £ 
DEPARTMENT OF EXPLOSIVES 
Officer-in-Charge 
Senior Inspector 
Officer-in-Charge, Public Magazines 
Qerks (Perm. 5, Temp. 1), Shorthand Writers (Perm. 1, Temp. 1), Office 
Assistant (Temp.) 
Inspectors (6), Attendents (Perm. 1, Temp. 1) 
Working Overseer, Senior Warders and Lightermen (2), Warders and 
Lightermen (Perm. 7, Temp. 8) 
Adjustment of Salaries . . . . . . 
Less Estimated Savings consequent upon Retirements, Resigna-
tions etc. 
" Recoup from Minewoncers' Superannuation Fund 
Total 
750 
550 
1965-66 
Estimate 
£ 
6,500 
4,500 
4,200 
4,200 
4,200 
3,484 
3,463 
3,273 
3,088 
3,076 
2,727 
13,073 
8,069 
80,845 
38,461 
46,873 
34,933 
124,676 
47,377 
26,918 
15,100 
8,200 
1,170 
24,572 
4,000 
19,287 
536,265 
92,410 
443,855 
2,533 
1,729 
1,624 
10,674 
11,002 
21,539 
819 
49,920 
1,300 
48,620 
- 4 2 5 -
APPENDIX A: VICTORIA 
Estimates of Expenditure for the Year ending 30th June, 1967 
ATTORNEY-GENERAL 
DIVISION No. 42—ATTORNEY-GENERAL 
1. Salaries and Payments in the nature of Salary— 
1. Secretary .. 
2. Salaries and allowances as per Schedule, page 139 
3. Overtime and penalty rates .. 
4. Payments in lieu of long service leave 
2. General Expenses— 
1. Travelling and subsistence .. 
2. Office requisites and equipment, printing and stationery 
3. Books and publications, other incidental expenses 
4. Postal and telephone expenses 
5. Motor vehicles—Purchase and running expenses 
6. Fuel, light, power and water 
7. Allowances to witnesses 
8. Payments to Jurors—Compensation and travelling expenses 
9. Professional assistance 
10. Costs payable by the Crown 
11. Costs—Companies (Special Investigations) 
12. Refunds of Jury fees 
13. Court reporting 
Non-recurring 
3. Other Services— 
1. Supreme Court Library—Contributions towards maintenance . . 
2. Contribution to special fund for superannuation allowances to 
Judges' Associates •• " , • , • " c ' J 
3. Consumers Protection Council—Expenses mcludmg fees and 
travelling allowances to Chairman and Members 
Non-recurring .. 
1966-67 
Estimate 
10,950 
1,438,392 
43,500 
19,582 
1965-66 
Expenditure 
1,512.424 
44.000 
61.000 
38.450 
19.000 
4,000 
18.000 
13,200 
335.000 
128.000 
10,500 
50.000 
30.000 
120,000 
871.150 
10.500 
j 2,200 
20.000 
Total Division No. 42 
32,700 
2.416,274 
10,384 
1,290,200 
42,516 
30,873 
1,373.973 
41,673 
67,713 
42,139 
18.945 
3,990 
17,983 
11.999 
334.173 
132.948 
4.061 
127.434 
34.560 
120,000 
6.949 
964,56' 
10,500 
2,193 
9,982 
11,613 
34,288 
2,372.828 
APPENDIX A: ~ ^^^ - VICTORIA 
Estimates of Expenditure for the Year ending 30th June, 1966 
HEALTH 
1965-66 
DIVISION No. 72—HEALTH ADMINISTRATION 
1. Salaries and Payments in the nature of Salary— 
1. Secretary . . 
2. Salaries and allowances as per Schedule, page 157 
3. Overtime and penalty rates . . 
Non-recurring .. 
2. General Expenses— 
1. Travelling and subsistence . . 
2. Office requisites and equipment, printing and stationery 
3. Books and publications, other incidental expenses 
4. Postal and telephone expenses 
5. Motor vehicles—Purchase and running expenses 
6. Medical and dental expenses, &c., at penal establishments 
7. Health Education—Expenses .. 
3. Other Services— 
1. Medical Board and Foreign Practitioners Qualifications 
Committee—Fees and other expenses 
2. Contribution to Hospitals and Charities Fund 
3. Alcoholism Foundation of Victoria—Grant .. 
4. Bush Nursing Hospitals—Grants 
5. National Fitness Council—Grant 
6. Nurses' Memorial Centre—Grant 
7. Occupational Therapy School—Grant 
8. Victorian Bush Nursing Association—Grant towards cost of 
travelling expenses of nurses 
9. Victorian Bush Nursing Association—Grant towards administration 
expenses .. 
10. Victorian Nursing Council—Grant . . 
11. Allowance to meet expenses incurred in connexion with the overseas 
visit of the Minister of Health the Hon. R. W. Mack, M.L.C. .. 
Total Division No. 72 
1964-65 
Expenditure 
4,800 
78,846 
2,279 
1,842 
87,767 
1,200 
1,560 
2,000 
1,560 
1,550 
9,000 
2,000 
18,870 
3,000 
10,240,000 
1,200 
160,000 
20,000 
2,000 
2,000 
500 
1,000 
12,000 
3,100 
10,444,800 
10,551,615 
1,318 
1,749 
3,760 
1,528 
1,015 
8,800 
1,394 
19,564 
2,499 
9,160,000 
1,200 
117,000 
19,000 
2,000 
2,000 
500 
1,000 
12,000 
9,317,199 
9,424,530 
- 427 -APPENDIX A: —' WESTERN AUSTRALIA 
! i .' ESTIMATES OF E X P E N D I T U R E FOR THE YEAR ENDING 30th JUNE, 1967 
XV.—CHIEF SECRETARY AND MINISTER FOR POLICE AND 
TRAFFIC 
N
o.
 
te
rn
 
h-i 
. 
No of 
Persons 
1 
<o 
<» 
*-* 
t ^ 
«3 
J> CO 
OS 
^^  
1 
I 
1 
29 
197 
1 
1 
1 
29 
200 
13 13 
KKW-Oli 
Division No. 39 
CHIEF SECRETARY 
SALAHIBS—S3li(i.(ii)() 
Salaries , Wages and . ' \ l lo«ancps goiiernlly (n) 
Le.ia Hfba tos from other D e p a r t m e n t s 
' I 'OTAL S A L A I U K S 
(a) Detai ls of t h e i tem are :— 
V'olo Ex-
pf-ndituro 
U n d e r Socretiiry 
Ass i s tan t U n d e r .Secretary 
A c c o u n t a n t .... . . . ..... 
Clerks .... • .... 
OORco Cleaners, Niglit Watcflimen, 
etc . . . . . . .... . , 
Correspondence Despa tch , Officer- I 
in-Cliarge .. . .... .... . . . I . , .__ , . 
Mai lmen, Ass is tan ts and Messengers ] iii.fidil 2H,r):i!l 
Expen- Esl i -
d i ture , mat(<, 
19R5-6fi 19fi6-r)7 
.? 
9,7.-,(i 
7,(l(il> 
0,213 
S 
10,494 
7,(1 IK 
l!,09S 
.'i7li.r,(i2 
41,(100 
335,o(i2 
:!K:i..sn.-i 
47.377 
33(i,428 
7S,73H ' S(i,9(iK I 
!;•) 1.901 2(il,H7.-) 1 
3 522 I 4,49H j 
i 
i 383,B05 40G,f>90 
CONTINGENCIES—S")4,21(1 
Inc iden ta l s , a.s imder :— 
Pos tages , Telephones , Travel l ing, T ranspor t , Inci-
denta l s , Cleaners ' T.equisitos, Fuel , F i lm Censor-
ship , P a p e r Towels, Nigh t Wa tch ing Servico, 
Account ing Machines, ote. 
Correspondence Despa tch :— 
Travel l ing, T r a a s p o r t , Bags and Uniforms. Bicycles 
a n d Repa i r s , Simdries. Telephone, Motor Vehicle 
Mnintenanc;e, e tc . 
G r a n t s to Chapla ins visit ing Ins t i t u t ions (including 
Sana to r i a ) and Prisons 
P r in t ing and S ta t ione ry—Governmen t Pr in te r 
Les.i Reba te s from other Departnioiit,s .. 
TOTAT- C O N T I N G E N C I E S 
G R A N D ' T O T A L S 
N E T JNCIRKASF, .... 
18,100 
20,000 
7.riOO 
21.3.-,4 
20.7r.3 
7.."i(IO 
4.').(i(>0 1 49,007 
2.000 I 2.210 
43.00(1 I 47.397 
379,222 3S3.s2r, 
R E V E N U E — 
Film Censorship Foes, etc 
Es t ima te 
190(i-07 
{'ornpured with 
Expendi tu re , 190.">-0(i 
Increase Decrease 
400.090 
40,000 
3()0.(i9O 
7,37 
30.2(i2 
24.100 I 
20.1111 ; 
i 
7,.">00 j 
4,.'iOO 
.")0.210 1 
2.000 i 
2,740 
4,."iOO 
0.l i( l3 
w^  
210 
r.4.210 ! (!.S13 
420.900 ' 37,07.") 
S37,07:. 
AC(>IH1, l!lii,".-00 ICstinuite. 190ti-0' 
s s 
.•).(i44 (i.tlllll 
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APPENDIX A: MANITOBA 
Year Ending 
March 31st, 1965 
-Appro. 
No. 
SICRVICE 
Details Rosolu-
of Sums Vear Enflinj? tinn 
to be Voted March J l s t , 1966 So. 
% 110,215.00 1. 
$ 12,500.00 
78,395.00 
t 90.895.00* 
19,3i0 .00 
i 10,660.00 2 . 
t 10,500.00 
t 101,560.00 
306,700.00 
$ 408,!>60.00* 
408,400.00 
$ 
$ 33,140.00 3 . 
$ 7,140.00 
26,000.00 
$ 234,530.00 4. 
$ 101,440.00 
18,!>90.00 
115,000.00 
$ 307,000.00 5 . 
$ SiS.OOO.OO 6. 
$ 74,790.00 7. 
S 69,090.00 
5,700.00 
$ 60,000.00 8. 
$ 34,090.00 9. 
$ 24.540.00 
9.550.00 
$ 65,625.00 10. 
$ 333,074.00 
268,049.00 
$ 11 . 
» 
t 995.950.00 
IV—PROVINCIAL SECRETARY 
A D M I . N I S T R . \ T I O N j 129,075.00 16 
(a) Salaries: 
••^•' '• ' ' t" } 12,500.00 
Other Salaries 96,165.00 
, , . , , , « 108 ,655 .00 ' 
(b ; .Supplies, Expenses, Equipment and Renewals 20,420.00 
Q U E E N ' S P R I N T E R (JEFICK " $ I0.5G0.00 17 
(a) Salaries 5 10,560.00 
(b) Operat ion—Open Leilger Aeeount, .Store.s Stoek, Queen's Pr in ter : 
(1) S.alaries $ 106,955.00 
(2j Supplies and Expenses •. . , 317,100.00 
$ 424,055.00* 
(3) Less—Est imated Reeeipls Recoverable from Other .Appropriations. . . 424,055.00 
$ 
M A N I T O B A G A Z E T T E $ 34,285.00 18 
(a) Salaries .$ 0,235.00 
(1)) Supiilies, Expenses, ICcjuipment and Renewals 28,000.00 
C I V I L S E R V I C E C O M M I S S I O N $ 241,270.00 19 
(a) Salaries . . ._ $ 107,>I55.00 
(b) Sujiplics, h'xpenses, I-"ciuipineiit and Heiiewals 18,4]5.(j0 
(c) Assistance for Educational Leave 115,000.00 
C I V I L S E R \ ' I C E SI P K R A . N N f A T I O N ACT $ 397,000.00 
C I V I L S E R V I C E ( J R O I P L I F E I N S C R A N C E $ 08,000.00 
P C R C f l A S I N G B L R E A i : S 81,905.00 
(a) Salaries ? 74,430.00 
(b) Supplies, Expenses, Efiuipment and Uenewals 7,475.00 
W O R K M E N ' S C O M P E N S A T I O N BOARD, A S S E S S M E N T S R E ACCI-
D E N T S T O G O V E R N M E N T E M P L O Y E E S $ 60,000.00 
I N F O R M A T I O N S E R V I C E S $ .34,690.00 
(a) Salaries $ 25,140.00 
(b) .Supplies, ICxpenses, Equipment anil Renewals 9,550.00 
E M E R G E N C Y ME.VSLRES S 71,450.00 25 
To ta l Expen.li turcs « 360,351 .00 
Less—Recoveries from Govcriunent of Canada and Municipalities 294,901.00 
T H E M A N I T O B A ( E N T E N N I A L C O R P O R A T I O N — C H A R G E A B L E T O 
C A P I T A L D I V I S I O N $1 ,020 ,000 .00 26 
(a) Project Gran t s « 050,1)110 00 
(h) AdminLstration Grants ""'• ' "» 
Tota l Vote tor the Depar tment $ 2,146,235.00 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
. \sterisk {*i denotes suli-total 
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APPENDIX A: QUEBEC 
BUDGET DES DEFENSES 1964/65 ESTIMATES 
III—AFFAIRES MUNICIPALES—MUNICIPAL AFFAIRS—Suite—Cont'd. 
21 
No 
1 
3 
4 
ARTICLE — ITEM 
DETAIL 
Administration: 
Salaries. 
2—Fnais de voyage 
Travelling expen.ses. 
3—Frai,s de bureau et autres depenses 
Ofliee and other expenses. 
4—Materiel, articles de bureau, impressions et 
abonnements, achat, entretien .et operation 
d'automobiles ... . 
Equipment, office supplies, printing and 
subscriptions, purchase, maintenance and 
operation of automobiles. 
Credits non requis pour 1964/65 
Appropriations not required for 1964/65. 
Prevention des incendies: Commissariat des incen-
dies et subventions aux nuuiicipalites: 
Fire prevention: Fire Commissioner's Office and 
grants to municipalities: 
1—Commissariat des incendies: 
Fire Commissioner's Office: 
Salarie 
Travelling expenses. 
3—Honoraires et .autres depenscs 
Fees and other expenses. 
Grants to municipalities. 
Regie d'epuration des eaux, y compris subventions: 
Water Purification Board, including grants: 
1—Administration: 
Salaries. 
2—Frais de voyage , • • t. 
Travelling expenses. 
'* MoNTANT 
1964/65 
1 
792,500 
75,000 
56,500 
40,000 
964,000 
145,000 
25,000 
13,000 
183,000 
1,400,000 
1,583,000 
447,000 
25,000 
- A.MOU.Nl 
1963/64 
685,000 
59,900 
2S,2C0 
24,900 
59,000 
857,000 
145,000 
25,000 
3,000 
173,000 
1,100,000 
1,273,000 
341,500 
25,000 
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APPENDIX A: MARYLAND 
STATE INSURANCE DEPARTMENT 
POLICY COMPLAINT AND INFORMATION SERVICE 
Program and Performance: 
As a service to policyholders, beneficiaries, and claimants and as a means of 
checking the compliance and performance of insurance companies, agents, brokers and 
solicitors, there is a Complaint Bureau -which receives and investigates complaints 
and requests for information about policy contracts. 
As a result of action by this Bureau, the complainant may be advised that he 
has no just complaint, or the company agent, or broker may be advised that the claim 
must be adjusted and liquidated; and facts disclosed by these investigations may lead 
to the suspension or revocation of licenses. The operation of this service frequently 
results in the return of unearned premiums, the collection of unpaid claims, the con-
vincing of the policyholder that he has a fair and equitable contract, and generally 
serves to police insurance practices in the State. 
Actual Actual Estimated Estimated 
1963 1964 1965 1966 
Number of Complaints and Inquiries .... 3,403 3,598 3,600 3,750 
Classification: 
1. Personal intervie-w 882 918 918 968 
2. Telephone interview 1,711 1,781 1,782 1,832 
3. Correspondence 810 899 900 950 
3,403 3,598 3,600 3,750 
Number of complaints found to be 
justified 347 360 375 400 
Number of complaints found to be 
unjustified 463 468 500 550 
Number of inquiries regarding policy 
provisions 2,593 2,770 2,725 2,800 
3,403 3,598 3,600 3,750 
Funds recovered for policyholders $63,975.07 $84,032.48 
Appropriation Statement: 
1964 1965 1966 
.4CTUAL APPROPRIATION ALLOWANCE 
Number of Authorized Positions 1 1 1 
01 Salaries and Wages 4,051 5,343 5,343 
08 Contractual Services 10 50 50 
09 Supplies and Materials 35 SO 30 
10 Equipment—Replacement 218 
Total Operating Expenses 45 298 80 
Total Expenditure 4,096 5,641 5,423 
Original General Fund Appropriation 5,455 
Transfer of General Fund Appropriation —1,235 
Total General Fund Appropriation 4,220 
Less: General Fund Reversion 124 
Net General Fupd Expenditure 4,096 5,641 5,423 
219 
APPENDIX A: 
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EDUCATION 
MARYLAND 
J 49 
Estimated 
Expenditure for 
Fiscal Year Ending 
March 31, 1966 
SERVICE Fiscal Year Ending March 31, 1967 
(2) 
)17,500 
5.940 
23,440 
750 
3,200 
27,390 
18,000 
12,660 
12,240 
10,140 
8,520 
7,110 
5,484 
6,588 
4,560 
4,260 
3,960 
3,384 
5,466 
(14) 102,372 
6,500 
12,700 
900 
250 
1,200 
1,300 
1,000 
1,350 
1,500 
129,072 
12,660 
10,140 
7,980 
4,260 
Vote 81 
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION 
MINISTER'S OFFICE 
Salaries: 
Minister of Education 
Secretary 
$17,500 
6,300 
Expenses: 
Code No. 
001 Office expense 
202 Travelling expense 
Total of Vote 81 _ 
(2) 23,800 
750 
3,200 
Vote 82 
GENERAL ADMINISTRATION 
Salaries; 
Deputy Minister of Education 19,000 
Superintendent of Education 15,300 
Assistant Superintendent of Education fAdminis-
tration) 13,680 
Co-ordinator of Special Services 13,140 
Co-ordinator of Teacher Recruitment 10,740 
Supervisor of School Plans - 9,060 
Assistant Supervisor of School Plans 6,540 
Draughtsman 4 - 5,460 
Draughtsman 3 4,920 
Chief Clerk _ - - - 7,020 
Secretary 4,920 
Clerk-Stenographer 5 4,686 
Clerk-Stenographer 4 4,452 
Clerk-Stenographer 3 
Clerk-Stenographer 2 
Two Clerk-Stenographers 1 
3,420 
5,832 
Expenses: 
Code No. 
001 
202 
004 
005 
OflSce expense. 
Travelling expense 
Office furniture and equipment 
Board of Reference—remuneration and 
expenses 
007 Advertising and publicity 
013 Printing and publications 
022 Transportation and other recruitment ex-
pense 
023 Educational supplies 
031 Preparation of standard school plans 
Total of Vote 82 
(16) 128,170 
8,850 
13,000 
2,290 
250 
1,200 
14,000 
1,500 
1,700 
1,000 
DIVISION OF GENERAL EDUCATIONAL 
SERVICES 
Vote 83 
CURRICULUM BRANCH 
S3.l3.riCS' 
Assistant Superintendent of Education (Instruc-
tion) 
Director of Curriculum 
Research Assistant 3 
Clerk-Stenographer 4 
13,950 
10.740 
8,280 
4,452 
$27,750 
171,960 
75,625 13 
78,461 
1,010 
77,451 13 
80.499 
805 
79,694 
APPENDIX A: " ^^^ " MARYLAND 
ADMINISTRATOR OF LOAN LAWS 
1964 1965 1966 
CLASSIFICATION OF EMPLOYMENT ACTUAL APPROPRIATION AXLOVS'ANCE 
Small Loan, Sales Finance and Installment Sellers Enforcement and Licensing: 
1 Administrator of Loan Laws 1 5,000 1 5,000 1 5,000 
2 Deputy Administrator 1 11,126 1 11,126 1 ] 1,126 
3 Chief Supervisor 1 9,154 1 9,154 1 9,154 
4 Examiner II 2 12,198 6 35,289 6 36,648 
5 Examiner I 6 31,152 2 9,444 2 9,808 
6 Secretary III 1 4,283 1 4,995 1 5.177 
7 Stenographer 1 2,712 1 3,453 1 3,.-86 
Less: Turnover Expectancy 
Total 13 
STATE AVIATION COMMISSION 
Development and Regulation of Aeronautics: 
1 Director of Aeronautics 1 
2 Secretary III , 1 
3 Secretary I 1 
4 Additional Clerical Assistance 
Total 3 
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION 
General Administration and Hearings: 
1 Chairman 1 9,001 1 9,000 
2 Commissioner 2 16,001 2 16,000 
3 Executive Secretary, Public Service 
Commission 1 15,004 1 15,004 
4 Assistant Secretary, Public Service 
Commission 1 10,698 1 11,126 
5 General Counsel 1 5,500 1 5,500 
6 Tariff and Eate Analyst 1 9,750 1 9,750 
7 Utility Analyst 1 6,280 
8 Accountant I 1 7,356 1 7,356 
9 Chief Clerk, Public Service Commission.... 1 5,254 1 5,254 
10 Secretary III 2 10,307 2 11,581 
11 Clerk III 1 4,302 1 4,456 
12 Principal Account Clerk I 1 4,295 1 4,106 
13 Secretary I 1 3,770 1 3,932 
14 Report Typist 1 3,688 1 3,828 
15 Stenographer 1 .... 
8,323 
5,052 
3,348 
544 
17,267 
1 
1 
1 
3 
8,656 
5,677 
4,297 
500 
19,130 
1 
1 
1 
3 
8,656 
5,677 
3,786 
500 
18,619 
1 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
9,000 
16,000 
15,004 
12,610 
5,500 
10,429 
6,531 
7,356 
6,230 
11,581 
4,610 
4,706 
4,078 
3,967 
113,173 117,602 
Less: Turnover Expectancy 566 1,176 
Total 16 104,926 16 112,607 16 116,426 
People's Counsel: 
1 People's Counsel 1 7,500 1 7,500 1 7,500 
'V:, Total 1 7,500 1 7,500 1 7,500 
Engineering Investigations: 
1 Chief Engineer, Public Service 
Commission 1 12,610 , 1 12,610 1 14,403 
2 Assistant Chief Engineer, • Public 
Service Commission 1 10,698 1 10,698 1 11,401 
(From separate volume, Personnel 
Detail^ accompanying budget.) ] 
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APPENDIX B 
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
NOTES INDICATING THE VARIATION IN SIZE AND CONTENT OF 
SELECTED BUDGET MESSAGES, 19^3 
Arizona -
Idaho -
Maryland:! -
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APPENDIX B 
SELECTED BUDGET MESSAGES, I965 
Twelve pages. Apart from informing members of the 
legislature that the budget weighs 2 lbs. 1^ ozs., has 
^72 pages, deals with the operational funds for 97 
departments, boards, agencies and divisions, and is 
similar to former budgets except that it is longer, 
this message is devoted almost entirely to stressing the 
need for the establishment of a budget agency, 
previously rejected by the legislature« In effect, the 
governor disclaims responsibility for the budget being 
presented, on the ground that he does not have the 
staff to make a proper assessment of the state's 
financial position or the needs of departments and 
agencies. 
Sixteen pages of text discussing in general terms the 
aims of the executive in each of the major areas of 
state responsibility. The text is followed by tables 
indicating the amount originally requested by each 
department, the amount recommended by the governor, and 
the variations between these sums both in money terms and 
as percentages. 
Seventy-one pages. Indicates the extent to which 
departmental requests for funds exceed the amount 
proiided in the preceding year, and the increase: 
considered justified by the governor. A table is 
Horth Dakota -
Vermont -
- ^ 36 -
presented showing the distribution amongst the 
departments of the suggested total increase. The 
likely revenue position is discussed, with a tabular 
dissection being presented. Suggested staffing increases 
are discussed in detail, as are the needs of the 
individual departments. Seven pages of the message 
are devoted to the proposed capital works programme. 
Twenty-two pages. Devoted almost entirely to the 
likely revenue position. Includes a table dissecting 
revenue, but gives no comparable break-up of projected 
expenditure. The governor points out that the state's 
tax structure is "antiquated" and "has not responded to 
change", but that he does not have adequate staff to 
conduct tax research. Accordingly he recommends the 
establishment of a tax institute within the bureau of 
business research of the university of North Dakota. 
Seventeen pages, bound with the budget papers. 
(Format is such that message is equivalent to 
approximately thirty pages of size commonly used by 
other States.) A "model" budget message in many 
respects. Explains all major items of revenue and 
expenditure. Text is supplemented by tables setting o^ t 
past and anticipated revenues, past and projected 
expenditures, and analysing receipts and expenditures by 
fund, function, and agency. Departmental requests for 
funds are compared with the amounts recommended by the 
- ^ 37 -
governor, and explanations are given of the 
functions of each agency and the programmes by 
which it attempts to accomplish its aims. 
Wisconsin - Twenty-four pages. Discusses major trends and 
indicates suggested reductions in departmental 
requests. Most of the message is devoted to 
discussing the programme approach to the budget, 
adopted for the first time in the accompanying budget. 
- k38 -
APPENDIX C 
SAMPLE PAGES ILLUSTRATING METHODS 
OF SETTING OUT LOAN ESTIMATES 
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APPENDIX C : 
Item 
No. Department and Undertaking. 
Railways : 
I AdditioNH and Imjinivomt^iits In Optnit^d K;iil\viivs 
WESTERN AUSTRALIA 
Estimates of Expenditure for 
Espcoditure, 
I J!J05-«6. 
Eatimate, 
1966-67. 
» $ 
4.205,004 3,356,000 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
Rollingstuck 
f 
203,000 
Kewdale Marshalling Yards and connecting railways, inc^luding land resumption 1,113,847 50,000 
Fremantle-North Fremantle—Now Hivcr Hridgo eonHtriiction and aswieiated 
works, including land resumption 
Cockburn Cement Co. Railway, including land resumption and survey 
Kwinana—Deviation for Alumina Works, Kwinana-.Mundijong-.Iarrahdale Rail-
way, including land resumption and survey 
Industrial spurs Kewdale, including land resumption; 
Industrial Lands (Kwinana) Railway construction 
Standardisation of (iaugc 
Narrow Gauge Works associated with standardisation 
Total 
State ElMtricity Commission: 
Capital 
Total 
PabUc Worlis : 
Bunbury Harbour Works (a) 
Busselton Harbour Works (a) . 
Espcrance Harbour Works (n) 
8,446 6,000 
2,506 
17,733 
.... 
1,905,941 
2,951,771 
15,000 
20,000 
300,000 
200,000 
5,936,000 
1,390,000 
10,205,248 ; 11,478,000 
1,300,000 2,150,000 
1,300,000 I 2,160,000 
348,161 
10,131 
639,345 
262,000 
46,000 
APPENDIX C: 
the Year ending 30th June, 1967. 
- H 1 
Main Items of Expenditure, 10C5-0C. 
WESTERN AUSTRALIA 
-Main Items of Proposed Expenditure, 1966-67. 
Renewals of sleepers and track components ; Minor liridges 
and culverts ; Telephone lines ; Reliallosting part .Midlaiwl 
Railway section—Watheroo-Coorow ; (^impletion i>f re-
placement of flood damaged bridges and renewal of hridge 
at 8m. 52c.. M.R. section ; Automatic signalling metro-
politan area and improved communication and signalling ; 
Septic sewerage ; Lifting facilities ; Station yard and 
siding improvements including grain transference sidings 
West Northam and Midland ; Diversion of Miling Branch 
and new yard Toodyay ; Initial expenditure on new Ad-
ministrative building, Northam ; Station buildings ; 
Depot buildings and works ; 'IVrniinal fa<'iliti<'s at .Midland 
for integrated rail-road service ; .Machinery and plant work-
shop and depots ; Motor vehicles ; Housing improve-
mentf ; Barracks and industrial requirements ; Land re-
sumptions 
leepcr. track, bridge and culvert renewals ; Telephone 
circuits and signal improvements on Midland Railway ; 
Automatic signalling and communications ; Reballasting 
part Watheroo-.N'amgulu and Geraldton-.Xamgulu sec-
tions ; iSeptic sewerage ; Lifting facilities ; Station yard 
and siding improvements and completion of grain trans-
tercnce sidiiigs at V\>»t Northam and Midland ; Cost of 
rc-opening sca.sonal lines ; Station and administrative 
buddings, including continuation of new administrative 
building at Northam ; Depot buiUlings and works ; Com 
mencement nf new road service depot at East Perth ; 
lerminal road-rail facilities nt .Midland ; .Machinery and 
plant workshop and depots ; .Motor vehicles ; Housing 
improvements ; Uurnicks and industrial requirements ; 
Land resumptions. 
j Improvements to locos., including dynamic braking for K 
class and multiple unit controls for J class ; Provision of 
I bulk cement wagon and bauxite hopper wagons, spare 
bogies for A class locos. 
Track formation, survey and engineering, track-laying 
materials, signalling and land resumption. 
Land resumption and clearing up costs for construction and 
relocating. 
Land resumption, clearing up costs, etc. 
Land resumption and clearing up costs. 
State proportion of standard gauge construction costs. 
Yard and sundry minor works. 
Land resumption. 
Land resumption. 
Land resumption. 
Industrial spurs and land resumption. 
Construction costs. 
Stute contribution to standard gauge construction colts. 
Land resumption ; Track formation ; Yard Master's offices 
Leighton and West Northam ; Signalling and interlocking ; 
Tracklaying material; North Fremantle loco, depot; Goods 
Offiiie and amenities ; Footbridges and buildings including 
services and barracks Northam and Merredin area. 
! Land resumption ; Track formation ; Tracklaying ; Signal-
I ling and interlocking ; Buildings, incluc^g services ; 
I .Mine spur at Koolyanobbing ; Footbridges. 
I 
Muja Power Station ; Transmission and distribution lines, 
sub-stations, transformers, switchgear. gas mains phuit 
and equipment. 
Muja Power Station ; Kwinana Power Station ; Transmission 
and distribution Unes, sub stations, transformers, switch-
gear, gas mains, plant and equipment. 
Substantial progress with No. 2 land-backed liertli. 
Provision of new fender system. 
Completion of breakwater, developmental dredging, new berth 
structure together with ancillary installations, and some 
dredging on eastern aide of exis"ting jetty Ui make lierth 
more tenable for tankers. 
Completion of . \o. 2 land-backed berth, minor new works, 
including improvements in supply of electricity to the 
switchyard and a commencement on a solid fill connection 
to the shore. 
Completion of ancillary installations at new berth. 
- kkz -
APPENDIX D 
SAMPLE PAGES ILLUSTRATING METHODS 
OF PRESENTING SUMMARY STATEMENTS 
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APPENDIX D: HEW SOUTH WALES 
AGGREGATE BUDGET STATEMENT 
Page F U N D OR U N D E R T A K I N G 
10 ' Consolidated Revenue Fund 
13 Department of Railways 
15 Metropolitan Transport Services .. 
1^  Newcastle and District Transport Services 
I 
18 [ Maritime Services Board of New South Wales 
Total 
Estimate, 
1965-M 
Actual, 
1964-65 
780,207 (Deficit) ; 2,236,020 (Deficit) 
109,300 (Deficit) 
2,821,000 (Deficit) 
357,000 (Deficit) 
I 
. .| 21,468 (Surplus) 
£ 4,046,039 .. 
88,008 (Surplus) 
2,172,167 (Deficit) 
296,974 (Deficit) 
36,044 (Surplus) 
Deduct— 
Net Adjustment on account of recoupment of debt 
charges by the above Undertakings to the' 
Consolidated Revenue Fund and continbuiions 
from that Fund towards losses of the Undertakings 2,620,100 
4,581,109 
2,046,160 
BUDGET RESULT .. £ _ 1,425,939 (Deficit) 2,534,949 (Deficit) 
E. J. WALDER, 
Under Secretary and Comptroller of Accounts. 
R. W. ASKIN, 
Treasurer. 
The Treasury, New South Wales, 
Sydney, 21st September, 1965. 
APPENDIX D: " "^^^ - VICTORIA 
ESTIMATED REVENUE AND EXPENDITURE FOR THE YEAR 
ENDING 30th JUNE, 1966 
PART I.-DEPARTMENTS AND SERVICES-OTHER THAN 
RAILWAYS 
Revenue-page 2 . . , , , . ,^ ;, 205,293,756 
Expenditure— 
Special Appropriations—pages 7 and 8 .. 68,587,413 
Votes—page 12 .. . . , , . . 136,016!676 
204,604,089 
Surplus .. , , 689,667 
PART II.—RAILWAYS 
Revenue—page 6 . . . , , . . . . . 52,600,000 
Expenditure— 
Special Appropriations—page 103 . . . . 4,683,300 
Votes—page 105 . . . . . , 48,606,367 
53,289,667 
Deficit . . , , 689,667 
TOTAL 
Revenue—page 2 . . ,, . . . . . . 257,893,756 
Expenditure— 
Special Appropriations—pages 7, 8 and 103 73,270,713 
Votes—pages 12 and 105 . . . . ., 184,623,043 
257,893,756 
HENRY E. BOLTE, 
Treasurer. 
Treasury, 
Melbourne, th September, 1965. 
APPENDIX D: , MARYLAND' 
EXHIBIT A 
GENERAL FUND BUDGET SUMMARY 
Fiscal Years 1965 and 1966 
1965 BUDGETARY OPERATIONS 
Estimated Revenues per Exhibit B , $327,462,412 
Deduct: Appropriations per Exhibit C ?344,389,061 
1965 Deficiency Appropriations 2,814,365 $347,203,426 
Less: Estimated Reversions 1,000,000 -846,2X^,426 
Estimated Deficit from 1965 Operations „„. $ 18,741,014 
1966 BUDGETARY OPERATIONS 
Estimated Revenues per Exhibit B 1360496,566 
Deduct: Appropriations per Exhibit C $369,835,532 
Less: Estimated Reversions 1,000,000 368,835,632 
Estimated Deficit from 1966 Operations .„.. $ 8,638,966 
GENERAL FUND SURPLUS SUMMARY 
GENERAL FUND SURPLUS—JULY 1, 1964 $ 37,528,050 
Deduct: Cash Advanced to Departments for Working Funds 
(as of November 30, 1964) 2,023,142 
SURPLUS AVAILABLE FOR BUDGET OPERATIONS—JULY 1, 1964 .... $ 35,504,908 
Deduct: Estimated Deficit from 1965 Operations 18,741,014 
ESTIMATED SURPLUS AVAILABLE FOR BUDGET OPERATIONS-
JULY 1, 1965 $ 16,763,894 
Deduct: Estimated Deficit from 1966 Operations 8,638,966 
ESTIMATED SURPLUS AVAILABLE FOR BUDGET OPERATIONS-
JULY 1, 1966 $ 8,124,928 
IV 
- kkS -
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APPENDIX E 
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
Methods of C l a s s i f y i n g E x p e n d i t u r e i n S t a t e Budget Documents 
A: By Fund . 
B; By Broad Functional Grouping, e.g. Legislative, General Government, 
Conservation and Development of Natural Resources, Welfare, etc. 
0: By Department or Agency. 
D: By Division, Institution, or Major Departmental Activity. 
E: By Programme. 
F: By Major Object of Expenditure, e.g. Personal Services, Current 
Expenses, Capital Outlay, Maintenance, etc. 
G: By Item of Expenditure, e.g. Allowances, Travelling Expenses, 
Stationery, etc. 
Note: Although wording varies from one budget to another it is 
possible to fit the classifications used to the above headings. 
States 
Michigan 
Vermont, West Virginia (2) 
Massachusetts 
California, Delaware, Georgia, Illinois, 
Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Mississippi, 
Montana, Oklahoma, Oregon, Utah (12) 
Ohio, Virginia (2) 
Minnesota, Nebraska, North Carolina, 
North Dakota ik) 
Maine, Wisconsin (2) 
Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho (3) 
Connecticut, Iowa, Texas (3) 
New Hampshire, New Mexico (2) 
Maryland 
Washington 
Primary 
Classi fication 
^^P^  
„ A 
A 
• S, 
B 
j.ra 
1 
S 
1 
1 
1 
B 
B 
Subsidiary 
Classifications 
B, 
B, 
c, 
c, 
c, 
c, 
c, 
c, 
c, 
c, 
G, 
c, 
c, 
c, 
D, 
D, 
D, 
D, 
D 
F 
F, 
G 
D, 
E, 
D 
D, F 
F 
F 
F, G 
G 
G 
F, E 
D, F 
- kkS -
states 
Tennessee 
Louisiana, Nevada (2) 
Missouri, Wyoming (2) 
New Jersey, New York (2) 
Alaska, South Dakota (2) 
Florida 
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island (2) 
Primary 
Classificai 
B 
B 
C 
0 
c 
c 
c 
and 
and 
bion 
C 
C 
Subsidiary 
Classification 
c, 
c, 
D, 
D, 
F 
F, 
E 
D 
D, F 
F 
F, G 
G 
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APPENDIX F 
CANADA 
Provincial Treasury Boards 
Province Act and Year of 
Establishment 
Present 
Composition 
Alberta 
B r i t i s h Columbia 
Manitoba 
New Brunswick 
Newfoundland 
Nova S c o t i a 
Ontar io 
Pr ince Edward 
I s l a n d 
Treasury Department Act , 
S .A. , 1906, c . 5 , s s . 3 1 - ^ 0 . 
Audit Act , S .B .C . , 1913, 
c.5» 
Treasury Act. S.M., 1887, 
C.20, ss.36-45« 
Members of the executive 
council. 
Minister of finance 
(chairman) and three 
other members of the 
ex-ecutive council. 
Three members of the 
executive council. 
An Act to provide for Auditing Minister of finance 
the Public Accounts, S.N.B., (chairman) and four 
1908, C.25. other members of the 
executive council. 
Minister of finance 
may designate officer 
of his department as 
secretary. 
Revenue and Audit Act, 
R.S.N., 1932, C.3I. 
Minister of finance 
(chairman) and from 
three to five other 
members of the executive 
council. Deputy ministez 
of finance ex officio 
secretary. 
No treasury board in existence. 
Provisions outlined in text. 
The Audit Aet, S.P.E.I., 
1930, C.3. 
Provincial treasurer 
(chairman) and three 
members of the 
executive council. 
Deputy provincial 
treasurer ex officio 
secretary. 
- ^51 -
Quebec 
Saskatchewan 
An Act respecting the 
Provincial Auditor, the 
Treasury Board and Public 
Accounts, MiiS-5, 46V.. c.^. 
ss.1^-15. 
The Treasury Department 
Act, S.S., 1907. C.6. 
Minister of finance 
(chairman) and four 
other members of the 
executive council. 
Lieutenant governor 
appoints secretary and 
assistant secretary. 
Provincial treasurer 
(chairman) and not 
less than two or more 
than four other members 
of the executive councilo 
Deputy provincial 
treasurer ex officio 
secretary. 
Remarks 
Alberta. The powers originally granted to the board have been 
strengthened considerably by several amendments to the Treasury 
Department Act, notably S.A., 1928, c.3, s.35(a); 1932, c.56, 
s.45(a); 19^2, C.18, ss.37-^7; and 1955, 0.3^3. 
British Columbia. In general, the board has a less positive role than 
in most other provinces, being in many respects directly 
subordinate to the premier, wh© also holds the portfolio of 
minister of finance. 
Manitoba. Contrary to the trend elsewhere the powers of the 
board have been reduced since its creation, some of its functions 
having passed to the provincial treasurer and to the comptroller 
general. (See particularly the Treasury Act, S.M., 1936, 0.^5.) 
New Brunswick. The powers of the board were very considerably 
strengthened by.the Financial Administration Act, S.N.B., 1961-62, 
C.13, which made/one of the strongest of the provincial treasury 
boards. 
Newfoundlando This board has substantial powers (including almost 
total control over the auditor general and the comptroller) 
which are spelled out in detail in the act which established it. 
Nova Scotia. There is no treasury board in this province and 
financial control is largely in the hands of the provincial 
treasurer, deputy provincial treasurer and auditor general. 
Ontario. A strong treasury board patterned on the federal 
government's board. 
- ^52 -
Prince Edward Island. The role of this treasury board is 
statutorily unclear. Its original powers have been affected 
by later legislation, particularly the Audit Act. R.S.P.E.I,, 
1951, C.15, and the Treasury Act. R.S.P.E.I., 1951, C.165, both 
of which were amended in 196O (R.S.P.E.I., i960, c.2 and c,44), 
but there appears to have been a failure to carry over to the 
new legislation some of the 1930 provisions governing the board's 
composition. 
Quebec. The functions of the board were significantly 
increased by an amendment in 196O-61 (R.S.Q. c.38). 
Saskatchewan. A board with wide powers, further strengthened by 
the extent of the co-ordination that has been developed between 
the board, its subsidiary bodies and the departments. 
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aPPENDIX G 
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
"PROFESSIONAL" BUDGET PERSONNEL BELOW DIRECTOR (1965) 
Agency Classification or Working Title Number of 
Established 
Positions 
Alaska Chief budget and management analyst 
Budget and management analyst 
Budget analyst 
1 
I 
1 
California Assistant director of finance 
Chief ©f the budget division 
Chief budget analyst 
Assistant chief budget analyst 
Principal budget analyst 
Senior budget analyst 
Associate budget analyst 
Assistant budget analyst 
Senior administrative analyst 
Chief financial economist 
Principal financial research technician 
Senior financial research technician 
Assistant financial research technician 
Principal social research technician 
Associate social research technician 
Assistant social research technician 
General accountant 
Agricultural adviser 
Medical fees consultant 
Colorad© Assistant budget director 
Principal administrative analyst 
Senior administrative analyst 
Administrative analyst 
Junior administrative analyst 
1 
1 
1 
k 
1 
10 
16 
13 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
_i 
58 
1 
1 
13 
- k33 " 
Connecticut Assis tant budget d i rec to r 
Accountant-auditor 
Administrative a s s i s t a n t 
Section chief 
Pr inc ipa l examiner 
Associate examiner 
Examiner 
Junior examiner 
Principal analyst 
Associate analyst 
Senior analyst 
Analys t 
Junior analyst 
Fiscal research supervisor 
Note: Excludes staff of 31 engaged in 
data processing. 
1 
3 
1 
2 
6 
6 
2 
5 
1 
if 
5 
3 
2 
_1 
k2 
Delaware Chief accountant 
Office manager 
Agency budgets supervisor 
Educational budgets supervisor 
Staff accountants 
Note: Excludes staff of 5 engaged in 
data processing. 
1 
1 
1 
1 
12 
^k 
Florida Assis tant budget d i rec to r 
Budget examiner 
1 
Georgia Appointment of 5 professional officers is 
proposed. Position classifications have 
not yet been prepared or appointments 
made. 
Hawaii Budget analyst IV 
Budget analyst III 
Budget analyst II 
Budget analyst I 
Budget aid 
Economic research analyst 
k 
4 
3 
Jl 
18 
Idaho Assistant director of the budget 
1 
Illinois 
Indiana 
- 456 -
Budget examiner III 
Budget examiner I 
Budget and fiscal analyst II 
Budget and fiscal analyst I 
Supervisor of research and statistics 
Accountant I 
Deputy director 
Engineer 
Budget examiner 
1 
3 
1 
2 
1 
1 
9 
a 
1 
2 
Iowa Assistant state comptroller 
Administrative analyst 
Budget examiner II 
Accountant 
2 
a 
1 
4 
Note J Excludes staff of 34 engaged in 
data processing, personnel work, 
and routine book-keeping. 
Kansas Principal budget analyst 
Senior budget analyst 
Budget analyst 
Junior budget analyst 
4 
a 
a 
1 
9 
Kentucky Executive assistant 
Principal budget analyst 
Senior budget analyst 
Junior budget analyst 
Louisiana Assistant budget officer 
State accounting co-ordinator 
Budget examiner III 
Budget examiner II 
Budget examiner I 
Accountant V 
Accountant III 
Accountant II 
Accountant I 
Budget research analyst 
1 
a 
1 
i 
1 
1 
3 
4 
a 
1 
1 
1 
1 
16 
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Maine Assistant budget officer 
Budget examiner II 
Budget examiner I 
Management analyst II 
Organization and methods examiner II 
Accountant I 
Maryland Chief of budget bureau 
Supervising budget analyst 
Budget analyst III 
Budget analyst II 
Budget analyst I 
Budget analyst trainee 
Building engineer 
Agriculture adviser 
Accountant I 
1 
2 
2 
1 
1 
1. 
8 
1 
1 
1 
1 
4 
2 
2 
1 
_1 
14 
Massachusetts Deputy budget director 
Assistant to the budget director 
Organization and procedure analyst 
Principal budget examiner 
Senior budget examiner 
Budget examiner 
Head budget clerk 
Michigan Direetor, budget division and assistant 
controller 
Deputy direetor 
Budget examiner IVA 
Budget examiner IV 
Budget examiner III 
Budget examiner II 
Economic analyst IVA 
Statistician II 
Account executive I 
Budget technician III 
Statistical clerk A 
Minnesota Assistant director 
Senior budget analyst 
Budget examiner II 
Budget examiner I 
Budget assistants 
1 
2 
1 
1 
3 
3 
_X 
12. 
1 
1 
4 
a 
3 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
-1 
17 2 
4 
2 
2 
__2 
12 
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Mississippi Accountant and research analyst 
Accountant 
Missouri Assistant budget director 
Analyst I 
Analyst II 
Analyst III 
Research officer 
1 
a 
a 
3 
1 
Montana Assistant to direetor 
Secretary 
Nebraska Budget s t a t i s t i c i an 
Fiscal clerk 
1 
a 
Nevada Deputy budget director 
Principal management analyst 
Management analyst 
New Hampshire Business supervisor 1 
Assistant business supervisor 1 
Direetor, division of accounts 1 
Direetor, division of purchase and property j1 
4 
New Jersey 
New Mexico 
Supervisor, bureau of the budget 
Budget analyst I 
Budget analyst II 
Budget analyst III 
Administrative analyst I 
Engineering analyst 
Senior budget examiner 
Budget examiner 
Budget clerk 
Budget program analyst 
Budget analyst II 
Administrative systems analyst 
Research analyst 
Budget research analyst 
1 
a 
1 
a 
5 
1 
a 
4 
_2 
20 
1 
a 
1 
1 
6 
- ^59 -
New York Deputy director 
Administrative deputy director 
Chief budget examiner 
Assistant chief budget examiner 
Principal budget examiner 
Associate budget examiner 
Senior budget examiner 
Budget examiner 
Junior budget examiner 
Principal civil engineer 
Associate civil engineer 
Senior civil engineer 
Principal architect 
Associate architect 
Principal research analyst 
Associate research analyst 
Senior research analyst 
Research analyst 
Research assistant 
Note: Excludes 2 consultants in data 
processing. 
North Carolina Assistant to budget officer 
Budget analyst III 
Budget analyst II 
Budget analyst I 
Personnel budget analyst 
Administrative officer II 
1 
1 
6 
3 
6 
13 
19 
17 
11 
1 
2 
2 
1 
2 
1 
5 
7 
5 
1 
104 
a 
6 
1 
a 
2 
__i 
14 
North Dakota N i l 
Ohio Assistant chief 
Section supervisor 
Senior analyst 
Analyst 
Assistant analyst 
Junior analyst 
1 
5 
3 
9 
4 
27 
Oklahoma Principal budget analyst 
Budget analyst I 
Budget analyst II 
Comptroller 
Senior accountant 
Accountant 
Note: Excludes staff of 11 engaged in 
data processing. 
1 
2 
1 
1 
1 
a 
8 
Ore gon 
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Assistant administrator 
Management analyst IV 
Management analyst III 
Management analyst II 
Management analyst I 
Real estate supervisor 
Economist 
Accountant 
Construction analyst (architect) 
Administrative assistant 
Accounts executive II 
Accounts executive I 
Note: Excludes staff of 4 engaged in 
data processing* 
Pennsylvania Assistant budget secretary 
Administrative officer II 
Administrative assistant I 
Budget examiner V 
Budget examiner III 
Budget examiner II 
Budget examiner I 
Management trainee 
Rhode Island Deputy budget officer 
Consultant engineer 
Budget examiner 
Assistant budget examiner 
Principal administrative analyst 
Senior administrative analyst 
Administrative analyst 
a 
4 
3 
3 
3 
1 
1 
1 
2 
1 
1 
1 
2f 
1 
2 
3 
3 
3 
2 
2 
_S 
21 
1 
1 
5 
2 
1 
4 
-I 
17 
South Dakota Senior budget and management analyst 
Tennessee Chief of budgets 
Senior budget analyst 
Junior budget analyst 
1 
a^ 
1 
Texas Chief examiner 
Budget exajminer III 
Budget examiner II 
Budget examiner I 
Accountant 
1 
1 
a 
a 
1 
f 
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Utah 
Vermont 
Virginia 
Account examiner 
Assistant director 
Budget and management analyst A 
Budget and management analyst B 
1 
1 
1 
1 
I 
5 
Assistant director of the budget 1 
Budget administrative officer 1 
State budget analyst 1 
Architectural and engineering assistant 1 
Statistician B 1 
Washington Chief budget analyst 
Chief accounting analyst 
Budget analyst III 
Accounting analyst III 
Budget analyst II 
Accounting analyst II 
Budget analyst I 
Accounting analyst I 
Note: Excludes staff of 13 engaged in 
data processing. 
West Virginia Assistant budget director 
Assistant division director 
Budget analyst 
Wisconsin Supervisor of budget and accounts 
Supervisor of budget analysis 
Administrative analyst III 
Administrative analyst II 
Administrative analyst I 
Account examiner 
1 
1 
5 
a 
3 
4 
3 
ai 
1 
1 
7 
1 
1 
3 
a 
5 
_1 
13 
Nil 
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APPENDIX H 
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
Authority Legally Responsible for Badget Preparation (1965) 
State 
Alaska, California, Colorado, 
Georgia, Hawaii, Iowa, Kansas, 
Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, Michigan, 
Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, 
Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, 
New Jersey, New Mexico, New Y©rk, 
Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, 
Rhode Island, South Dakota, 
Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, 
Virginia, Washington, 
Wyoming. (32) 
Delaware 
Idaho 
Authority 
Governor 
Governor, with advice of Budget 
Commission (Governor, Secretary 
of State, Auditor of Accounts, 
State Treasurer, and State Tax 
Commissioner.) 
Governor, with advice of 
Legislative Budget Committee. 
Illinois Governor, with advice of Budgetary 
Commission. (Twelve members of the 
legislature.) 
North Carolina Governor, with advice of Budget 
Advisory Commission. 
Louisiana Governor, with some formal 
authority in hands of Legislative 
Budgetary Commission. 
Texas Governor and Legislative Budget 
Board. 
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Florida State Budget Commission. 
(Governor, Secretary of State, 
Controller, State Treasurer, 
Attorney-General, Commissioner 
of Agriculture, and State 
Superintendent of Public 
Instruction.) 
Mississippi Commission of Budgeting and 
Accounting. (Governor, President 
pro tem of the Senate, Chairman 
of the Senate Finance Committee, 
Chairmen of the House Ways and 
Means and Appropriations 
Committees.) 
West Virginia 
Indiana 
Ohio 
Board of Public Works. (Governor, 
Secretary of State, Auditor, 
Treasurer, Commissioner of 
Agriculture, Attorney-General, 
and State Superintendent of Free 
Schools.) 
Wisconsin 
Budget Coiamittee. (Budget 
Director and four members of the 
l e g i s l a t u r e . ) 
Department of Fineince. (Governor's 
au thor i ty i s to "communicate...by 
message to the General Assembly, 
the measures as he s h a l l deem 
expedient". Ohio Const i tut ion, 
Ar t ic le I I I , Section 7.) 
Department of Administration. 
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APPENDIX I 
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
Authority Legally Responsible for Budget Execution (1965) 
State 
Alaska, Colorado, Delaware, 
Georgia, Hawaii, Iowa, 
Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, Minnesota, 
Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, 
New Jersey, New York, North 
Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, 
South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, 
Washington, Wyoming. (24) 
Authority 
Governor 
Illinois Governor for agencies placed 
directly under his control. 
Other agencies responsible for 
execution of own budgets under 
general direction of Budget 
Division. 
Louisiana Governor. (Appeals against 
Governor's decisions may be 
made by any agency to Budget 
Appeals Commission consisting of 
Lieutenant Governor, Speaker of 
the House and Chairmen of the 
Senate Finance and House 
Appropiations Committees.) 
Michigan 
New Mexico, Rhode Island, Virginia 
(3) 
Governor iv (Allotments to agencies 
must be approved by State 
Administrative Board consisting of 
Governor, Lieutenant Governor, 
Attorney-General, Secretary of 
State, State Treasurer, Auditor 
General, State Highway Commissioner, 
and Superintendent of Public 
Instruction.) 
Governor and Budget Director 
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Vermont, Wisconsin (2) 
O^o , California (2) 
Indiana 
Department of Administration. 
Department of ELnance 
Budget Agency, 
Pennsylvania Budget Bureau and the several 
departments and agencies. 
Nevada Governor and State Board of 
Examiners. (Governor, Secretary 
of State, and Attorney-General.) 
New Hampshire Governor and Council. (Five 
members, directly elected 
biennially to advise Governor* 
Constitution, Article 60.) 
Texas Governor and Legislative Budget 
Board. (Lieutenant Governor, 
Speaker of the House, four 
Senators and four Representatives.) 
Idaho State Board of Examiners. 
(Governor, Secretary of State, 
Attorney-General, and State 
Auditor.) 
Mississippi 
West Virginia 
Kansas 
Commission of Budgeting and 
Accounting. (Governor, President 
pro tem of Senate, Chairman of 
Senate Finance Committee, and 
Chairmen of House Ways and Means 
and Appropriations Committees.) 
Board of Public Works. (Governor, 
Secretary of State, Auditor, 
Treasurer, Commissioner of 
Agriculture, Attorney-General, and 
State Superintendent of Free 
Schools.) 
Budget Director and Finance Council. 
(Governor, Lieutenant Governor, 
President pro tem of Senate, Speaker 
of House, Chairmen of Senate and 
House Ways and Means Committees, 
with Director of Department of 
Administration as non-voting 
secretary.) 
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Florida State Budget Commission. 
(Governor, Secretary of State, 
Controller, State Treasurer, 
Attorney-General, Commissioner 
of Agriculture, and State 
Superintendent of Public Instruction.) 
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APPENDIX J 
Alaska 
C a l i f o r n i a 
Colorado 
Connecticut 
Delaware 
Florida 
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
State Budget Director or Equivalent 
Appointed by Responsible to 
Commissioner of 
Administration 
Commissioner of 
Adrainis tration 
Governor Governor 
Governor Governor 
Tenure 
Commissioner's 
pleasure 
Governor's 
pleasure 
Civil Service 
Commissioner of Commissioner of Civil Service 
Finance and Control Finance and Control 
(with Governor's (in turn responsible 
approval) to Governor) 
Governor Governor Governor's 
pleasure 
Governor (with 
confirmation by 
State Budget 
Commission) 
State Budget 
Commission 
State Budget 
Commission's 
pleasure 
Georgia Governor Governor Governor's 
pleasure 
Hawaii Director of 
Department of 
Budget and Review 
Direetor of 
Department of 
Budget and Review 
Civil Service 
Idaho Governor Governor Governor's 
pleasure 
I l l i n o i s Govern6Sr(with 
consent of Senate) 
Director of 
Finance 
Biennial term 
(may be removed 
by Governor) 
Indiana Governor Governor Governor's 
pleasure 
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Iowa 
Kansas 
Kentucky 
Louisiana 
Governor 
Executive Director 
of Department of 
Adminis tration 
Commissioner of 
Finance 
Commissioner of 
Administration 
Governor Governor's 
pleasure 
Executive Director 
of Department of 
Administration (in 
turn responsible to 
Governor) 
Civil Service 
Commissioner of 
Finance (in turn 
responsible to 
Governor) 
Commissioner's 
pleasure 
Commissioner of 
Adminis tration 
(in turn responsible 
to Governor) 
Civil Service 
Maine Commissioner of 
Finance and 
Adminis tration 
Commissioner of 
Finance and 
Adminis tration 
(in turn responsible 
to Governor) 
Commissioner's 
pleasure 
Maryland Governor Governor Governor's 
pleasure 
Massachusetts Commissioner of 
Administration 
Commissioner of 
Administration 
Civil Service 
Michigan Governor Controller of 
Administration 
(in turn 
responsible to 
Governor) 
Civil Service 
Minnesota Commissioner of 
Administration 
Commissioner of 
Adminis tration 
(in turn 
responsible to 
Governor) 
Civil Service 
Mississippi Commission of Budget Elected members of Commission's 
and Accounting (an Commission of pleasure 
elected body of Budget and 
which the Budget Accounting 
Director is 
chairman) 
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Missouri 
Montana 
Governor 
Governor 
Nebraska Governor 
Governor 
Governor 
Governor 
Governor's 
pleasure 
Governor's 
pleasure 
Six-year term 
after 
confirmation by 
Legislature 
Nevada Governor Governor Governor's 
pleasure 
New Hampshire Governor and 
Council 
Governor Pleasure of 
Governor and 
Council 
New Jersey 
New Mexico 
New York 
North 
Carolina 
North Dakota 
Ohio 
Oklahoma 
Governor 
Director of 
Department of 
Finance and 
Adminis tration 
(with Governor's 
consent) 
Governor 
Director of 
Adminis tration 
(with Governor's 
approval) 
Governor 
Director of 
Finance 
Governor 
Governor and 
State Treasurer 
Director of 
Department of 
Finance and 
Administration 
Governor 
Director of 
Adminis tra tion 
Governor 
Director of 
Finance (in 
turn responsible 
to Governor) 
During term of 
office of 
Governor who 
appointed him 
Pleasure of 
Director and 
Governor 
Governor's 
pleasure 
Director's 
pleasure 
Governor's 
pleasure 
Director's 
pleasure 
Governor Governor's 
pleasure 
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Oregon 
Rhode Island 
South Dakota 
Tennessee 
Texas 
Director of 
Finance and 
Administration 
Pennsylvania Governor 
Direetor of 
Adminis tration 
(wi th Governor's 
approval) 
Director of 
Finance and 
Adminis tration 
(in turn 
responsible to 
Governor) 
Governor and 
Secretary of 
Adminis tration 
Director of 
Adminis tration 
(in turn 
responsible to 
Governor) 
Governor (with 
advice and consent 
of Senate) 
Governor 
Governor Governor 
Governor Governor 
Director*s 
pleasure 
Governor's 
pleasure 
Civil Service 
Four-year term 
(removable "for 
cause" by 
Governor) 
Governor's 
pleasure 
Governor's 
pleasure 
Utah Finance Commission Finance Commission Finance 
Commission's 
p l easu re 
Vermont Governor (with 
advice and consent 
of Sena te ) 
Commissioner of 
Adminis t r a t i o n 
Two-year term 
(removable by 
Governor) 
Vi rg in ia Governor Governor Governor 's 
p l ea su re 
Washington Governor (wi th 
consent of Sena te ) 
Governor Governor's 
pleasure 
West Virginia Governor (with 
advice and consent 
of Senate) 
Governor and 
Board of Public 
Works 
Governor's 
pleasure 
Wisconsin Commissioner of 
Administration 
Commissioner of 
Adminis tration 
Civil Service 
Wyoming Governor Governor Governor's 
pleasure 
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APPENDIX K 
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
Minimum Qualifications Required for Appointment as State Budget 
___«______________^ Director or Equivalent 
California; Delaware; Georgia; 
Idaho; Illinois; Iowa; Maryland; 
Missouri; Montana; Nebraska; New 
Hampshire; New Jersey; New York; 
North Dakota; Pennsylvania; Vermont; 
Virginia; Washington; West Virginia; 
Wyoming. (20) 
At the discretion of the 
governor. 
North Carolina At the discretion of the 
director of administration, 
subject to the approval of 
the governor. 
Maine; Minnesota; Ohio. (3) At the discretion of the 
director of finance or 
administration or equivalent, 
Florida Adequate education, training 
and experience in public 
finance. 
Indiana Adequate capacity and training. 
Massachusetts Ability and extended experience 
in the type of work performed 
by the budget bureau. 
Oklahoma Adequate knowledge of and 
experience in governmental 
fiscal management. 
Oregon 
4# 
Adequate technical training 
and experience. 
Tennessee Training and experience in 
governmental or business 
budgeting, accounting or 
fiscal control. 
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Alaska 
Connecticut 
Nine years' experience in 
budget analysis, including 
four years in supervisory 
posts. 
Twelve years' experience in 
budget and management planning 
and control, including six 
years in public supervisory 
positions. 
OR 
Nevada 
Graduate training and six 
years' experience in budget 
and management planning and 
control. 
Formal education necessary for 
the position. 
Four years' experience in 
accounting, budget administrat-
ion or governmental research. 
Texas Six t© ten years' experience in 
fiscal management and budget 
preparation. 
South Dakota College degree. 
Mississippi Training in accounting. 
Previous experience in 
governmental administration. 
New Mexico Skill in accounting and 
auditing. Familiarity with 
the operations of educational 
and other state institutions, 
and with budgets and finance. 
Colorado Master's degree in public 
administration, economics, 
finance or a related field. 
Seven years' experience in 
organization and management, 
budget analysis and preparation, 
or similar work. 
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Hawaii 
Kansas 
College degree in 
administration. 
Eight years' administrative 
experience, including six 
years of work concerned with 
organizational analysis, of 
which three years must have 
been in a supervisory 
capacity in budget analysis. 
College degree, with 
specialization in accounting, 
public finance or publie 
administration. 
Four years' experience in 
budget analysis. 
Kentucky Bachelor's degree in 
political science, publie 
administration, or a related 
field. 
Seven years' increasingly 
responsible experience in 
public budgetary administrat-
ion, including four years in 
a supervisory capacity. 
Louisiana Certified public accountant. 
Six years' experience in 
accounting, including three 
years in a supervisory 
capacity. 
OR 
Bachelor's degree with major 
in accounting, business 
administration, or a related 
field. 
Eight years' experience in 
accounting, including three 
years in a supervisory 
capacity. 
Note: The required experience 
is reduced by one year for the 
holder of a master's degree 
and by two years for the 
holder of a doctorate. 
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Michigan 
Rhode Island 
College degree, preferably 
with a major in political 
science or public 
administration. 
Five years' experience at 
the level of senior analyst. 
College training in 
accountancy or public 
administration. 
Knowledge of governmental 
accounting, budgetary control 
and administration. 
Extended experience in a 
responsible administrative 
capacity. 
Utah Four years of college 
education or its equivalent. 
Extensive experience in publie 
accounting. 
Wisconsin College degree, preferably in 
business administration or 
public administration. 
Eight years' administrative 
experience in budget or 
management analysis. 
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THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
Minimum Qualifications Required for Initial Appointment as Budget 
Analyst 
S - B.A. l e v e l 
m - M.A. l e v e l 
CPA - C e r t i f i e d Publ ic Accountant 
S t a t e 
Alaska 
Usual or Required 
Q u a l i f i c a t i o n s 
Expressed Preference 
M 
California B 
Colorado 
Connecticut 
M Liberal arts. 
(B if supported by experience) Administration. Economics, 
Previous experience 
important. 
B 
Delaware Business administration. 
Accounting. Economics, 
Florida B or CPA Economics. Publie 
administration. Previous 
experience important. 
Georgian 
Hawaii 
Idaho 
Illinois 
B 
B 
Public administration. 
Business administration. 
Sociology, 
Public administration. 
Economics. Statistics. 
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Indiana B 
Iowa 
Ksuisas m 
Accounting. 
Administration. 
(Particularly the first.) 
Liberal arts. Public 
administration. Political 
science. Previous 
experience important* 
Kentucky 
(B in some circumstances) 
Public administration. 
Liberal arts. 
Louisiana B or CPA 
Maine 
Accounting. 
Public administration. 
Business administration. 
Public finance. Previous 
experience important. 
Mary Ian €& M 
(B in business or public 
administration in somee 
circumstances) 
Massachusetts Academic backgromnd, in 
accounting or business 
administration. 
Michigan B Liberal arts. Public 
administration. Previous 
experience important. 
Minnesota B Public administration. 
Business administration. 
Experience in management 
or accounting. 
Mississippi 
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Missouri B 
Montana B 
Political science. 
Public administration. 
Business administration. 
Economics. Accounting, 
Business administration. 
Accounting. 
Nebraska B 
Nevada 
Business administratien. 
Accounting, 
New Hampshire Business administration. 
New Jersey 6 Business adminis t ra t ion . 
Public adminis t ra t ion. 
Economicso Accounting, 
Engineering. Previous 
experience important. 
New Mexico B Business administration. 
Statistics, (Would 
consider economics, 
political science or 
psychology.) 
New York B 
(M if entering through 
internship programme) 
Liberal arts. 
Engineering or 
architecture sometimes 
sought. (Administration, 
government, economics or 
public finance for 
interns.) 
North Carolina B Experience required, 
preferably in functional 
areas such as education, 
agriculture or 
highways, 
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North Dakota 
Ohio i Public administration. 
Business administration. 
Economics. Political 
science. Previous 
experience important. 
Oklahoma B 
Oregon B Public administration. 
Previous experience 
important. 
Pennsylvania B M preferred. 
Public administrat ion, 
Previous experience 
important. 
Rhode Is land B Political science. 
Public administration. 
South Dakota Recruitment procedures 
not yet developed. Intend 
to recruit at M level. 
Tennessee M Public administration. 
Business administration. 
Texas B Public administration. 
Business administrationo 
Previous experience 
important. 
Utah B Accounting. Business 
administration. 
Vermont B Public adminis t ra t ion . 
Virginia 
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Washington B Public administration. 
Business administration. 
West Virginia 
Wisconsin M Public administration< 
Political science. 
Wyoming No professional staff below agency head. 
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Transfer of Budget Analysts to and from Administrative Posts in 
the Operating Agencies 
Occurrence of Transfer 
to Budget Agency 
Occurrence of Transfer 
from Budget Agency 
Alaska 
California 
Colorado 
Connecticut 
Delaware 
Florida 
Georgia 
Hawaii 
Idaho 
Illinois 
Indiana 
Iowa 
Kansas 
Kentucky 
Louisiana 
Maine 
Maryland 
Massachusetts 
Michigan 
Minnesota 
Mississippi 
Missouri 
Montana 
Nebraska 
Nevada 
New Hampshire 
New Jersey 
None 
Rare 
Frequent 
Occasional 
None 
Frequent 
N.A. 
None 
N.A. 
Occasional 
Occasional 
Frequent - "to achieve 
staff improvement" 
Occasiond.3;~ 
increasing 
None 
Rare 
frequency 
Normal source of reciniits 
Occasional 
Frequent 
Occasional 
Frequent 
None 
Occasional 
N.A. 
None 
None 
Frequent 
Occasional 
None 
Frequent - "considered 
natural" 
Frequent 
Frequent 
None 
Frequent 
N.£. 
None 
N.A. 
Frequent 
Frequent 
None 
Occasional - frequency 
increasing 
Frequent 
Frequent 
Frequent 
Rare 
Rare 
Frequent 
Occasional 
None 
None 
N.A. 
None 
None 
Occasional 
None 
New Mexico 
New York 
North Carolina 
North Dakota 
Ohio 
Oklahoma 
Oregon 
Pennsylvania 
Rhode Island 
South Dakota 
Tennessee 
Texas 
Utah 
Vermont 
Virginia 
Washington 
West Virginia 
Wisconsin 
Wyoming 
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Occasional 
Frequent 
None 
N.A. 
Rare 
None 
None 
None 
Occasional 
None 
None 
Occasional 
N.A. 
Occasional 
Occasional 
Frequent 
None 
None 
N.A. 
Occasional 
Frequent 
Rare 
N.A. 
Occasional 
None 
Occasional 
Occasional 
Occasional 
None 
None 
Occasional 
N.A. 
None 
None 
Infrequent - but 
"considered 
desirable" 
Occasional 
Occasional 
N.A. 
Notes: 1. "None" may imply that occasion for transfer has not yet 
arisen. 
2. "N.A." has been used where agencies are too small for 
transfers to be feasible. 
3. Only one State, Michigan, indicates that it has any formal 
policy on transfer of analysts to operating agencies, 
stating that this is "to some extent a deliberate policy". 
4. Eight agencies frame their replies, however, in such a way 
as to suggest the existence of a policy decision. Seven 
of these - Delaware, Kentucky, North Caroiina, Oklahoma, 
Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and Wyoming - state that budget 
analysts are not recruited from other agencies. One -
Virginia - indicates that analysts are not transferred to 
other agencies. 
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AUSTRALIA 
State Public Service Classification Stmactures (January, 1967) 
New South Wales 
Automatic Scale 
for Adult Clerks 
(Administrative and Clerical Division) 
Class A 
Class B 
0 
2242 
2352 
2462 
2572 
2682 
2812 
2962 
3112 
3262 
Grade 1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
Queensland 
0 
3383 
3623 
3893 
4163 
4663 
5033 
5^03 
5773 
6143 
6513 
6883 
7263 
7683 
8123 
0 
3503 
37if3 
4013 
4283 
4833 
5203 
5573 
39^3 
6313 
6683 
7063 
7^^3 
7883 
8323 
(Note: Deputy Heads, 
Permanent 
Heads, etc. 
on higher 
salaries.) 
Automatic Scale 
for Adult Clerks 
Classifications Flat Salaries 
0 0 0 
2242 3066 3206 
2352 
2452 
2552 
2652 
2752 
2852 
2952 
3052 
3152 
3252 
3352 
3^52 
0 
33^6 
3716 
4016 
4316 
4616 
4916 
5216 
55.16 
5816 
6116 
6416 
6716 
7016 
7316 
7616 
7916 
8216 
8516 
8816 
9116 
9416 
9716 
0 
3486 
3821 
4121 
4421 
4721 
5021 
5321 
5621 
5921 
6221 
6521 
6821 
7121 
7^ 21 
7721 
8021 
8321 
8621 
8921 
9221 
9521 
9821 
0 
3626 
3926 
4226 
4526 
4826 
5126 
5426 
5726 
6026 
6326 
6626 
6926 
7226 
7526 
7826 
8126 
8426 
8726 
9026 
9326 
9626 
9926 
0 
10226 
10526 
10826 
11076 
11326 
(Note: Certain 
Permanent 
Heads, etc, 
on higher 
salaries.) 
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Vic t o r i a 
Automatic 
for Adult 
Class D 
Automatic 
for Adult 
Scale 
Clerks 
0 
2520 
2625 
2755 
2839 
29^8 
3026 
3110 
3209 
3303 
Scale 
Clerks 
0 
2104 
2214 
2324 
2444 
2564 
2684 
2804 
2924 
3044 
(Administrative 
Class C 
C1 
C2 
. B 
B1 
A 
(Note: 
• 
South . 
Class 1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
Western 
$ 
3209 
Permane 
higher 
0 
3303 
3879 
4494 
5108 
5786 
6605 
Division 
3407 
4022 
4637 
5252 
5970 
6790 
mt Heads, etc. 
salari 
Aus tralia 
0 
2924 
319^ 
0 
3044 
33^^ 
3644 
3964 
4284 
4624 
4964 
5304 
5644 
6004 
Australia 
es.) 
0 
319^ 
3494 
3804 
4124 
4454 
4794 
5134 
5474 
5824 
6i84 
6364 
66o4 
693^ 
725^ 
0 
0 
3510 
4165 
4780 
5396 
6154 
6975 
on 
0 
33^4 
3644 
3964 
4284 
4624 
4964 
5304 
5644 
6oo4 
6364 
66o4 
693^ 
725^ 
7604 
0 
Class Al 7282 
7589 
7897 
8204 
851a 
8819 
9332 
9844 
(Note:Permanent 
Heads, etc, 
on higher 
salaries.) 
Automatic Scale 
for Adult Clerks (Administrative Division) 
Group IV 
0 
2341 
2427 
2511 
2617 
2723 
2829 
2945 
0 0 0 0 
Group II 1 3075 3205 Group I 1 
2 3335 3^65 2 
3 3605 37^5 3 
4 3885 ^025 ^ 
5 4175 ^325 5 
6 4475 4625 6 
7 4775 4925 5075 7 
8 5235 5395 8 
9 5565 5735 
10 5905 6075 
11 6245 6415 
6705 Special 1 f280 
6995 Class 2 962Q/ 
7305 3 10060 
7625 4 10500 
79^5 5. 109^0 
8265 6 11380 
8595 7 11730 
8925 8 1208® 
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Automatic 
for Adult 
Class XIV 
Scale 
Clerks 
0 
2387 
2525 
2663 
2801 
2939 
3077 
3215 
Class 
(Note 
XIII 
XII 
XI 
X 
IX 
VIII 
VII 
VI 
V 
IV 
III 
Tasmania 
(Administrative and 
0 
3329 
4475 
4865 
5255 
5645 
: Permanent 
0 
3^67 
3719 
3971 
4223 
46i3 
5003 
5393 
5783 
6035 
6317 
6599 
Heads, 
higher salaries. 
0 
3605 
3857 
4l09 
4361 
4751 
51^1 
5531 
5921 
6173 
6455 
6737 
etc., 
) 
Clerical 
Class II 
Class I 
on 
Officers) 
Grade 4 
3 
2 
1 
Grade 3 
2 
1 
0 
7007 
7280 
7553 
7826 
8216 
8525 
8834 
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Salaries of Budget Directors (1965) 
State 
Alaska 
California 
Colorado 
Connecticut 
Delaware 
Florida 
Georgia 
Hawaii 
Idaho 
Illinois 
Indiana 
Iowa 
Kansas 
Kentucky 
Louisiana 
Maine 
Marylaad 
Massachusetts 
Michigan 
Minnesota 
Mississippi 
Missouri 
Montana 
Salary 
14,300 -
30, 
11,700 -
11,200 -
10, 
18, 
12,200 -
9, 
14. 
13,000 -
13, 
9,000 -
10,900 -
11,900 -
11, 
23, 
12,000 -
16,300 -
11,400 -
12, 
12, 
10, 
17,200 
300 
15,000 
15,700 
500 
000 
000 
14,800 
600 
500 
17,000 
000 
12,600 
13,200 
14,300 
200 
400 
15,100 
19,800 
13,300 
200 
000 
000 
State 
Nebraska 
Nevada 
New Hampshire 
New Jersey 
New Mexico 
New York 
North Carolina 
North Dakota 
Ohio 
Oklahoma 
Oregon 
Pennsylvania 
Rhode Island 
South Dakota 
Tennessee 
Texas 
Utah 
Vermont 
Virginia 
Washington 
West Virginia 
Wisconsin 
Wyoming 
Salary 
0 
12 
15 
11,500 
19 
11 
28 
13 
12 
11,300 
13 
11,900 
18 
11,600 
10 
12 
15 
9,000 
12 
17 
15 
10 
12,300 
10 
,500 
,100 
- 13,100 
,000 
,000 
,900 
,200 
,000 
- 15,800 
,200 
- 13,300 
,500 
- 13,400 
,500 
,500 
,000 
- 12,000 
,500 
,000 
,000 
,000 
- 16,000 
,000 
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Colorado; 
(Junior Analyst) 
(Analyst) 
(Senior Analyst) 
(Principal Analyst) 
(Assistant Budget 
Director) 
APPENDIX P 
: Civil 
Grade 
1 
a 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
f 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
Service Clasi sification 
Five-Step 
Salary Range 
2150 
2260 
2370 
2490 
2610 
2740 
2880 
3020 
3170 
3330 
3500 
3670 
3860 
4050 
4250 
4470 
4690 
4920 
5170 
5430 
5700 
5980 
6280 
6600 
6930 
7270 
7640 
8020 
8420 
8840 
9280 
0 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
— 
-
— 
-
-
— 
-
-
2740 
2880 
3020 
3170 
3330 
3500 
3670 
3860 
4050 
4250 
4470 
4690 
4920 
5170 
5430 
5700 
5980 
6280 
6600 
6930 
7270 
7640 
8020 
8420 
8840 
9280 
9750 
10230 
10750 
11280 
11850 
(1965) 
"Longevity" Step 
0 
2880 
3020 
3170 
3330 
3500 
3670 
3860 
4050 
4250 
4470 
4690 
4920 
5170 
5430 
5700 
5980 
6280 
6600 
6930 
7270 
7640 
8020 
8420 
8840 
9280 
9750 
10230 
10750 
11280 
11850 
12440 
- 496 -
(Budget Director) 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
9750 -
10230 -
10f50 -
11280 -
11850 -
12440 -
13060 -
13720 -
12440 
13060 
13720 
14440 
15120 
15880 
16670 
17500 
13060 
13720 
14400 
15120 
15880 
16670 
17500 
18370 
Notes: (a) In grades 1-11 the increase to the second step in the 
salary range may be granted after six months' service. 
(b) Other increments in each range occur annually, except the 
last which is only granted after twelve months on the 
level below if the employee has a service rating of "very 
good"; otherwise two years on the level below is required. 
(c) The "longevity" step is given for above average performance 
of five years at the maximum salary of the grade. 
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